



Israeli Foreign Policy Index 2024

Findings of the Mitvim Institute Survey



September 2024

The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2024

Findings of the Mitvim Institute Survey

September 2024

The Mitvim Institute's twelfth annual public opinion poll on Israeli foreign policy was conducted at the end of August. The survey was conducted by the Rafi Smith Institute in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, among a representative sample of the adult population in Israel (862 men and women, Jews and Arabs) and with a sampling error of 3.3%.

Almost a year after the October 7th attack, the survey aimed to assess the public's views on key issues concerning Israel's foreign policy and strategy. It focused on immediate topics such as war objectives and potential exit strategies, while also exploring how the war has shaped the public's strategic mindset on foreign policy issues.

This document presents the findings of the survey, divided into five areas: Israel's foreign relations, Israeli foreign policy, Israel and the Palestinians, Israel-United States relations, and Israel's relations with regional actors.

This year the survey included, among other things, questions about the preferred outcome of the fighting in Gaza; Israel-US relations and the upcoming presidential elections; Israel's policy towards Hezbollah in the short term, and towards Iran in the long term; Israel's global status following the war and the danger of becoming a "pariah state"; the future of strategic relations with Egypt; Israel's relation with the UN and international sanctions on violent settlers; The connection between the campaign against Iran and the conflict with the Palestinians; Israel's role in the global struggle between the US, China and Russia; the humanitarian crisis in Gaza; and the future of Israel-Turkey relations.

A. Israel's Foreign Relations

- A sharp drop in the Israeli public's assessment of Israel's situation in the world (4.31). This is a significant decrease from the relatively low score given by the public last year (5.03) and the second lowest assessment in the last decade. 70% of respondents describe Israel's international situation as not good or not very good.
- However, the public is quite optimistic in assessing **Israel's international situation 5 years from now**. 60%*¹ of the respondents believe that the state of Israel's foreign relations is expected to improve, compared to a quarter of the respondents who believe that it is expected to continue to deteriorate. This optimism cuts across political sectors among the Jewish audience but it does not include the Arab sector, where they are much more pessimistic about the future of Israel's foreign relations.
- The majority of the public (57%)* show great concern over **the transformation of the State of Israel into a "pariah state"** following the continuation of the war in Gaza and the government's policies. This, compared to 43% who show little or no concern at all.

¹ Data marked with * refers to respondents with an opinion only, excluding those who did not express an opinion.

- In relation to **Israel's conduct in the face of the UN's critical approach** - the majority of the public (53%)* believes that Israel should mobilize the US and Israel's allies to change UN policy and its institutions. A quarter of the respondents support boycotting the UN as a hostile entity, and 22% support improving relations with the UN.
- A change in the global orientation of the Israeli public - a focus on developing relations with Western European countries and a decrease in the diplomatic value of Russia and China. In the question of **who are the three most important countries for Israel besides the USA**, the importance of Western European countries increased - Great Britain (44%), Germany (41%) and France (30%), at the expense of Russia (from 32% to 12%) and China (from 26% to 7.5%) that were pushed down the list of importance. Germany was chosen for the second year as the most important country for Israel besides the USA (21%). Turkey's importance dropped significantly from 9% last year to less than 1% in the current survey. A general decrease is noticeable in the selection of Middle Eastern countries.

B. Israel's Foreign Policy

- The public gives **the government's performance in the field of foreign relations** since the beginning of the war a score of 3.84 - which is the lowest score since we started conducting the surveys in 2013. This is a drastic decrease from the relatively low score given by the public last year (4.89). 72% of the respondents expressed relatively low satisfaction with the functioning of the government. Dissatisfaction cuts across political sectors and includes 77% of center-right voters and more than half of right-wing voters².
- **Foreign Minister Israel Katz** receives a low score for his performance - 4.02. Almost half of the respondents are not satisfied with his performance so far (1-3). Over half of right-wing voters (including more than half of Likud voters) and 75% of center-right voters gave his performance a relatively low score (1-5)³.
- The public gives the state of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a score of 3.94, which is also the lowest score since we started the survey a decade ago. This is a drastic decrease in the evaluation of **the situation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** from last year (5.00). Almost a quarter of the respondents rated the situation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as 1.

C. Israel-United States Relations

- There is a slight increase in the public's assessment of **the state of Israel-US relations** (5.73 compared to 5.3 last year). However, this is still a relatively low score compared to previous years. There is a clear correlation between political positions and the assessment of the state of relations. Thus, almost 40% of the respondents who define

² Among the respondents in the Jewish sector.

³ Among the respondents in the Jewish sector.

themselves as left or center-left evaluated the relations as not good (1-3) compared to almost 70% of the right-wing voters who defined them as good (6-10).

- There is near unanimity in the Israeli public regarding **the importance of the US as a critical element for ensuring Israel's existence**. The public gives this importance a score of 7.69. Over a third of the respondents rated the importance of the US at a score of 10.
- **Ahead of the US elections** in November - a vast majority (68%)* of the Israeli public see Donald Trump as **the candidate who will best serve Israel's interests**. Only 14% chose Kamala Harris. 18% see no significant difference between the candidates on this issue.

D. Israel and the Palestinians

- A relative majority of the Israeli public (44%) supports a package deal that includes **normalization with Saudi Arabia, the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state that is not controlled by Hamas, and an American-led regional defense alliance**. 37% oppose this deal. 19% have not yet formed an opinion on the subject.
- On the question of **the desired outcome of ending the fighting in Gaza** - 42%* of the respondents support the replacement of Hamas rule with an alternative Palestinian rule with regional aid and American backing. 29% support the full occupation of the Gaza Strip and civilian settlement there. The same percentage supports the continuation of a military presence and long-term variable-intensity combat to suppress the regrouping of Hamas.
- Deploying a multinational force that includes the moderate Arab states is **the temporary solution preferred by a relative majority** of respondents (46%)* **to manage life in Gaza in the coming years until a permanent solution is found**. 38% prefer that Israel rule Gaza and manage the lives of its citizens in the coming years. Only 14% support the transfer of control to a revitalized Palestinian Authority (among them only a quarter of the left and center-left supporters). Only 2% support continued control of a weakened Hamas in the Strip.
- The Israeli public is divided on the question of **the strategic political goal that Israel should lead vis-a-vis the Palestinians**. 25% support the promotion of an agreement for a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians within the framework of a regional normalization agreement. 23% support the annexation of the territories and the application of sovereignty to Gaza, and the West Bank. 15% support a unilateral separation from the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank similar to the process of disengagement. Only 5% support the establishment of one equal democratic state from the river to the sea. A considerable percentage - about a fifth of the public - have not yet formed their opinion on the issue.
- The recognition of the connection between **the Government's judicial reform and the promotion of annexation and the application of sovereignty over the territories in the West Bank** is growing stronger in the Israeli public. More than half of the respondents believe that the efforts are related to a large extent (47% last year),

compared to 27% of respondents who believe that they are not related or related to a small extent. 22% of the respondents have not yet formed an opinion on the subject.

- A majority of the public (about half of the respondents) supports the international move to impose **sanctions on violent settlers and settler organizations that encourage violence in the territories**, as long as it is limited to violent settlers only. This, compared to the 33% who oppose the move altogether. Among those who support the move - 21% support it as long as it does not include sanctions against all settlers, 19% support the move without reservations, and 10% of respondents support the move as long as it is not directed against Israeli citizens within the Green Line. 17% of the respondents have not yet formulated a position on the issue.
- The opinions of the Israeli public are divided on the question of **Israel's involvement in preventing the worsening of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza**. 52%* of respondents support an Israeli effort to prevent a crisis, compared to 48% who believe that the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip should not be a concern for Israel. Focusing on those who support the Israeli effort to prevent a crisis - 32% of respondents justify their support for preserving Israel's status in the world and maintaining public health in Israel. 20% of respondents support the humanitarian effort for moral reasons.

E. Israel and Regional Actors

- When asked **which two countries in the Middle East have the most important relationship with Israel**, the long-standing peace partners — Egypt and Jordan — were ranked highest, well ahead of the countries involved in the Abraham Accords and the normalization process. Egypt leads by a large margin as the most important country in the Middle East for Israel. 30% of respondents chose it as the most important country, and 46% for one of the two most important countries. Jordan is second with 15% (38% chose it as one of the two most important countries). Trailing behind are Saudi Arabia, which 20% of respondents rated as one of the two most important countries, and the United Arab Emirates, which only 11% rated as one of the two most important.
- Building a US-sponsored regional coalition is **the public's preferred strategy for dealing with the threat from Iran and its allies**. *46% support this option, compared to 32% who support launching an independent military campaign against Iran and its proxies. 14% support the opening of diplomatic negotiations with Iran. Only 8% support the continuation of the existing situation of limited fighting against Iran, Hezbollah and the Houthis.
- When asked about the possibility of **establishing a channel for dialogue and message exchanges with Iran** (via a third party), 42% of respondents believe it would have little impact on reducing tensions between the parties. Meanwhile, 38% think that creating a dialogue track could benefit Israel, while 20% feel it could be detrimental.

- Only 36%* of the public agrees with the opinion that **promoting an arrangement with the Palestinians will help Israel deal effectively with the Iranian threat**, compared to 64% who do not agree or tend to disagree with this opinion.
- A sharp increase in **the view of the European Union as Israel's adversary** (54% this year compared to 39% last year) and a decrease among those who see it as a friend (23%). This is in opposition to the trend that has been observed in recent years of the strengthening of the positive perception towards the Union. However, almost a quarter of the respondents have not yet formed a position on the issue.
- 44%* of the public supports an all-out military operation in Lebanon as a **preferred strategy to deal with Hezbollah in Lebanon**. 25% of the respondents think that the international community should be harnessed to promote a diplomatic move that will lead to the withdrawal of Hezbollah beyond the Litani River. A similar percentage supports the promotion of a broad international arrangement to stabilize the internal system in Lebanon and delineate the land border between the countries. Only 5% support leaving the status quo with Hezbollah.
- The majority of the public (58%)* opposes any **European involvement in the West Bank**. 24% of the respondents believe that Europe should have a role in the economic rehabilitation of the Palestinian Authority and the promotion of governmental reforms. 11% believe that Europe should focus on stopping the expansion of settlements in the West Bank and imposing sanctions on violent settlers. Only 7% recognized the European role in promoting the establishment of a Palestinian state.
- 41%* of the respondents believe that **Europe** should not have any role in **shaping the reality after the end of the fighting in the Gaza Strip**. In contrast, 34% believe that the European Union should take part in a civilian multinational force, which will replace the IDF for an interim period after the end of the fighting. 17% believe that the Europeans should focus on the economic and civil development of the Strip. And 8% believe that they should focus on the introduction of humanitarian equipment.
- The public is divided on the question **to what extent Israel should take Egypt into account when formulating its military and political moves**. 41% believe that Israel should consider Egyptian interests to a great extent, 31% believe that it should consider them to a small extent, and 16% believe that it should not be considered.
- As in previous years, the importance of **strengthening relations with Jordan** continues to be high in the view of the Israeli public (7.57). Over 30% rated this goal with a score of 10.
- The public continues to attach relatively high importance to the establishment of a **regional framework for cooperation to deal with the climate crisis in the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin**. However, there is a decrease this year in the level of importance of this goal compared to the previous two years (6.9 this year compared to 7.56 last year).
- The public is divided on the question of **the future of relations with Turkey** - *39% of the Israeli public supports severing relations with the Erdogan government, while 29% actually support the advancement of business and civil ties as a way to circumvent the

political crisis. 18% believe that Israel should ignore the current crisis. Only 14% support a proactive Israeli effort to improve relations with the Erdogan government.

- A large majority of the Israeli public (60%) attaches great importance to **Israel's belonging to the global democratic-liberal camp in the reality of an increasing conflict between the US on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other**, compared to only 18% who attach little or no importance to it. 22% of the public has not yet formed a position on the subject.
- The public is divided as to **the preferred policy towards Russia**. A third of the respondents* believe that Israel should join the Western countries and strengthen its political support of Ukraine, but the same percentage believe that it should try to "toe the line" between the West and Russia. 22% are in favor of strengthening relations with Russia and reducing friction with it. In contrast, 12% believe that Israel should act to suppress Russia's influence in the region, even at the cost of a direct confrontation with it.

Trends Over the Years

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014
Israel's standing in the world	4.31	5.03	5.85	5.58	5.63	6.10	5.82	5.49	5.01	3.96	5.12
Government's foreign policy performance	3.83	4.82	5.53	5.29	6.05	5.99	5.22	5.05	4.55	4.03	4.80
Strengthen the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	3.94	5.0	5.4	5.23	5.69	5.37	5.01	4.81	4.31	4.03	4.80
State of US-Israel relations	5.7	5.3	6.85	6.46	8.05	7.75	7.75	6.88	5.56	5.01	6.09

*In the years 2014-2018, the question about the status of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was phrased differently.

Background Variables of the Sample

Sample size: 862.

Gender: 50% women and 50% men.

The Arab public constitutes 17% of the total sample.

Immigrants from the former Soviet Union constitute 15% of the Jewish sector.

The survey was conducted at the end of August 2024.

A. Israel's Foreign Relations

- How would you rate Israel's current global standing, on a scale of 1-10, with 10 signifying "excellent" and 1 "poor?"

	2024	2023	2022
1- Poor	17%	13.7%	5.1%
2	6%	5.7%	2.8%
3	16%	9.0%	5.6%
4	15%	13.0%	8.7%
5	15%	14.4%	15.8%
6	13%	12.6%	17.9%
7	10%	13.3%	23.3%
8	4%	11.1%	15.4%
9	1%	2.9%	3.4%
10 – Excellent	3%	4.3%	2.0%
1-10 average	4.31	5.03	5.85
% of those expressing opinion	98%	98%	99%

- Israel's global standing – grouped by sector

	Jews (99%)	Arabs (95%)	Total (98%)
1-3 Poor	37%	50%	39%
4-5 Fair	29%	30%	30%
6-7 Good	25%	13%	23%
8-10 Excellent	9%	7%	8%
1-10 average	4.44	3.69	4.31

- Israel's global standing – Multi-year trend

2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014
4.31	5.03	5.85	5.58	5.63	6.10	5.82	5.49	5.01	3.96	5.12

- How do you foresee Israel's global standing five years from now?

	Total	Among 87% expressing an opinion
Much better	20%	60%
A little better	32%	
The same	13%	15%
Slightly worse	9%	25%
Much worse	13%	
No opinion	13%	
Better-worse gap		35%+

- Israel's future standing – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (86%)	Arabs (90%)	Total (87%)
Better	67%	30%	60%
Same	14%	18%	15%
Worse	19%	52%	25%
Better-worse gap	+48%	22%	+35%

- The UN and its institutions have increased their criticism of Israeli policy on the Palestinian issue since the war began. How do you think Israel should respond?

	2024	Among 88% expressing an opinion
Boycott the UN and designate it a hostile body	21%	25%
Make an effort to improve relations with the UN and its institutions	20%	22%
Mobilize the US and other allies to influence UN attitudes toward Israel	47%	53%

No opinion	12%	
------------	-----	--

- How should Israel respond to the UN? – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (91%)	Arabs (73%)	Total (88%)
Boycott the UN and designate it a hostile body	26%	17%	25%
Make an effort to improve relations with the UN and its institutions	15%	64%	22%
Mobilize the US and other allies to influence UN attitudes toward Israel	59%	19%	53%

- Some say the prolonged Gaza war and government policies are eroding Israel's international standing, potentially turning it into a "pariah" state. To what extent does this concern you?

	2024	Among 90% expressing an opinion
A great deal	26%	57%
To quite a large extent	26%	
To a small extent	20%	43%
Not at all	18%	
No opinion	10%	

- Decline in Israel's standing – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (92%)	Arabs (81%)	Total (90%)
Concerning	56%	67%	57%
Not concerning	44%	33%	43%

- Besides the US, which three countries are currently most important to Israel?

(Open question: Table only includes countries receiving 3% or more)

	First country	Two other countries	Aggregate of 3
UK	17.9%	26.2%	44.1%
Germany	21.2%	20.0%	41.2%
France	4.7%	25.2%	29.9%
Egypt	2.4%	9.7%	12.1%
Russia	5.5%	6.2%	11.7%
China	1.4%	6.1%	7.5%
Saudi Arabia	2.4%	5.0%	7.4%
Jordan	1.9%	5.0%	6.9%
India	1.0%	3.0%	4%
UAE	1.4%	2.4%	3.8%

- Multi-year trend

	2024	2023	2022	2021
UK	44.1%	%28.2	%24	%25.6
Germany	41.2%	%31.4	%28.7	%28.4
France	29.9%	%20.2	%16.3	%11.8
Egypt	12.1%	%21.3	%18.6	%16.3
Russia	11.7%	%31.8	%39.7	%36.6
China	7.5%	%25.8	%23.4	%21.9
Saudi Arabia	7.4%	%11.8	%10.8	%2.6
Jordan	6.9%	%11.5	%6.7	%11.6
India	4%	%5.5	%4.4	%3.4
UAE	3.8%	%10.5	%9.7	%7.2

B. Israel's Foreign Policy

- To what extent are you satisfied with the government's handling of foreign relations since the start of the war, with 10 signifying "very satisfied" and 1 "not at all"?

	2024
1- Not at all satisfied	31%
2	11%
3	10%
4	9%
5	11%
6	9%
7	8%
8	5%
9	3%
10- Very satisfied	3%
1-10 average	3.84
% expressing an opinion	97%

- Government's foreign relations performance – grouped by sector

	Jews (98%)	Arabs (95%)	Total
1-3 Dissatisfied	50%	59%	52%
4-5 Not very satisfied	19%	24%	20%
6-7 Quite satisfied	18%	12%	17%
8-10 Satisfied	13%	5%	11%
1-10 average	3.96	3.24	3.84

- Government's foreign relations performance – multi-year trend

2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014
3.83	4.82	5.53	5.29	6.05	5.99	5.22	5.05	4.55	4.03	4.80

- How would you rate Foreign Minister Israel Katz’s performance, with 10 signifying “excellent” and 1 “poor”?

	2024	Total
1- Poor	27%	48%
2	8%	
3	13%	
4	9%	24%
5	15%	
6	9%	18%
7	9%	
8	6%	10%
9	2%	
10- Excellent	2%	
1-10 average	4.02	
% expressing an opinion	83%	

- Foreign Minister’s performance – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (83%)	Arabs (86%)	Total (83%)
1-3 Poor	48%	45%	48%
4-5 Fair	21%	34%	24%
6-7 Good	19%	15%	18%
8-10 Excellent	12%	6%	10%
1-10 average	4.10	3.64	4.02

- How would you rate the current state of the Foreign Ministry, with 10 signifying “excellent” and 1 “not good”?

	2024	2023	2022
1- Not good	24%	16.6%	10.6%
2	9%	5.5%	5.4%
3	14%	8.7%	6.5%
4	10%	10.4%	7.1%
5	16%	12.3%	17.4%
6	10%	14.2%	14.2%
7	9%	13.3%	19.6%
8	4%	10.3%	13.1%

9	2%	4.5%	4.1%
10- Excellent	2%	4.2%	1.9%
1-10 average	3.94	5.0	5.4
% expressing an opinion	87%	92%	93%

○ Foreign Ministry's current state – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (87%)	Arabs (89%)	Total (87%)
1-3 Poor	48%	47%	47%
4-5 Fair	25%	28%	26%
6-7 Good	19%	19%	19%
8-10 Excellent	8%	6%	8%
1-10 average	3.99	3.72	3.94

○ Foreign Ministry's current state – Multi-year trend

2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
3.94	5.0	5.4	5.23	5.69

C. Israel-United States Relations

- How would you rate the current state of US-Israel relations, with 10 signifying “excellent” and 1 “poor”?

	2024	Aggregated
1- Poor	7%	17%
2	3%	
3	7%	
4	11%	27%
5	16%	
6	15%	33%
7	18%	
8	14%	23%
9	5%	
10- Excellent	4%	
average 1-10	5.73	

% expressing an opinion	96%
-------------------------	-----

- Current state of US-Israel Relations – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (97%)	Arabs (93%)	Total (96%)
1-3 poor	16%	19%	17%
4-5 fair	27%	27%	27%
5-7 good	36%	22%	33%
8-10 excellent	21%	32%	23%
1-10 average	5.74	5.68	5.73

- Current state of US-Israel Relations – multi-year trend

2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014
5.7	5.3	6.85	6.46	8.05	7.75	7.75	6.88	5.56	5.01	6.09

- To what extent do you see the US as being important to Israel’s survival, with 10 signifying “very important” and 1 “not at all”?

	2024	Total
1- Not at all important	4%	7%
2	1%	
3	2%	
4	4%	12%
5	8%	
6	7%	20%
7	13%	
8	15%	
9	11%	61%
10- Very important	35%	
1-10 average	7.69	
% expressing an opinion	96%	

○ Importance of the US to Israel – grouped by sector

	Jews (97%)	Arabs(93%)	Total (96%)
1-3 not important	6%	10%	7%
4-5 not very important	11%	20%	12%
6-7 somewhat important	21%	16%	20%
8-10 important	62%	54%	61%
1-10 average	7.78	7.22	7.69

● Which US presidential candidate do you believe would better serve Israel's interests?

	2024	Among 85% expressing an opinion
Kamala Harris	12%	14%
Donald Trump	57%	68%
No difference	16%	18%
Don't know	15%	

○ Presidential candidates considered best for – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (85%)	Arabs (83%)	Total (85%)
Kamala Harris	13%	17%	14%
Donald Trump	76%	27%	68%
No difference	11%	56%	18%

D. Israel and the Palestinians

- The international community and countries in the region are offering Israel a regional initiative that includes normalization with Saudi Arabia, the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state not under Hamas control, and an American-led regional defense alliance. Do you support or oppose this initiative?

	2024	Aggregated among 81% expressing an opinion
Greatly support	17%	55%
Quite support	27%	
Quite oppose	18%	45%
Greatly oppose	19%	
No opinion	19%	

- Support for a regional peace initiative – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (83%)	Arabs (71%)	Total (81%)
Support	52%	70%	55%
Oppose	48%	30%	45%

- In your view, what would be the best outcome for the war in Gaza?

	2024	Among 86% expressing an opinion
Replacing the Hamas regime with a US and regionally backed Palestinian alternative	36%	42%
Full occupation of the Gaza Strip and settlements there	25%	29%
Long-term military presence and fighting at required intensity to prevent re-emergence of Hamas military power	25%	29%
No opinion	14%	

- Preferred outcome of the Gaza war – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (92%)	Arabs (59%)	Total (86%)
Replacing the Hamas regime with a US and regionally backed Palestinian alternative	40%	62%	42%
Full occupation of the Gaza Strip and settlements there	31%	11%	29%
Long-term military presence and fighting at required intensity to prevent re-emergence of Hamas military power	29%	27%	29%

- Who would you like to see running Gaza and the affairs of its residents in the coming years until a permanent solution is found?

	2024	Among 89% expressing an opinion
A weakened Hamas	2%	2%
Israel	34%	38%
A reconstituted, reformed Palestinian Authority	12%	14%
A multinational force that includes moderate Arab states	41%	46%
No opinion	11%	

- Who should rule Gaza – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (92%)	Arabs (72%)	Total (89%)
A weakened Hamas	1%	7%	2%
Israel	41%	21%	38%
A reconstituted, reformed Palestinian Authority	11%	31%	14%
A multinational force that includes moderate Arab states	47%	41%	46%

- **What strategic goal do you think the government should pursue regarding the Palestinian issue?**

	2024	Among 80% expressing an opinion
Agreement on a two-state solution within the framework of a regional normalization deal	25%	31%
Annexation and application of sovereignty on Gaza, and the West Bank	23%	29%
Avoiding strategic moves and maintaining status quo	12%	15%
Unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, similar to 2005 Gaza withdrawal	15%	19%
Establishment of one egalitarian state from the river to the sea	5%	6%
No opinion	20%	

- **Strategic goals on the Palestinian issue – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)**

	Sector		Total (80%)
	Jews (81%)	Arabs (72%)	
Agreement on a two-state solution within the framework of a regional normalization deal	26%	31%	31%
Annexation and application of sovereignty on Gaza, and the West Bank	33%	29%	29%
Avoiding strategic moves and maintaining status quo	15%	15%	15%
Unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, similar to 2005 Gaza withdrawal	21%	19%	19%
Establishment of one egalitarian state from the river to the sea	5%	6%	6%

- The current Israel government is pursuing two main initiatives: legislation to change the judicial system and the annexation and application of sovereignty over the West Bank. To what extent do you think these efforts are related?

	Total	Aggregated among 78% expressing an opinion
Related to a very large extent	25%	65%
Related to quite a large extent	26%	
Slightly related	15%	35%
Unrelated or very slightly related	12%	
No opinion	22%	

- Extent of link between judicial legislation and annexation plans – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (79%)	Arabs (72%)	Total (78%)
Related	64%	69%	65%
Unrelated	36%	31%	35%

- Extent of link between judicial legislation and annexation plans – multi-year trend and grouped by sector

	Jews		Arabs		Total	
	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023
Related	64%	56%	69%	72%	65%	59%
Unrelated	36%	44%	31%	28%	35%	41%

- What is your opinion on the recent sanctions imposed by several countries on violent settlers and settler organizations that incite violence in the territories?

	2024	Among 83% expressing an opinion
Unreservedly support	19%	24%
Support as long as they don't include non-violent settlers	21%	25%
Support as long as they don't include Israelis within the Green Line	10%	12%
Oppose the sanctions	33%	39%
No opinion	17%	

- Views on settler sanctions – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (85%)	Arabs (71%)	Total (83%)
Unreservedly support	17%	59%	24%
Support as long as they don't include non-violent settlers	26%	18%	25%
Support as long as they don't include Israelis within the Green Line	12%	15%	12%
Oppose the sanctions	45%	8%	39%

- Do you think Israel should act to prevent a humanitarian crisis in Gaza?

	2024	Among 90% expressing an opinion
Yes, it's in Israel's interest in order to defend its international standing and protect its public health	29%	32%
Yes, it's the ethical thing to do	18%	20%
Israel should not concern itself with the humanitarian situation in Gaza	43%	48%
No opinion	10%	

- Position on acting to prevent humanitarian crisis in Gaza – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (81%)	Arabs (71%)	Total (90%)
Yes, it's in Israel's interest in order to defend its international standing and protect its public health	29%	45%	32%
Yes, it's the ethical thing to do	17%	37%	20%
Israel should not concern itself with the humanitarian situation in Gaza	54%	18%	48%

E. Israel and Regional Actors

- Which two Middle Eastern countries do you consider most important to Israel?

	First country	Two other countries	Aggregate of 3 countries
Egypt	29.8%	16.0%	45.8%
Jordan	15.1%	23.0%	38.1%
Saudi Arabia	11.4%	8.6%	20.0%
UAE	5.4%	5.9%	11.3%

- Two most important countries – grouped by sector

	Jews	Arabs	Aggregate of 2 countries
Egypt	49.2%	29.3%	45.8%
Jordan	38.9%	34.0%	38.1%
Saudi Arabia	22.0%	10.7%	20.0%
UAE	11.6%	10.0%	11.3%

- What strategy do you think Israel should adopt in response to Iran's efforts to mount a combined attack from Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria, Iraq, and Yemen (Houthis)?

	2024	Among 87% expressing an opinion
Launch an independent military campaign against Iran and its proxies	28%	32%
Continue with the current limited fighting against Hezbollah and Houthis	7%	8%
Build a US-led regional coalition to confront Iran diplomatically and militarily	40%	46%
Back international negotiations with Iran on curbing its regional activity and that of its proxies	12%	14%
No opinion	13%	

- Israel's strategy in response to Iran – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (90%)	Arabs (72%)	Total (87%)
Launch an independent military campaign against Iran and its proxies	35%	15%	32%
Continue with the current limited fighting against Hezbollah and Houthis	7%	12%	8%
Build a US-led regional coalition to confront Iran diplomatically and militarily	49%	31%	46%
Back international negotiations with Iran on curbing its regional activity and that of its proxies	9%	42%	14%

- Israel-Iran tensions have turned into an almost direct war over the past decade. What is your stance on creating a path for dialogue and message exchange with Iran through third parties?

	2024	Among 86% expressing an opinion
Support: Dialogue path could benefit Israel	32%	38%
Oppose: Dialogue path could harm Israel	18%	20%
Dialogue path will not make a significant difference	36%	42%
No opinion	14%	
Supporter-opponent gap		+18%

- Creating dialogue path and exchanging messages with Iran through third parties – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (88%)	Arabs (74%)	Total (86%)
Support: Dialogue path could benefit Israel	34%	59%	38%
Oppose: Dialogue path could harm Israel	21%	19%	20%
Dialogue path will not make a significant difference	45%	22%	42%
Supporter-opponent gap	+13%	+40%	+18%

- Do you agree or disagree with the following view: “Promoting an arrangement with the Palestinians will help Israel effectively deal with the Iranian threat”?

	Total	Among 91% expressing an opinion
Greatly agree	12%	36%
Agree	20%	
Don't quite agree	23%	64%
Disagree	36%	
No opinion	9%	

- Promoting an arrangement with the Palestinians will help Israel deal effectively with the Iranian threat – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (93%)	Arabs (80%)	Total (91%)
Agree	29%	71%	36%
Disagree	71%	29%	64%

- What strategy do you think Israel should adopt in light of the growing escalation with Hezbollah and Lebanon's domestic collapse?

	2024	Among 84% expressing an opinion
Launch all-out military campaign in Lebanon	37%	44%
Mobilize international community for diplomatic measures to push Hezbollah beyond the Litani	21%	25%
Mobilize international community to advance broad deal with Lebanese gov't on domestic stabilization and border dispute resolution	21%	26%
Maintain limited fighting against Hezbollah	5%	5%
No opinion	16%	

- Preferred strategy vis-à-vis Hezbollah – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Sector		Total (84%)
	Jews (86%)	Arabs (72%)	
Launch all-out military campaign in Lebanon	49%	14%	44%
Mobilize international community for diplomatic measures to push Hezbollah beyond the Litani	25%	25%	25%
Mobilize international community to advance broad deal with Lebanese gov't on domestic stabilization and border dispute resolution	22%	47%	26%
Maintain limited fighting against Hezbollah	4%	14%	5%

- Do you regard the EU as more of a friend or adversary to Israel?

	Jews	Arabs	Total
More of a friend	19%	39%	23%
More of an adversary	60%	29%	54%
No opinion	21%	32%	23%
Friend-foe gap	-41%	+10%	-31%

○ **EU as more of a friend or adversary to Israel – multi-year trend**

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
More of a friend	23%	33%	%33.3	%24.4	29%	27%	18%
More of an adversary	54%	39%	%40.4	%46	43%	45%	55%
No opinion	23%	28%	%26.3	%29.6	28%	28%	27%
Friend-foe gap	-31%	-6%	%-7.1	%-21.6	14%-	- 18%	- 37%

● **What should Europe's main role be in the West Bank?**

	Total	Among 86% expressing an opinion
Economic rehabilitation of Palestinian Authority, advancing significant reforms	20%	24%
Blocking continued settlement expansion in the West Bank and punishing violent settlers	10%	11%
Support for establishment of a Palestinian state	6%	7%
Europe should not play any role in the West Bank	50%	58%
No opinion	14%	

- Europe's role in the West Bank – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (88%)	Arabs (79%)	Total (86%)
Economic rehabilitation of Palestinian Authority, advancing significant reforms	20%	40%	24%
Blocking continued settlement expansion in the West Bank and punishing violent settlers	9%	25%	11%
Support for establishment of a Palestinian state	5%	20%	7%
Europe should not play any role in the West Bank	66%	15%	58%

- What role should Europe play in Gaza after the war, assuming Hamas is no longer in control?

	Total	Among 89% expressing an opinion
Delivering humanitarian aid	7%	8%
Gaza's rehabilitation and economic development	15%	17%
Participation in a multinational force to replace the IDF as an interim solution after the war	30%	34%
Europe should not play a role in Gaza	37%	41%
No opinion	11%	

- Europe's post-war Gaza role – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (91%)	Arabs (81%)	Total (89%)
Delivering humanitarian aid	5%	23%	8%
Gaza's rehabilitation and economic development	14%	32%	17%
Participation in a multinational force to replace the IDF as an interim solution after the war	35%	28%	34%
Europe should not play a role in Gaza	46%	17%	41%

- Given that Egypt is directly affected by the Gaza war and humanitarian crisis and also serves as a mediator between Israel and Hamas, to what extent should Israel consider Egypt's position when formulating military and diplomatic strategies?

	2024	Aggregated among 88% expressing an opinion
To a large extent	12%	41%
To quite a large extent	29%	
To a limited extent	31%	34%
Not at all	16%	
No opinion	12%	

- Taking Egypt's position into account – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (90%)	Arabs (75%)	Total (88%)
Consider Egypt's position	41%	76%	41%
No need to consider Egypt's position	59%	24%	34%

- How important is it for Israel to restore and strengthen relations with Jordan, with 10 signifying “very important” and 1 “not at all”?

	2024	Aggregated
1- Not at all important	4%	8%
2	1%	
3	3%	
4	3%	11%
5	8%	
6	8%	21%
7	13%	
8	19%	60%
9	10%	
10- Very important	31%	
average 1-10	7.57	
% expressing an opinion	94%	

- Rehabilitation of relations with Jordan – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (95%)	Arabs (89%)	Total (94%)
1-3 not important	8%	11%	8%
4-5 not too important	9%	22%	11%
6-7 quite important	22%	17%	21%
8-10 important	61%	50%	60%
1-10 average	7.69	6.96	7.57

○ **Rehabilitation of relations with Jordan – multi-year trend**

Note: Previous surveys asked about “strengthening” relations. The current survey asked about “restoring” and “strengthening”.

	2024	2023	2022	2021
1-3 not important	8%	4%	7.7%	7.1%
4-5 not too important	11%	9%	11.3%	11.6%
6-7 quite important	21%	24%	23.4%	23.9%
8-10 important	60%	63%	57.6%	57.3%
1-10 average	7.57	7.82	7.46	7.50

- **The Middle East and Mediterranean Basin are among the regions most vulnerable to global warming. States in other regions have joined forces to confront the climate crisis. How important do you think it is to establish a similar framework in the Mideast and Mediterranean Basin, with 10 signifying “very important”, 1 “not at all”?**

	2024	Aggregated
1- not at all important	8%	15%
2	2%	
3	5%	
4	4%	
5	9%	13%
6	11%	
7	13%	
8	14%	48%
9	10%	
10- very important	24%	
1-10 average	6.9	
% expressing opinion	87%	

- Importance of regional framework to confront climate crisis – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (88%)	Arabs (84%)	Total (87%)
1-3 not important	16%	7%	15%
4-5 not so important	12%	15%	13%
6-7 quite important	24%	27%	24%
8-10 important	48%	51%	48%
1-10 average	6.85	7.14	6.9

- Importance of regional framework to confront climate crisis – dual-year trend

	2024	2023
1-3 not important	15%	6%
4-5 not so important	13%	12%
6-7 quite important	24%	25%
8-10 important	48%	57%
1-10 average	6.9	7.56

- Which steps do you think Israel should take in response to President Erdogan's hostility?

	Total	Among 90% expressing an opinion
Sever all ties with Turkey	35%	39%
Focus on commercial and civilian ties to bypass diplomatic crisis	26%	29%
Seek to improve ties with Erdogan	13%	14%
Ignore Erdogan, wait until after the war to restore ties	16%	18%

No opinion	10%	
------------	-----	--

- Turkey-Israel relations – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Jews (93%)	Arabs (79%)	Total (90%)
Sever all ties with Turkey	43%	15%	39%
Focus on commercial and civilian ties to bypass diplomatic crisis	30%	25%	29%
Seek to improve ties with Erdogan	8%	48%	14%
Ignore Erdogan, wait until after the war to restore ties	19%	12%	18%

- Given the growing tensions between the US and China and Russia, how important is it for Israel to align with the global liberal-democratic camp?

	2024	Aggregated (among 78% expressing an opinion)
Very important	29%	77%
Quite important	31%	
Not very important	12%	23%
Not at all important	6%	
No opinion	22%	

- Importance of joining democratic-liberal camp – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Sector		Total (78%)
	Jews (80%)	Arabs (71%)	
Very important, quite important	79%	65%	77%
Not very important, not at all important	21%	35%	23%

- What policy should Israel adopt toward Russia in light of its condemnation of Israel’s Gaza campaign and its deepening relations with Iran?

	2024	Among 82% expressing an opinion
Join the Western world and strengthen diplomatic support for Ukraine	27%	33%
Continue “tiptoeing” between Russia and the West	27%	33%
Strengthen relations with Russia to reduce friction	18%	22%
Seek to erode Russia’s regional influence even at the expense of a direct clash	10%	12%
No opinion	18%	

- Israeli policy on Russia – grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion)

	Sector		Total
	Jews (85%)	Arabs (69%)	
Join the Western world and strengthen diplomatic support for Ukraine	35%	22%	33%
Continue “tiptoeing” between Russia and the West	34%	32%	33%
Strengthen relations with Russia to reduce friction	19%	38%	22%
Seek to erode Russia’s regional influence even at the expense of a direct clash	12%	8%	12%

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Commercial use of the publications of the Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation without written permission is strictly prohibited.