Schlaglicht Nummer 20/24, Aktuelles aus israelischen Zeitungen, 15. – 30. November 2024

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Die Themen dieser Ausgabe:

1. Internationaler Strafgerichtshof erlässt Haftbefehle gegen Netanyahu und Gallant
2. Einigung über Waffenstillstand mit der Hizbollah
3. Trumps Wahlsieg
4. Weitere Themen

1. Internationaler Strafgerichtshof erlässt Haftbefehle gegen Netanyahu und Gallant

Für Empörung bei der israelischen Regierung wie auch in Teilen der Opposition sorgte der Haftbefehl, den der Internationale Strafgerichtshof in Den Haag gegen Premierminister Benjamin Netanyahu und Ex-Verteidigungsminister Yoav Gallant erlassen hat. Das Gericht legt dem Erlass den begründeten Verdacht für mutmaßliche Kriegsverbrechen zugrunde. Bereits im Mai hatte Chefankläger Karim Khan den Antrag gestellt, gegen den israelischen Premierminister, den israelischen Verteidigungsminister sowie mehrere führende Köpfe der Hamas Haftbefehle zu erlassen. Aktuell steht nur noch der unter dem Namen Mohammed Deif bekannte Militärchef der Terrororganisation auf der Liste, der aber laut Informationen der israelischen Armee bei einem Luftangriff im vergangenen Juli zu Tode kam. Netanyahu nannte die Entscheidung des Gerichts „antisemitisch“. Der rechtsextreme Minister für Nationale Sicherheit, Itamar Ben-Gvir, forderte dazu auf, in Reaktion auf die Haftbefehle nun das Westjordanland zu annektieren.

Stop Calling the ICC Antisemitic: 4 Better Ways to Respond Instead

(…) But calling the judges antisemites is not a good plan. The reality is that the vast destruction and suffering in Gaza raises legitimate questions. With all the worldwide outcry, the ICC prosecutor would be remiss if he didn’t investigate. (…) there is no reason to believe that the judges didn’t give serious consideration to the weighty legal and factual issues at hand. (…) There has never been a war without war crimes, and there’s no reason to expect or believe this would be the first. As Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi correctly noted, if the ICC had existed during World War II it would likely have issued arrest warrants against Churchill and Roosevelt in addition to Hitler. The leaders of any other country that had been brutally attacked, had its citizens taken hostage, and thereby been dragged into a war would undoubtedly have wound up in this same situation. (…) These ICC indictments are hardly a badge of honor, and they raise serious questions about the war that deserve inquiry and answers. But it’s wrong to say that this shows Israel’s conduct in Gaza is somehow uniquely condemnable or worse than other countries. While inappropriate with regard to the ICC judges, should these indictments be used in attempts to uniquely stigmatize Israel or claim that Israel shouldn’t exist as a state, accusations of antisemitism may then be called for.

Shlomo Levin, TOI, 21.11.24

Starvation, Murder, Persecution: ICC Warrants Are an Unprecedented Moral Nadir for Israel

(…) Israel's diplomatic and legal battle to prevent the arrest warrants, which began as soon as the prosecutor requested that they be issued, has failed. Khan wasn't even deterred by the sexual harassment allegations against him. The Israeli legal system, military and civilian alike, didn't do anything to investigate these grave suspicions, while the government refrained from setting up a state commission of inquiry that could have probed the prosecutor's allegations. Any such investigation is politically unfeasible in Israel. (…) Netanyahu hopes U.S. President-elect Donald Trump will rescue him from this trouble with the help of sanctions on the ICC, its judges and its prosecutors. In the meantime, Netanyahu, like Gallant, will have to stay out of countries that would honor the arrest warrants, like France and Ireland. But Israel's problem, and that of every Israeli, isn't whether the prime minister and his ousted rival have the ability to travel freely. Rather, it's the horrific actions of its government and its army, as described by this international legal institution. These are actions to which most of the Israeli public is indifferent and hardhearted. (…) The fact that Hamas itself has committed horrific war crimes against Israelis and refuses to surrender and release the hostages, does not justify the mass killing, deportation and destruction that Israel has inflicted on the Gaza Strip. One might have hoped the ICC's announcement would raise pointed questions in Israel about the morality of the ongoing war in Gaza. Unfortunately, both the government and public opinion, with the support of most of the media, are refusing to listen. (…)

Editorial, HAA, 22.11.24

ICC risks its credible reputation with warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant

(…) the day the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued arrest warrants for alleged war crimes against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant – will go down as the day that led to the demise of the ICC itself. (…) this decision will be seen by reasonable people around the world (…) as a farce, a joke, a miscarriage of justice. The authority of courts, all courts, rests in the degree of credibility it has in the eyes of those it is meant to serve. (…) Just as the effectiveness and stature of the United Nations began to decline when Israel’s enemies turned it into a bludgeon with which to bash the Jewish State, so too will the ICC lose any relevance as a result of turning democratic Israel into a war criminal for fighting a just war for its survival. The kind of war Israel is fighting in Gaza – against a terrorist organization for which the norms of civilization have no meaning – is not covered in international law. The laws of nations are those that deal with war between states who act in accordance with the same law. It is not the same as the situation Israel is in, where one side is a state bound by international law and the other side is a terrorist army hiding behind civilians and intentionally drawing fire toward civilians as a tactic of war. (…) That the court is now going after leaders of a democracy may lead to other countries leaving the court, fearful that they too – in a battle with terrorists, such as ISIS, for instance – will be accused of war crimes. (…) Israel will survive this scandalous decision; the ICC may not.

Editorial, JPO, 22.11.24

J’accuse…The Shame of the Wrongful Warrants

The International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and former defense minister Gallant makes a mockery of both the Court and those who pushed for this indictment. (…) In the face of years of genocidal activity in so many places around the world without any similar action by the ICC, it is only our response to the slaughter of 1,200 people on October 7, 2023 that justifies this action against us.  It is only what we have done in defense of the only Jewish state in the world, that justifies the ICJ to issue warrants for the arrest of our leadership……the  very first time that leaders of a modern Western democracy have been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity by a global judicial body. What would you call that?  There is only one name for this and it is antisemitism, hatred of the Jewish people plain and simple. (…) How truly sad that not even 80 years after the worst genocide ever applied to the Jewish people, we should be, once again, subjected to the level of antisemitism and discrimination that is rampant worldwide today. (…) the world should realize its folly in charging us, once again, for being the cause of all things bad in the world while happily benefitting from the incredible goodness our people have brought to mankind for almost 4,000 years.  Shame on those who verify the lies of our enemies.

Sherwin Pomerantz, TOI, 22.11.24

Dark nations dominate UN: ICC grants victory to terror over Israel

(…) As a result of the war on terror, 38 million people were displaced. Approximately 4.6 million died, directly or indirectly, due to these wars. (…) According to UN studies presented in 2022, around 90% of those killed in wars in recent decades have been innocent civilians. But when it comes to Israel, the standard changes. Every country in the world is allowed to act — except Israel. A terrorist organization whose leaders declare their intent to continue killing Jews scores a major victory at the International Criminal Court (ICC), an institution established precisely to combat entities driven by genocidal, racist ideologies. Does the presence of a murderous enemy justify a harsh response by a sovereign state? (…) When the UK bombed Dresden and Hamburg, who was to blame — Hitler or Churchill? When the war on terror directly caused the deaths of half a million people (…) who was at fault, Osama bin Laden or George Bush and Barack Obama? (…) The answers are clear. Until it comes to Israel. (...) The arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant are a product of the free world’s grave decline. This happened at the UN, dominated by a majority of authoritarian states. It happened at the UN Human Rights Council, which appointed countries like Iran and Libya to head committees on human and women’s rights. And now, it’s reached its peak with the ICC, which should have been far more impartial and balanced, succumbing to the same fate. The dark majority has reached there too. (...)

Ben-Dror Yemini, YED, 22.11.24

2. Einigung über Waffenstillstand mit der Hizbollah

Nach 14 Monaten zum Teil sehr heftiger Gefechte einigten sich Israel und die libanesische Regierung auf eine Waffenruhe. Die vor allem mit Hilfe des US-amerikanischen Vermittlers Amos Hochstein erreichte Einigung enthält ein Bekenntnis Israels und des Libanon zur Resolution 1701 des UN-Sicherheitsrates aus dem Jahr 2006, sieht jedoch keine explizite Verpflichtung der Hisbollah vor, ihre Milizen hinter dem Litani-Fluss zu belassen. Laut dem Abkommen werden die Hisbollah und alle anderen bewaffneten Gruppen auf libanesischem Territorium keine Offensivaktionen gegen Israel durchführen. Gleichzeitig wird Israel keine offensiven Militäraktionen gegen Ziele im Libanon durchführen. Diese Verpflichtungen negieren nicht das Recht Israels und des Libanon auf Selbstverteidigung. Die offiziellen libanesischen Sicherheitskräfte und die Armee werden die einzigen bewaffneten Einheiten sein, die Waffen tragen oder ihre Streitkräfte im Südlibanon stationiert haben dürfen. Jeder Verkauf, jede Lieferung und jede Produktion von Waffen oder Materialien im Zusammenhang mit Waffen an den Libanon unterliegen der Aufsicht und Kontrolle der libanesischen Regierung. Alle nicht genehmigten Einrichtungen zur Herstellung von Waffen und waffenbezogenen Materialien sollen abgebaut werden, ebenso sämtliche militärische Infrastruktur und Stützpunkte, die nicht zur libanesischen Armee gehören. Alle Waffen ohne Genehmigung, die diesen Verpflichtungen nicht entsprechen, werden beschlagnahmt. Es wird ein Ausschuss eingerichtet, der für Israel und den Libanon akzeptabel ist, um die Durchsetzung dieser Verpflichtungen zu überwachen und bei der Sicherstellung zu helfen. Israel und der Libanon werden dem Ausschuss und der UNIFIL-Truppe Berichte über alle festgestellten Verstöße gegen diese Verpflichtungen vorlegen. Der Libanon wird seine offiziellen Sicherheitskräfte und Streitkräfte entlang aller Grenzen, Grenzübergänge und der Linie, die den Südlibanon definiert, stationieren. Israel wird sich innerhalb von 60 Tagen schrittweise hinter die blaue Linie zurückziehen. Die USA werden indirekte Verhandlungen zwischen Israel und dem Libanon fördern, um eine anerkannte Landgrenze zu erreichen. Das Abkommen wurde in Israel mit gemischten Gefühlen aufgenommen. Rund 60.000 Menschen waren mit Beginn der Hiszbollah-Angriffe aus dem Norden Israels geflohen. Aus Sorge davor, dass der Waffenstillstand nicht hält, sollen die Evakuierten in den kommenden zwei Monaten, die als Probezeit für das Abkommen definiert wurden, noch nicht in ihre Heimatorte zurückkehren. Für viele, deren Häuser zerstört oder schwer getroffen wurden, wird es ohnehin noch Monate dauern, bis die Schäden behoben sind und sie nach Hause zurückkehren können.

Israel Must Fight Until Hezbollah Is Dismantled

(…) At the beginning of the current war, the leadership was frightened and despairing. It therefore ordered some 60,000 Israelis to flee the north (…) the army's mid-level officers (…) altered the lowly spirit of containment and proved to the higher ranks, as well as to the battered, confused political leadership, that it was possible to do things differently – that he who dares, wins. The achievements of these mid-level officers laid the groundwork for the recovery of the political and military leaderships and gave them confidence. This confidence is what was behind the offensive – admittedly a year late – in Lebanon. But despite the not inconsiderable achievements, especially the assassination of Hezbollah's leadership, Israel hasn't won the war. To survive, Hezbollah is willing to discuss a cease-fire. But it will never agree to its own disarmament. (…) The mood in the army's top ranks, just like in the bad old days, is leaning toward "agreement now." But if that happens, northern communities will remain abandoned and a significant portion of the Galilee will continue to be under Hezbollah conquest de facto. (…) the new defense minister, Israel Katz, presented his vision: "Hezbollah has been dealt a serious blow. Consequently, to reap the fruits of this victory, what we actually need now is to continue hitting it with all our might." And indeed, only thus will residents of the north return home. Only thus will the land truly have rest for 40 years.

Israel Harel, HAA, 18.11.24

Prerequisites for safe return of residents to the north

(…) the process of returning residents evacuated from 42 communities near the Lebanese border, as well as thousands who left surrounding areas, is long and complex. (...) there is concern in the north that once the war ends, Hezbollah will rebuild the ruins and re-establish the terror villages within years. Without a security perimeter, (...) no responsible parent would allow their children to play in front of terrorist shooting and observation positions. (...) Community leaders demand more than cosmetic repairs, like completely resurfacing roads, while the Property Tax Authority insists on localized repairs. (…) Residents also need compensation for expected expenses in moving from temporary homes and repairing damaged homes and their contents. (...) the children have experienced prolonged trauma over the past months and need healing. Parental authority, damaged by prolonged stays in small hotel rooms, will also need rehabilitation. (…)                       The state cannot expect them to return to restoration efforts that seek to restore the reality that was here on October 6. The message to residents must be upgrading and developing the area, not just restoring it. In the end, even those who fell in love with the advantages of life in central Israel know there's nothing like the beautiful life we had in the north. (…)

Yair Kraus, YED, 19.11.24

Why should we trust government, military now, after Oct. 7 failings?

Both the government and military intelligence failed more than anyone on Oct. 7, and now they are telling Israelis to trust them and that things have changed. Under Netanyahu's never-ending leadership, it allowed murderous terrorists to flourish. It enabled a determined, faith-driven enemy to train and arm, without any impediment and decide when to strike and it did, successfully. (…) The government and the military intelligence let us sleep at night right next to the danger. Now, after they gambled with our lives, they tell us not to worry about the deal that they are about to sign. (…) we must stop for a moment and see who the architects of the cease-fire deal, are and who would be there to enforce it. Why should we believe them? (…) We know who our enemy is and can be certain that it will try to rebuild its military might. (…) Will the government and military again misread the situation, as they have done for so many years? (…) After all, the same people responsible for the failures are still in power and in the same positions. (...) Like battered women, we are asked to believe things would change and asked to trust the abuser after the beatings and even have pity on him.  (…) Netanyahu, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Bezalel Smotrich and IDF Chief of Staff Halevi want to force us to believe them and there is no reason for them to succeed. 

Amichai Atali, YED, 26.11.24

Why a ‘settlement’ with Hezbollah is a dangerous delusion

(…) what happens if the IDF withdraws from Lebanon now? History shows that even a small opening for terror groups can lead to a full breach. Hezbollah, battered but far from defeated, would return its fighters to the villages, rebuild its strength, fortify its defenses with UNIFIL's cooperation, and once again pose a threat to northern residents within months. The fears of slaughter and kidnappings might subside briefly, only to resurface, not to mention the continued rocket fire. (…) The current talk of a settlement hinges on Israel's ability to enforce deterrence in the north. But experience has taught Israelis the limits of such enforcement. (…) when it comes to Lebanon, the only way to achieve such a vision is to clear the country of Hezbollah and other armed militias. A plan akin to UN Resolution 1559, which called for disarming terrorist groups and restoring Lebanon to its more stable past, remains the ideal. However, Lebanon as a state is still incapable of confronting Hezbollah and other terror organizations on its own. It requires Israel—or moderate Arab forces—to do the heavy lifting. (…) The ideal scenario would involve advancing modestly—around 10 kilometers—seizing that territory as Israel did in Gaza, and establishing a perimeter there. Over time, this could evolve into an upgraded buffer zone. Yet, for some reason, there are those allergic to the terms "perimeter" and "buffer zone," favoring the more palatable "settlement." It sounds better, but in reality, it’s little more than a dangerous illusion.

Naveh Dromi, YED, 21.11.24

Hezbollah can only claim Pyrrhic victory, but the real one is Israel's

(...) the reality is clear to most Lebanese citizens – whether Shiite, Sunni, or from other communities – that Hezbollah suffered a devastating defeat in the recent conflict. This loss goes beyond the elimination of key figures, including Hassan Nasrallah, his deputy, and other senior members of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council. It also includes the highly effective “pager operation,” which, almost overnight, exposed Hezbollah’s vulnerabilities and left the organization weakened and exposed. (…) Will Israel act decisively to prevent Hezbollah’s next military buildup, or will it hesitate, as it has over the past 17 years? (…) Without the flames of the southern front, Israel might have woken up one day to face an even more dangerous threat than Hamas in the south. The tunnels, infrastructure and weaponry on the northern border all point to the extensive preparations Hezbollah and Iran had made for a confrontation with Israel – one that could have ended in a national catastrophe. (...) Once the cease-fire takes effect, Hezbollah will undoubtedly resume its reconstruction efforts, while Iran will likely attempt to funnel funds and weaponry to the group by any means possible. This raises a critical question: will Israel act decisively to prevent Hezbollah’s next military buildup, or will it hesitate, as it has over the past 17 years? (…) This agreement is far from ideal but represents the least harmful option under the circumstances and, in some respects, is even a reasonable one. It is also crucial to consider the human cost of both civilian and military lives. (…) The more urgent issue for Israel, beyond the return of hostages, remains not Gaza but  Iran’s nuclear ambitions. While fighting in the south has slowed, Iran continues its relentless push toward a nuclear weapon. (...) with a nuclear arsenal, Iran would no longer need Hezbollah to the same extent, and the organization’s role would be significantly reduced.

Avi Issacharoff, YED, 27.11.24

A Fragile Pause Amid Uncertainty

(...) The ceasefire agreement, brokered by the United States, offers a temporary reprieve for Lebanon, a country already buckling under economic collapse and political dysfunction. (...) the ceasefire faces significant hurdles that could undermine its implementation. One of the most immediate challenges is whether Hezbollah will comply with the demand to withdraw north of the Litani River, a region deeply entwined with the militia’s identity and operations. (…) While Hezbollah may agree to relocate weapons and equipment further north, expecting it to uproot its fighters from their homes and communities seems unrealistic. If Hezbollah’s withdrawal falls short of expectations, Israel will face a difficult choice: resume military operations, risking the collapse of the ceasefire, or adopt a more lenient stance that allows Hezbollah to maintain its foothold. Another critical issue is the capacity of the Lebanese army to enforce the ceasefire and patrol Southern Lebanon to Israel’s satisfaction. (…) Beyond its immediate impact, the ceasefire carries potential regional implications. (…) The idea that Hamas will alter its calculations based on Hezbollah’s withdrawal seems more like wishful thinking than a plausible outcome. While the ceasefire offers Lebanon a chance to begin rebuilding and restoring some semblance of stability, the path forward is fraught with uncertainty. (…) As both sides navigate the fragile dynamics of this ceasefire, Lebanon’s recovery and Israel’s security hang in the balance. (...) For now, the region holds its breath, hoping that this time, peace can endure longer than the ink used to sign the deal.

Ethan Goldberg, TOI, 28.11.24

Israel must use ceasefire in North to prioritize return of hostages

(…) The strategic blows dealt to Hezbollah have been substantial: its long-range weaponry destroyed, its leadership decimated, and its infrastructure in southern Lebanon thoroughly dismantled. Hezbollah has been unequivocally set back by about 20 years. (…) Yet there is another perspective, one that centers on a single urgent question: What about the hostages? (…) While wrapping up the northern front to concentrate on the southern one offers strategic advantages, it seems that Israel is no closer to securing the release of those still held captive by Hamas. What we do know, however, is that the number of the 101 hostages still in Gaza believed to be alive is rapidly diminishing, creating an unbearable sense of urgency. (…) Members of Netanyahu’s coalition have openly discussed resettling Gaza and reversing the 2005 Disengagement Plan, which saw the evacuation of 8,000 Israelis and the demolition of 21 settlements. These ideological ambitions, combined with the government’s broader goal of preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state, have made it significantly harder to reach a deal in Gaza, despite the urgency of the hostage situation. (…) At the moment, even Israel’s friends in the US and the Gulf fail to understand the country’s plan for post-war Gaza. (…) Of course, the inability to reach a deal is not solely Israel’s responsibility. Hamas’s refusal to engage in meaningful negotiations for a hostage deal renders progress impossible. As much as Israel wishes to bring the hostages home, it cannot negotiate with itself. (…) If the ceasefire with Hezbollah holds, Israel must use the quiet in the North to refocus its efforts on the South and prioritize the return of the hostages. (...)

Yaakov Katz, JPO, 29.11.24

3. Trumps Wahlsieg

In Israel wurde der Sieg Donald Trumps bei den US-Wahlen sowohl auf Regierungsebene als auch in weiten Teilen der Bevölkerung mit Freude aufgenommen. Premierminister Netanyahu zählt auf Trumps Unterstützung bei einer offensiven Politik gegenüber dem Iran, insbesondere im Hinblick auf das iranische Atomprojekt. Gleichzeitig hoffen viele in der israelischen Regierung und der Siedlerbewegung auf ein amerikanisches Wohlwollen unter Trump im Hinblick auf die israelische Siedlungspolitik. Allerdings hat auch Donald Trump sowohl während des Wahlkampfs als auch nach seiner Wahl deutlich gemacht, dass er die schnellstmögliche Beendigung des Krieges im Gazastreifen und die Freilassung der dort festgehaltenen israelischen Geiseln anstrebt. Wie wohl Netanyahu diesem Ziel Lippenbekenntnisse zollt, scheint er an seiner Erreichung deutlich weniger interessiert zu sein als sein amerikanischer Counterpart. Netanyahu sieht den andauernden Krieg im Gazastreifen als Sicherheitsgarantie für den Fortbestand seiner Regierung und der weiteren Hinauszögerung seines Prozesses.

Trump’s pro-Israel appointments: Dream team or a tightrope for Jerusalem?

US President-elect Donald Trump chose strong supporters of Israel in a series of appointments announced last week. (…) Although the appointments have been hailed by Israel advocates, especially those on the Right, as comprising “a dream team” for both the United States and the Jewish state, the Israeli government must brace itself for a future in which the new Trump administration could be warm and supportive, but also tight and tough. Ultimately, the administration will act in accordance with American interests, not Israel’s (...). Let’s start with the clear message Trump himself has conveyed: Before his inauguration on January 20, Israel must end the current war, which was launched against Hamas in Gaza after the October 7, 2023 (...). Yet it is not in Israel’s interest to end the war until its primary goals have been achieved – one of them being the return of the hostages. (…) One of the main missions of Trump’s team, and particularly his Middle East envoy, will be to expand the historic Abraham Accords that his first administration mediated, and bring Saudi Arabia into the fold to make it the most powerful bloc of nations in the region against the “Axis of Resistance.” It is also likely to resuscitate the “Deal of the Century,” authored by a team headed by Trump’s senior adviser and Jewish son-in-law, Jared Kushner. (…) While Trump might maintain (...) a high level of security aid provided by the US to Israel, he could also cut it or use it as a way to pressure the Jewish state. (…) Perhaps most important of all will be the Trump administration’s policy on Iran. (…) The bottom line is that while Israel can allow itself to be pleased with the make-up of the new Trump team, it should also be cautious.

Editorial, JPO, 17.11.24

Israel Can't Count on Trump When It Comes to Iran. Now's the Time to Attack

(…) If Tehran obtained a nuclear weapon, it would indeed be able to wipe out Israel. (…) The opportunity to attack Iran's nuclear program is delimited by the U.S. political calendar. Until January 20, the pro-Zionist Joe Biden, who has repeatedly declared he will not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon, remains president, before turning over the reins to Donald Trump. (...) He also doesn't owe Kamala Harris anything after she lost to Trump, and he isn't beholden to the will or whims of the American people (...). During his four-year term, Biden has (…) prevented Israel from attacking Iran's nuclear sites, most recently on October 26, when that option was apparently under consideration. One may assume that Biden is still averse to seeing Israel assailing the Iranian nuclear project, even though he fears nuclear weapons in the hands of the ayatollahs and despite his understanding that Iran's possession of nuclear weaponry would threaten the existence of the Jewish state and endanger the free world in various ways. (…) For Israel, this is truly an existential issue. (…) Throughout his career as prime minister, Netanyahu has been a master of procrastination, bordering on cowardice. And perhaps he now believes that it would be better to wait until Trump assumes office, and that Trump will permit an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear sites and maybe even back it or join in. But Netanyahu would do better to think again. He shouldn't bank on Trump. (…) Trump's political values are topped by a desire for global stability that would ensure American economic growth (...).  Elon Musk's recent secret meeting with Iran's UN ambassador seems to strongly hint at where Trump is going. Who knows? With Trump, a lot may depend on the last person who whispered in his ear. (…) in the weeks since the air force's October 26 attack on Iran, the country's defense chiefs have proclaimed that Israel destroyed or seriously damaged Iran's air defense (...). No doubt Iran these past weeks has been trying to shore up its air defenses, but the country remains vulnerable and its nuclear project may conceivably be (...) easy prey. (…) this is the moment to attack, a moment that may not recur.

Benny Morris , HAA, 17.11.24

Trump's new administration represents a return to biblical truths

It seems even righteous patriarch Joseph, the master dreamer, couldn't have envisioned a dream more grandiose than the lineup of names in the new Trump administration, which is soon to steer the world. Before long, as is customary, the losing side – namely the U.S. media, and to some extent the Israeli media – will start to smear and mock each of them. (…) Trump's new administration is a global upheaval. The geopolitical fabric, unraveled by the Muslim takeover led by Iran and Qatar over Western nations, will be mended. The American hegemony that once dominated and stabilized the world but collapsed due to the naive policies of Democratic administrations will be restored. (…) Affirmative action led to the boundless liberal "wokeness" storm, allowing murderers to be seen as righteous, children to undergo gender reassignment surgeries, and the oppression of anyone white, conservative, religious and normative. (…) Trump’s potential nominees list is astonishing. Nearly every appointment comes with plans on a revolutionary global scale. They are rearranging the blocks: identifying who is good and who is bad; who wants the sun to rise; and who seeks to darken the world. They seem more determined than ever and won't stop until they succeed. Their test case is Israel, which stands alone at the forefront. (…) Israel will receive all the means to destroy its enemies – and the U.S. will take every measure not to contain but to annihilate those who rise to darken the world, including toppling the Ayatollah regime by Israel. (…) The U.S. will not join, but Israel's solitary dismantling of the dangerous Ayatollah regime will make it the most significant country globally. This, too, is written in the Bible.

Rami Simani, YED, 20.11.24

Paradoxically, Trump’s pro-Israel appointees are good for the Palestinians

(…) Take the appointment of Mike Huckabee as US ambassador to Israel. He is a staunch supporter of Israel’s settlements in the territories and opposes any pressure to withdraw. He has stated that it will be a privilege to help Israel exert its sovereignty over them. As far as Huckabee goes, Israel’s Right has a blank check. (...) we can expect to see intense construction (...). Increased settlement activity will no doubt anger many Palestinians; who knows how this will be expressed. Will there be a third intifada? How will Israel, already stretched, respond? In the meantime, those aforementioned wise Palestinians will smile quietly to themselves. How is that possible? (...) Annexation will find some support in America and possibly in Europe, especially among those concerned about growing Islamist influence on the continent. Other than in isolated pockets, the rest of the world will object strongly. (…) When Israel’s intentions become undeniable, it will be expected to provide equal rights, including the right to vote, to all the human beings under its control. Whoever imagines that Israel can withstand the pressure and the sanctions which will be directed at it, is invited to ask apartheid-era South Africa if that is possible. Hello, egalitarian ballot box. Goodbye, Jewish state – without a Jewish majority, it will not be. Which is why, if I were a wise Palestinian, I would (…) sit and wait patiently until Israel, the country which was established by the nation which counts its Nobel prizes and prides itself on its wisdom, will fall into the trap which it is laying for itself, aided and abetted by friends like

Tova Herzl, TOI, 20.11.24

4. Weitere Themen 

Annexionsgerede wird in Israel immer lauter

Is annexation a realistic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate?

(...) The two-state solution, which envisions a separate, independent Palestinian state coexisting peacefully with Israel, has long been presented as the key to resolving the conflict. However (…) the situation on the ground today suggests that it is no longer a viable solution. (…) At its core, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is driven not just by territorial disputes but by deep religious and cultural divides. (…) This religious framing of the conflict shapes the strategies of militant groups and complicates efforts to negotiate peace, as both sides see the stakes as existential. (…) Even if Hamas were eliminated as a political and military force, the underlying issues that fueled its rise would not disappear. (...) other extremist groups would likely emerge, driven by the same grievances that have perpetuated decades of violence. The cycle of terror would continue, and a new extremist group could easily fill the vacuum left by Hamas, ensuring that violence remains an ongoing threat. In light of the ongoing and escalating violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel may find itself with little choice but to annex Gaza and the West Bank. (…) violence of militant groups like Hamas, the internal fragmentation of Palestinian leadership, and the absence of genuine negotiations have rendered the two-state solution increasingly unrealistic. Amid this failure, annexation appears to be a pragmatic option to address the immediate security threats Israel faces. (…) Annexation would allow Israel to bring these territories under direct control, ensuring greater security and eliminating the militant strongholds that continue to perpetuate violence against Israeli citizens. (…) Given the changing geopolitical landscape and the failure of the two-state framework, it is time for the international community to support an annexation that would end the fragmentation of the Palestinian territories, which has only fueled further instability. (...)

Amine Ayoub, JPO, 17.11.24

The unbearable price Israel would pay for annexation

(…) Bezalel Smotrich declared that 2025 would be the year of applying sovereignty to the West Bank. (…) Indeed, since the launch of the Trump peace plan in January 2020, the settlement enterprise has reached new heights. Bennett’s tenure as prime minister and Smotrich’s role as Finance Minister and in the Defense Ministry have seen an unparalleled acceleration in the legitimization of illegal outposts. No fewer than 22 outposts were legalized between 2020-2024, while a staggering 79 new outposts were established, more than half of these during the war. (…) This systematic expansion of settlements, masked behind bureaucratic jargon, represents nothing less than a calculated transformation of the West Bank’s landscape. The numbers tell a story of opportunistic land grabbing, particularly intensified during a period of crisis when public attention was diverted elsewhere. (…) Annexing Area C, or even parts of it, would likely lead to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, the termination of security coordination, and the IDF’s takeover of the entire West Bank. In such a scenario, Israel would be forced to establish military rule and assume responsibility for 2.6 million Palestinians. The economic costs alone are staggering: $14.5 billion annually, including healthcare, education, and social security for Palestinian residents. Moreover, Israel’s economy would suffer significantly from decreased foreign investment, international sanctions, and GDP damage. (…) Even if the Trump administration supports such a move, European nations and Arab states would likely respond harshly with economic and diplomatic sanctions. (…) The central concern is that annexation would lead to a point of no return where Israel must choose between two impossible options: a binational state where it loses its Jewish majority or an apartheid regime where millions of Palestinians live under military rule without full civil rights. This isn’t merely about territory; it’s about Israel’s soul and future. (…) it’s crucial to understand that opposing annexation isn’t about being “anti-Israel” – quite the contrary. It’s about preserving Israel’s character as a Jewish and democratic state, ensuring its security, and maintaining its standing in the international community. (...)

Shaul Arieli, TOI, 17.11.24

Krieg im Gazastreifen

Ask the Gazans what they think of Hamas!

(…) In the first journalistic report from Jabalia ten days ago, Gazans appeared one by one in front of the camera and told about Hamas’s terrible atrocities and guilt for Gaza’s devastation. (…) The story of these ordinary Gazans does not match the image drummed up by the Palestinian organizations. Parts of the Western world’s political elite and opinion leaders seem to have sold themselves to the death cults of Hamas and Hezbollah and discredit Israel, which only defends itself under international law. (…) Hamas has in its charter the goal of eradicating Israel. Not so much to conquer the country but to destroy the Jewish state in the name of Islam. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has built a state within the state with the express goal of annihilating Israel. Iran’s mullahs are behind them. (…) For the West in general and Europe in particular, much self-examination awaits when the forces behind the terrorist regimes of Hamas and Hezbollah are unmasked. Too much focus has been on the death toll, which prevents people from seeing what the conflict between Israel and Palestine is really about; Israel’s destruction.

Richard Conricus, TOI, 29.11.24

Gazans deserve the right to freedom of movement

(...)In many ways, the world treats the Arabs of Gaza differently than other people – and often to the Gazans’ detriment. (…) The Syrian civil war and governmental atrocities have motivated millions of Syrians to relocate since 2011. Lebanon has been a less-than-ideal location for many years, as the civil war of 1975-1990 was followed by the ascendancy of Hezbollah, which continues to terrorize the country. This has led to emigration of such magnitude that more Lebanese now live outside of their country than in it (...). No one has suggested that the international community block them from leaving. Gaza is unquestionably a mess. (…) A poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) just before the Simchat Torah massacre of October 7, 2023, found that nearly a third of Gazans were interested in emigrating (...). One can assume that due to the war, those numbers are even higher. (…) The global community welcomed the Ukrainian and Afghan refugees without any hint that they should stay and watch their countries burn. Why is choosing to flee a combat zone or an economically challenged region deemed logical and acceptable for all except the Gazans? Politicians from around the world complain about the supposed civilian death toll in Gaza, yet one concrete step available to them is to provide them with a safe haven. Yet when Israel suggested voluntary Gazan emigration, the EU and UK slammed it. (...) The migration of Gazans should not only be allowed, but should be encouraged. (…)

Ari Zivotofsky, JPO, 21.11.24

HAA = Haaretz

YED = Yedioth Ahronoth / Ynetnews

JPO = Jerusalem Post

IHY = Israel HaYom

TOI = Times of Israel

GLO = Globes

Published: Dezember 2024.

Responsible:

Dr. Ralf Melzer,

Head of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Israel

Editors:

Susanne Knaul

Judith Stelmach

Homepage: israel.fes.de

Email: fes(at)fes.org.il