Schlaglicht Nummer 18/24, Aktuelles aus israelischen Zeitungen, 16. – 31. Oktober 2024

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Die Themen dieser Ausgabe:

1. Hoffnung auf Waffenruhe im Gazastreifen nach Tod von Sinwar
2. Krieg gegen die Hisbollah / Israelischer Gegenangriff auf den Iran
3. US-Wahlen und Israel
4. Weitere Themen

1. Hoffnung auf Waffenruhe im Gazastreifen nach Tod von Sinwar

Nach der Tötung von Hamas-Anführer Yahya Sinwar, der der führende Kopf hinter dem Massaker vom 7. Oktober war, hofften viele in Israel auf ein Abkommen über einen Waffenstillstand und die Befreiung der noch immer im Gazastreifen festgehaltenen Geiseln. Sinwar war die Nummer eins auf der Liste der von Israel verfolgten Hamas-Terroristen. Sein Tod war im Gegensatz zur Tötung von Hisbollah-Chef Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut nicht Folge einer komplizierten Geheimdienstoperation, sondern eher zufällige Folge von Kämpfen israelischen Bodentruppen, als er sich oberirdisch blicken ließ. Noch immer ist unklar, welche Pläne Regierungschef Benjamin Netanyahu für den Gazastreifen hat und wie lange er den Krieg fortsetzen will. Eine komplette Zerstörung der Hamas, wie Netanyahu sie erklärtermaßen anstrebt, halten militärische Beobachter_innen für illusorisch. Die Anzeichen dafür, dass Netanyahu den Krieg in die Länge zieht, um die Fortsetzung seiner Regierung sicherzustellen, verdichten sich. Die Demonstrationen für einen baldigen Austausch der in den Gazastreifen Verschleppten gegen palästinensische Häftlinge dauern an. Allerdings verlagert sich die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit auch auf die Gefechte im Norden.

With Sinwar gone, Israel's next move must be decisive

The holiday of Sukkot is a joy (…) the time of our celebration. Last year, Sukkot’s conclusion was immediately marked by the October 7 massacre, one of the most harrowing events in Israeli history. (…) But this year, Sukkot started off with a bang – and one that is certainly cause for celebration. The IDF, after years of trying, has finally managed to find and kill Sinwar. (…) since October 7, 2023, wiping out the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah became arguably Israel’s most important war goals. (…) Sinwar soon became the last man standing, hiding out in Gaza. (…) When Haniyeh was killed, Sinwar ascended to total leadership of Hamas: the sole head on the snake. And now that head has been cut off. (…) Decisions will need to be made about what to do next, and this war is still not over. Hezbollah remains a well-armed threat against Israel and continues to regularly fire rockets, drones, and missiles into the Jewish state. Hamas still has men under arms and rockets at their disposal, and 101 hostages still remain in their possession. The Houthis in Yemen are still a threat that could strike at any moment, boasting an arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones, and their leadership remains intact. And then there is the ever-looming threat of Iran, a well-equipped nation who backs all the aforementioned actors and hosts a formidably large army of its own. (…)

Editorial, JPO, 18.10.24

Yahya Sinwar’s Grim Legacy

Yahya Sinwar, the ruthless mastermind of last year’s October 7 massacre in southern Israel, got his comeuppance on the 377th day of the war he ignited in the Gaza Strip. (…) Sinwar, 61, was the latest in a series of high-ranking Palestinian figures to be violently removed from the scene. (…) Sinwar’s demise is a tremendous psychological blow to Hamas, but he is not Hamas’ first leader to be assassinated. (…) In the past, Hamas managed to routinely replace its fallen leaders. But now that Israel controls Gaza and has pledged that Hamas will never rule Gaza again, Hamas finds itself in troubled waters. It is quite probable that Sinwar may indeed have been Gaza’s last Hamas ruler. (…) In line with Hamas’ national charter, he vehemently opposed Israel’s existence. Yet, during his 22 years in an Israeli prison, he learned Hebrew and immersed himself in the intricacies of Zionism and Israeli society, thereby becoming a formidable opponent of Israel from an intellectual point of view. (…) During his term of office from 2017 onward, Sinwar established close relations with Iran, Israel’s deadliest enemy, and used scarce resources to build a military machine and an elaborate network of attack and supply tunnels. (…) Two years ago, he delivered a speech urging Palestinians everywhere, including inside Israel, to “get your cleavers, axes or knives ready.” A week later, a Palestinian terrorist killed three Israelis in an axe attack. (…) The day after 3,000 Hamas terrorists attacked Israel, killing roughly 1,200 Israelis and foreigners and kidnapping 251, Hezbollah began firing rockets and drones at Israel in solidarity with Hamas. Hezbollah’s loyalty to Hamas proved to be disastrous, prompting Israel to invade southern Lebanon late last month. Sinwar’s fierce hatred of Israel and his opposition to a two-state solution immortalized him as a hero of resistance. But outside of rejectionist Palestinian circles, his legacy is unrelentingly grim. In response to the October 7 attacks, Israel has devastated Gaza, leaving it in ruins. Thanks to his policy of cynically using civilian infrastructure and civilians as human shields, Sinwar stands rightfully accused of direct complicity in the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinian men, women and children. (…) Sinwar is gone, but Hamas is determined to fight to the last man.

Sheldon Kirshner, TOI, 18.10.24

Could Sinwar’s assassination lead to the release of all 101 hostages?

(…) As Israel's most wanted target, Sinwar had not appeared in public since the conflict began. (…) While Israel concentrated on Hezbollah to the north, the army left fewer troops in Gaza. Ironically, it was these remaining forces that ended up killing Sinwar. He had apparently left his tunnel hideout and was moving with several key lieutenants, including the head of the brigade in Rafah. (…) Sinwar's death sends a powerful message to the region that Israel remains strong and in control, much like the impact of eliminating Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah would have. Symbolism is a powerful language in this war. (…) Sinwar's death will undoubtedly shake even those who believe they can revive the organization. His elimination may scare off those who once thought they could evade the Israeli military. (…)

Maayan Hoffman, YED, 18.10.24

The killing of Sinwar, his predictable martyrdom and the consequences

The killing of Sinwar, the sadistic mass murderer (…), has inevitably evoked fears of his elevation to martyrdom by Islamic fundamentalists. No doubt the sheer brutality, cowardice and wanton cruelty of the man will be eclipsed by apologists for his ideology and he will be resurrected as a hero of his people who sacrificed his life for his cause. (…) like that other arch Jew-hater, Adolf Hitler, he must have been brutalized from his youth, drilled into a hatred endemic in his culture and grown into a maniacal belief that it was the Jews, now become ‘the Zionist enemy’, who were responsible for his suffering and that of his people. It would be his life’s task to murder and torture as many Jews as possible, clad in the mantle of a savior. The combination of cunning and ruthlessness which brought Sinwar into a position of leadership also made him into a hero. The image he presented of a tormented soul (…) fitted him admirably for the role of martyr and he is already being proclaimed as such by those who believe that they have lost a savior. Israel’s relief at the killing of Sinwar is understandable but (…) Israelis who support the government would do well to reflect on the genesis of Sinwar’s journey from fighter to leader to hero, savior and martyr and take a long hard look at their own leaders. The policies of Netanyahu and his extremist cabinet colleagues, not to mention the unbridled violence of the settlers directed at Palestinian communities in the West Bank, are taking the country further away from the law which once underpinned the Jewish nation and bringing it closer to the barbarism of its enemies. Cruelty only begets cruelty and creates fertile soil for a fresh crop of heroes, who in turn will welcome martyrdom for their cause in a war without an end in sight.

Harold Behr, TOI, 20.10.24

Israel must not end war yet despite Sinwar success

(…) Urban warfare is grueling – especially with Hamas terrorists cowering behind Palestinians who also hate Israel. (…) The IDF has destroyed over 40,000 military targets this year. Nevertheless, both Southern Lebanon and Gaza still overflow with weapons depots, command-and-control centers, and Jihadists vowing to destroy the Jewish State. Consider the stockpile’s scale. (…) Indeed, we cannot “end the war in Gaza” until “Israel is secure.” And if the Gazans are truly innocent, they should turn on Hamas and force it to surrender, while freeing the hostages. Until that happens, Israel must maintain the military pressure, and prepare its security zone along the Gaza border, including taking Gazan territory, so the Palestinians learn that every future attack will result in more territorial losses. (…) we, who want this war to end yesterday, must keep fighting tomorrow and tomorrow, until the aggressors – Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran – cave in. Only then, once Israel is secured, will those Palestinians who actually want “dignity, security, freedom, and self-determination” – rather than Israel’s destruction – have a shot at making progress, too.

Gil Troy, JPO, 23.10.24

Netanyahu must put his ministers in order to make successful 'day after' plan

(…) In a period of time in which the world is looking at Israel with magnifying glasses, the fact that nearly a third of the members of the prime minister’s party in the Knesset are in favor of a policy that not only Israel’s allies oppose but that the government of Israel opposes is staggering. Israel is in the worst diplomatic situation it’s been in since its establishment. (…) Netanyahu must put his house in order and instruct the MKs in his party and the ministers in his coalition to wait with these ambiguous statements for the time being. As we focus on day-after plans, we should think of realistic solutions.

Editorial, JPO, 23.10.24

Dancing and mourning

On Simchat Torah this year we will be dancing because that is what we have joyfully done for centuries and no evil people will take that away from us as long as we have breath in our body. We will also be remembering in our hearts all those souls slaughtered in a 21st-century pogrom that we never in our worst dreams thought to witness in our lifetimes. (…) God is both merciful and strict. The sukkah is both a temporary hut and our furnished home for the week. Judaism is both a race and a religion. This year, Simchat Torah is a day of joy with an underlay of mourning. We do not customarily mourn on a festival but the shadow is there. (…) one can dance while reflecting; and the dance may change the reflection. (…) May we mourners be comforted in our tradition: our living ancient tradition of choosing joy in the face of hatred and persecution.

Yael Unterman, TOI, 23.10.24

Israeli Government's Message to Its Soldiers: Shut Up and Fight

Under the current government, the Israeli soldier has never had it worse. Compulsory service has been extended by four months, the length of reserve duty has been tripled, and the age for retiring from the reserves has risen by a year. Plus, any soldier abducted to the Gaza Strip is set to be the last released in a deal to bring the hostages home, if a deal ever happens. All this is going on as the government pushes a bill to let the ultra-Orthodox dodge the draft, even though the army has lost over 10,000 soldiers who have been killed, wounded or impaired psychologically. Netanyahu describes the security situation as an existential threat to the nation, but at the same time he's working hard to exempt the ultra-Orthodox from military service. He praises the soldiers who have fallen in battle but has abandoned the ones who were abducted. (…) he has put his personal political considerations first. But when, in an act of desperation, a few soldiers sign a letter warning that they will stop serving if the government doesn't get the hostages released, cabinet members rush to condemn them and demand that they be put behind bars. The soldiers are still showing up for military duty (…). But the actions of this reckless government, which isn't bringing the hostages home and isn't drafting the ultra-Orthodox, is exploiting this good spirit. Let the soldiers put their lives in danger as long no hair is touched on Netanyahu's head.

Sami Peretz, HAA, 23.10.24

Israelis, Indifferent to Gaza's Destruction, Are Overloading on October 7

(…) While Israelis are indifferent to Gaza's destruction, they are constantly and repeatedly immersed in testimonies attesting to their victimhood. The victims themselves are actually demonstrating admirable resilience. (…) For over a year we've been crying ourselves senseless. (…) We insist on drawing parallels between death in a safe room fire and a gas chamber; between children in Gaza border communities who hid in a closet and Anne Frank, even though it's hard to think of historical events more dissimilar in their purpose and overall context than the Holocaust and October 7. A hint: we now have a state. (…) as we succumb to victimhood, we, via the Israel Defense Forces, are striking our assailant with all our might, hitting his bleeding face, riddling his body with bullets even after he has long been dead by our hands. (…) Israel is fighting as if it were in an anxiety-driven frenzy. There is therefore no amount of military achievements and fatalities that would provide it with a sense of victory. At the same time, it is operating a mechanism which constantly creates anxiety, in the fashion of the Yad Vashem Holocaust Remembrance Center. This is a dangerous combination. If Israel isn't stopped, it will gorge itself to death on Palestinian blood.

Carolina Landsmann, HAA, 25.10.24

2. Krieg gegen die Hisbollah / Israelischer Gegenangriff auf den Iran

Die israelische Armee setzt ihren Kampf gegen die schiitische Terrororganisation Hisbollah einschließlich ihrer Finanzinstitutionen im Libanon mit unveränderter Härte fort. Bei Angriffen auch im Norden des Libanon wurden weitere Hisbollah-Spitzenfunktionäre liquidiert, darunter Hashim Safi al-Din, der als Nachfolger für den bereits zuvor getöteten Hisbollah-Chef Hassan Nasrallah gehandelt wurde. Außerdem soll auch der Befehlshaber des Hisbollah-Geheimdienstes getötet worden sein sowie weitere Kommandeure der vom Iran finanzierten Terrororganisation. Umgekehrt setzt auch die Hisbollah ihre Angriffe gegen Israel fort. Internationale Bemühungen um eine Waffenruhe, wie die Reise von US-Außenminister Antony Blinken und des US-Gesandten Amos Hochstein in die Region, bleiben vorläufig ohne Ergebnis. Die Sorge gilt einer möglichen Ausweitung des Konflikts zu einem offenen Krieg zwischen Israel und Iran, in dem womöglich auch Saudi-Arabien vom Iran angegriffen werden könnte. Israel reagierte auf den iranischen Raketenbeschuss Anfang Oktober mit dem Bombardement von iranischen Raketenabwehrsystemen sowie einer zentralen Raketenherstellungsfabrik, ließ jedoch die iranischen Ölfelder und Nuklearanlagen unberührt. Dies wurde von Beobachter_innen als möglicherweise deeskalierend interpretiert. Aus den Reihen der Regierungskoalition und auch von Oppositionspolitiker Yair Lapid war die Gegenoffensive als zu schwach kritisiert worden. Unterdessen dauert der Streit um den Nutzen der UNIFIL-Mission an.

UNIFIL in South Lebanon Reminds Us of Israel's Famous Keystone Cop

The UN peacekeeping force in south Lebanon, several of whose members were wounded and one of whose positions was damaged by Israeli forces in recent days, reminds me of the famous fictional Israeli policeman Azoulay. That character starred in the 1971 cult film by legendary director Ephraim Kishon, "The Policeman." Like the hero played by Shaike Ophir, the UN troops didn't see, didn't hear and didn't stop the crimes taking place right in front of them. Their thousands of patrols – by foot, vehicle and helicopter – contributed to law enforcement about as much as Kishon's cop did. (…) In southern Lebanon, the UN troops never reported the extensive military infrastructure that Hezbollah deployed along the border as part of its plan to capture the Galilee. (…) Its reports remind us of the satiric columns that Kishon also wrote; the reports include piles of bureaucratic text about the training of staff members and local officials aimed at preventing sexual harassment and abuse. There are also granular reports about border incidents. (…) UNIFIL complained that it had a hard time because the Lebanese Army and "individuals in civilian clothes" blocked the force's way, sometimes on the grounds that the area was private property, and sometimes there were roadblocks and threats of beatings. From the reports it seems that the UN patrol vehicles had only one gear: reverse. But despite this complete and ongoing failure, UNIFIL continues its worthless mission. (…) This is convenient for Hezbollah, which benefits from a human shield to conceal its activities, and also from the money that UNIFIL spends in Shi'ite villages. It's convenient for the Lebanese government and army, which receive international legitimacy and assistance. It's convenient for the Western governments, which clear their consciences and "support Lebanon." (…)

Aluf Benn, HAA, 18.10.24

Triple saturation: Hezbollah's new tactic behind attack on Netanyahu residence

Hezbollah is entering a "new and advanced phase of confrontation" with Israel (…). The group's latest strategy blends short-range rocket barrages with drone strikes, designed to overwhelm Israel’s detection and interception systems, particularly the Iron Dome. The goal is to confuse Israel’s defense systems while increasing the likelihood of interception debris falling in populated areas, even if the rockets themselves are intercepted. (…) The group concentrates rockets on a relatively small target area while launching drones in multiple directions to distract detection systems elsewhere. (…) While short-range rocket fire remains somewhat effective in areas with unique topographical conditions, most salvos are intercepted, and the overall effectiveness of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket attacks has been diminishing. In contrast, the number of casualties and direct hits from Hezbollah’s explosive drones has been rising. (…) We can expect Hezbollah to ramp up its use of explosive drones, as they are harder to detect and intercept when flying low over the terrain, and they offer greater precision. Netanyahu’s home in Caesarea is a relatively easy target for Hezbollah, given its known and publicized location. A drone flying low over the sea from Lebanon could potentially reach it without being detected, and even if spotted, it would be difficult to intercept. (…) fortunately, the drones did not hit or come close to Netanyahu’s family, who were not at their Caesarea home at the time. (…) we must be better prepared for the next attempt. (…) The downside of this policy is the increased frequency of alerts, which forces residents in affected areas to seek shelter more often. On the bright side, there are promising developments in the pipeline for better detection, interception and the ability to strike drones at their launch sites.

Ron Ben-Yishai, YED, 19.10.24

Netanyahu Isn't Waging His 'War of Revival' in Lebanon

(…) It cannot be that a terrorist organization can (…) force an entire country to take cover in safe rooms. (…) the IDF's invasion of Lebanon should bring an end to the rain of drones and missiles. However, instead of advancing forward (…) and dismantling Hezbollah positions, they are staying close to the border in search of weapons caches. This is further proof of the hesitation of the government and the high command. The prime minister is not waging his "War of Revival." After Oslo, the withdrawal from Lebanon and the evacuation of Gush Katif, the role of the Likud governments was to bring about a fundamental transformation in thinking about national strategy. They failed. No new objectives were set for the IDF, no commanders were assigned or appointed with the power to change the nature of the IDF from a defensive army to an attacking army, one that pursues the enemy without allowing him to recover, as war doctrine demands. (…) We will win but not decisively. (…) We will (…) emerge overwhelmingly victorious from this war, although it could have been ended much more quickly.

Israel Harel, HAA, 20.10.24

UNIFIL’s future questionable as Israel criticizes its role in Lebanon conflict

(…) Following the Second Lebanon War (…), the Security Council expanded UNIFIL’s original mandate, stating that its purpose was to “monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations (…).” That means that whenever there is no longer a cessation of hostilities (…) UNIFIL’s main task is undefined, and it may find itself playing a role contrary to its original purpose, as a peacekeeping force. Nevertheless, UNIFIL can have a positive role during wartime. But (…) the peacekeeping force must be extremely careful about impartiality, and this is much more challenging during wartime. (…) Israel has accused UNIFIL of providing a shield for Hezbollah. (…) There is truth in Israel’s claim that the force’s insistence on remaining in the same positions in South Lebanon is at best counterproductive. Not only is there a danger that UNIFIL members could be caught in the crossfire, but there is also the question: How are they supposed to continue to provide humanitarian aid to the population of southern Lebanon that is no longer in place (...) UNIFIL can help ease the suffering of the civilian population, but it should show more flexibility while doing so. (…) Its size and capabilities can now be redirected toward logistical support. It can collaborate with other organizations, states, and NGOs. (…) Alternatively, it risks turning into an entity exploited by Hezbollah as a trap for IDF forces.

Tatiana Waisberg, JPO, 21.10.24

A new front emerges with Iran’s growing threat to Israel and Jordan

(…) From a broad observation of the interests of the Islamic Republic, the intention to expand over as wide an area as possible is evident. First, it intends to take over the Middle East, then the Gulf countries, and then the entire world. Despite the fact that it sounds more than a little like science fiction, this is indeed the aspiration of the Shi’ite extremist Islamic rule in Iran. (…) This is how the Islamic Republic of Iran (…) behaved in Lebanon, through the designated terrorist organization Hezbollah, and in Syria, via its Shi’ite militias. This is how it operated and continues to do so in Yemen, via the Houthis, and this is how it operates through sleeper cells throughout Europe and the entire West. What prevents the territorial continuity of the Iranian regime in the region is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel. (…) last year (…) when the Iranian regime made use of Jordanian airspace for the benefit of the first missile attack against Israel, the king of Jordan put his foot down and cried out publicly against Iran for the first time. Herein, a message was also conveyed to the Iranians regarding their attempt to bring about a coup in Jordan, through the agitation of the Palestinians and the encouragement of Hamas in the kingdom, in their pursuit against the monarchy and the existing regime. In the meantime, the border remains long and easily passable. The world’s attention is directed to the Gaza Strip and to Lebanon, while the eastern arena is left largely unattended.

Ruth Wassermann Lande, JPO, 22.10.24

To Defend Israel, Pressure Netanyahu

(…) Over the past 42 years, Hezbollah has been responsible for the deaths of thousands of Lebanese, Syrians, Israelis, Americans and Jews, including the 1994 bombing at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 85. And today, the terror group (…) holds tremendous power over a weakened Lebanese state.  (…) the Israeli military has every right to defend its citizens against Hezbollah and enable the safe return of northern residents to their home. Even so (…) defeating and disempowering Hezbollah requires a political agreement. One that ensures Israel’s security and that strengthens the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon so it can keep Hezbollah at bay. Israel cannot defeat Hezbollah alone, and it certainly cannot do so with pure military force. (…) there must be a diplomatic solution led by the US, France and pro-Western Arab countries. (…) the international community must seize this opportunity to deescalate regional tensions through a ceasefire that will bring  the hostages home and  end the suffering in Gaza. But none of this will happen without pressuring Netanyahu, who has proven time and again that he’s focused on preserving his political survival. (…) he has bent over backwards to appease the right-wing fringes of his government, even as those fringes become increasingly extreme and unrepresentative of the majority of the Israeli people. (…) Israel is facing unprecedented threats from both external enemies and from its own government. The US cannot follow Netanyahu down this destructive path and must push a diplomatic solution that would integrate Israel into the region, protect it from the threat of terrorism, and ensure it can be a lasting, democratic home for the Jewish people.

Nadav Tamir, TOI, 24.10.24

Strikes on missiles and defense systems send Iran a powerful signal

(…) It’s unlikely that Iranian authorities will publicly acknowledge the full extent of the damage inflicted, which reportedly includes hits to advanced air defense systems and the exposure and destruction of secret sites. (…) Although nuclear and oil facilities remained untouched, Israeli officials described the decision to avoid these sites as reasonable and strategic, given key factors such as the critical partnership with the U.S. Washington not only declined to join any nuclear-focused action but also explicitly vetoed such an attack, opposing economic infrastructure strikes—especially on oil facilities—due to potential global economic fallout on the eve of consequential elections. (…) Now, the pivotal factor is the outcome of the U.S. presidential election and the next administration's policy on the Middle East. Although solving the nuclear issue was not anticipated at this stage, there is limited time left for action, and the new administration will need to engage. For now, Israel appears satisfied with U.S. backing and Iran’s warning against retaliation. The dilemma for Iran’s leadership remains: respond forcefully or contain the attack. Israel believes a response is likely, though its timing is uncertain, leaving tense days ahead.

Yossi Yehoshua, YED, 26.10.24

Israel's Retaliation on Iran Was a Rare Moment of Reason and Restraint

Here is some good news, for a change. Israel acted (…) with commendable rationality and restraint.

The decision to make do with a measured retaliation in Iran, with few casualties and little boasting, is the first judicious decision made by Israel this year. One must commend decision-makers in the government and army, and this too is something of a rarity. (…) If Israel doesn't wreck things and if Iran displays similar restraint, we were saved from another disaster (…) possibly harsher than all the preceding ones. No war broke out between Iran and Israel. The incompetent U.S. administration managed, for the first time since the war erupted, to affect its course. Following a year in which the U.S. fulfilled all Israel's desires and needs, without any strings attached, a year in which Israel did not adhere to any advice, warnings or pleas by the Americans, Israel acceded to the superpower's request. (…) Perhaps it is thanks to the administration that a calamity was avoided. (…) Iran is still a bitter enemy and so are its proxies. The solution for this will never be a military one. Blood continues to be shed on all sides, pointlessly (…). But in the midst of all this despair, a faint glimmer of hope appeared (…). Israel acted with reason and restraint. (…) in these black days, even a faint glimmer of hope is almost a formative event.

Gideon Levy, HAA, 27.10.24

Israel Proved Its Aerial and Intelligence Capabilities in Its Attack on Iran. Now It Can Afford to Show Restraint

(…) This is the first time that Israel has attacked targets in Iran from the air in several locations, including near the capital of Tehran. (...) Israel once again showed Iran's leaders and military commanders that Israeli intelligence knows a lot about most of the country's bases, headquarters, air defense systems and missile depots, as well as its command- and control centers. (…) Despite the damage inflicted, this was a limited strike on some 20 targets. Israel did not attack oil installations, other economic infrastructures or symbols of government. Israel also refrained from striking the well-known nuclear sites (…). The restraint shown by Israel in its attack came in response to the requests and even demands of the United States, which warned that too potent an attack could increase the danger of a regional war, which would also lead to Iranian attacks on its neighbors – Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. This teaches us that (…) Netanyahu is very well aware of the limitations of Israel's power and its dependence on the United States. (…)

Yossi Melman, HAA, 27.10.24

3. US-Wahen und Israel

Israels Regierungschef Benjamin Netanyahu hielt sich anders als bei der US-Wahl 2012, als er offen den Republikaner Mitt Romney unterstützt hatte, diesmal mit einseitigen Sympathiekundgebungen zurück. Klar war dennoch, dass er Donald Trump favorisierte. Gegen beide Politiker laufen in ihren Ländern Gerichtsverfahren. Auch inhaltlich sind sich beide häufig einig, vor allem mit Blick auf das iranische Atomforschungsprogramm. Trump zeigte zudem deutlich mehr Verständnis für Israels Siedlungspolitik im Westjordanland als US-Präsident Joe Biden und Vize-Präsidentin Kamala Harris. Er hielt sich auch mit Kritik an der israelischen Kriegsführung im Gazastreifen zurück und irritierte gleichzeitig mit Aussagen über ein eventuelles Ende Israels, sollte seine Gegenkandidatin Kamala Harris das Rennen für sich entscheiden. Die Kandidatin der demokratischen Partei forderte Israel wiederholt zu mehr Rücksicht auf die Zivilbevölkerung im Gazastreifen auf, sicherte aber auch die ungebrochene Fortsetzung der US-Militärhilfe zu.

Netanyahu is rooting for Trump: Here's why you shouldn't

(…) In the three presidential elections since then, Netanyahu has been backing Donald Trump. (…) There are distinct differences between Trump and Netanyahu. The disgraced former president describes himself as “a really smart person,” but isn’t one; the Israeli prime minister is. (…) The Israeli leader also speaks better English, has a more sophisticated vocabulary, and actually wrote the books that list him as the author. Bibi has military, diplomatic, and governing experience; Trump is a draft dodger with none of that. (…) Netanyahu, the self-styled defender of world Jewry who is so quick to see antisemitism behind all criticism of Israel, seems unfazed by Trump’s history of antisemitism, notably accusations of dual loyalty and threats to hold Jews responsible if he loses the election. (…)

Douglas Bloomfield, JPO, 20.10.24

A Trump Victory May Break the US-Israel Alliance

(…) Kamala Harris is more likely to advocate for limits in the Israeli government’s actions. Trump would voice no such objection, perhaps even urging them to go further. As Israel fights an existential war, it’s not hard to understand why someone voting mainly on Israel would support Trump. However (…) If Trump retakes the presidency, the political fallout may threaten Israel in far more lasting ways than comments about civilian casualties ever could. (…) Think what would happen if Trump is re-elected via a victory in Michigan. Immediately, Dearborn’s Arab-American leaders will crow that Harris’s disregard for their anger about Gaza cost her the election – just as they warned. Student activists will blame her Pro-Israel stance for insufficient turnout from the state’s many universities. It would be hard to argue with either of them. After a year like this, the narrative of Pro-Palestinian political power would reverberate across the country, emboldening these coalitions. (…) some Democratic candidates (…) would seek to build better relationships with the disenchanted Pro-Palestinian voters who were decisive in the 2024 election. Without a Pro-Israel, Democratic president to protect, politicians would feel free to use stronger rhetoric against America’s Israel policies. The bipartisan consensus would start to erode. The “Squad” may have been impotent before, but now would feel the wind in their sails. (…) In this election, Pro-Israel voters can best defend Israel by protecting the resurgent center-left. We must prove to Democratic candidates that supporting Israel is good both for America and their own careers. (…) Israelis cannot afford more damage to the strong bipartisan support that created and sustains its military strength. (…)

David Pernick, TOI, 20.10.24

Israel's alliance with the US has its limits

(…) the American administration has provided us with enormous diplomatic and financial support and has also helped us successfully intercept thousands of enemy missiles. (…) Despite the many disagreements and the breach of trust that has developed toward the U.S., it remains our greatest ally and is irreplaceable. However, we cannot ignore the significant gaps that exist between this important ally and the State of Israel. (…) We frequently hear that the U.S. is pressuring Israel to restrain its military actions in Gaza and Lebanon, urging it to achieve a complete cease-fire, and questioning its commitment and efforts to reduce civilian casualties. (…) One can understand the desperate reluctance of the American people to be involved in the conflict-ridden Mediterranean quagmire, considering the failed wars America fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. One can understand the White House's resistance to entering deep into a war without a predetermined end date, while it prides itself on having brought an end to the "endless wars." (…) However, this understanding does not obligate us to forget our supreme national interests, which we must preserve and uphold. The State of Israel cannot afford to project fear in the face of its enemies, nor to fail to carry out threats of retaliation. This war will continue to accompany us for a long time. (…) we cannot afford to forget, not even for a moment, that we are in a complex and bloody regional war that we have no choice but to fight. (…)

Michael Oren, YED, 23.10.24

Israel Will Be the First to Lose if U.S. Foreign Policy Shifts

At the rapid pace with which U.S. military equipment and personnel were moved to Israel – including air defense interceptor missiles and aircraft carriers – since the October 7 war broke out, all that is missing is to transfer the Pentagon's operations to the Israeli army's military headquarters in Tel Aviv. (…) The Americans told Israeli that they are generous in all respects when it comes to Gaza – Israel can destroy and kill as it desires. The same goes for Beirut's Dahiyeh neighborhood. But when this superpower's economic and strategic interests could possibly be harmed, the "DON'T" sign lights up. Then Israel very quickly backs off its threats to attack Iran. (…) Israel and the United States have the same interests concerning Iran, but the Americans have an additional interest, which is no less important: preserving quiet in the region. Every increase in oil prices, even by one cent, is a blow to the profits of U.S. companies. (…) all the talk about Israeli superiority without relating it to American equipment is imprecise. (…) Israel needs U.S. weapons. (…) Israel must adopt a different tactic. Instead of decisive victory, it should adopt a policy that highlights the shared interests of all countries in the region. (…)

Odeh Bisharat, HAA, 28.10.24

4. Weitere Themen 

Streit um UNRWA

Israel’s race to dismantle UNRWA may backfire

Since the devastating attacks on October 7 and the subsequent revelations of UNRWA’s deeper-than-expected ties to Hamas, Israel’s political establishment has intensified efforts to dismantle the agency. (…) Israel’s case against UNRWA is rooted in serious and well-founded concerns. (…) Yet for all its flaws, rushing to dismantle UNRWA – especially without a viable alternative – will not make Israel safer. At a moment when the country is engaged on multiple fronts, such a drastic measure risks igniting an already volatile landscape in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Shutting down the agency could trigger immediate chaos in the West Bank, sapping Israel’s resources further from areas where it needs it like in Southern Lebanon, and opening new fronts of instability that could overburden its already overstretched military. (…) UNRWA currently (…) coordinates closely with the IDF’s Civil Administration, the sudden severance of communication would disrupt vital deconfliction procedures and hinder civil-military coordination, affecting IDF operations in densely-populated and hostile refugee camps where militant groups have proliferated. This breakdown would not only escalate the risk to Israeli soldiers but also open the door to new levels of chaos and unrest. On the economic front, the West Bank is already suffering from the loss of income for the more than 100,000 Palestinian workers now barred from entering Israel (…). In Gaza, the consequences could be even more severe. (…) UNRWA remains the de facto backbone of humanitarian operations. (…) What’s needed is a rigorous, internationally-driven reform agenda that tackles UNRWA’s core deficiencies head-on. (…) Destroying UNRWA without a strategic plan will only deepen the region’s instability and complicate Israel’s multilayered security challenges. (…)

Jess Manville, TOI, 19.10.24

Why an anti-UNRWA law won’t work

(…) the Knesset passed a law banning the UNRWA organization in Israel. Yet a proper legal analysis shows that, aside from some short-term virtue signaling, the new Israeli law is unlikely to have any impact at all. Under Israel’s new law, UNRWA is not permitted to “operate any institution, provide any service, or conduct any activity, whether directly or indirectly,” in the sovereign territory of Israel. However, by Israeli law, neither Gaza nor Judea/Samaria (the “West Bank”) are Israeli “sovereign territory” and for good reason. In order to become sovereign territory, Israel must perform a legal act called “annexation.” (…) Under both international law and Israel’s own citizenship laws, Israel is required to offer full citizenship to all people living in an annexed area, regardless of religion, ethnicity, or national origin (…). To do otherwise would effectively create multiple classes of citizens with different rights, an anathema to most Israelis as well as to any true democracy. (…) Most of the areas where UNRWA operates are not Israeli “sovereign territory” according to Israeli law, and therefore not covered by the new anti-UNRWA law. Under this new law, UNRWA will therefore continue to operate in Gaza and Judea/Samaria, and in all likelihood, will continue its involvement in terror activities against Israelis. (…)

Daniel Pomerantz, JPO, 31.10.24

Gedenken an Yehuda Bauer

Pioneering Israeli Holocaust and Genocide Scholar Yehuda Bauer Dies at 98

Professor Yehuda Bauer, one of the world's leading Holocaust scholars, passed away (…) at the age of 98. A recipient of the Israel Prize, a member of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, and a senior researcher at Yad Vashem, Bauer is survived by daughters and grandchildren. Bauer was born in Prague in 1926 (…). In March 1939, just before the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia, his family fled Prague on a train alongside Max Brod (…). Bauer began his Holocaust research in the 1960s, encouraged by the poet and partisan Abba Kovner. (…) Bauer dedicated his life to studying the Holocaust, antisemitism, and genocide. He was a pioneering figure in Holocaust research in Israel and globally. (…) One of the central questions that occupied Bauer as a Holocaust and genocide scholar was the issue of the Holocaust's uniqueness. On the one hand, he argued that clear parallels exist between the Holocaust and other genocides, which have occurred throughout human history. (…) On the other hand, Bauer explained why the Holocaust was distinct. First, because of its global scope – the plan to annihilate every Jew, everywhere. Second, because of its ideology. Unlike other genocides, which were often pragmatic, the Holocaust was anti-pragmatic, and was a burden on the German people, who could have used the Jews as slaves, but instead chose to exterminate them. (…) Bauer criticized attempts to draw parallels between Israel's security threats and the persecution of Jews during the Holocaust, and also rejected claims that Israel's extreme nationalism mirrors that of Hitler. (…) Bauer opposed the current format of educational trips to Poland, available and popular in most Israeli high schools, which include flag-waving and singing, as well as teaching about the Holocaust in elementary schools. (…)

Ofer Aderet, HAA, 19.10.24

In Memory: Yehuda Bauer (6 April 1926-18 October 2024)

(…) Yehuda Bauer, one of Israel’s foremost historians who dedicated his life to the study of the Holocaust (…) began his academic career a year later at the Institute of Contemporary Judaism at the Hebrew University. Between the years 1973-1975 and 1979-1977 he served as the head of the Institute for Contemporary Judaism and in the years. Bauer also founded and headed the Vidal Sasson International Center for the Study of Anti-Semitism at the Hebrew University. Between 1996-2000, Professor Bauer was the head of the International Institute for the Study of the Holocaust at Yad Vashem. (…) In 1998, Professor Bauer won the Israel Prize for the History of the People of Israel. In 2000, he was elected a member of the Israeli National Academy of Sciences. During his long career, Professor Bauer published more than 40 books on the Holocaust and anti-Semitism (…). Yehuda was a tower of knowledge and wisdom. His scholarship and legacy will last for many years to come.

Raphael Cohen-Almagor, TOI, 19.10.24

HAA = Haaretz

YED = Yedioth Ahronoth / Ynetnews

JPO = Jerusalem Post

IHY = Israel HaYom

TOI = Times of Israel

GLO = Globes

Published: November 2024.

Responsible:

Dr. Ralf Melzer,

Head of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Israel

Editors:

Susanne Knaul

Judith Stelmach

Homepage: israel.fes.de

Email: fes(at)fes.org.il