November, 2009

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The S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue

The 21st century harbors global changes which entail hopes as well as threats to world peace. Dozens of armed conflicts still prevail at this time around the world which pose a threat to the well-being of various societies. Stabilizing these conflicts is the most pressing challenge of our time.

Given today's security concerns, leaders and national policy makers require more than ever a practical dialogue with experts and academics, in order to arrive at the proper decisions. Several think tanks around the world that deal with theoretical approaches to conflict resolution face two major problems: 1. How to transform theory into practical approaches in policy-making? 2. How to establish dialogue between experts and policy-makers. Furthermore, the principal challenge facing world leaders today concerns ways to transform theoretical research into solution-oriented policies and actions.

Goals of the Center

The S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue at Netanya Academic College is a think-tank and action group comprised of scholars and leaders from a variety of fields. The Center is a unique institution in the Middle East, engaging in both academic pursuits and on-the-ground efforts toward conflict resolution. The International Management of the Center is comprised of former President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev and HRH Crown Prince Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan. The current of the Center is Dr. Ephraim Sneh, former Deputy Defense Minister, Transportation Minister, and Health Minister. The Board of Directors includes academic, political, business and community leaders from nations around the globe (please see the end of this statement for a full listing of the members of the Board of Directors).

The S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue has become pivotal in the establishment of substantive position papers and suggestions for conflict resolution in the region and beyond. The Center represents a much-needed approach to the problems of worldwide conflict, offering solution-driven initiatives based on practical experience and realistic goals. Its multi-faceted method provides a combination of political, security, academic and economic responses through the dispatching of teams of former politicians, community leaders, security experts, distinguished academics and prominent international business people, offering powerful mediation services in regional disputes based on the experience and expertise in their respective fields. The Center also organizes opportunities for academics and world leaders to gather together in order to address pressing global issues via international conferences, round table discussions, and workshops.

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Count Mirabeau said, of 18th century Prussia, "This is not a state that has an army, but an army that has a state". Twenty-first century Israel, based on the conclusions of the insights and findings of the workshops that examined the relations between society and military in Israel, is not a state that has an army either, but an army (the IDF) that has a state. However, we found that the influence of Israel's defense establishment over its society goes far beyond issues that are directly related to defense and security in the military sense.

The idea of studying the relationship between the defense establishment and Israeli society, focusing on ostensibly civilian issues, led us to form a research program that was based on two expert workshops, each of which was composed of two working sessions. Our concept was based on the notion that "national security" is not only a topic of the military and war, but also other, civilian fields. These civilian fields cannot be severed from an analysis of the state's national security concept.

The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which we approached to fund this project, allowed us to realize the research program and the conference that followed. The enthusiastic response to our proposal from the foundation, particularly its director in Israel Dr. Ralph Hexel and Ms. Anita Haviv proved contagious and gave us, at the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue, further incentive to realize our work plan.

After forming the list of experts from different fields, we invited them to the working groups. During the first session, the participants presented the findings of their studies from their academic work or professional experience. In preparation for the second meeting, we asked them to write position papers on their research topic. These were distributed to all the other participants so that they could comment on each others' findings in the second session. As a result, the discussions in the working groups were fascinating. Some of the insights and findings were shown in the conference we held following the workshops. This booklet features the position papers and studies of the workshop participants.

The papers in this booklet analyze various aspects of a unique Israeli cultural phenomenon. Since the late 1940s, a culture that could be referred to as Israel's "**security culture**" has developed. The aspects of this "security culture" continue to be used to this day as an almost sole frame of reference by both policymakers and most sectors of Israeli culture, on national defense topics. The rooting of these aspects has led to a militaristic culture (although there is a debate among the participants surrounding the definition of Israeli society as "militaristic").

We found that within this unique Israeli culture, the security establishment had not only far-reaching influence on all fields of civil life of Israeli society, but is also pivotal in determining the nature of many different fields. These fields are as diverse as education, land resources, communication, care for the peripheral regions of the country and women's integration in decision-making processes. The defense establishment has not only become the exclusive tool for shaping the national defense policy, but also an organ that determines the activity and duties of most of Israel's population, in fields of activity that appear, at first glance, to be far removed from security.

This has caused, among other things, an increase in the weight of the IDF in policymaking and in forming the behavioral norms and values of Israel's society. One contributing factor to this is that "the only place where research on national security are made is the Planning Directorate of the IDF", according to Kobi Michael.

Israel has become a militaristic society without the military overtaking the government. Militarism has become a key component in the politics of Israel's leadership. This, as Uri Ben Eliezer established, is super-partisan militarism, which traverses borders between right and left wings, religious and secular, Oriental and Ashkenazi Jews, new immigrants and veterans. This is a militarism of the controllers and controlled alike.

It is recommended that the policymakers in Jerusalem read this booklet and internalize its message. Israel is actually controlled by the IDF, and they, the public elects, are often a mere rubber stamp for the decisions of the Chief of Staff and the senior command. The experience of the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead should convince them that the time is ripe to change the balance of power between the military and elected officials. A militaristic atmosphere is taking over Israeli society in recent years, increasingly eroding the fundamental values of the country's democracy. It is time to change the equation and state that like any well regulated democratic state, ours must be a state that has a military and not a military that has a state.

In conclusion, I wish to thank again the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, without which this project would not have taken place, and Esti Ofer and Elie Friedman, the members of the center, whose involvement in preparing the workshops and conference was indispensable.

Dr. Reuven Pedatzur
Academic Director
S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue
Netanya Academic College

There is probably no country in the world where the question of national security plays such an important role as in Israel, in both its domestic and foreign policy. The historical background, and at the same time the key to understanding the pivotal significance of this topic in Israeli politics and society, is to be found in the history of the Diaspora, the murder of six million Jews in the Holocaust, and the fact that the existence of the State of Israel has time and time again been threatened and continues to be threatened by its neighbors in the region. At the present, the most vociferous threats come from Iran, whose president hardly misses any opportunity to call publicly for Israel's destruction, while at the same time advancing his country's nuclear program.

This is this background against which the Israel office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue at the Netanya Academic College considered the issue of the relationship in Israel between society and national security doctrine. Which actors, criteria and goals determine the concept of security in Israel? How do politics and the military interact when implementing national security doctrine? Is the concept of security defined in a purely military fashion, or are questions of education, social security or gender also taken into account? What role and significance are attached to the media and civil society actors?

On the international level, an intensive debate is taking place on these issues, and with its worldwide network of projects the FES is also participating in this debate. Since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 9/11, the subject of security has dominated the international agenda. New security policy approaches have been developed because it was no longer possible to tackle the new challenges (terrorism, warlords, failed states) using traditional security concepts. What typifies most of the new concepts is that they no longer focus unilaterally on military means; instead they view the concept of security from a broader perspective.

The present publication documents the attempt to find answers to the questions outlined above. The joint project of the FES and the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue comprised two stages. The first step involved the setting up of two discussion groups, comprising experts and researchers, who in May and June 2009 met in separate workshops to analyze and discuss Israeli security doctrine, on the one hand from a civil perspective (education, culture, gender, welfare, and so on) and on the other hand from a military perspective. In a second step, the results of these workshops were presented on September 2, 2009 in Netanya at the Israeli Society and National Security conference, and then debated before some 200 participants with researchers, representatives of the security establishment, representatives of civil society and journalists.

The FES is a German organization that is committed to the values of social democracy. At the same time, a fundamental principle of our work involves promoting controversial discussions and open debates, and enabling different political positions to be expressed. The choice of participants in the discussions enabled Dr. Reuven Pedatzur to put together a genuinely pluralistic and interdisciplinary think tank. Discussions in both the workshops and the conference were no-holds-barred and controversial, and a variety of political positions were manifest. The productive discussions showed that there is a major need to debate this topic, in order to achieve new approaches to formulating and implementing Israeli security doctrine. It also became clear that civil actors are both able and wish to make a very important contribution to this project.

On behalf of the FES, I would like to thank the researchers and experts involved in this publication for their outstanding work and major commitment. This commitment on their part involved not only drawing up the analyses, but also the open and productive discussions in the workshops and at the conference. I would like in particular to thank Dr. Reuven Pedatzur, Elie Friedman, Esti Ofer and the team of the Netanya Academic College, without whose contribution the project and this publication would not have been possible.

Dr. Ralf Hexel, Director
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Israel Office

Herzliya, November 2009

Workshop A:
What Stands behind the Concept of "Security" in Israel?

The participants of the first workshop were requested to relate to five issues that were presented to them:

1. How, in your opinion, does Israeli society perceive the concept of security?
2. What are the security threats that Israel faces, and does the defense establishment manipulate them for achieving its objectives?
3. To what extent does the civil establishment control the defense establishment?
4. Can Israeli society be defined as militaristic?
5. Is Israel's democracy endangered?

1. How, in your opinion, does Israeli society perceive the concept of security?

Kobi Michael opted to combine his response to cover the first two issues, giving his analysis the title: National Defense and the Framing of Threats

The purpose of the political leadership, as well as its clear-cut responsibility, is to ensure national security, which is defined as defending the existence of the nation and its vital interests (Tal, 1996).[1] The threats to the existence of a country and nation have both physical and political meaning. Whereas threats to state security are threats to the well-being of its citizens, its intactness and sovereignty, threats to the security of the nation are threats to national identity and the legitimacy of its existence as a national entity.

National security is "undoubtedly a significant social problem" (Kimmerling, 2001, 270), and as such it becomes a concept that represents a wide spectrum of threats and challenges, the military threat being only one of them. Various state institutes are responsible for addressing threats of different kinds, meaning that in cases in which a certain threat out of all of the threats to national security has a prominent, unique weight, whether objective or merely perceived as such, it may be said that the institute charged with facing the threat would have greater influence over shaping the national security concept.

Because national security is a socially oriented term, it cannot be detached from ideologies and cultural characteristics. This means that "doctrines of national security often have rules and practices that completely contradict the genuine interests of the goals of national security" (Kimmerling, 2001, 272). Indeed, policymakers interpret the strategic environment through their lenses of political ideology, which shape the way in which they perceive others and frame threats.

An example of such a failure may be found in the United States, in which policy makers have been affected by their democratic ideology, identifying democratic countries as friends while defining undemocratic countries as enemies (Oren, 1995). Therefore, understanding how political ideology materializes and the conceptual frames that it draws upon is essential for solving the riddle of who effectively interprets the essence of the strategic environment, the threats to national security and the solution to these threats and challenges.

In effect, the national security concept involves framing of threats and devising the required solutions to them. But in many cases, particularly in the Israeli context, there is a tendency to blur different types of threats. Security threats become strategic threats, and strategic threats become existential ones. Because the broad concept of security is perceived, in the Israeli context, in most cases, as equivalent to military security, the meaning of the strategic threat almost always leads to a military form of framing, which draws its logic from military philosophy. The distinction between the threat types is very important in general, and all the more so in the case of Israel, owing to its unique characteristics, because facing existential threats legitimizes the use of extreme measures, which in turn may lead to escalation and intensification of the threats.

When speaking of threats to Israel, an existential threat would be defined as a **trend, process, or development that significantly endangers the very existence of the state of Israel as a national home of the Jewish People**. An analysis of the geo-strategic reality indicates three main categories of existential threats to the State of Israel.

1. The first category is demographic in essence and deals with the loss of the Jewish majority in the State of Israel;
2. The second category is political and international in essence and deals with the loss of international legitimacy to the right of the State of Israel to exist as a state of the Jewish People;
3. The third category is one of security in essence, covering the range of military threats, from

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1 The bibliography of Kobi Michael appears at the end of this document.

unconventional threats such as the Iranian nuclear threat to sub-conventional threats such as terrorism.

The first two categories, despite their severity, are perceived as less threatening to the general security of the Jewish public in Israel. In contrast, the third category is perceived as more tangible, and in the eyes of most of the public, the military is perceived as the most authoritative and professional party for forming a solution through the use of military means. The tangibility and severity of this category have increased in recent years with the escalation and deadlock of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, the results of the Second Lebanon War and the rebuilding of the Hezbollah, the tension on the northern border with Syria, and the acceleration of Iran's nuclear program.

Historically, the unique status of the military in Israel places the political establishment in an inferior position compared to the military establishment, in a manner that constantly casts doubt as to its ability to defy the opinion of the military. "In the disputes between the helmsmen of the system, the Chief of General Staff still reigns over everyone else – the head of the Mossad, the head of the Shabak and even the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister – because nobody dares to act against his position" (Amir Oren, Haaretz, January 24, 2008). In effect, the military establishment in Israel has become, over the years, the ultimate authority of knowledge in all matters relating to the definition of security threats and shaping solutions for facing them. Reality in Israel perpetuates a state in which "the experts who are authorized to exercise violence" are usually senior members of the military establishment "whether on active military duty or in reserves" (Kimmerling, 2001, 271). Indeed, the status of the military as an "epistemic authority" (epistemic referring to the meaning and validity of familiarity and knowledge) has increased the dependence of the political establishment upon it and upon the knowledge bases that it has developed (Michael, 2007b), and has led to the formation of political militarism (Kimmerling, 2003) in the sense of wielding military force for solving political problems.

Despite the fact that the state of war is the status quo in Israel, it is important to remember that wars and violent conflicts are complex systems whose military dimension is only one among many. In effect, we are dealing with complex systems that require broad understanding of social science and "in our attempt to understand why conflicts and threats develop, we must return to the scriptures and understand how people behave" (Last, 2008). This means that engaging in the definition of threats is an intellectual challenge that requires deep understanding of the essence of conflicts and human nature, making it necessary to base it on well developed constructs of knowledge that cannot be confined to the limitations of military thinking.

The supremacy of the national goal is ensured when the political leadership defines its national strategy as a master strategy from which the security strategy is derived and upon which a military strategy is shaped. The order of shaping of strategies inevitably influences the way in which threats and opportunities are defined, meaning that it can be assumed that in a place or context in which military strategy becomes one of hegemony, threats and opportunities will be defined, usually more threats than opportunities, owing to the unique characteristics of military thinking,[2] based on a set of concepts from the world of military philosophy, as well as the characteristics of their solution. The order of shaping of strategies is a result of characteristics of the meeting point of political and military establishments, which is affected, inter alia, by the status of the military as a social and political player in society.

The meeting between the establishments may effectively be defined as a clash of competing strategies, and therefore the meeting is intellectual in essence, within which the military echelon can exercise substantive civil control as a mechanism that ensures the superiority of political thinking over its military counterpart. As long as the superiority of political thinking is not ensured, military thinking will shape the basis of interpreting the strategic environment and the influence of the military, and in all matters related to defining the essence of threats, will remain the dominant one. In the absence of national and defense strategies, the military strategy will take the place of the former, being shaped by the characteristics of military philosophy and guesswork of military officers concerning the intentions of the political establishment (Michael, 2007b; Michael, 2007c).

The reality of a confrontation characterized by intractable and protracted conflict[3] stresses the

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2   For further details on the characteristics of military thinking, its conservatism and limitations, see: Yoshafat Harachbi, **War and Strategy**, Tel Aviv, Maarchot, fourth print, 1994.
Norman Dixon, **the Psychology of Softness in the Military**, Tel Aviv, Maarchot, 1979.
Samuel, P. Huntington. **The Soldier and the State — The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations**, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957; Kobi Michael. "The Israel Defense Forces as an Epistemic Authority: An Intellectual Challenge in the Reality of the Israeli - Palestinian Conflict," **Journal of Strategic Studies**, vol. 30, no. 3, 2007, pp. 421 - 46

3   For further details on the matter of the essence of intractable, persistent conflicts, see: Samuel, P. Huntington. **The Soldier and the State — The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations**, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957; Kobi Michael. "The Israel Defense Forces as an Epistemic Authority: An Intellectual Challenge in the Reality of the Israeli - Palestinian Conflict", **Journal of Strategic Studies**, vol. 30, no. 3,

asymmetrical aspect of the meeting of the political and military establishments. This asymmetry, which favors the military establishment, is a result of the weakness of political thinking compared to its military counterpart, and shifts the directions of development and shaping of the national security concept. In such a reality, which exists in an era of "democratization of war" (Levi, 2008), which involves high sensitivity of the political echelon to the critical public voice and the reduced public willingness to "sacrifice one's body", the political establishment has to expedite its decision making processes in all matters relating to anything that is perceived as a threat or acute provocation (such as the events that led to the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War). In such expedited decision-making processes, the importance of knowledge increases, so in conditions of asymmetry, which is characterized by a weakness of thinking and knowledge bases in the political establishment compared to the military, greater influence of the military establishment over decision making processes must be assumed, usually tending to identify the threat or provocation as having military characteristics, and as such necessitating a military solution. This trend has particularly significant consequences in the period of transformation in the world of war, where the borders between the military sphere and the political sphere are blurred and permeable.

The world of war has transformed significantly in recent decades, and most violent conflicts that have been conducted in the world in recent years have been asymmetrical conflicts, usually between state entities and organized militaries and sub-state players in the form of terrorist and guerilla organizations. Frank Hoffman has defined modern wars as hybrid wars, which have many components of different types of wars (Hoffman, 2007). These wars emphasize the tension in the meeting between abstract political strategic logics and the physical action of combat forces, whose encounter has been in, any case "… a recurring fault in most of the world's militaries for 200 years" (Tamari, 2007, 33). Therefore, the significant challenge of statesmen and military leaders at that time was to create the transformation of abstract political logics and ideas into a physical action of fighting forces, in a manner that served that abstract political logic.

Military thinking on the issue of RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) draws on the importance of precision fire and the technological effort that is required for acquiring targets (including human targets for targeted assassination purposes) and improvement in the

effectiveness of precision fire for destroying them. Effectiveness may be improved, inter alia, by improving the characteristics of inter-service cooperation and intelligence. But intelligence in this context is not necessarily the same as intelligence that is required to understand the fundamental reasons behind the formation of security problems that result from conflicts and are translated into threats. An in-depth understanding of conflicts and violence, and prudent conceptualization of security problems require a profound understanding of the nature and behavior of people (Last, 2008), nations and states. Such an understanding relies on established knowledge of social science and not necessarily just military technology or doctrines.

Could different framing of the threat lead to different patterns of response? Probably, for example, the Israeli pattern of action against the Gaza Strip draws its logic from military thinking and reflects the militaristic discourse, which attempts to solve political problems through force. The political discourse is almost completely devoid of a discussion of other political options, such as negotiating with the Hamas, whether directly or indirectly. This statement does not express normative judgment of any manner of conduct or a prediction of the degree of applicability or success of negotiations, but intead describes an existing perception of reality and courses of action that are derived from it.

Another example can be seen is the Israeli blockade policy towards the Gaza Strip, which eventually drove the Palestinians to break down the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. The border fence's destruction came to be viewed as an impressive political achievement for Hamas and significantly strengthened its status in the eyes of the local population. The idea of shaping consciousness, which is also part of the RMA philosophy, led to the strategy of exerting pressure on the local population in order to increase criticism against the Hamas government, which was in turn to cause a change in Hamas policy. But this logic appears to have been disproved completely. Israel opted to use this course of action even though a similar train of thought was employed and proved ineffectual in operations Accountability (1993) and Grapes of Wrath (1996) in Lebanon and during the Second Lebanon War. It appears that "returning to the scriptures" in this context results from thought that draws its logic from militaristic thinking, which represents the idea of using force for solving political problems. In both examples, the effect of military framing over interpreting the environment of the confrontation and shaping policy is evident, and inattention to socioeconomic and religious-

political dimensions, which shape the adversary's modus operandi, is underlined.

Intelligence and its influence over the manner of framing threats

These two examples also prove the weakness of political and strategic thinking and the structured weakness of military intelligence as a result of failing to use complementary, alternative broad knowledge from social science. The thinking of intelligence in the asymmetric confrontation era greatly exceeds the scope of military targets or protecting military task forces against different threats. The main importance of intelligence is its ability to form a master strategy against threats and understanding the nature of threats, while learning and analyzing their context in the arena of operation. Strategic intelligence, of the kind that policy makers require, can certainly be defined as cultural intelligence,[4] which relies on an in-depth understanding of all of the dimensions of the adversary's arena. Such an understanding cannot develop without a broad infrastructure of knowledge in social science (Michael, 2007d; Last, 2008). Without a deep understanding of the context, the chance for conceptual biases that result from worst case scenario perception will increase. Under such conditions, there is a greater chance of overrating security problems and threats, defining them relatively easily as existential threats.

In Israel, the responsibility for national intelligence evaluation is in the hands of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate, leading to the tendency to relate more strictly and carefully to the military component of the intelligence evaluation. Military intelligence is deficient in all cultural aspects and lacks the knowledge infrastructure of social science in its broader context, which may be found to be relevant and even essential for forming a national situation assessment and defining the characteristics of the various threats. Because "Israel has no security concept that may be a regulating conceptual system for politicians and soldiers [and] in Israeli governments, relevant knowledge concerning anticipated crises and on security issues does not develop" (Tamari, 2007, 30-31), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as other threats, is examined in the context of an outdated security policy that is not sufficiently developed or refined, and is usually detached

from broader contexts of global security and the way it is managed. Israel tends to distrust the international community and therefore many threats tend to become overrated to the point of being existential, and the difficulty in coping with them becoming heavier and more complex. This concept, which results from military thinking, will definitely affect the way that security problems are analyzed in the analytic framework that is known as security (securitization).

Gabi Sheffer defined what he perceives to be as "the contemporary security concept in Israel":

According to Prof. Sheffer, from the time of the beginning of the Jewish Yishuv (pre-state Jewish settlement) in the Land of Israel until today, at the beginning of the twenty first century, in the most part, the concept of "security" has been perceived as the most vital need to ensure the physical existence of the Yishuv and later Israeli citizens. From the pre-state period to this day, there have been and are still fears, which usually gain strength, particularly concerning the physical security of individuals, their families and the groups that they have belonged to and supported. Yet very grave concerns concerning the cultural, social and political existence of the Jewish community in the Land of Israel, and afterward in Israel, have never been expressed. The main reasons for emphasizing the security of the individuals and their relatives rather than the fate of the Yishuv and the state have been:

A. The deeply rooted belief in the need for an absolute advantage of the Yishuv and of Israel in the field of security over its Palestinian neighbors and over neighboring Arab countries;

B. A lack of attention by the Jewish public in the Yishuv and in Israel to the various consequences and influences that have resulted from the fact that safeguarding physical security has been entrusted to members of the Israeli "security network" (whose characteristics and implications I shall discuss below), this network having been assisted greatly by emphasizing the perceived existential threats faced by the Yishuv and the state.

The "pure" concern for physical security of individuals and their neighbors has increased as a result of attacks against the Yishuv and Israel by Palestinians and Arab countries, as well as anti-Jewish attacks around the world. The case here is of expulsion of some of the Jews of the Land of Israel by the Turkish authorities (during World War One), "riots" during the Yishuv period (in the early and late 1920s), the "Arab rebellion" (from the mid-1930s until soon before the outbreak of World War Two), the Holocaust, the invasion of the Land of Israel by Arab armies and incidents carried out by the

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4   For further details on the essence of cultural intelligence, see: Kobi Michael. "Doing the Right Thing the Right WAY; The Challenges of Military Mission Effectiveness in Peace Support Operations in a 'War Amongst the People' Theater", in Cees, M. Coops and Szvircsev Tibor Tresch (eds.) **Cultural Challenges in Military Operations**, Rome, NATO Defense College, Research Division, 2007, pp. 254-263; Kobi Michael and David Kellen. "Cultural Intelligence for Peace Support Operations in the New Era of Warfare", in Kobi Michael, David Kellen and Eyal Ben-Ari (eds) **The Transformations of the World of War and Peace Support Operations**, Praeger Security International (PSI,) (forthcoming).

Palestinians in the war of 1948, the Fedayeen actions (in the late 1940s and early 1950s), the 1973 war, the intifadas (Palestinian uprisings), the actions of the Hezbollah and the Hamas, and recently the great fear of Iran's nuclear plans. However, as has been stated, there is no evidence that in any of these periods, the majority has ever had fears concerning Israel's cultural, social and political existence.

Sometimes, fears have arisen among the Jewish population concerning economic security, mainly in the wake of economic crises in the Yishuv, in Israel and in the world at large. Such fears arose in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and in periods of global economic crises in the period of the state, including during the current economic crisis. However, when the Yishuv and Israel recovered economically, these fears ended. In this spirit, it appears that the fears of the effects of the current economic crisis have also dissipated at the present time.

Therefore, there is a vital need to make a distinction between worries of the majority of Jews in Israel for their personal physical security and that of their relatives, their fears of hostile actions on the domestic Israeli and foreign plane (mainly by Arab entities in the Middle East), and threats of far-reaching damage to Israel's culture, society, politics and economy. This focus has been on physical security, which results in militancy (an aspect that I shall discuss below), without forming rigid militarism.

Israel faces no real existential threats

As has been stated, there were persistent security threats to Jews in the period that preceded the independence that was achieved in 1948. The appearance of Zionist Jews in the Land of Israel / Palestine, from the late 19th century, formed increasing friction between the Jewish community in the Land of Israel ("the Yishuv") and the Palestinian Arab community and Arabs in the region. This led to a continuous chain of conflicts between and within the two communities and with the Arab entities in the region. The result was, inter alia, increasing influence over the security sector in the "Yishuv" over is political, economic and cultural fields. This phenomenon gained strength during the armed struggle that the Yishuv waged against the British forces (1945-1947), during the Jewish-Palestinian conflict, and intensified greatly after the partition resolution of the UN in 1947 and during the "War of Independence".

Since 1949, particularly after the signing of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria (but not with the Palestinians), civilian and military leaders in Israel have been preoccupied with the matter of foreign and domestic security threats that the country have faced. These threats, in turn, have become a primary source for legitimacy for its senior politicians, the IDF and for its large security sector.

To cope with the security threats, Israeli politicians have taken a number of steps. First, they established a regular army that expanded over time; second, they installed conscription, which does not apply to most Palestinian Arab and ultra-orthodox Jewish citizens; third, they formed a large reserve force that could be mobilized in times of emergency; fourth, according to the recommendations of the military, they developed the ability to deliver a preemptive strike on Israel's enemies (as was demonstrated in the wars of 1956, 1967, and in the Lebanon Wars). Fifth, they developed nuclear capability, but have adopted a policy of ambiguity on this subject. And sixth, they have formed relations with major powers such as Great Britain, France and the United States, with non-Arab Middle Eastern countries, such as Iran and Turkey (the relations between these two countries and Israel subsequently changed), with other countries that faced persistent existential threats such as South Africa and Singapore, and other countries.

Due to the incessant military conflicts with its neighbors (in the wars of 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982 and two Palestinian intifadas) and notwithstanding the peace treaties with Egypt (1979), with Jordan (1994) and the Oslo Accord with the PLO (1993), the security sector in Israel, particularly the IDF, has become large, strong and highly involved in almost all fields of public life, as this phenomenon has become a type of historical legacy in Israel. It is noted that a similar legacy exists in Israel's highly problematic political development.

The consequence that is important for our discussion is the formation of the "security network". While the Israeli model of the relations between the civil field and the security field is subject to differing interpretations, the best way of understanding these relations is in terms of an informal "security network", whose attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict are not constant, but have recently been "right wing" and militant.

There is a lot of evidence to support this concept, such as: the elevated function of former security people in the political system in Israel (in the government and Knesset), in the economy (as CEOs and directors of public and private companies, many of them dealing in the manufacturing of various defense products) and in civil society (such as in the education system and in public policy). In all matters concerning the relations of the security sector and the civil sector, from 1948

onward, particularly after 1967, the Israeli "security network" has been acting against the differentiation and professionalism of the IDF and the other security agencies (particularly the Mossad and the Shabak), and against downsizing in the relevant civilian fields.

In view of this, the continuous existence of the "security network" may be considered as a key factor that prevents the formation of effective democracy in Israel. And therefore, in effect, Israel's democracy is only a "formal democracy".

It is emphasized that the Israeli security network was established not because of the militarist character of Zionism and Yishuv and Israeli society, but is a product of the particular structure of power that developed in the time of the Yishuv, which was in turn adopted by the founding fathers of the state (mainly David Ben Gurion) and their successors. Indeed, in addition to coping with what they perceived to be persistent existential threats (foreign and domestic alike) to the state, these leaders intended to use the security sector (particularly the IDF) to advance the process of formation of the state and social integration. However, while wishing to secure the common interests of their institutes, players in the security sector (and in particular the IDF) eventually overshadowed civilian leaders, and as an informal collective entity became the most influential player in Israel.

Therefore, the borders between the security field and the civilian field in Israel, which have remained deliberately permeable (or vague), have allowed defense people to gain a foothold in completely civilian fields and forge pacts with their influential players, thus strengthening the interrelations between the two fields.

There is no doubt that the persistent security threats that Israel faces have been a key factor that has helped preserve the informal "security network". This is mainly because such persistent threats have legitimized the privileged status of the security sector, compared to the various civilian sectors in terms of financing, social status and in particular access to policy making and decision-making processes. This status of "the first among equals" has also continued with the retirement of security people from active duty, upon entering completely civil fields in the state.

To summarize this issue, despite significant changes in the international system (from the end of the cold war), and in the Middle Eastern environment (the peace with Egypt and Jordan and the occupation of Iraq by American forces and their allies), the senior figures in the political and defense systems, and major groups in the Israeli public, believe that Israel is facing genuine persistent existential threats, foreign and domestic alike. This concept, which has strengthened in recent years because of the open hostility of Iran towards Israel and the frequent reports of Iran's nuclear ambitions, helps preserve the dominant status of the security sector and of the "security network" in particular, but certainly not only in the field of defense.

Israel's transformation from a formal democracy to an effective democracy depends not only on reducing the strength of the **objective** threats that the state faces, but also on reducing the powerful function of the security sector and the "security network", which assume a key function in preserving the **subjective** perception of a persistent existential threat. This may be achieved by more effective civil control over the defense agencies, particularly the military, such as reducing the ability of their members to affect the public discourse, and mainly by significantly reducing the power of the "security network".

Lev Grinberg also combines the issue of the relations between the military and the civil establishment:

Security is not an abstract concept that is detached from a historical and political context, but is a socially dynamic construct that varies with circumstances and the degree of legitimacy of the state. With the advent of the formation of the modern nation state, two opposing processes occurred: on the one hand, the personal security of citizens has increased due to the disarmament of individuals and concentration of legitimate violence in the hands of the state and its institutes, the military and the police, while on the other hand, national security has been disrupted due to inter-state tension and an arms race that broke out following bloody wars. In this sense, security, personal or national, is a political concept because it is dependent on legitimacy: personal security depends on the legitimacy of the state monopoly over the use of violence, and national security depends on the legitimacy of the sovereignty of the state over its borders in the eyes of neighboring countries.

The State of Israel has experienced security problems both because of the refusal of its neighbors to recognize its borders and because of the non-recognition of its monopoly over the use of violence in the eyes of its Palestinian subjects. The blurring of the border between the State of Israel and the territories under its control is the link between these two factors, and is mainly a political problem. The attempt to address a political problem by exercising violence is the fundamental shortcoming of security thinking, but the source of the problem is not in the security thinking

itself, but the inability of Israeli society to relate to threats realistically. This shortcoming originates in security being not only based on a series of genuine threats that must be coped with, but being a seminal myth of Israeli nationalism.

Israeli society formed in the context of personal and collective insecurity that the Jews were exposed to in Europe due to the development of nation states, colonialism, racism and anti-Semitism. As a solution to their insecurity, some of them decided to immigrate to the divinely promised land and cradle of the Jewish People, to establish a national state with a defined territory and a military to defend it. The insecurity of Jews throughout history and the need to arm and fight for their lives became a seminal myth of the Jewish-Israeli nation and shaped this nation despite the many cultural differences between its parts. The Palestinian and pan-Arab hostility to Jewish immigration and taking over of their lands became a formative and cohering factor of Jewish immigrants, without which Israeli society would fear dissolution. The fear of dissolution manifested in 1993-2000, when the hypothetical possibility of a compromise with the Palestinians begun: society split into hostile ethnic groups that were impatient with each other. The second intifada allowed Israeli society to return to the cohering and unifying security myth of constant insecurity.

The fundamental security problem is the mythological character of security that impedes realistic perception of threats and viewing them as problems that should be coped with using political means. Due to the security myth, there is difficulty in seeing the acts of the Palestinians as a response to the acts of the State of Israel, and there is a tendency to construe Palestinian resistance as part of the persecutions of the Jews during history, from Pharaoh and Haman to Hitler. The inability to see the genuine threats and cope with them using the appropriate tools leads to inability to resolve the conflict through political means, a need to continue controlling the Palestinians, and thus blurring of the borders of the sovereign State of Israel. In other words, the myth of security that results from the trauma of the Jewish People is the most severe security problem of the State of Israel.

Constant lack of security sometimes compels the military and statesmen to act without controls or checks, and sometimes lets them manipulate fear for their own purposes. For example, following the outbreak of the demonstrations after Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, some senior IDF members succeeded in neutralizing the political establishment, contending that this was a "war over the homeland",

thus necessitating the use of disproportionate force. In contrast, after the abduction of the two soldiers into Southern Lebanon, a military campaign without controls or checks was begun, due to public hysteria rather than out of any intent or prior planning. In both cases, the relationship between the force that was used and the degree of threat was very weak, and the response was affected by the feelings of the fundamental insecurity that is at basis of the security myth.

Objective, personal and national insecurity results from a lack of recognition of the borders of the state by its neighbors and the presence of a population of Palestinian subjects who do not recognize the authority of the state to exercise violence against them. These assume the form of a collective security threat (such as arms smuggling and bombardments using ballistic weapons) and personal insecurity (terrorist strikes). In the circumstances of a blurred border and military control over a portion of the population, the military becomes an obligatory key player in the decision making process in the state, i.e. it is a policy shaping agent with influence that is not less than that of the political establishment, and which is indeed often pivotal. The control of information and the professional authority to determine the nature of security, are the sources of power of the military versus the political echelon; however, often insecurity of the Jewish public and its demand for a violent reaction strengthen the military against the political establishment.

Tamar Malz-Ginsburg: The concept of "security" in Israeli society is derived from it considering itself to be facing severe and even existential threats. A review of the pages of history of the State of Israel illustrates that there has barely been any time during which Israeli society construed its situation to be devoid of severe strategic threats. When Israelis are confronted with the term "security", the immediate context that comes to mind is security from physical threats against the State of Israel – a threat of physical destruction. It appears that "threats to the nation",[5] such as against the Jewish majority in it or its democratic regime, assume second place.

According to the predominant perception in society, the existential threat that the State of Israel currently faces is first and foremost from nuclear Iran. Beyond Iran, the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the non-recognition of the State of Israel along with the tension on the northern border with the Hezbollah, also fuel the sense of threat felt by the Israeli public. At a completely different reference level,

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5   See Kobi Michael's commentary on this issue above.

there are threats posed by other fields too, such as: the economic crisis, threats to moral social underpinnings, the crisis in education and the threat to the future of higher education and more. Domestic and international social organizations also emphasize the threat to the ecosystem and the future of the planet due to various pollutants.

The agency that effectively presents the national situation assessment, and therein the threats that the State of Israel faces in the security-strategic plane, is the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate. This is despite its official and original function being to provide an intelligence situation assessment. For historical reasons, this evaluation organ of the IDF enjoys superiority to the official civilian branches that are supposed to take part in the process of shaping the perception of strategic reality.[6] Beyond this, decision makers enlighten the public and provide it interpretations of strategic reality in accordance with their own considerations, and thus also the threats posed against it. Often, manipulation by politicians or military people in interpreting strategic reality and the consequences of these moves over the public perception of strategic reality are criticized. Even if this criticism is justified, to my mind, the Israeli public is exposed to transformations that occur in its security-strategic environment that grant it knowledge and an ability to interpret strategic reality independently as well.

This is due to two main factors:

The first factor is the fact that many Israeli citizens are exposed and subject to attacks and hostile actions at different times (such as Qassam rocket bombardments in the South, Katyusha rocket bombardments in the north, or suicide actions around the country). The second factor is related to the mass media, which exposes the public to the positions and statements of leaders, such as the venomous declarations of the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Because of these two key factors, the ability of the public to evaluate and interpret events unfolding around it should not be underestimated.

In this context, I would like to quote the words of historian (and former military man) Mordechai Bar-On. Bar-On related to Israeli society and its understanding of the strategic reality of the State of Israel in the early 1950s. Bar-On cited things against the contention of a few "new historians" that the dominance of Ben Gurion and military and defense people among Israeli society at

that time was what affected the shaping of the national consensus for an activist defense policy.

In Bar-On's words, "….Israeli citizens were exposed throughout most of that time to 'subversive' information and interpretations, which conflicted with the position of the establishment. If reading journals such as 'Ner' or New Outlook was the domain of a few, one cannot say the same for 'Haaretz' or 'Haolam Hazeh', and even in the evening newspapers 'Maariv' and 'Yedioth Aharonoth', one could often read articles written by opposition elements … the fact that these [the establishment – T.M.G.] succeeded to convince such a high proportion of the public in Israel of the righteousness of their ways, and that opposing opinions failed to gain sympathy and persuasive effect beyond an insignificant minority, resulted from dominant images that outside reality and the declared positions of the Arabs shaped with or without mediation".[7] It appears that more so than influencing national society, leaders exploit the threats that the state faces in the international arena.

Due to the existence of serious threats and lessons of the past, the perception among the public is that the element that is entrusted with ensuring the national security of the state is first of all the IDF (in contrast, for example, to achieving a strategic pact and relying on other powers for protection against potential threats). The prominent opinion is that a strong military is needed and must be allocated maximum resources. Thus, the IDF is undoubtedly one of the strongest institutes in the country and, as opposed to other state institutes, it also benefits from a very high level of public trust.[8] The military is interwoven and spliced into Israeli identity and culture. This is an army of the people, into which a significant proportion of Jewish Israeli society enlists, thus forming a bond that is difficult to unravel between citizen and army. I disagree with the definition of it being an army that has a state. This is a society for which the military is part of its essence.

My key contention is that in attempting to explain each perception and interpretation of the strategic reality and defense policy of a state, and to understand the senior status of the IDF in Israeli society in particular, it is not possible to relate to strategic reality as objective. In other words, any description of strategic reality is

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6 Processes of decision making and strategic evaluations have been written on profusely. See Yehuda Ben Meir, **Decision Making on National Security Issues: the Israeli Aspect**, Tel Aviv, Kav Adom series, Hakibbutz Hameuchad publishing, Yaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University 1987.

7 Mordechai Bar-On, "the security mindset and its critics: 1949-1967", in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.) **the Challenge of Sovereignty: Formation and Contemplation in the First Decade of the State**, Jerusalem, Yad Yitzhak Ben Zvi publishing, 1999, pp. 102-103.

8 According to recently published polls, the IDF's trust in the IDF is approximately 90% (**the War and Peace Index**, April 2009, the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University; poll published in the Independence Day edition of the **Israel Hayom** newspaper, April 28, 2009, p. 23).

a product of two main factors: transformations that have occurred in the strategic environment of the state (which can be, for example, regional pacts, acquisition and development of arms, declarations of leaders of countries) and the interpretation that is given by society and its decision makers to those transformations.[9] This interpretation is related to cultural historical factors of society, bureaucratic factors and the attitudes of its decision makers (including psychological characteristics, beliefs and ideologies of the decision maker/s).

I wish to focus the discussion on the historical cultural factors that are common to all of society, as decision makers are part of it and therefore, when threat perceptions are shaped, the products of these perceptions are not derived exclusively from their conscious intentions. However, shaping the perceived threat by policy makers is an intentional result of promoting political and institutional interests. However, because cultural factors precede those policymakers, they create conditions, to some degree, for the possibility that they themselves will be voted into power, by shaping the perceived strategic reality and the policy for shaping that reality based on and according to a given cultural context.

In my comments on the nation state, I contend that the behavior of society in the field of security, i.e. the interpretation of strategic reality and the implementation of defense policy, is not detached from its behaviors in other fields of life. There is one national culture that includes common understandings and patterns of behavior that shape, using socialization tools, the members of society and influence their understanding of reality and the way in which they act within it.[10] This applies at the state level too. National culture does not lead decision makers to execute a certain policy, but because of the existence of that national culture, the policy desired by society materializes – this being the normative policy for society.

My commentary on the influences of national culture over the behavior of society can be compared to Hans Morgenthau's comment on the "national character" concept of society and the way in which it affects the conduct of that society. According to

Morgenthau, "National character cannot fail to affect national strength; because these act for the sake of the nation in peacetime and wartime, formulate, execute and collaborate with its policy, voters and electorates, public opinion shapers, create and consume – all these are instilled, to a greater or lesser extent, in the impression of the intellectual and moral properties that determine national character. The 'fundamental strength and persistence' of the Russians, the individual initiative and inventive ability of the Americans, the non-dogmatic common sense of the British, the discipline and thoroughness of the Germans – all these are some of the properties that are revealed, for better or worse, in all individual and collective actions, which members of nations may deal with. As a result of the differences in the national character, we shall let the governments of Germany and Russia, for example, employ a foreign policy that American and British governments would not be capable of exercising, and vice versa."[11]

As I have pointed out, national culture includes common understandings and behavior patterns. In Israeli culture, there is a common understanding that is deeply and dominantly rooted in national culture, and I am referring to the narrative of the vulnerability of the Jewish People throughout its generations. This is an axiom whereby "every generation has its own Amalek". This common understanding has naturally also influenced the shaping and interpretation of strategic and defense occurrences and transformations in the region of the State of Israel. When relating to the shaping of threats by Israeli society today, in view of the existence of this vulnerability narrative in Israeli society, and in view of the recurrent satanic declarations of the President of Iran, it may be assumed that even without the leaders of Israel emphasizing the threat for political or other purposes, Israeli society would feel threatened.

It must be noted that this common understanding, vulnerability and even a very fundamental sense of persecution and constant fear of extermination affect the conduct of Israeli society in various fields rather than merely that of security. According to Asa Kasher, Israeli society "is suffering in its entirety from post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from persecution… there is no justification for there being no field in which we have long term planning. The focus on the present and the near future is a survivalist, irritable thinking pattern of those who are persecuted. Compared to any normal country, we have far fewer multi-annual plans than we should or need… I think that our intensity is one of the deep-rooted foundations of our exile lifestyle, which

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9   See the contention of Jutta Weldes that "the decision of what the exact situation that the state is coping with is; what are, if any, the threats facing the state; and what is the national interest consistent with the situation that the state is in and the threats it faces always requires construction action. Instead of being taken for granted, the threats and the national interests that are matched with them are mainly a result of construction purposes".
Jutta Weldes, **Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis**, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 7.

10   Geert Hofstede, **Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and its Importance for Survival**, London, Harper Collins Business, 1991, p. 6.

11   Hans J. Morgenthau, **Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace** (1948), Tel Aviv, Yachdav Publishing, 1968, p. 167.

we have inherited without noticing, from our ancestors who were persecuted from time to time but determined to survive. Survival lies deep in the lifestyle of the Israeli Jew. It is the bed in which intensity grows, along with its impatience, myopia, its focus on the present at the expense of what might happen tomorrow… exile is part of the historical underpinning of our lives."[12]

Not only have the narrative of vulnerability and the fear of threats predating the founding of the state shaped the perception of reality, but they have also been key factors in forming the additional shared understanding that the Jew must evolve, take his fate in his own hands and create and influence reality. The representation of this "new Jew" was not, initially, the "Warrior" character, but the pioneering farmer. Later, the representation changed and the mythological Sabra became the warrior in a combat unit. So it came to pass that the soldier, and effectively the IDF, took a very significant part in shaping the identity of national society in the fledgling State of Israel, a society that was effectively divided into groups that dramatically differed from each other (ethnically, culturally, religiously and otherwise). In other words, it must be emphasized, that it was not military power or strength that was the foundation upon which this new identify formed, but a virtue of activeness, purposefulness and action that the pioneer first represented, followed by the warrior. It was the wish and ability to influence and cause changes. This value, and properties related to it, is very central for understanding the "Sabra" and his behavior in all fields of society, not necessarily only in the field of security (it is not by chance that the Israelis have come to be associated both with technological innovation and initiative in high-tech fields). Today, it may be said, that this value, i.e. activism, no longer heads the values that are considered the most worthy and desirable for many members of society. This requires further scrutiny. However, the properties derived from this value, such as purposefulness, initiative and action, still constitute very key properties of Israeli society and also influence its conduct in the field of security. It must be emphasized that these properties do not necessarily lead to forceful conduct of the state but conduct that aims in "resolving" a situation, a wish to cause a change and a belief that we are able to do so. This also applies to the attitude of society to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its difficulty in living with a state in which the conflict is being "waged" but not "resolved".

Beyond this, society, as has been noted, also has certain behaviors. Some of these are worthy behaviors that society aspires to, and some are common behaviors that are characteristic of society (which are not always desired or cherished by it). Among the characteristic behaviors of Israeli society, one may count: impulsiveness (not necessarily forcefulness), impatience towards others, cynicism, and critical and argumentative tendencies. This conflicts with solidarity and cohesion among various events and incidents (such as collective enrollment of society for giving bone marrow or blood giving to save human life).[13] The intolerance of the Israeli public adds to what I have stated above concerning the wish of the public to see a "solution" to the security threat and the difficulty in coping with the recognition that there are issues that require processes that occur over a long period (even generations). The culture of sociability, such as the "trust me", and "it will be okay" culture, persists and its influences also lead to deficiencies in planning or observance of instructions and laws. The lack of planning also affects conduct in security related fields – for example the failure to observe fixed, clear procedures on how to cope with abductions, captivity and negotiations for freeing prisoners of war and hostages (and the case of Gilad Shalit only reinforces this lacuna). Beyond this, in the State of Israel, no orderly, written defense doctrine has ever been written and its actual policy appears more like ad hoc reactions to unfolding transformations.

Peri Golan: A number of aspects which, from the perspective of the citizen and society, affect and shape the way in which the security concept is defined, should be emphasized:

1. The citizen's perception of personal security

The perception of personal security of the citizen is affected by the basic wish to live with one's family in peace and quiet, around one's home, without fear for oneself, one's children, close family or friends, lest they be physically hurt at home, at work, in their town, at leisure and shopping centers, on their way to kindergarten, to school or to their workplace.

The suicide bombings by the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad from the mid-1990s and early 2000s and their catastrophic results led to fear of using public transport, fear of visiting leisure and shopping centers or leaving city centers, or in other words, a greatly impaired perception of personal security.

Rocket and mortar bomb fire from Gaza towards Sderot, Ashkelon and the towns around Gaza, which has caused casualties and destruction of homes, education

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12 Vered Levi-Barzilai, **17 Conversations with Asa Kasher**, Or Yehuda, Kineret, Zamora-Beitan, 2005, pp. 86-86, 93-94. See also Doron Rosenblum, "optimism (nonetheless) pays off", **Haaretz**, May 7, 2008.

13 Dan Margalit "The solidarity continues" **Israel Hayom**, January 22, 2009, p. 22.

institutes and shopping centers in various towns, has led to severe psychological problems among residents and even the abandonment of Sderot and other towns in the region, due to an inability to bear the situation and the absolute loss of a sense of personal security. The citizen expects the state, within a kind of unwritten contract, to provide him and his family with a sense of personal security and act to ensure a safe, protected environment for them to live in.

The day before Operation "Cast Lead", the dominant perception was that the state, with its monopoly to exercise military force, was expected to do so in order to remove the threat to the settlements around Gaza and to return the lost sense of security.

2. The bloody history of the People of Israel and Israeli society

On Remembrance Day for the Fallen of Israel's Campaigns and Victims of Terror Attacks, which is held on the 4th of Iyar, Israeli society unites with the memory of 22,305 fallen among the sons and daughters of Israeli society since the outbreak of violence in 1860, which has accompanyed us from the beginning of the settlement of the land to this very day.

The State of Israel is home to Holocaust survivors and their second and third generation offspring who bear the memory and lessons of the Holocaust. Wars and security incidents have shaken Israeli society since the beginning of the Yishuv before the founding of the state and since the founding of the state. Israeli society has paid a heavy price for its right to live in this country. The security and regional reality (wars, terrible terrorist attacks that have been perpetrated or attempted) emphasize and prove that these are not false threats. Therefore, Israeli society attributes great importance to the threats that are voiced by the enemies of the country and expects the defense establishment to protect it against these threats if and when other efforts fail (peace treaties, ceasefire agreements, mediation efforts, and political efforts).

Israeli society is very sensitive to casualties, whether to IDF soldiers or civilians. Israeli society does not consider the exercising of power to be a first response, but against certain enemies in the arena, the evaluation is that when dealing with these adversaries, there is no escaping protracted confrontation with them, which will extol a price.

3. The perception of the threat by society

The Israeli security system is appreciated as being generally reliable and has gained the trust of most of the public in the country. The threats are usually perceived seriously, and these, in the eyes of many, are based on solid facts and draw on severe incidents that have materialized. Israeli society has had specific experience with the materialization of threats and for many years has paid a high price as a result. Therefore, it takes threats and their consequences very seriously.

4. The media in the State of Israel as a shaper of the concept of security in public opinion

The State of Israel has a free press that is open to a range of opinions that shape and influence public opinion concerning the concept of security as well as other fields. The various attitudes of Israeli society on security issues are based, inter alia, on the right to consume modern media within Israel and abroad. The messages, news and interpretations reach every home and every person 24 hours a day. The result is that Israelis are equipped with broad, current information.

Political affiliation and the differences between left wing, right wing, and center also constitute a component that influences the shaping of the security concept. Alongside the unfolding arguments between the different political concepts, security is often the issue that constitutes a bridging factor that is agreed upon, even between opposing political concepts.

2. Which security threats threaten Israel and is the military establishment manipulating them for its own purposes?

The security threats that face Israel are existential threats in the form of the Iranian nuclear threat and strategic threats in the form of threats from fundamentalist terrorist movements such as the Hezbollah, Hamas and Al Qaeda. Iran is a terrorist state and the Iranian regime represents the uncompromising extremist Islamic perception of enemies of Islam. Senior officials in the regime call for the destruction of the State of Israel. Iran supports and assists terrorist movements such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza and in the West Bank, and global terrorist movements such as Al Qaeda as part of the concept of exporting its revolution. Iran wishes to become an influential player and a regional power at the expense of moderate countries. The last wars in Lebanon in the north and Gaza in the south were effectively waged against capabilities that were built up in Lebanon and in Gaza by Iran.

The combination of nuclear weapons, long-range missiles and an ideology wishing to destroy Israel is a genuine threat. Terrorist threats from Lebanon by a Hezbollah armed with long-range rockets with Iranian and Syrian support and a Hamas in Gaza armed with rockets capable of striking civil population

centers are tangible threats. The threat from terrorist infrastructures in the West Bank and in Gaza towards Israeli civilians is a familiar, tangible threat, even if at the present time we are enjoying a sense of relative quiet.

The defense establishment utilizes these threats to gain resources and budgets, but as the threats are genuine, I believe that it is legitimate to use their presentation to convince the supporting of defense budgets so that optimum preparations may be made against the threats.

After the disengagement from the Gaza Strip, an attempt was made to portray the firing of rockets at Sderot as something negligible that should be ignored. We recall the declaration of Shimon Peres at that time, in which he claimed that these were rusty pipes from which there was nothing to fear. The military even underestimated the rocket force of the Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, the Chief of General Staff (Moshe Yaalon) evaluated that the force would rust over before being deployed. In both of these cases, the underestimate resulted from political considerations.

Yaakov Amidror: What is the "security" that citizens refer to?

There are two clear components and one vaguer aspect.

A. **Personal security**. The feeling of every citizen that he can travel, walk out of his home, go anywhere, send his children anywhere using any mode of transport – without feeling that he or his family are in danger (beyond the danger of road accidents). The demand for security of this type intensified significantly after the terrorist attacks of the spring of 2000. It was made clear to residents of Israel that every location in Israel was dangerous and there was no way of coping with these dangers other than staying at home, though this was not always a safe place either.

Terrorism grossly and painfully frayed living conditions in Israel, making the need for personal security very acute. As a result of this, residents of Israel understand that in order to achieve such security, there is a certain compromise in convenience and freedom. For example, every Israeli citizen is searched every time he enters a shopping center and often he gets stuck in a traffic jam that forms due to checkpoints whose purpose is to stop the entry of terrorists into one area or another, particularly around Tel Aviv.

B. **Confidence in the ability of the IDF to cope with a military threat**. The Jewish residents of the State of Israel are aware that there are many countries around the State of Israel that would not hesitate to attack it if they thought that they had a good chance of success. While political agreements that Israel has with some of its neighbors are important, most citizens think that without a strong military, these agreements would be violated. Military power therefore has three intended goals: collateral for political agreements, deterring potential enemies, and prevention of the success of the enemy, should it decide nonetheless to attack.

Recently, a specific type of preventative mission has become increasingly understood – preventing the firing of rockets and missiles at the State of Israel. This is due to the fact that our enemies have transferred some of their efforts from building a military that is designed to storm the borders of the country into improved widespread firing capabilities. In view of the experience during the recent campaigns in Lebanon and Gaza and the threats voiced from Teheran, this need has become all the more apparent.

Beyond these two fields that are defined in the strictly military sense, both concerning personal security and the ability of the state to repel enemies at its borders, most Jews in the State of Israel also have a vaguer security demand: the state is expected to find a way to maintain its Jewish character, though this term does not have agreed, conventional definitions. The contrary is the case.

Is there an increased perception of threats against Israel as a manipulative measure?

Having been responsible for more than four years for defining threats, I can attest that no manipulation has ever been made in defining threats to the State of Israel or their manner of presentation to the public. Some errors may have been made in evaluating threats; there may have been a tendency to overestimate more than underestimate when the picture was unclear (and in most cases quite rightly), but we have said what we have thought and thought what we have said. The academia and the media, owing to a combination of ignorance, condescendence and certain political opinions, are attempting to define correct and incorrect evaluations as manipulation, but this is not the case.

As a footnote, there is a methodological problem that during a deliberation, since the publication of the Agranat Commission (which investigated the intelligence shortcomings in the 1973 war), "capabilities" rather than "intentions" should be shown. However, the professional circles that are in charge of defining threats actually object to this convenient solution for them; this is due to their awareness of the cost of the answers, if they show only the capabilities of

the opposing force, without attempting to analyze the force's possible spectrum of intentions.

The examination of the presentation of threats that has been brought before the State of Israel over the last 15 years, such that the ability of terrorism to flourish following the Oslo Accords, of Arafat having no intention towards peace and his lack of hesitation to turn to terrorism, the strengthening of Hezbollah particularly following the withdrawal from Lebanon, Iran's building of missile and nuclear capability, the implications of abandoning the Philadelphi Route, in particular, and Gaza, in general, and the strengthening of Hamas in that region, and the notion of strikes upon the Home Front becoming a central issue – all indicate that there have been no exaggerations and no manipulations. The only case of error that may appear to be manipulation, and should be investigated in order to rule out that contention, is the case of defining the Iraqi threat prior to the Second Gulf War. It seemed that professional agencies estimated that the opposing force had biological and chemical weapons, which was discovered to be wrong. To the best of my knowledge, it was a mistake to define, based on the information possessed by Israel at that time, that there were such weapons, although it could not be ruled out. In any case, the "worst case" evaluation, even if incorrect, is not a case of "manipulation".

Usually, the contentions of "manipulation" distort the true face of these threats. These contentions are often made because the reality of such threats would interfere with a certain political worldview. Therefore, they contend that manipulation is used with no basis.

Shaul Arieli: How does Israeli society define the concept of security?

The struggle of the Jewish People within the Zionist movement for establishing and safeguarding a national home in the Land of Israel, in the wake of the pogroms and the Holocaust, resulted in the Zionist insight in the form of "the security of the Jews will always be entrusted to the Jews". The two conflicting trends of separatism and blending in, which characterized Diaspora Judaism of the century before the founding of the state, did not secure their equality before the law or their right to personal security in their countries of residence. The lesson of the silence of the world in the face of the atrocities of the Holocaust at the time of their occurrence had been learned. Even in the Land of Israel, under the mandate that was given to the British for establishing a Jewish national home and encouraging mass immigration to it, proper protection for their security against the violence of Arabs of the Land of Israel was not provided. The failure of the

UN to enforce the partition resolution (November 1947) against Arabs of the Land of Israel and ensure its realization against the invasion of Arab expeditionary forces, strengthened the notion that the international community would be impotent even relative to its own decisions. This chain of events led to the concept that even when one adopts international resolutions, one needs power to defend oneself. An "iron wall" (a term coined by Zeev Jabotinsky) should be built in front those who wished to prevent the founding of the Jewish national home or destroy it.

The security that the Jewish residents of the State of Israel long for covers three interrelated and complementary dimensions, because they originate mainly from the Palestinians and part of the Arab and Islamic world:

* National security – maintaining the borders and existence of the State of Israel.
* Personal security – safeguarding the life of the citizen within his life routine within and without the State of Israel
* Identity security – maintaining the Jewish culture of the State of Israel.

The State of Israel has successfully withstood the evitable and inevitable wars that have accompanied its 61 years and threatened its territorial integrity and existence. The exclusion of Egypt and Jordan from the confrontation circle has not removed the perceived threat from Israeli society because permanent arrangements with the "near circle" countries and with the Palestinians have not been completed, and the fear of changes in the regimes of Jordan and Egypt is ever present. The occupation of Iraq by the United States eliminated the potential threat in Iraq joining forces with a weaker Syria. National security is perceived today mainly through the notion of the Iranian nuclear threat. The threat of SSMs (surface to surface missiles) from Syria, the Hezbollah and the Hamas is not perceived as a threat to national security, but as a factor that may extol a very heavy toll from the Home Front and national infrastructures even in a war that Israel wins.

The threat to personal security has been an integral part of the life of the Jews in the last hundred years in the Land of Israel. Even when the state was founded and the IDF succeeded in removing national threats, the damage to the routine life of residents continued with varying patterns and intensities. The peak threats to personal security were in 1949 and 1956, 1987-1999 and 2000-2003. The damage manifested in various terrorist attacks, sabotage and property theft.

The threat to identity has two main components: the loss of the Jewish majority due to absorption of

refugees within permanent arrangements, or a gradual change of the country from the state of the Jewish People to a state of all of its citizens, canceling the Law of Return and its national symbols with a Jewish character, such as the National Anthem.

What security threats threaten Israel and how does the establishment use them as manipulation for its own needs?

• The nuclear threat against Israel has been perceived for decades as the most severe existential threat. It motivated military Israeli responses against Egypt in the 1960s, against Iraq in 1981 and against Syria in 2008. Iran's developing capability, in the wake of its militant policy, is perceived as the most acute and genuine threat. This threat, which may be confronted with a military solution by the Israeli Air Force, would require enormous budgets to resolve. In the absence of ability to effect a military action for various reasons, or if and when Israel agrees to live with Iranian nuclear capability, this threat may not be used as justification for budgetary claims.

• The conventional SSM (surface to surface missile) threat is not perceived as an existential threat but as a major threat of damaging the Home Front, national infrastructures and the ability of the IDF, particularly the Israel Air Forces, to transition from readiness to action. Israel has had to invest huge budgets in protecting the Home Front, protecting or relocating infrastructure and protecting army bases. Permanent agreements with Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians will not stop this process completely, but the need for a budget will decrease, and will be used primarily for maintenance purposes.

• The threat of conventional war is particularly low considering that Jordan and Egypt have left the circle of confrontation. The ability of Syria to start independent moves is very limited. This reality has allowed Israel to make preparations and for a partial confrontation only in a manner that reduces the workload of the military while maintaining the competency of a large reserve force.

• The threat of terrorism of various kinds comes both from the West Bank and from Gaza. Israeli deployment requires a completion of the seam zone with a protracted investment of billions of shekels in both personnel and infrastructures.

In the absence of regional peace agreements, these threats, at different levels, exist, with ups and downs, and require appropriate preparation of the IDF and additional security agencies. The demand of the Israeli public for almost complete security against these threats and the acute criticism in its absence exerts

pressure on the military, to which security has been entrusted, and on the political establishment, which avoids confronting the IDF, an institution that enjoys public trust.

Because of the military's self-perception as the primary bearer of responsibility, its attitudes in the political field relating to arrangements and agreements sometimes form constraints that impede their pursuit, as was evident in the comments of the Chiefs of General Staff on the peace treaty with Egypt, the unilateral pullout from Lebanon, the disengagement plan and control of the Jordan Valley.

3. Supervision of the defense establishment by the civil establishment

Lev Grinberg: The lack of political (civilian) control over the military is a common interest of the military and political establishments alike. Thus, the military assumes autonomy and control, and the civilian establishment is relieved of responsibility for failures in military campaigns. In other words, the lack of control allows the political establishment to shun responsibility for military failures in times of crisis, and allows the military to execute its policy autonomously at all other times. Only when the two establishments will be interested in civilian supervision of the military, will change be affected. The conditions for these are for the political establishment to be prepared to take responsibility for failures of the military, and for the military establishment to be prepared to concede independent security policy making. Under the current conditions of blurred borders of the state that controls a population of non-citizens, it appears that the lack of civilian control will only continue. Even if institutes for civilian control are established, they will continue to be weak compared to the defense establishment, because of the unique status of the army. The fundamental problem is structural, the absence of recognized borders of the state, which institutionally expresses too much autonomy for the military.

Gabi Sheffer: Some of the chief reasons for the weak civil control over the army are:

A. First and foremost, the highly flawed political culture in the State of Israel;

B. The relative popularity that the army still gains from the Jewish population;

C. The belief that the IDF is an effective organization that can handle defense affairs is incessant;

D. The predominance of the security network;

E. The dominance of Israeli intelligence gathering

services, divisions of the Ministry of Defense and the IDF in preparing assessments and planning in the defense field;

F. The major weakness of civil authorities – parties, the Knesset, the government, the judiciary and local authorities in all fields that the security network and the IDF control.

G. Organizational and behavioral inertia in these fields.

However, there is a certain increase in public criticism and attempts to control the defense establishment more effectively. In this context, there is a need to point out the direct relations between civilians and those serving in the army, and resulting complaints against the behavior of the military and the defense establishment; the involvement of social organizations in certain defense fields, and their attempts to influence policy and behavior of these systems; the attempts of the Ministry of Finance to increase monetary control over the defense system and the IDF; the criticism of certain media outlets of the defense establishment and the IDF. However, these do not significantly detract from the dominant status of the defense system and the lack of effective civilian control thereof.

And in this context, it is necessary to state that despite the recurring contentions (to a great extent by retired senior officers, some of whom are active members of the security network) that the political system, particularly prime ministers and defense ministers, are the ones who make the important decisions, in effect, the members of the network are the ones who plan and push for military activity. This has been the case in a number of wars in Israel and military actions on various occasions, including in critical moves such as the air strike against the nuclear reactor in Iraq in the early 1980s. The green light that was given by the prime minister and minister of defense, who, it has been noted, have usually been connected to the security network in recent years, was not a matter of clear cut decision making in this field. In most cases, the critical decisions are made by members of the security network.

Kobi Michael examines the issue of civil control over the defense establishment in the context of wars:

Civil control in the test of war

War is one of the most complex and dangerous challenges that the political establishment in a democratic country faces. "Waging modern war is a very complex profession that requires extensive theoretical scientific knowledge…" (Tamari, 2007, 40).

At the same time, war is the ultimate manifestation of military professionalism, where the military is required to realize its upreme functional edict, which is victory, whose purpose is to secure the defense of the nation and its vital interests (according to the definitions and understanding of the elected political echelon) against outside threats (Huntington, 1957; Kohn, 1997). However, at this time, the military is still the tool of the political establishment, and military action should be the means used to serve a political goal.

This logic inevitably dictates the essence of civilian control over the military and the superiority of the political echelon over the military one. This superiority is not only constitutional or hierarchical, whose purpose is to ensure the obedience of the military establishment to the civilian-political one; its meaning is superiority of political thinking over military thinking. This superiority requires intellectual strategic leadership and a broad understanding of military actions and their consequences for the political scene.

Misunderstanding this complex universe due to insufficient skills and strategic thinking may lead the political establishment to define threats and the goals of the war erroneously and irrelevantly, or adopt the definitions of the military establishment for the goals of the war in an uncontrolled manner, reversing the order of dependence between the echelons (Michael, 2007c).

The Second Lebanon War became one of the ultimate examples of the key position of "military wisdom" in the Israeli ethos, as well as in decision making processes of the political establishment concerning the method for coping with threats. But glorification of "military wisdom" inevitably led to weakening and possibly the degeneration of political thinking in Israel. This became more and more biased in favor of defense thinking, identified in Israel as military thinking, which is the foundation of political militarism, an ethos that advocates wielding military power for solving political problems.

In the absence of the necessary knowledge infrastructure, the chance of the adverse effects of misconceptions concerning the evaluation of military and other threats will increase, and political manipulations may become a formative force in all matters related to the definition of threats. Political considerations may lead political leaders to intensify perceptions of threat for rallying political support and for displacing political opponents and serving governments. The Iranian threat, which is perceived by most Israelis as the most tangible and existential, is extended to different fronts. Many Israeli politicians warn against the Iranian presence in

the Gaza Strip,[14] while others warn against the return of the Golan Heights to the Syrians' lest Iranian presence be facilitated.[15]

When the political leadership in office has difficulty providing a solution the leadership demonstrates "strategic helplessness", a vacuum forms into which the military establishment is drawn, this being perceived as the source of authority and deliverance during hard times. The professional element is perceived to be able to provide the solution when a sense of disorientation and loss of purpose intensifies (Michael, 2007b). In this reality, a "cultural-intellectual symbiosis" forms between the establishments, whose social and ideological characteristics are extensively discussed by Kimmerling (Kimmerling, 2001; Kimmerling, 2003).

It appears that the Winograd Commission did a good job of describing the phenomenon and the extent of the asymmetry of the Israeli reality in the interim report that it published, when it stated that "On political-defense issues… the most dominant professional authority in Israel is the military" (Winograd report, 2007, p. 110). The report of the commission identifies the problem as being mainly structural, resulting from "the relative power of the planning, staff, intelligence and evaluation apparatuses in the military, compared to the great weakness of these apparatuses in the political establishment" (ibid, p. 111), but ignores the historical reasons and the cultural context at the foundation of the Israeli ethos.

One of the most salient characteristics of this ethos is the central place of the military in Israel's self-image and public consciousness (Michael, 2008). This finding recurs in public opinion polls and is strongly expressed in Asher Arian's democracy index and the peace index over the years.[16]

In the great majority of cases, and almost as an ongoing tradition, the military establishment has no real competitors. The sophisticated staff work capabilities of the military make it the professional and almost the sole staff work agency of the government. In effect, according to the Winograd Commission "apart from the IDF, we have not found any professional party that has truly examined the situation, examined options for a response and raised them before the political establishment… in this respect (again) it was the military alone that served as the government's professional staff element" (Winograd Report, p. 123). Worse, this structural advantage is also becoming a material advantage, with the military establishment becoming the most influential agent in decision making processes, while almost completely negating the government, its ministries and experts (ibid, p. 128). The asymmetric characteristic in the discourse between the establishments sometimes reaches absurd extremes, such as when the military establishment defines for its political counterpart the strategic purpose and objectives of the war (testimony of Chief of General Staff Halutz, Winograd Report, p. 56).

The reality described by the Winograd Commission is a relatively faithful reflection of the liberties that the political establishment takes in conceding its responsibility to the military establishment in analyzing the strategic environment and threats, defining the political goals, and converting them into clear guidelines. Under these conditions of an "intellectual vacuum" of the political establishment, the political leadership becomes frail and hollow, while the military establishment, with its sophisticated argumentation, is "drawn" into this vacuum, presenting an almost exclusively military basis of argumentation.

The problem only intensifies when this vacuum is taken over by the military establishment headed by a charismatic military leader who by his captivating personality and leadership succeeds in "incapacitating" the political establishment. A charismatic military leader, who is perceived in the eyes of the political branch as brilliant and as possessing a broad base of military knowledge, may drag the political establishment into adopting his recommendations (Michael, 2008) as well as his definitions of the nature of the threats with which

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14 A major example of this phenomenon is the statement of MK Yuval Steinitz, as quoted in the article of Yoel Marcus, "On their nose and on their Hamas", **Haaretz**, March 11, 2008; MK Yuval Steinitz, former chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, says that Israel's lack of action (i.e. enter and occupy Gaza) is suicide. "We are allowing Iran to establish in the heart of the country a foothold and base for firing long-range rockets… if we reconcile with this, our very existence will be in danger".

15 Minister Shaul Mofaz, heading an Israeli delegation to Washington says that giving the Golan Heights to Syria would mean Iranians on the Golan Heights. "While the Iranians have established a foothold in Southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, they will establish a foothold on the Golan Heights. In this reality, the Golan Heights is a strategic asset that must not be transferred to the Syrians". www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3537162,00.html

16 See Asher Arian, David Nachmias, Doron Navot and Daniel Shani, **2003 Democracy index**, Jerusalem, Israel Democracy Institute publishing 2003. Efraim Yaar and Tamar Herman, **February 2005 Peace Index**: "The IDF is the entity whose trust is the highest, and the common assessment is that its influence over the shaping of national policy is appropriate, i.e. not too strong and not too weak… we have assessed the degree of trust of the public in various institutes in the state. Among Jews, the figures indicate, as previously, that the greatest trust – 73% full trust and 21% some trust, for a total of 94%, is given to the IDF. In second place – albeit with a significant gap – is the Supreme Court with 43% full trust and 31.5% some trust, for a total of 75%. The main political

institutes all gain much less trust – the government gets 12% full trust and 33% some trust, for a total of 45%".
In this context, the findings of the May 2007 peace index, published after publishing the initial report of the Winograd Commission and testimonies of seniors who appeared before it, are particularly salient. The public in Israel expresses "deep distrust in the political establishment, which is particularly prominent compared to the significant trust in the military leadership". **May 2007 peace index** – www.tau.ac.il/peace

the state must cope. Indeed, in the case of the Second Lebanon War, "The Chief of Staff personally played a very central and almost exclusive role in leading the initiative for opening the military move…" (Winograd Report, p. 141). His function was so important that ministers, even the most senior ones, were paralyzed into inactivity, "It was not even 'bon ton' to vote against [the decision to depart for war] at this stage", stated the Minister of Foreign Affairs in her testimony before the Winograd Commission (Livni's testimony before the commission, p. 12).

The political establishment in Israel (voluntarily) lacks civil institutional ability and infrastructure to generate knowledge,[17] which can systematically and thoroughly develop options that compete with the options of military knowledge infrastructure in the context of the violent confrontation and the manner in which it is conducted. Therefore, even in cases in which the political establishment objects to the interpretation and recommendations of the military establishment concerning the operational environment, it lacks genuine ability to present a worthier alternative. Military knowledge, which is converted into a sophisticated set of conceptualizations, becomes the common knowledge base of the military and political establishment and in effect the most significant relevant knowledge base in all matters related to the identification and evaluation of threats (Michael, 2007b; Michael, 2007c). On important military-related issues, such as annual and multi-annual situation assessments of the defense policy, on some occasions the discussion does not exceed a presentation by the military followed by a question period. The ability of the military to prepare an attractive, convincing presentation gives its position a prior advantage" (Yaari, 2004, 34).

The essence of the interrelations between the political and military establishments is in the depth and quality of the discourse held between them, for the meeting between the establishments should be defined as an intellectual meeting between the different knowledge infrastructures, political and military. The purpose of the meeting is to refine knowledge in a manner that maximizes the synchronization between the military effort and political effort and the efficacy of a military move for realizing the political goal of the war (Michael, 2008). The purpose of civilian control in this case is to reduce the influence of the military

establishment over the political goal in a manner that maximizes the contribution of the military move for advancing the political purpose where reducing the influence of the military establishment which does not serve the political objective. But in the reality of strong asymmetry favoring military knowledge, when the political establishment comes to the meeting almost completely devoid of knowledge, and its political thinking is biased towards the military thinking, the military establishment becomes an epistemic authority. This leads to informative dependence of the political establishment on its military counterpart and informative closure of the political establishment before sources of information and knowledge that are an alternative to military knowledge (Michael, 2007b). The result is a takeover of the discourse space between the establishments by the military echelon[18] and the almost complete detachment of substantive civilian control when facing the basic, grounded, and convincing argumentation ability of the military establishment.[19]

Because political-military inter-establishment discourse is of supreme importance on issues of war and peace, there is an expectation to avoid restricting the freedom of thought and freedom of expression by the senior officer corps, which manages the discourse with the political establishment: "… for the boundary between the civilian and military branches …. Deals with issues of responsibility and authority, rather than in realms of spirit and thought…" (Tal, 1996, 104). However, under conditions the military establishment's professional and psychological advantage, and in the absence of the political establishment's capability and skills of comparable standard and quality to that of the military, the open discourse between the echelons, in which the boundaries are diffuse or almost nonexistent, may blur the boundaries between fields of responsibility and authority. Under such conditions, the takeover of the very definition of threats, national interests and political objectives by professional military strategic thinking may prove dangerous (Williams, 1999). Such a blurring of boundaries may lead to the intervention of the military establishment in the responsibilities of the political establishment and weaken its authority and in certain cases even undermine the expectancy of the political goal and disrupt the responsibility to effect its realization.

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17 For more details on the matter of absence of knowledge infrastructure for the civilian establishment concerning missions, structure, combat doctrine and responsibilities of the military, see the comprehensive composition of Aviezer Yaari, **Civil Control over the Military in Israel**, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, memorandum 72, October 2004, pp. 23, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34-35.

18 Concerning the meaning of "discourse space" as an organizing concept in political-military establishment relations, see: Michael C. Desch, "Bush and the Generals," **Foreign Affairs**, May/June 2007.

19 On the theoretical development of the essence of argumentation and its military standards based on American experience, see: Cori Dauber, "The Practice of Argument: Reading the Condition of Civil-Military Relations," **Armed Forces & Society**, vol. 24, issue 3, 1998, pp. 435-446.

Yaakov Amidror: The level and minutiae of the control depend almost completely on the degree of the civilians' will to be involved. In places and times in which civilians prefer to ignore their duty or avoid delving into details, and the military must make decisions based on a given situation on the ground, it does so, and civilians give their silent approval. But such freedom is a result of the weakness of the civilians and not the result of any military penchant to make decisions beyond its authority. In critical areas such as the crossing of a border, firing across the border and so on, in other words, any matter that involves a violation of the sovereignty of a neighboring country, the degree of freedom that military elements have is negligible.

In both public and latent military culture, the understanding of the subordination of the military to the political establishment is clear and absolute. The military system internalizes this at every echelon and in every opportunity of education, training or unclear situations. The military has no sense of conflict with the political establishment; even when there is an argument, it is obvious who will decide at the end of the process. The military may attempt to exploit its advantages as an entity that enjoys a high level of staff work, particularly in comparison with the weakness of other governance bodies in this field. It may exploit the ignorance of decision-makers, who often lack information on the purpose of a decision, particularly the person assuming responsibility for execution of the decision – but it will not contest the authority of the decision-maker, and will align the execution with the decision of the competent civilian element. In marginal cases, in situations that are unclear for a particular reason (for example, when the text of a decision is vague), senior commanders in the field may act in a manner not explicitly prescribed in the spirit of the political decision. However, such cases are marginal, and are not clearly in violation of a political resolution. Any clear case of violating the decisions of the political establishment would lead to the ousting of the relevant commander, which everyone in the military would agree to without question.

Recently, we have experienced two decisions that are devoid of defense logic. The military clearly objected to the first, while the second decision dragged the military into a confrontation with the citizens of the state in a manner that endangered its existence; however, the military nonetheless carried out the decisions of the politicians (I refer to the military's objection to leaving the Philadelphi route in the Gaza Strip, and its difficulty of accepting the task of removing Jewish residents from their homes in the Gaza Strip). The execution of the two decisions was further proof, for whoever needs it,

of the absolute subordination of the military to political decisions, even when lacking military logic.

Shaul Arieli: Civilian control is required mainly with respect to two characteristics that are unique to Israel compared to other democracies:

A. The control of defense information and knowledge channels.

B. The exclusive ability to perform orderly staff work based on organizational history and high professional abilities in the field of foreign relations and defense.

These advantages, against the weakness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government Secretarial Office and the National Security Council, require ensuring that the political establishment and controlling elements have a full, balanced picture with real options. I believe that this situation does not occur at the required level of continuity and frequency.

Civilian control over the military relies on four main elements: the government via the Defense Minister, the Knesset via its committees (particularly the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and its subcommittees), the State Comptroller and the Supreme Court, convening as the High Court of Justice.

• Out of all of these elements, the most significant and effective control is entrusted to the Defense Minister. This effectiveness is contingent to his personal ability and familiarity with the IDF and the Ministry of Defense, his personal ability to motivate and back up the key functions in his ministry – the Deputy Defense Minister, the Director General of the Ministry, the military secretary, the Head of the Political-Security Bureau, the Chief of Staff, the Comptroller of the Defense Systemn and the Military Ombudsman, with his political power that can be wielded against a Prime Minister, preventing the common tendency of Prime Ministers and Chiefs of Staffs to find channels for circumventing the Defense Minister. Defense Ministers who have enjoyed these capabilities have led to a positive perception of control by the military itself, which in turn cooperated and considered the Defense Minister to be its representative, leading to more effective control over the military.

• The ability of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee to control the military depends on the composition of its members, its ability to challenge the positions stated by the IDF, its relationship with the Chief of General Staff, the Defense Minister, his deputy, the assistant to the Director General and his military secretary. The ability of each of these to compartmentalize and sift through the information

presented to the committee and its subcommittees is considerable. The only weapon that the committee has is its required support for the defense budget.

- The State Comptroller benefits from a well developed, institutional auditing mechanism that that can ensure that his findings reach the decision-makers and public opinion. However, his ability to enforce the adoption of his recommendations completely within the prescribed schedule is weak.

The activist approach that characterizes the High Court of Justice confronts the IDF with constraints of the law even within operational activity, particularly regarding events unfolding in the Occupied Territories. In many cases, the IDF will not hasten to implement High Court of Justice rulings, but it will not do so without backing and coordination from the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister.

Tamar Malz-Ginsburg presents a different position, contending that there actually is civilian control over the military:

It is important to note that in Israel the norm whereby military people perceive and recognize the principle of subordination of the military establishment to civilian authority has been preserved. However, there are also phenomena that pose questions concerning the separation of the two establishments. One of these phenomena is the transition of former military officers into politics without any "cooling-off" period. This phenomenon raises the question of whether this strengthens the military concept among the civil leadership, or whether it increases the control of civilian authority over its military counterpart, due to politicians from a military background having great familiarity with military activity.

Another phenomenon is related to the IDF being the entity that effectively possesses the monopoly over interpreting the strategic situation. For this reason, both the decision making echelon and the public at large accept the interpretation of reality that highlights and emphasizes only one aspect – the threats that the State of Israel faces. However, it must be assumed that reality has other facets as well.

Against the contentions that are voiced concerning lack of control over and increasing involvement of the military (as well as the contention that the State of Israel is effectively a military that has a state and not the opposite),[20] there are other contentions that

indicate the opposite trend. For example, Stuart Cohen contends that a significant change has occurred in the relations between the military and civilian establishments – increased civilian involvement in military activities. Cohen states, "This process, which began with the advent of a more opinionated civil society that scrutinizes its conventions, has gained momentum as a result of the central place of low intensity conflict activity on the agenda of IDF forces, and due to internal reforms in the military organizational structure and composition… today's IDF suffers from eroded autonomy, and it is in danger of being completely enslaved by the civilian establishment, i.e. 'turning the tables'".[21]

4. Is Israel a Militaristic Country?

Kobi Michael: In the western democratic world, the concept of militarism is usually perceived as having negative, ominous connotations that embody actions of exercising force and violence for coping with political problems. The concept has a number of definitions. One of the best, in my opinion, is Shaw's, who defined militarism as "the influence of the military organization and its values over social structure" (Shaw, 1993).

Israel has been a major object of interest and research in the field, owing to its uniqueness as a democracy that is subject to a persistent existential threat that has existed since its establishment in the shadow of wars and violent confrontations – a reality in which the military has had a key function and unique position. Major Israeli researchers, such as Uri Ben Eliezer, Yagil Levi, Yoram Peri, Moshe Lisk, Yehuda Ben Meir and others who have dealt with the subject, have stood out in the field and laid highly important cornerstones for the discipline.

Kimmerling's attitude to the concept is more complex. According to his definition, the source of militarism is as a cultural, cognitive and behavioral pattern in military existence. This serves to reflect military thinking and a set of concepts that interprets social processes, as well as modes of intervention and decision-making processes, or in other words a perception of reality. Militarism, in his view, reflects hierarchy, authority, and primarily the wielding of power as a problem solving pattern (Kimmerling, 1992, 125-130). Ben Eliezer described the concept of wielding power when he wrote, "This is a cultural phenomenon that indicates the existence and sometimes the enforcement of a perception of reality whereby war or

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20 See also the criticism of Reuven Pedhazur, "Mobilized State", **Haaretz**, Sfarim supplement, June 3, 2009, p. 12, on the book **An Army that Has a State: a New View of Defense and civil Relations**, eds. Gavriel Sheffer, Oren Barak and Amiram Oren, Jerusalem, Carmel Publishing, 2009.

21 Stuart A. Cohen, **Excessive Subordination of the IDF? Change in Relationships between the Civil Establishment and the Military in Israel**, reviews in Middle Eastern security no. 64, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, February 2006, pp. 16-17.

organized violence is a correct, apt solution to political problems" (Ben Eliezer, 1995, 20).

Some of the different definitions of the concept require differentiation to be made between certain types of militarism. It appears correct to make an initial, basic distinction between militarism in mode of thought and behavior and militarism at the level of rule (martial law or military junta). Ben Eliezer differentiated cultural or ideological militarism from praetorianism (Ben Eliezer, 1995, 124). Kimmerling's distinction is slightly more complex, indicating three characteristics of militarism:

1. **The forceful-political dimension**, which manifests in the existence of direct or indirect martial law for an extended time, rule being based on military coercion.
2. **The cultural dimension**, which manifests in the central position of the military in collective existence and identity and embodiment of absolute patriotism.
3. **The cognitive dimension**, the structural and cultural permeation of militarism into the public mood (Kimmerling, 1993, 125-130).

It appears that the uniqueness of Israel, as a democracy that is functioning under a persistent threat, results in a militarism that is unique to this country, which challenges the generally accepted theoretical distinctions concerning this term. As a rule, two key schools may be indicated in the research literature on the subject. One, which is represented by researchers such as Baruch Kimmerling, Uri Ben Eliezer, Yagil Levi and others, portrays Israeli society as a militaristic one, in which the political establishment adopts an approach that lies in the principles and patterns of military philosophy. The other, which is represented by researchers such as Feiner, Perlmutter, Moshe Lisk, Dan Horovitz and Yoram Peri, considers Israeli society to be a pluralistic society in which the military is attentive to and influenced by social processes, and engages in complex, diverse interactions with the political establishment and other social players.

The core of militarism, according to Kimmerling, is "… with the existence of wars and the various forms of civilian participation in military and defense services… in the Israeli context, the lion's share passes through a military filter" (Kimmerling, 1993, 25). Kimmerling contends, in his writing about militarism in Israel, that militarism has also become one of the sources for creating interests for sustaining the (Israeli-Arab – K.M.) conflict. Civil militarism has acted as a blurring element between the defense domain and the civilian domain and has served the political/civilian establishment as a means for achieving hegemonic control (ibid, 131). The term "security" has become the core concept of the terminology that interprets reality. Ben Eliezer used the concept of a "**a nation in uniform**", which he saw as a bringing, reconciling mechanism between the structure of democratic liberal society and the military, where the involvement of the military in civil fields does not lead to its civilianization, but militarization of society.[22]

Israel is evolving and becoming a society that has neo-liberal signs, with civilian-oriented trends; however, it is doubtful whether these changes could modify cultural concepts that place the military and possible military solutions at the center of every policy, to create, in the absence of significant anti-militaristic forces, a counterweight to the power and political involvement of the military, or in effect, the expansion of its function into politics. He contends, "Institutional arrangements that connect the military to politics and to society in Israel, are not a mitigating mechanism that allows Israeli democracy to function while preventing military coups, but constitute a kind of infrastructure that may stand as an obstacle to political compromise, irrespective of the intentions and the degree of willingness of the counterparty to have true peace with Israel" (Ben Eliezer, 2000, 260-261).

Kimmerling (2001) emphasizes that "security" as a social problem was not formed in a void. The way he understands it, security doctrines are a reflection of and part of a set of beliefs, perceptions of reality and ideologies that are dominant in society that may reflect the interests of the dominant social groups. The doctrines themselves also shape social reality. Military mentality and culture (cultural militarism – K.M.) have encroached on civil culture, have influenced and have been influenced. According to him, it is no surprise that in the circumstances that are described, "Israel has developed a culturally and materially mobilized militaristic society, in which the component of national security has shaped many aspects of culture, values and ideologies. Politics and culture are involved in the 'professional' military considerations of national defense and shape social reality, which serves as a convenient shell" (Kimmerling, 2001, 272).

One of the more interesting later developments of the concept was presented by Yagil Levi (2003) in his recent book on "**materialist militarism**". Levi devotes the first chapter of his book to a definition of the concept of "materialistic militarism" (Levi, 2003, 18-21), which he identifies as the organizing concept of the theoretical construct that he wishes to develop.

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22   Uri Ben-Eliezer, "A Nation-in-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel's First Years", assignment based on an article due to be published in the periodical **Comparative studies in Society**.

Levi fuses the concept using two secondary anchors: militarism and material rewards that social groups gain from it (ibid, page 18). Levi attributes great importance to the place of military contents and symbols in the cultural discourse and long history, which is based on an interesting dialectic contention in which Levi explains how materialistic militarism becomes the organizing mechanism of the political-military establishment relations. According to Levi, by its very formation, it subordinates statesmanship to the set of concepts that adopts military logic, which has led to the shaping of Israeli defense policy that has relied on the militaristic political principle, advocating the solving of political problems using military force. At the same time, materialistic materialism becomes a safeguard against a military coup, simply because the military echelon does not need such a move to advance its concept concerning the manner of waging the Israeli-Arab conflict.

In parallel, Levi explains how materialistic militarism regulates the dependence the military's dependence on the hegemony of civil elites by granted to its servicemen the possibility of converting assets and resources accrued during their service into civil assets and resources after they conclude their military service and join civilian organizations. The confluence of interests between the establishments allows the political establishment to secure its control of the military establishment on the one hand, while on the other hand ensuring the social prestige and influence of the military as a cultural institution.

The interesting innovation, albeit not free of criticism, which Levi promulgates, is the very causal relationship that he identifies between materialistic militarism, demilitarization, and remilitarization trends that occur in the military. Levi contends that as long as the political establishment gains benefit from materialistic militarism, its existence will be secured and it will lead to a trend of remilitarization. If the balance of benefits changes, and the continued existence of materialistic militarism calls for civil elites to pay a high "price" for its very existence, the willingness of those elites to continue supporting the military in an unqualified fashion will decrease. Such conditions constitute the infrastructure for the development of the trend of demilitarization, in the sense of the dissolution of dominant belligerent military formations, resulting in the social prestige of the military decreasing. In such a reality, retired servicemen will find it difficult to convert their military assets and resources into civil resources, and the influence of the military establishment over political currents will decrease.

Moshe Lisk (2001) strongly disputes the conclusions of Ben-Eliezer, Kimmerling and others, who claim that Israeli society is militaristic. He contends that Israeli society is not militaristic, and shows a number of salient characteristics to prove his plea. One of the strongest of these is the political pluralism among senior officers who are discharged from the military and join the various political parties.[23] He states that the security challenges that Israel has faced since its founding until the present, have led to a combination of civilian dimensions with military dimensions that fuel one another. Over the years, particularly after the first intifada broke out, it was the military echelon that led to the development of a new atmosphere, which held that it was not possible to suppress a popular uprising using military means alone. Later, diverse, even competing concepts of security evolved, the most prominent of which was expressed through the Oslo Accords. Lisk concludes that Israel is closer to the model of Athens than that of Sparta, and contends, "In Israel there was a tendency of the two sectors to develop a certain degree of resemblance to one another by partial 'militarization' of civil activity and partial 'civilianization' of the military, thus preventing the military from becoming a military caste that is distinct and alienated from civil society (Lisk, 2001, 210).

Gabi Sheffer: There is no militarism in Israel, there is militancy.

There have been ups and downs in the extent and depth of the political, media and academic debate regarding the question of militarism in Israeli society. Without going into the fluctuations in the tendency to discuss this question in the past and the conclusions drawn from these discussions, the debate on this issue is again expanding. One of the main reasons for the expansion of the scope of the debate of this question is the tendency of many more Israelis to lean towards the political right wing. However, this rightward trend is not the result of material changes in the fundamental views of the majority of Israelis, but characterizes mainly the electoral preferences of Israeli voters. However, the numerical increase mainly in the electoral power of the central right, right and far right camps and the ultra-orthodox and national religious camps causes many observers to state that the society and state of Israel are still, or have resumed being, "a significantly militaristic society and country".

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23 Additional characteristics that Lisk mentions for strengthening his plea are: the absence of one security concept, shrinking of the military industrial fabric and the failure to translate economic power into political goals and more. For details, see Moshe Lisk, "the security ethos and the myth of Israel as a militaristic society", in, Stuart Cohen (ed.) **Democratic culture – Military and Society in Israel**, Bar Ilan Publishing – Israel Democracy Institute, 2001, vol. 4-5, pp. 200-204.

However, a more careful examination of the subject shows that the way in which most Israelis think and behave is unrelated to expanding militarism. These are related to three key factors:

A. The lack of a profound ideological discussion on the essence of Israeli society and politics.
B. The aspiration for the appearance of a "strong leader".
C. Placing strong emphasis on personal competition between candidates, mainly for the positions of Prime Minister and Defense Minister.

There is a wealth of evidence illustrating that the notion of Israel increasing its level of militarism is problematic and unrealistic. The evidence supporting this statement concerning militarism of Israeli society and politics may be found, only ostensibly, in Israeli public opinion polls, which must be treated with caution. Most polls attest that many Israelis support, for example, the use of military force to prevent or stop Iran's moves in the field of development of nuclear weapons and its ballistic capabilities, or that many Israelis support the use of military force against terrorist actions that are carried out by Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian organizations. In contrast, many of the observers who contend that Israel is militaristic in character do not relate to the results of polls that show that most Israelis support reaching peace with its neighbors and negotiations with the Palestinians and even with the Syrians concerning the founding of two states or a solution to the Golan Heights issue. These, of course, are essentially non-militaristic views, according to the characteristics of militarism that are commonly held by different writers on this issue. In addition, there is evidence that very few Israelis support a dictatorship or martial law per se.

The writers support the view of Israeli militarism and attribute it to several causes, as discussed: memories of persecutions experienced by the Jewish People throughout its history, particularly memories of the Holocaust; the protracted conflict with the Palestinians and Arab countries; hostile actions and wars with the Palestinians and Arab states; the nuclear threats from Iran, Syria and recently even from Pakistan; Zionist ideology; the alleged sacrosanct status of the IDF and the defense establishment in the eyes of "all Israelis", and so on. But, the influences of all of these elements on the attitudes of Israelis in the context of militarism should be carefully reexamined without adhering to these conventions.

Therefore, it is necessary to reexamine the definitions and characteristics of militarism accepted by the theorists who consider Israeli society to be militaristic in character. Needless to say, the number and character of the attributes and definitions of militarism are almost as numerous as the writers on these subjects. One of the researchers who influenced thinking in this field and whose formulations have been adopted by many researchers and observers is Baruch Kimmerling. According to him, "Militarism constitutes a tremendous cluster of customs, interests, observances, actions and thought, which, while related specifically to armies and wars, reach far beyond the true military goals and their effect is unlimited in scope. They permeate every corner of Israeli society and conquer it, from industry to art." It is obvious that this is a very vague and universal characterization / definition. Later in his statements, as Kobi Michael clarified above, Kimmerling cited three aspects of militarism – cognitive, cultural and political-military.

If it is necessary to apply these characteristics to the various countries in the world, there would barely be a single country that would be exempt of the categorization as militaristic. In contrast, there are researchers and observers who agree that the term is very broad, and to make it meaningful, particularly concerning Israel, its scope must be greatly reduced.

In this spirit, before we clarify the actual state of militarism in Israel, the following is a much more focused characterization of the phenomenon that many researchers accept: "Militarism is a state in which a whole society fully accepts, without mutiny, the unlimited control and influence of the military power and other defense arms, of their commanders, and of their speakers, over everything that happens in the political or regional field that they control." According to this specific characterization, the number of countries that are undisputedly dominated by militarism is rather small. The absolute majority of these countries have authoritarian regimes or military dictatorship. It is obvious that Israel does not belong to this category.

All of the factors mentioned above only apparently contribute to militarism in Israel, and today do not have such great influence on most of Israeli society. For example, few Israelis are very familiar with the insecure history of the Jewish People from Genesis to World War Two, the memory of the Holocaust is disappearing among most Israelis, particularly among youth, the attitude to the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict is multi-faceted, and the attitude to the military and the defense system has also changed and frequently changes. See, for example, the severe criticisms voiced against these systems after the 1973 war, after the First and Second Lebanon Wars, and even after Operation Cast Lead. This means, primarily, the tendency for "pure" militarism

with the influence of most of the factors mentioned by the followers of the definitions of Kimmerling and similar authors are cast in very considerable doubt.

In addition, we must consider that Israeli society is heterogeneous and takes a range of views regarding most of the key issues that society and the state face. This relates to the character of the regime in Israel as well. While Israeli democracy is far from being perfect, it is fundamentally a formal democracy (i.e. a political method that guards and preserves formal democratic arrangements - elections, the replacement of members of Knesset after the elections, the formal relations between the Knesset and the government), and does not utilize militaristic political methods according to the characterization shown above.

Fundamentally, what has occurred and continues to occur in Israel is a significant tendency not to militarism but to "militancy". In other words, this is a tendency for "belligerency" (militancy) and forceful responses against true and imagined existential threats inside Israel, in the Territories, in the whole region, and now also in more remote areas, such as in Asia, where Islam is gaining strength.

Moreover, the adoption of belligerency/militancy by broad circles in the heterogeneous society is a phenomenon that wavers, as belligerent attitudes frequently rise and subside. There have been periods in which the tendency for militancy was strong and periods in which this tendency weakened. Usually, after what many Israelis perceived to be clear military victories or achievements, the tendency for militancy decreases. In times of security tension and after military failures, the tendency for militancy increases. These tendencies are strengthened by Israel's defense policy makers. They are motivated not only by genuine security dangers to extensive groups in the population, but also by interest-based considerations of defense policymakers, the military, and the secret services.

In view of these statements, it is worth reconsidering the various perceptions of Israeli society, which is militant rather than militaristic, and the functions that the power brokers in Israeli society assume.

Tamar Malz-Ginsburg: It is often asked whether owing to the central status of the army in society, Israel may be defined as militaristic. Militarism is a broad concept that has been given many different interpretations.[24] The different definitions include those that are apt for describing the prevailing situation in the State of Israel; thus, the question must be raised as to whether there is an attempt to stretch the definition of

militarism by adapting it to the existing state in Israel. To my mind, due to the fact that this concept is subject to different interpretations, and due to it being charged with negative connotations, it is a problematic concept. Therefore, to my understanding, an attempt should to be made to study Israeli society and the military, without adopting this concept.

The State of Israel is democratic by character and laws, institutes, and measures have been established for civil control over the military. The Knesset, the government, the State Comptroller's Office and the High Court of Justice are the main institutes that supervise the army. Beyond this, additional entities are critical of the army, such as the media and the Israeli public including: social organizations, parents of enlisted servicemen, reserve servicemen, and academics. However, there are also lacunae that exist in the law and in the various ministries' operations, which I shall not discuss in this paper.[25]

It is also important to note that in Israel the norm whereby military people perceive and recognize the principle of subordination of the military to civil authority has been maintained. However, there are also phenomena that raise eyebrows concerning the separation of the branches. One of these phenomena is the transition of retired military personnel into politics without any cooling-off period. This phenomenon raises the question of whether this causes the strengthening of military perspective among the civil leadership or whether it increases the control of civilian control over the military, due to the close relations between politicians who are former servicemen with the military system.

Another phenomenon is related to the IDF being the entity that effectively monopolizes the way in which the strategic situation is interpreted. For this reason, both the decision-making echelon and the public at large accept an interpretation of reality that highlights and stresses only one facet: an analysis that focuses on the threats that the State of Israel faces. However, it must be assumed that reality has other facets as well. Does Israeli democracy face any danger because of the lack of civilian control over the military, as well as the exalted status of the military in Israeli society? The answer is no.[26] In contrast to the contentions voiced

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24 See detailed review on this subject in the statements of Kobi Michael.

25 In this context, see the detailed review of Eliezer Yaari, **Civil Control over the Military in Israel**, memorandum 72, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, October 2004.

26 In this paper, this issue is dealt with from the security-national context I discussed above. I do not deal with the dangers that Israeli democracy may face due to other factors and rifts within society (religious-secular relations; Israeli Jewish – Israeli Arab relations; ideological or ethnic separations; the configuration of the regime, moral social changes and more).

about the absence of control over and the increasing empowerment of the military (and also the contention that the State of Israel is effectively a military that has a state and not vice versa),[27] opposing contentions, which show the opposite trend, are also relevant. For example, as I indicated above, Stuart Cohen contends that a significant change has occurred in the relations between the military and civilian establishment, but this change is actually illustrates increasing the involvement of the civilian establishment in activity in the military.

Another question that is frequently asked, particularly among those who believe that Israeli society is militaristic, is whether Israeli society is based on the use of force. In other words, does Israeli society prefer a policy that relies on military action for solving political–strategic issues rather than other options (such as negotiations, and choosing management approaches that use diplomacy) because the military is so strongly imprinted on Israeli identity? The answer to this is not unequivocal. On the one hand, I have depicted the problems whereby the State of Israel has no branch of identical weight to the military that takes part in strategic policy making processes. Due to this, it has been noted, reality is shown mainly through one lens – that of threats. This means that the mode of conduct in this reality is guided by the military. In addition, as has been stated, the cooling-off periods of former servicemen upon transitioning to senior positions in the civilian establishment is very short, and some claim that this results in a preference of military approaches. Beyond this, as I shall state below, Israeli society still believes in self-sufficiency regarding its forces, i.e. the IDF protecting against the threats it faces.

In contrast, reality has proven that former servicemen in key positions, including prime ministers, have not always pursued military options, such as Rabin and the Oslo processes, Barak and the pullout from Lebanon, and Sharon and the unilateral exit from Gaza. Yehuda Ben Meir asserts that despite the problems in the decision making processes and the dominance of the military therein, the recurrent pattern is that of the "civilian establishment making major decisions [policy – T.M.G.] without involving the military. Major examples from Israeli history include: Ben Gurion's decision to withdraw from Sinai after the Sinai War in 1956; Eshkol's decision to wait before entering the war…in which despite the heavy pressure exerted by the military ("the officers' rebellion"), Eshkol made a

decision based on civilian establishment considerations; the decision of Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan the day before the 1973 war not to deliver a preemptive strike against the enemy even after it was obvious that Egypt was about to attack and the Chief of General Staff recommended acting. Two key political decisions were made without the military establishment: the initial contacts with Egypt and Sadat's visit to Israel (November 1977), which were held without the knowledge of the military and without the knowledge of the serving defense minister, Ezer Weizmann; and the beginning of the Oslo process (1993)".[28] In my opinion, Israeli society prefers an active political approach more so than relying on the IDF for executing policy. In other words, Israeli society prefers decisions that apparently lead to solutions (as was the case concerning the support for the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and the erection of the separation fence). Consequently, Israeli society prefers a policy based on pragmatism and activism, rather than a forceful military policy.

Lev Grinberg: Militarism and democracy

Due to the belief in the security myth, military service is a perceived as a value that allows many Israelis to express their identity and accept the concept whereby there is a constant need to fight for existence. Sectors that do not accept Israel's seminal security myth do not serve in the military (mainly Arabs and ultra-orthodox Jews), and in times of acute political dispute, the willingness of Jews who dispute the government policy weakens too. As the military has been, since 1977, a key tool for implementing government policy towards the Palestinians (after the peace treaty with Egypt), the military sometimes becomes the scene of political conflict. Therefore, the structural problem of the military is maintaining its apolitical image to the greatest extent possible in the eyes of its servicemen; otherwise, its ability to wield force becomes impaired. For example, in the 1980s, when a dispute arose around the use of force during the First Lebanon War and during the first intifada, the IDF had difficulty escalating the violence, and in the end concluded that there was no military solution to the intifada, but a political one instead. These were years in which the security myth weakened because of the political dispute between the left and right wings. The political argument around deploying the military caused a political definition of the security problems. In contrast to this, after the

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27 See also the criticism of Reuven Pedhazur, "Mobilized State", **Haaretz**, Sfarim supplement, June 3, 2009, p. 12, on the book **An Army that Has a State: a New View of Defense and civil Relations**, eds. Gabriel Sheffer, Oren Barak and Amiram Oren, Jerusalem, Carmel Publishing, 2009.

28 Yehuda Ben Meir "changes in civil establishment and military establishment relations in recent years" in Ram, Erez (ed), **Civil Establishment and Military Establishment Relations in Israel**, Tel Aviv: Yaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, November 2004, p. 21.

failure of the Oslo process, the security myth reunited Israelis, and the difference between left and right wings were blurred; in the 2000s, the IDF received legitimacy and encouragement to escalate its violent responses irrespective of the threat, vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the Hezbollah.

Therefore, there is no permanent state of public support for wielding violence, or any fixed attitude of the military in favor of violent escalation. I suggest a distinction between cultural militarism and political militarism. These two terms are dynamic and are in a constant process of change, not necessarily in the same direction and homogeneously. Militarism was pivotal in the formation of the nation before 1948, as service in underground units and in the Haganah were key means of the Jewish Yishuv to mobilize all of its forces for achieving its goals. From the 1950s until the 1973 war, the military continued to be a key factor in absorbing immigration and turning immigrants into part of the fighting nation. During this period, militaristic culture was at is peak, from youth movements to military marches. Since 1974, particularly since the economic liberalization of the 1980s and globalization, cultural militarism and the desire to contribute to the state through serving in the military have weakened, and have been replaced by additional cultural forms. However, many groups continue to consider service in the military as a symbol of their national identity, and many signs of militaristic culture have remained; however, as Israeli society matures, militarism as a central culture is likely being displaced.

Militarism as statesmanship, i.e. the notion that political problems may be solved by deploying military force, has assumed various levels in Israel. It was the mode of operation until the 1973 war. It weakened following the interim agreements and peace treaty with Egypt, and was at the center of the public debate in the 1980s. Its weakening led to the recognition of the PLO and the subsequent Oslo Accords, but it still shaped the concept of a process as a "security" move that was intended to improve the personal security of Israelis (through security cooperation), rather than as a political arrangement between two independent entities. The belief that political problems may be solved by wielding force was restored with the failure of the Oslo process and the outbreak of the second intifada. Since then, the military has received full backing to escalate the use of force, based on adoption of the philosophy that whatever cannot be achieved by force can be achieved using more force. When wielding power is unsuccessful in incapacitating the opposing force, there is a sense of a "loss of deterrence", such as the Second Lebanon War. However, the conclusion drawn from this war was that the military has to "do its homework" and better prepare to use force (see the Winograd Report), rather than the notion that the problem cannot be solved by using force.

Yaakov Amidror: Yes, in two senses:

A. Many civilians are involved in military activities, and feel that the military belongs to them and that they belong to it. The military is part of existence in Israel far more than in other democratic countries. There are two reasons for this that bear on one another: The first is that most young Israelis enlist in the military, men for three years and women for two. While the number of people who do not enlist, mainly among the ultra-orthodox and also in certain elements of the well-off left-wing population in the center of the country, has been on the increase, the majority does enlist, and the process, as well as the number of young people in the military, dictates the tone. The second reason is the reserve duty that many perform for several years, even if it is a minority out of the total Jewish population. The reserve duty culture has had a great effect over society, because it involves leading figures in civil society, in the economy and in education. A state in which most young people are drafted and many adults serve a few weeks of reserve duty each year results in phenomena that may be called militaristic in all matters related to interest in the military and being a central reference point of society (for example: Where did you serve? is a common question in meetings between people who do not know each other).

B. The second reason that Israeli society is more militaristic than western counterparts stems from the understanding of most of Jewish society that the existence of the State of Israel depends on a strong military, without whose sacrifice and success the state's existence would be cast in doubt. Therefore, there is much greater appreciation for the military and its personnel than in other countries. It appears that on this matter, Israel is no exception; there are countries, of which the United States is a major example, in which military personnel have status and appreciation that greatly exceed those attributed to most state institutes. However, it still appears that the admiration for the IDF that exists in broad sectors and the pride of serving and commanding in the military are exceptional in Israel, even relative to these countries. This results from the sense of ever-present danger against which the military provides protection.

No, in two senses:

A. The military itself often appears to be more like a militia than a military due to its uniforms, ceremonies, hierarchy, awards, and so on. Beyond this, as it is based mostly on reserve forces, there is naturally a more civilian attitude in military discourse and in the behavior of the military as an organization. The ability of every parent to reach by phone commanders and have a sense of involement is a civilian indicator that is unique to Israel, preventing rigid militarization even in the regular army.

The IDF is the only modern military whose officers have all risen from the ranks of enlisted personnel. This unique phenomenon prevents the formation of a detached officer class that is inclined towards social and professional militarization. All servicemen have risen from the bottom and everyone knows everyone from those levels. In addition, regarding length of training and socialization of servicemen, particularly in command functions, the IDF lags far behind other militaries in the modern era. This uniqueness is what inhibits the formation of strong militaristic concepts that exceed the regular civil ones in an almost inherent manner.

B. Israeli society has not formed a social class that considers military duty in general and senior command work specifically to be a profession that belongs this group and its offspring. There are no "families" of servicemen, and when there is a high ranking son of a high ranking officer, it is a curiosity rather than a model for imitation. There are no groups that enlist in the military as a unified group, and when there are phenomena that are similar to this, which used to involve kibbutz members and now involve National Religious Jews who wear woven yarmulkes (kippot srugot), this is a short-term mission, up to the level of company commanders. Thereafter, the great majority is discharged and considers its continued service in reserve service as the conclusion of its duty.

However, there is an unusual phenomenon in Israel – the number of senior career servicemen among politicians; however, I believe that this is an indicator of the lack of a military worldview among servicemen who continue to think in civilian terms, rather than a sign of militarization of political life. It is important to point out that as opposed to the existing image, even if this was given political weight previously, today, it appears that a military career does not constitute a fast track into politics. The current prime minister was a junior officer in a special unit, his predecessor was a military newspaper correspondent and the head of the opposition does not portray her military service to be

of any importance (her service in the Mossad appears to be irrelevant). Other than the Defense Minister, today there is no high ranking officer who heads his party or holds a key position in the political world. The fact that senior officers in Israel are discharged at a relatively young age and still seek public challenges leads many of them to attempt to participate in political life, relative to other countries, where discharge is at a more advanced age; however, in the last decade, their influence has not been greater than those of economists, to name one example. As noted, this is not an indicator of militarization in the sense that military people in politics "take care" of their kind or for the security establishment more than other civilians in the same function.

Shaul Arieli: This question (of whether Israeli society is a militaristic one) relates mainly to the central position of uniformed personnel in various fields in Israeli society and the consolidation of values and patterns of thinking and action that originate from the military. The security threat that accompanied the founding of the State of Israel and its years of formation created processes that bestowed a central position to "military" modes of thought and to the security establishment and its graduates. The peak levels of these processes, in my opinion, are now behind us, and Israel is becoming less militaristic. However, the continuation of the trends of the last decade regarding threats that originate from Islamic extremism, the continued existence of the military as a channel for the upward mobility of immigrant populations (from the Former Soviet Union and Ethiopia) may slow down or reverse the trend of moderation. The following is a list of factors that affect the level of militarism:

• The central place of the security threat to a varying degree throughout the years of existence of the state, and as perceived in the consciousness of the Jewish public, has inevitably granted a central place to the entities that possess the solution to the threat. Thus, the IDF and its officers have gained public trust and unique compensation which is not received by other sectors that contribute to the national resilience of the State of Israel.

• The size of the population in Israel coupled with the need to build the fledgling state lead to conscription service that turned the IDF into a central "melting pot" for the influxes of immigration that were absorbed in the country, securing the involvement of parents throughout military service. This in turn lead to reserve duty that ensured a life routine, a set of contacts and acquaintances, and involvement and intervention in all matters related to the military

system. And in the end, bereavement that results from military activity or duty has become a cohesive factor among the Jewish population in Israel.

- The need for sustenance coupled with generous compensation packages have motivated many people to serve in the military for extended periods. The children of immigrants and the first generation that was born in Israel considered military service to be a platform for significant social advancement. Indeed, service in the military can be transformed into a second career in different fields: particularly politics, the defense industry and academia.

- The quality of career servicemen in the first decades that the military system created a high demand for its graduates in government and governmental systems from the 1960s onward. Technological units served as the founding fathers of the Hi-tech industry and the defense industries upon which the Israeli economy is based. The natural phenomenon of mutual "back scratching" gives military graduates an advantage in opening a second career.

- The proportion of former servicemen in Israel's Knesset does not exceed the proportion of members coming from other sectors, but the picture changes significantly when the composition of governments in Israel and their premiers are examined. More significantly, during government deliberations on foreign and defense issues, half of the participants to this day are retired senior IDF officers.

As I have noted, these trends and advantages are becoming more moderate due to the restrictions on the use of force in the regional arena; this results in disappointment, albeit oft unjustified, with the ability of the IDF in limited confrontations that have characterized the last three decades, as well as the "demobilization" of Israeli society, the formation of alternative paths to social mobility, and more.

5. The danger to democracy

Kobi Michael: Democracy in its broad, most basic sense is the foundation of the existence of the State of Israel, even if it has defects and interruptions. The State of Israel was founded as a democratic state and has survived many foreign and domestic crises as a functioning democracy. In the reality of recent years, the Supreme Court has been transformed, due to its adoption of a type of judicial activism to become the "watchdog" of Israeli democracy; however, in many cases, judicial activism reaches the point of judicial tyranny that negates the responsibility of the other authorities, particularly that of Israeli society. However, a list of important basic laws, such as the Human Dignity

and Liberty Law and the Freedom of Occupation Law have protected and reinforced Israeli democracy and turned it into one of the most enlightened and advanced democracies in the western world.

Considering the reality with which the State of Israel copes with, democracy is put to important, difficult tests every day, most of which are passed successfully. Israeli democracy is threatened by a number of central factors, including:

- Ineffectual governance.
- Political culture that encourages sectored politics.
- A security reality that leads to employing military power of high intensity and relatively high frequency – a reality of war that intensifies the security mindset, which in turn overshadows certain democratic duties.
- Increasing irredentism and radicalism among Israeli Arabs, or more correctly among the political and religious leadership of Israeli Arabs, a leadership that does not necessarily represent the majority of the public.
- The demographic aspect – continued control over many fields of life of the Palestinian population in the West Bank.
- Increase in the political power of immigrants from the Former Soviet Union, who have arrived from places that have known no democratic political structure, many of whom express an adverse to hostile attitude to Islam and Arabs or more correctly, towards Israeli Arabs. The increase in their political power under conditions of violent, ongoing confrontation with the Palestinians in a reality in which the political and religious leadership of Israeli Arabs exercises a radical, irredentist line, leads to deteriorating of the relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel. Uncontrolled deterioration of relations, backed by certain types of legislation, may weaken Israeli democracy and make it an ethnocracy that may lose international legitimacy.

Shaul Arieli: The danger to Israeli democracy occurs in three key channels:

A. Protracted control of Palestinians in the West Bank.

B. Potential threat from populations that want or prefer other values to democracy.

C. The struggle of Arabs of the State of Israel.

A. The lack of willingness to achieve political separation from the Palestinian population in the Territories, on the one hand, and abstention from

granting them civil rights, on the other, results in a different set of laws for 40% of residents under Israeli control, and a different set of laws for Israelis and Palestinians living in the same territory – the West Bank. This reality, which has existed for more than four decades, involves processes that have been eroding the democratic image of the State of Israel in the world and within Israel itself – including the legal status of Palestinians in East Jerusalem to whom Israeli law applies, the construction of Jewish settlements in violation of international law and in part in violation of Israeli law too, the construction of the separation fence beyond the Green Line and more. Israeli control of the territories, in the wake of the violent confrontations with the Palestinians, also damages the IDF and its ability to maintain rule of law. Manifestations of politicization of the military such as the use of security claims in favor of interested considerations have been strongly present in recent years (the separation fence, crossings, the road regime, land grabs, olive plantations, and so on).

B. Despite the recurring declarations of some leaders of the national religious persuasion that originates from the followers of Rabbi Kook (father and son) to prefer the Land of Israel (the wife) over the State of Israel (the maid) and that "any proposal whose intent is to surrender parts of the State of Israel to a foreign sovereign represents denial of the destiny of the Jewish People, the goals of the Zionist establishment and is **an illegal act** ...", with a call to refuse to cooperate and warnings of "civil wars", the partition proposal was accepted and the State of Israel was founded. The withdrawal from Sinai and the disengagement from Gaza involved clear violations of this concept; however, the leaders of the dissenting public and the public itself demonstrated responsibility by not bringing their threats of civil war to fruition. Conversely, in their everyday routine, a minor proportion of this public and its leaders contributes to, encourages or actually undermines the rule of law by taking over Palestinian public property, damaging Palestinian property, hurting innocent Palestinians, attacking IDF soldiers, building without permits and more. On a smaller scale, we must be wary of those who call upon people to refuse to serve in the military in the Territories or who violate the law by demolishing the Separation Fence that has undergone all the necessary approval processes.

C. The struggle of the Arabs of the State of Israel could focus both on achieving full equality of rights in the social sphere and on fighting against harsh Israeli actions against their fellow countrymen and their families in the West Bank and in Gaza. The struggle may be waged nonviolently, as civil disobedience, or

violently. In both cases, Israel would have to use old laws – emergency laws – which are uncharacteristic of the democracies of the world, in its defense.

Lev Grinberg: The danger to democracy does not lie in military personnel attempting to seize power, but in the very notion that political problems between portions of the population are solved by wielding violence. The blurring of the border of the State of Israel is a danger to democracy, because the state controls stateless subjects who do not recognize the legitimacy of the state. The danger to security and the danger to democracy are one and the same: the lack of a recognized border for the state, which requires illegitimate violence to be used, responded to by counter-violence. Democracy is a method that accommodates its subjects as citizens and allows them to contain the conflicts between them by giving representation in the institutes of the state; personal security is a result of legitimacy for the institutes of the state and national security is a result of international agreements. The Israeli regime does not have political tools to end the control over Palestinians and there is no accepted, institutionalized legitimate way to cope with the conflict between Jews and Palestinians on the same territory. In other words, this is a situation that endangers democracy and security alike.

Peri Golan: I do not believe that Israeli democracy is in danger, despite the need to correct and improve upon Israeli democracy and the way in which it is run. The state has survived many crises and events that could have been perceived as a threat to democracy and has fended them off, proving the resilience of democracy. In general, the military and the defense system act in a stately manner while respecting the rules of democracy. In Israeli democracy, there are also groups that are on the margins of Israeli society that are trying to exploit the rules of democracy and the foundations of democracy to undermine security by "manipulating democracy".

Gabi Sheffer: Formal Israeli democracy is not in danger. To no small extent, this is because of the status of the security network (which I mentioned above). Israeli democracy has been and is only a "formal democracy", and is far from being an "effective democracy", in which citizens have a pivotal role in policy making and decision making processes on critical issues that effect the situation of citizens, including in the defense field. In this respect, the problems of Israeli democracy are far reaching. Generally speaking, there are no significant existential threats to the existing political system in Israel. In other words, it does not seem that formal democracy is under immediate danger. However,

because of the existence of the security network that we have discussed in this article, there are few signs of Israeli democracy becoming an effective democracy in the foreseeable future. Even if Israeli society is not militaristic, the prestige that is granted to the defense establishment and the relatively minor involvement of most Israelis in the fundamental political processes of Israeli democracy will continue to maintain the status quo of the state and its regime. ∎

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Workshop B:
National Security and Civil Society in Israel

The second workshop was of a different character. Each of the participants focused on his or her own field of occupation and research, resulting in diverse issues being analyzed and presented.

Zohar Avitan, a resident of Sderot, analyzed the relationship between resilience and national security from the perspective of the peripheral region

The reality of life in Sderot and the Gaza Outskirts (the towns east of the Gaza Strip) in the last eight years, in the face Qassam rocket bombardments, has caused far-reaching changes in collective consciousness. Concepts such as "my home is my castle" no longer hold water. Anxiety owing to uncertainty over the near future is ubiquitous. None of the residents of this region can remember when the last time they slept calmly was. Instead, they have a nightmarish, punctuated sleep that ranges from hallucinations to a reality of air raid sirens.

Over recent years, fundamental questions of the relations between Israel's central and peripheral areas have been put to the test: the attitude of the government; the attitude of the media, the perpetuated media distinction of the elite class from others; a phenomenon called the "Tel Aviv Bubble" has been exposed, public discourse has shifted from discussing fundamental problems of society to escapist television programs such as "Survival"[1] and "Big Brother".[2] An embellished Israeli democracy that does not even have a basic law of regulating a "democratic act", such as holding elections on time, is evident. Beyond the matter of political stability, the full truth is that as a society, it is doubtful in Israel whether there is a single field in public life for which there is a consensus by all parts of Israeli society.

These thoughts aside, as a resident of this region – Sderot and the Gaza Outskirts – I have learned that the municipal authorities in the region, particularly the Municipal Council of Sderot and the Shaar Hanegev regional council, have not been able cooperate and

1   Survival, reality program on Channel 10: survivor.nana10.co.il
2   Big Brother, reality program on Channel 2: www.thebigbro.co.il

coordinate their claims from the central government. The media's portrayal of Sderot and its residents, throughout most of the long period of the Qassam bombardments, has been completely different to that the kibbutzim of the Shaar Hanegev Regional Council and key institutes in the region, such as Sapir Academic College. The fist has been characterised by a presentation of weakness, flight and panic, and the second by resilience, stamina and continued routine. The truth behind this media representation is completely different.

In February 2008, a student, the late Roni Yahiya, was killed at Sapir Academic College. In May 2008, a member of Kibbutz Kfar Aza, the late Jimmy Kadoshim, was killed. He was a colorful character well known to residents of the region because of his occupation as a parachutist. The description of different behavior by different people under the threat of the Qassam rocket bombardments is a function of their status: a kibbutz member, a son of the movement that fulfilled Zionism, an offshoot of the founding elite. After the loss of his life was disclosed, including in the kibbutz movement, the concealment of his military function was removed. Roles such as parents and children, students and teachers, and behavior derived from them, were found to be constantly present. They were concealed by the order of the kibbutz secretaries, spokesmen of institutes and media people, who were happy to cooperate to perpetuate the predominant stereotypical representations in Israeli society, and which are partly to blame for forming rifts in that society. After the tragic events at Sapir Academic College and in Kfar Aza, everyone learned of the feelings of terror, acts of abandoning settlements and going on vacation, including by residents of kibbutzim in the area. Two years previously, students of the primary school in Shaar Hanegev were evacuated to areas that were outside the radius of Qassam strikes, and this was also revealed in the media. It turned out that despite their elitist guise, these people are human beings like any other.

The "frontier" used to be a place of fulfillment for a community at the time of the formation of the state. Willingness to settle frontier areas was described in a manner that associated the frontier residents with values and a culture that included being prepared to bear the burden of building the nation: heroism, courage, willingness to sacrifice for the ideal and more. This was portrayed in the context of belonging to a society that is capable of creating a new culture out of an ancient one. The kibbutz became a form of settlement that represented utopia: a small, egalitarian, collective, working community. A community that was not only

a form of settlement but a whole fabric of cultural life, forming new ceremonies, such as those of Jewish holidays, which are based on a combination of ancestral tradition with new "Hebrew industriousness".[3] "Israel is the result of an ideological movement that formed a community that became a state", as Horovitz and Lisk wrote to describe the process.[4]

The pioneer who travels to desolate regions, in the north, during most of the Yishuv (early settlement) period, and in the south, mainly at the time of founding the state and the declaration of its independence, was perceived as a role model that Israeli society should look up to. This group was identified with the national force that determined the borders of the state in the making based on where its members settled. The key function of the Yishuv in establishing the future borders overshadowed any other character that it had. It was one of the fundamental elements of the many years of hegemony enjoyed by the labor movement. The pioneers, the frontier settlers, were the elite whose members formed the political leadership of the state at the time of its founding and for its first two decades.[5]

The working Yishuv was charged with the role absorbing refugees in the wake of World War Two. After the founding of the state and later in the 1950s, the working Yishuv assumed, as ordered by the leadership of the fledgling state, the task of absorbing the masses of immigrants from Asia and North Africa. They were absorbed not on the kibbutzim, but in transit camps that were built around the country in the heart of frontier areas formerly populated mainly by kibbutzim.[6] The kibbutz members were given the task of managing the transit camps and of caring for the needs of the immigrants they housed. These transit camps, which evolved into towns and cities, represented the "other", with a different, inferior culture. These were immigrants whose cultural identity, with all its tones, flavors and costumes, was not consistent with the new Israeli spirit of a dominant profile and good looks epitomized by the character Srulik devised by caricaturist Dosh (Kariel Gardosh).[7]

In the heart of the frontier regions of pioneering fulfillment, the peripheral region was formed, which

did not gain the legendary status of pioneers who established the borders of the country with their bodies. They were made up of the "other", whose existence served as the rationale of granting the social and cultural elite its status and its right to serve in leadership functions related to responsibility for the future and fate of the nation. "Knowers" compared to "those who don't know", "comprehenders" versus "those who don't comprehend". The brave, from whose ranks the supreme military command and combat units evolved, compared to soldiers who were assigned mainly to support units. Neighbors but strangers to one another.

The Six Day War in 1967 changed the borders of the country, not only in the geographical sense, but also with regard the foundations of the social structure that was previously shaped in the Yishuv period.[8] Demands for recognition from and representation by the government were increasingly voiced by residents of the peripheral and frontier regions. The voices calling for representation and recognition were heard very well by leaders of the liberal and revisionist opposition, mostly from urban areas, members of which also did not have the privilege of being part of the class of pioneers and fulfillers who built the country through the labor movement.

The protest of the Black Panthers in 1972 unleashed the cry of the "other" element of society. This became a protest that, after a crisis involving trust in the national leadership following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, enrolled the masses of "Orientals" into the arms of charismatic opposition leader Menachem Begin, who excelled in plucking the strings of "feeling different" experienced by residents of peripheral frontier region. The individual who was never called by his name by the founding prime minister, David Ben Gurion, the clear representative and shaper of the labor movement, was elected as prime minister not because he offered social equality, but because he succeeded in turning humiliation and grudges into a significant political force. The periphery in the frontier "won" political independence, so it seemed, and effectively gained a chance to rise up from its inferior status as the underdog in Israeli society.

The changes of the leadership in Israel were an earthquake that shocked a seemingly stable system that was centered by the pioneer, the fulfiller, the socialist with supreme humanist values, the splendid brainchild of the Zionist movement. The working Yishuv, owing to

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3   Muki Tzur, **Here on Earth**, Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 5741-1981

4   Dan Horovitz and Moshe Lisk, **Plights in Utopia, Israel – an Overloaded Society**, Tel Aviv, Am Oved Publishing, 1990, p. 9.

5   Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir, **Who is the Israeli – the Dynamics of Complex Citizenship**, Tel Aviv University, 2005, pp. 65-67.

6   Cohen Aharon, **the Formation of Development Towns: Sderot, Netivot and Ofakim in 1951-1965**, doctoral thesis submitted to the senate of Ben Gurion University, 2007.

7   Oz Almog, **Parting from Sherlock – Change in Values in the Israeli Elite**, University of Haifa – Zamora Beitan, 2004.

8   Dan Horovitz and Moshe Lisk, **Jews of the Land of Israel in the British Mandate Period as a Political Community**, Am Oved, Tel Aviv 5738 1977

its foothold in the establishment, did not make an effort to grow its circles of support by expanding its premises to accommodate all of the towns that had become cities, in the sense of shared responsibility and leadership. Instead, it preferred to find ways to maintain its status in the new liberal-capitalist hegemony. "The serving elite"[9] continued to serve the new hegemony without noticing the snowballing capitalist economics that would lead to the dissolution of the kibbutz movement. This dissolution manifested in leaving each kibbutz for itself in the form of the edict of privatization.

The founding party (Mapai followed by Labor) continued to be the place that could potentially reinstate the previous status of its loyal members from the kibbutz movement as the leading elite. The United States, during Ronald Reagan's term of office, and England, at the same time, headed by Margaret Thatcher, started the process of globalization that turned capitalist liberalism into cruel, capitalist neo-liberalism; according to a statement that is attributed to Margaret Thatcher: "There is no society, there are individuals". This neo-liberalism begot other forces that took over political parties, including in Israel. Capital replaced ideology. Salary gaps displaced the voluntarism of the beginning of the state. What the kibbutzim were left with was the image of an "elite" at any price, even at the price of separating their identity from that of any nearby city. This process did not overlook the region that is subject to the threat of Qassam rockets: Sderot and Shaar Hanegev – Sderot and the Gaza Outskirts.

The decision made by the leadership of Shaar Hanegev in 2001-2006, at which many Qassam rockets were fired, could be explained as a wish to continue to be a "serving elite". The leadership expected, like in the good old days, some kind of reward for its loyalty. Of particular note was the wish to gain sympathy from the media, the contemporary "public space", to prevent economic damage to the region. This is also a legitimate kind of expectation of reward. We compare this behavior to that of the Mayor of Sderot, who acted in the opposite manner – in this period, he used the threat of Qassams to secure additional budgets for the municipal council, which like many other local authorities, was subject to budgetary hardships. He exploited the media interest in stereotypic pictures and sounds without considering the unintended future consequences.

At least until 2006, the leadership of Shaar Hanegev was dominated by the sense of destiny it had been bestowed by Ben Gurion in the first years of the country: "The security of the state will not be based only on military defense forces. Our forms of settlement will determine the security of the state no less than military methods. Only dense agricultural settlement along the borders – a chain of farms in the north of the country, on the coast, along the River Jordan, in the deserts of the Negev – will serve as the most faithful buffer for securing the country against foreign attacks. Not silent stone fortifications, but a living human, working and creating a human wall – the one wall that cannot be deterred and damaged by enemy weapons – can maintain the borders of the country. The most fortified building can be undermined and disrupted using sophisticated demolition gear, but no weapon will vanquish motivated, brave people, who guard and protect the sanctity of their life and the fruit of their labor".[10] This is wording that epitomizes hegemony being in the hands of those willing to taken on these national tasks. This may explain the absence of demands to protect private homes of residents of kibbutzim in Shaar Hanegev, at least until 2006, five years after the appearance of the security threat. From their former state of hegemony, it had become evident that they were unable to bear the sacrifice with the same former willingness.

In the five years in which Shaar Hanegev was "silent" about demands for fortification of homes, some 500 houses were damaged in Sderot. For five years, the serving national governments of Israel enjoyed a broad consensus of abstaining from dealing with the subject of fortifying homes. The attitude that associated willingness to sacrifice with belonging to Israeli hegemony did not change much over the years, and was joined by new residents who considered the continued settlement of the West Bank and Gaza (the occupied territories) as part the Ben Gurion legacy. Here it should be mentioned that when the plan for unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip was carried out, at the order of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the evacuees from Gush Katif did not consider settling the development towns in the south, including Sderot, to be a default option for their resettlement. They wished to preserve their differentiation and status, by demanding compensation in the form of separate settlements from the Israeli "other". I maintain that this behavior shows that the trend of rewarding those who help maintain the national consensus is continuing.

9   Dan Horovitz, Moshe Lisk, **Plights in Utopia, Israel – an Overloaded Society**, Tel Aviv, Am Oved Publishing, 1990, p. 9.

10   Speech of David Ben Gurion "A military for protection and building" during Machal parade, November 13, 1948, in: Oren Amiram, **Military and Space in the State of Israel: IDF Land Uses from the War of Independence to the Sinai Operation (1948-1956)**, doctoral thesis, University of Haifa, 2003, p. 74, comment 27.

Sderot, 80% of whose residents did not abandon it throughout its years of Qassam bombardment, according to Home Front Command data, has not been recognized as a frontier settlement in the sense of pioneering attitude and willing to sacrifice associated with the meaning of the "frontier". Sderot remained a peripheral town throughout most of the years of the Qassam rocket bombardments, even in the minds of the leaderships of the kibbutzim in the region, who opted to differentiate themselves from Sderot. "It can therefore be said that Israeli society arose in the spirit of ideology, but now exists as a sovereign political society that owes its existence to the persistency of institutes and rules of play that are vested in social interests of individuals and groups and in the community interest of the Jews of Israel".[11] Based on a comparison of the numbers of news references, the leadership and institutes of Shaar Hanegev gained support from the masters of contemporary public space – the media.

But this representation has been occurring in a period during which another discourse is underway, the liberal discourse of citizenship: "According to liberal, contractual and utilitarian concepts alike, the individual is the sovereign over the course of his life, and aims to ensure himself individual rational benefit or fulfill his private concept of good, while owing nothing to the community".[12] This may explain the phenomenon that the leadership of Shaar Hanegev has attempted to conceal: the strength of commitment to the community, great ideas of pioneering and willingness to sacrifice, once shared by kibbutz residents, no longer exists. Their conduct is actually similar to the media portrayal of the residents of Sderot.

The manager of the Sderot community center, whom I talked to, angrily describes the way in which Sderot is portrayed in the media: "… out of 800 members of a certain kibbutz, I won't mention its name, only 80 people are left on the kibbutz. That means ten percent. On television yesterday, they did a survey and found that 80% of residents of Sderot had stayed here. 80% of residents of Sderot… a good friend of mine from a certain kibbutz told me that after the death a member of her kibbutz, there were cases of panic and massive exodus. And some of its residents compounded the sin by saying that when it happened in Sderot we mocked them. And we downplayed their pain. Now maybe we understand what they felt then". The disregard for "others" while vocally mocking their fears is consistent with the attitude of the center of the

country for the peripheral regions of the country in the north and south. It manifests mainly in the definition of the security problem in these regions as one that only affects a few exceptional members of Israeli society, a society that has "the world's strongest army". The threat to this region of the country was defined in 2003 by defense minister Shaul Mofaz as merely a statistical threat, i.e. one that could not constitute an existential threat to the entire country.

In 2006, the common struggle of Sderot and Shaar Hanegev, which challenged the attempt to portray the problem of Sderot and the Gaza Outskirts as only a "statistic threat", started. As a major manifestation of contesting the consensus, a petition was filed to the High Court of Justice[13] to order the state to provide physical protection for Sderot and the Gaza Outskirt settlements. The statement of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert "We won't protect ourselves to death" encountered a wall of civil objection by residents of Sderot and the Gaza Outskirts with the assistance of the High Court of Justice. The tenure of MK Amir Peretz as defense minister in this period led to the commencement of works to protect institutes and homes in Sderot, funded by the Ministry of Defense budget. These actions included erecting standalone shelters that could protect residents.

The Second Lebanon War in July 2006 only strengthened the feeling in Sderot and the Gaza Outskirts that the defense establishment had no answer to the phenomenon of the Home Front becoming the battle front. The Home Front Command was given the responsibility for an area that was defined as being subject to a constant "special security situation". The cry of lack of preparation in the north of the country in caring for the Home Front during the Second Lebanon War masked the fact that for five years, another region, with a civilian population in the south of the country, had been subjected to a threat whose volume and intensity were limited only to the technological ability possessed by the Palestinian organizations launching the rockets at it. The lack of preparation for protecting the Home Front epitomizes the intolerable ease with which national resilience was abandoned, a resilience which consists of the strength of the population, and is based on the comprehensive, constant care for issues such as employment, education, solidarity, egalitarianism, encouragement, and support of those willing to bear the national burden.

The statistic threat became a much broader one when major cities such as Ashkelon, Ashdod and Beer

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11   Dan Horovitz, Moshe Lisk, **Plights in Utopia**, p. 15.

12   Yoav Peled – Gershon Shafir, **ibid**, p. 12

13   www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3411633,00.html

Sheva, were found to be in the range of rockets. At this time, war created a consensus of being under threat. The war ended. The long range rockets were no longer launched at major cities in the south of the country. The war had achieved its purposes, which were defined by the top brass of the defense establishment as getting Ashkelon, Ashdod and Beer Sheva out of missile range. In contrast, Sderot, Netivot, the Shaar Hanegev Regional Council settlements, Sdot Negev, Merhavim and Eskol continue to sustain occasional reminders, in the form of Qassam rockets and mortars, of the ongoing conflict.

With regard to the relationship between resilience and security, the feeling is that not much has been done. While the Home Front Command has learned many lessons and its functioning has greatly improved, no military command can actually grant resilience. Resilience is normally a product of the civil systems of the state. It is obvious that Sderot and the Gaza Outskirts are a test case for the entire country. Resilience will not be built by marginalizing any second rate "others".

The commitment of the working settlement in the Sderot region and Shaar Hanegev to past ideology of proper behavior is partly correct. As holders of this past ideology in this region, only the management of Shaar Hanegev has made an effort to preserve behavior that is intended to keep the system quiet. This attempt shattered during Operation Cast Lead. Even after the operation, Qassam rockets and mortar bombs continue to explode in Sderot and in the settlements in the Gaza Outskirts. Now there is no longer any "frontier" or "periphery" in the region that faces that threat. It is now clear to us all that the residents of Sderot and the settlements in the Gaza Outskirts alike are the peripheral region. Settling along the southern and northern borders of the country is no longer a national objective. Settlement as a national objective has been transferred to the West Bank, in an attempt of Israel's governments in recent decades to form a new consensus that serves a leadership of which a major part has replaced, for the sake of survival, the seminal objectives of the State of Israel with a national consensus called the "Land of Israel". This is what has led the leadership of Shaar Hanegev to differentiate its settlements and institutes, which are remnants of the behavior of the "serving elite". However, this differentiation serves a consensus that no longer exists.

Culture translates, of course, into behavior patterns. "... Nobody in this country cares enough about the residents of the South, and thousands of "colonialist" shopping trips to Sderot's market to buy mint will not help. This is nothing to do with there being no stylish cafes in the Gaza Outskirts... that is the way it is, ideology is a matter of geography".[14] The unstylish cafes of Sderot have become the backdrop of many broadcasts made from Sderot. Such footage has highlighted the dilapidation and strangeness of the "other".

The media who have stayed in the region, in the hunt for "pictures that the desk in Tel Aviv would want", made no effort to seek pictures of despondency, helplessness and anxiety in the kibbutzim of the region. In contrast, the residents of the region held their silence. Unprotestingly. They did not send letters to the editorial board in an attempt to protect the image of their neighbors from Sderot. A city in the center of Shaar Hanegev, which became the urban center in which residents of Shaar Hanegev attended to all their needs: commerce, services, healthcare and even culture.

During the Qassam years, the region continued to develop under the threat by virtue of the resilience of its residents. Cultural activity has included activities for children and adults, song and dance troupes and the Sderot Cinematheque, the "southern film festival" held in Sderot for the eighth year running, a festival that has gained international recognition, as attested to by the many visitors of the festival from Israel and abroad, including ambassadors of many countries. Sapir Academic College, which is in the heart of the area, has enjoyed an increase in its number of enrolled students. All these facts and more did not gain any major media coverage, for a society wishing to foster pride originating from the strength of society and community.

"Rabbi Hillel says: do not judge your fellow man until you reach his place" (Fathers 2:5). The "silence" of neighbors in the Shaar Hanegev kibbutzim in the face of the images that the media chose to describe Sderot represented a form of consent to differentiation in image. In 2008, two years after the leadership of Shaar Hanegev changed its attitude and ceased differentiating itself from Sderot, the voices of kibbutz members, which sounded similar to those of Sderot, started to be heard in the media. However, these were mainly the voices that perpetuated the stereotypes of a peripheral region, which are now representative of the entire region, including the working Yishuv.

In a media world, in which "the good life"[15] of the individual is the raison d'etre, the "other" is what proves what a "good life" is, by way of elimination or exclusion.

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14 Dana Spector, "Mental Material", **7 Yamim, supplement of Yedioth Aharonoth**, January 2, 2009.
15 www.haimtov.co.il/

In the virtual reality of reality television programs, Sderot and the Gaza Outskirts are another news scene in a remote place, which helps form the desired, contemporary image of the media: individualism, a world without limits, a world without commitment to society. This does not point an accusing finger to the members of the kibbutzim in my area. For years, the kibbutz society, through the kibbutz movements, shopping centers such as Hamashbir Hamerkazi, cultural establishments such as Tzavta – have been socially and culturally detached from the periphery that is geographically close to it, and the media has taken this differentiation to underline the otherness of the "underdogs" – the Orientals, those who are deficient in resources, deficient in language, uncivilized, followers of religious movements and talismans. All of these rifts converged to one remote place – Sderot. The traveling time from Sderot to Tel Aviv is one hour. The travel time from Tel Aviv to Sderot is a year. This is a manifestation of an imaginary distance that is created by the media. To create it, past elites are also exploited.

The reality of life under a persistent security threat has given rise to extensive debate in Israeli society, on questions such as the responsibility of the state for its citizens. These have arisen in varying intensities during the period examined. Public discourse has led to a wide public consensus in favor of military operations such as the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead, only to be followed immediately by severe criticism for the inability of these operations to achieve the declared objective of stopping security threats to the civilian population.

The illusion of resilience, in a split society, will eventually dissipate. Slowly, the leadership of Shaar Hanegev has come to recognize that their policy of concealment, a representation of resilience compared to Sderot, has had no benefit. For the dominating elite in Israel, the residents of Sderot and Shaar Hanegev are one and the same. From this point on, the plight of Sderot has not only been shown to be the plight of Sderot. The loss of life at Sapir Academic College and in Kfar Aza in 2008 tore away the last separating screen in representing Shaar Hanegev in contrast to Sderot. Voices of anxious residents, the distress of children and the elderly who lacked protection in kibbutzim were revealed en masse. In the neo-liberal state that had developed in Israel, the center is the "Tel Aviv Bubble", which concentrates all the components of the hegemony in Israel: political, security, economic and media. Whatever is geographically distant is not far from the eye, but is far from the heart, in a country that has lost its compassion even for weak and otherwise disadvantaged populations.

During the year of the Qassams, the Sderot Social Conference was formed, as an answer of the "underdog" to the Herzliya Conference, the conference of the "center of the country". At the conference in November 2005, the President of Sapir Academic College, Professor Zeev Tzachor, said the following:

"Solving the fundamental problems of the State of Israel is contingent to changing the national agenda, from focusing on security problems to preferring to solve social problems. This means resource allocation needed mainly to closing gaps between 'center – periphery' relations and the gap between the wealthy and lower socioeconomic classes. A change in the public agenda requires the public to understand that security problems have been preferred by politicians because they are more convenient for controlling public opinion. One of the goals of the conference is to lead to a redistribution of economic, educational and cultural resources".[16]

The problems of society, whose solution should be preferred, have formed through long years of differentiation of the "center" from the "other". The purpose of differentiation is ensuring the hegemony of the almost permanent power elite, which has adjusted to changes in Israeli society, from a republican society to a neo-liberal one. It has maintained its hegemony throughout the years using two well known political tactics: the politics of fear and the politics of distraction.

Shaar Hanegev and Sderot are only an example of the disillusionment Israel must experience in order to understand that military force alone cannot ensure national resilience. In this region, the developing realization is that we residents here are not at the top priority of the Israeli elite. In this situation, the chance is that the place of differentiation between Sderot and Shaar Hanegev will be replaced by a common quest for ways of creating our own "central region", while detaching from and disregarding images that have been dictated to us for long years by an alienated, alienating "center". In Sderot, whose residents are portrayed as "thirsty for revenge", one can see graffiti on walls such as: "Life for Arabs = life for us". About two years ago, out of a sense of helplessness that originated from the state's evading its responsibility for building resilience and declaring that its job is only to provide security, a group called "Kol Acher" (another voice) formed, whose aim was to hold a dialogue between residents

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16 kenes-sderot.sapir.ac.il/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=34

in Gaza and in Israel, to present to the public discourse space a shared wish for a normal life, of the kind that prevailed between residents of Sderot and the region and residents of the Gaza Strip until the outbreak of the second intifada (Palestinian uprising). This life includes, among other things, commercial ties, joint women's groups and sports teams, students from Gaza studying at Sapir Academic College and courses that the college has held in Gaza.

About two months ago, Israeli television's Channel One broadcast a piece that dealt with the hunt underway in Tel Aviv for Darfur refugees who ignored the regulation that they could only live north of Hadera or south of Gedera. Civil society in Israel was not outraged. The marginalization of Galilee and the Negev compared to the hegemony of the center between Gedera and Hadera is fixed into public consciousness. This conscienceless is what is able to describe a security threat to the civil population as "only a statistic threat". The continued existence of settlements in "remote" regions in contemporary Israeli consciousness is not a result of a conscious choice of national missions, but a lack of choice that originates from economic weakness. The strong will abandon it and the weak will stay. Against this trend, residents of Sderot and Shaar Hanegev are waging a stubborn struggle in an attempt to create quality of life that will prevent the abandonment of the region at the time of a security threat.

In the past, the prevailing concept was that the settlement in the north and south was the protective wall of Tel Aviv. The voices today lead one to feel that the protective wall has become a nuisance. There is not enough room to print statements by senior officials that prove this sentiment. In today's Israel, the trend of preferring the individual to society is strongly evident. In our case, a small number of residents living in the south of the country attempt, with teeth clenched, to construct from individuals a society. ∎

Amiram Oren has analyzed the affinity between security and geography in Israel

The subject of security in Israel in its political and military sense has many aspects. One of them, which is often overshadowed, and whose scrutiny and research are only just beginning, is security in the geographic context. In the basic sense, when one says geography, this refers to a territory of the area, as it exists in the present and as it is planned for the future. When speaking of the area, one refers to its land resources, its geographic regions and spaces that are distinct from one another in physical character and in human and demographic character. The area also includes its surrounding area, in other words, its natural and heritage values. It is also the landscape that has been shaped by man as an expression of different meanings and representations. The definition of the concept of area can be extended to include, other than its landscape, its airspace, territorial waters and its virtual space, containing transmission and reception frequencies, which is also called the electromagnetic space.

The theoretical basis for discussing the combination of country and security has two aspects. On the one hand, the area is the arena of security in the sense that it is a factor (albeit not the only one) that defines and affects the needs of security. This leads to the basic assumption that the area is the purpose of security and that protecting it means protecting the very existence of the state, protecting the lives of its residents and safeguarding its sovereignty, but also that of the territories under military occupation and that are still held due to a belligerent concept.[17] On the other hand, security is also a matter of territory, as the country is both one of the inputs for realizing security and one of the components of military power. This article focuses only on the aspect of land resources that are allocated for security purposes. These are defined as "security land uses", and are the physical and geographical-spatial basis for allowing the military to realize its functions and abilities in peacetime and wartime. Security as a "consumer" of land is affected by the existing spatial reality, but also affects it and even shapes it.

Today, at the beginning of the State of Israel's seventh decade, despite Israel's small area and high density, its security establishment possesses and influences more than half (!) of the territory of the state within the Green Line. Methodologically speaking, to discuss such a large area of security land uses, and in particular their effects, it is worth relating separately to its three components:

1. Physical infrastructures - camps, installations, frontier and border infrastructures (minefields), roads and paths.
2. Construction restriction zones.
3. Areas of operational activity in peacetime and in emergencies, as well as military training and testing grounds.

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17 In this article, the discussion does not include the territories in which the laws of the state do not apply, known as "the West Bank" or "Judea and Samaria". These are occupied territories in which the military is the sovereign and it administers them in accordance with international law.

The security land use constellation expresses military needs and a set of considerations (strategic, systemic and tactical), land, economic and technological possibilities, settlement conditions, environmental restrictions and historical circumstances. Their formation, since the early days of the state, as discrete units and as an overall array, has not been the result of any orderly planning, but is derived from the country's British legacy, from security and political events that could not be anticipated in previous years, demographic, economic and social transformations and the recognition of environmentalist elements that occurred in later years.

Israel is an exceptional case of a defense establishment's degree of territorial-spatial rule over national territories and spaces. The defense establishment is considered to be an autonomous entity that operates and affects the geographic space of the country that is distinct from the civil establishment, albeit holding asymmetric interrelations with it. It maintains independent planning systems and manages its land economics using tools that differ from those of other organs of the state. The managing of territories possessed by the defense establishment in all matters related to sealing off areas for training or operational activity purposes, for providing land, for establishing its planning designation, obtaining permits for building physical infrastructures and imposing construction restrictions around them, their means of "protection" against civil plans and means of protecting the environment, are exceptional and fundamentally different from those that apply to civilian territories. This status quo has been made possible through unique laws, regulations and administrative arrangements that were established in the 1950s and 1960s and which have gone almost unaltered and unmodified.

Security zones and security infrastructures of every form have far-reaching consequences for civil life. The impression of the security landscape is evident in various forms almost everywhere in the country: in the North, Center and South, in cities, in rural areas and also in open areas. The area of the State of Israel is relatively small; it is dense and diverse in population and landscape. In the geographic space, in almost every area and place, security and civil land uses coexist side by side. This intermingling results in "islets" of military infrastructure in densely populated areas or civilian "enclaves" in the security space (mainly in the Negev). In Israel, it is difficult to point out an area or place where there is no territorial "interface" between civil and security uses, and this obviously affects fields of physical – spatial planning (conflict or coexistence in land uses), the economy and society, the landscape, ecology and more.

The extent of security land uses, their layout and consequences all characterize a special geographical and topographic phenomenon of unprecedented scope that may be discussed in a geographic and physical aspect – "the image of the country", regarding of land – a resource that has economic value; and in the environmental aspect – quality of life and natural values, landscape and scenery.

For many years, the public in Israel has rarely been called to deal with the subject of use of land resources for security purposes, as it has never risen to the national, public, planning or academic agenda. In view of the size of the area that is intended for security purposes, and in view of the fact that land in Israel is in any case a limited resource that is dwindling as time goes on, it is odd that the Israeli public, most of which is opinionated and involved in events around it, has not included this field in the public debate and has not raised for public discussion questions that arise from this reality. Moreover, in the comprehensive sense, it is not possible to identify a clear policy of determining land designations for security purposes, because the principles of the security layout and its effects for the civil sector have never discussed in detail by the planning institutes of the state. The policy of allocating land to the security establishment has never been discussed in any governing framework dealing with land policy issues either. The theoretical aspect has also been found to be deficient: the way in which significant proportions of land in Israel are shaped and defined by agents who deal with what is known as "security", and the way in which these spaces are attributed to what is known as "security needs", have not been subjected to any serious academic discussion or research. This deficiency is contrasted by the extensive academic coverage of the military, militarism, security and the multi-faceted relationship between sovereignty, territory and state. Recently, a change has occurred with the development of the discussion of the combination of security and territory, on two different levels.

The first level for discussion is a description and explanation of the geographic - spatial expression ("price") of security in the following contexts: the source of the phenomenon, the phenomenon itself and its consequences, in five different perspectives:

1. Time and space – the process of forming the variety of security land uses;
2. From theory to practice – the legal foundation for determining security land uses and the forums in which they are determined and heard (the planning

forum, the judicial instance and the real estate and economic scenes);

3. Contrast and coexistence, military and civil, meanings and consequences of the interface between land uses for civil purposes and security purposes;

4. Military and the environment – the relationship between security considerations and sustainable development and the effect of security infrastructures and zones over natural values, quality of life and the environment.

5. The "Israel Land Guard" – the function of the defense establishment in safeguarding land reserves for civil and military use and securing "fresh air".

The second level when analyzing the phenomenon of using land resources for security purposes in Israel is as an unintended consequence of intentional policy, according to two approaches.

The first approach involves analyzing the territorial dimension of military-societal relations and military-state relations through the structural-functional approach that is generally accepted in social science – a "dialogue" between the military and civil sectors. The key issues are: subordination of the military establishment to the political civil establishment; the manner of allocation of resources and civil checks and balances over the military establishment.

The second approach involves an examination of the political-cultural aspect of security land uses, which is effectively the ethno-national aspect, dealing with the broad meaning of the term "security of the State of Israel". Here, the view is through the lens of the Israeli-Arab conflict, with a distinction being drawn between actual land use and the interpretation of its implications. The meaning of this view is also reflected in the relationship between war and nation building, i.e., in view of the function of war and militaries as the seminal factors underlying society and state in Israel. This aspect is directed at examining the affinity between security land uses and national identity and territory. One of the key subjects in this context is political-ideological goals and the policy of establishing security land uses and broadening military infrastructures in areas as factors that support its judification, increasing their presence in frontier regions and on the border and strengthening the state's control thereof. Alternatively, they may be defined as elements that assist in de-Arabization of territory.

This aspect also pertains to the close, reciprocal relationship between security and settlement: settlement serves security and vice versa. The nature of the interrelations have changed over the years, mainly in view of the circumstances that followed the Six Day War and subsequently the government change of 1977, when the Likud Party came to power. In addition, the interrelations are not uniform throughout the territorial field that is controlled by the state. Those that occur in the sovereign area of the state are not the same as those occurring in the territory beyond the Green Line. The discussion of the political-cultural aspect requires an examination of the relations between Zionist institutes and the security system in all matters relating to territorial and settlement aspects too.

Gaining an understanding the process of formation of security land uses and their intended purpose is not enough. We cannot leave unanswered the contention that security land uses exist in opposition to, or as an alternative to, civil land uses. In addition, there is room for asking whether the term "civil land uses" presumes that citizens of the state are only the Jewish population, or whether land uses for security purposes are a measure for displacing and controlling the Arab minority. The initial assumption for the discussion of this issue may be the ambivalent attitude to this minority. Israeli Arabs are citizens of the state, but in the eyes of many they are also a hostile fifth column.

The theoretical framework that is required for understanding the territorial aspect of security may be one that considers Israeli society to be militaristic, as it appears that the geographic aspect of security is an additional expression of militarism as a political and cultural concept. In view of the control and hegemony of the defense establishment over state lands and spaces, one may ask whether the State of Israel militarizes its land and space with civil consent. The discussion of militarism does not examine whether this applies to the country only from the perspective that considers it to be a resource, but also from the sociological-political aspect. In other words, with regard to the manner in which the military shapes and influences space socially. It may be asked, in these senses, whether the country has been mobilized by its national administration for security purposes, i.e. whether Israel is a "uniformed country" – in parallel to the social state that existed in the early days of the country, when the political machine and social organization put the state in the center, around which the population was mobilized directly or indirectly for the purposes of the war during its formation as a nation.

It is possible to cover the issue from another angle: a more critical approach, which holds that it is not enough to deal with questions of security zones that are part of the physical space that decision makers consider, with public backing, as a necessary, vital

solution to a perceived threat. This approach requires a broader discussion of security and the connection between with national space. In this context, the following questions may be asked: what is security? Is it a means for removing dangers to the existence of the state, or is it a goal in itself of the system that sustains it, or maybe a component of the national ideology that stems from the variations of perceived threats? How should the map of security considerations and needs, which differs from the map that expresses the needs and considerations of the civil sector, be drawn out, and how much does the public know about sites that have been assigned for security purposes?

From the field of postmodern geography, which deals with the issues of the factors that shape the space, comes another question: what is the space and who defines it? Other questions include: what is the epistemological connection, i.e. the way in which people choose to see society, between security and space? In other words, what is the security-geographic dialogue in Israel? How has the concept of security space been structured? What interests does this concept serve? Is considering the whole area to be a security space an objective need? Or alternatively, has a view of the whole area as a security area been formed in order to increase threat anxiety and instill this anxiety among the public for pursuing political or other goals? This way, the public would blindly trust the military professionals, who are considered as an elite group that acts without prejudice, using only objective considerations.

In conclusion, this brief article has stated part of the broad context within which issues dealing with the connection of security and geography have been categorized. Not all of the questions asked in the article have a clear answer, and so they must be discussed further as part of the attention given to the meaning and essence of security in Israel. ■

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Dalia Gavrieli-Nuri focused on analyzing the aspects of identity and culture in the wars of Israel

Two issues stood at the center of Gavrieli-Nuri's analysis:

A. The persistent presence of "war" in Israeli culture.

B. Is war a positive value in Israeli culture?

A. The persistent presence of "war" in Israeli culture

The starting point for part of this discussion is that since 1948, the State of Israel has taken part in a "record" number of wars. If we take into account its participation in all-out wars, it emerges as a "leader" among western democracies. This figure (which I shall refer to for brevity as "the Israeli war record") has a major influence over almost every aspect of life in Israel. I have opted to highlight this influence in five regards: **education, language, media, gender and popular culture** (which I shall refer to in this discussion as "practices").

The question that I shall ask is reciprocal:

1. How has the "Israeli war record" affected this range of practices?

2. How have these practices contributed to maintaining this war record?

Usually, it is difficult to separate the two questions from one another. Often, it is a snake that is holding its own tail in its mouth. In the following pages, I shall briefly demonstrate these interrelations. I hope that this modest discussion will highlight a number of small but characteristic points on what may be called the map of Israel's culture in the wake of its war record.

Education – education is of course a key field of action for reflecting and preserving the Israeli war record. Dozens of cases in which the war record has had an effect on and has been affected by the Israeli education system may be listed. Here, there is a sporadic set of phenomena that express the permeation of the concept of war into the education system as it appears in the book "Militarism in Education": a visit of kindergarten children to IDF exhibitions, inviting high school students to watch a live fire exercise, assigning recently discharged servicemen as school principals, studying literature, history and the Bible within the context of Israel's wars over the generations, and of course a list of major national ceremonies, like Remembrance Day for the Fallen of Israel's Campaigns and Remembrance Day for Yitzhak Rabin. The education system continues to produce endless interfaces between war and the children of Israel, and has a great influence over the formative years of pre-enlistment age for Israeli youth.

Language – the recognition of the contribution of language for initiating wars and the use of military force started to gain particular momentum in the world in the last decade, mainly since September 2001. The penetration of terms that originate from the "wartime" semantic field into clearly "civilian" fields is a well-known phenomenon in Hebrew. Examples of this are dominant expressions such as "You're a big gun" and "the war on poverty".

George Orwell's classic novel, 1984, discusses a regime that forces citizens to adopt an ideology that involves creating newspeak, a new language, to replace the old one. In the imaginary state described in the book, one of the key slogans of the controlling power is "war is peace". In the Israeli parlance too, wars frequency gain metaphors that conceal their destructive character to turn them into a form of sport ("Don't stand over us with a stopwatch", asked Chief of General Staff Dan Halutz in 2006, when the war started to become protracted), children's games, and even cooking. The charged name "Operation Cast Lead" connected war with the Hanukkah holiday, thus charging it with meanings of radiance and happiness, strength, power and festivity.

Gradually, language has contributed to people taking war for granted, in Bourdieu's cultural sense. Hebrew has become enriched over the years with dozens of expressions that have turned war into a "natural" part of Israeli existence: "smart bomb", "targeted assassination", "Operation Peace for Galilee", and even the Hebrew word for ice cream cornet, "tilon" [literally a small missile] are all semantic constructs that have allowed military actions to a normalized part of the "Israeli narrative".

Gender – the relationship between social prestige and participation in wars barely needs any verification. Cynthia Enloe, Betty Reardon, and many other Israeli researchers in their wake, have studied the military's special function in shaping and facilitating masculine prestige, wherein the battlefield grants the greatest measure of masculine-military prestige. Metaphorically, it may be said that for women, in the Israeli case, these places have been a "closed military zone" for many

years.

The Israeli war record has had a major glass ceiling effect of displacing women from political power the and ability to achieve anything near equal opportunities. In the Israeli vocational track, it is difficult to think of a datum that has constituted a more important different starting point in people's résumés as the first row: "Military service".

But what have women done to war? The "Four Mothers" movement caused a surprising move that led to the pullout from Lebanon. But as a rule, "Israeli motherhood" continues to see the ethos of living by the sword to be an ordained act of fate. It has not managed heretofore to offer a serious alternative to the Ethos of the near-sacrifice of Isaac. The departure of sons to the battlefield is still perceived as a cornerstone in the Israeli maternal culture.

And maybe it should be asked: what have women done to promote a culture of peace? Maybe they have done too little. The place of women pales into insignificance in formal negotiations, but is gaining momentum in informal meetings for promoting peace. Their contribution may be considerable as the agents responsible for children's education at home. And in this context too, there is still a long way to go.

Media – in the first three decades of the state's existence, the Israeli media was voluntarily and complementarily "mobilized". One of the most prominent representations of this mobilization was the institute of the "editors committee", an heirloom of the British mandate period. In the 1950s and 1960s, this editors committee"aligned with what was perceived as "security needs", both towards the international scene and the domestic scene. It would be enough for us to think that for more than a decade, the public heard vague reports about "the incident", "the third person", and "he who gave the order". A particularly dramatic example of this voluntary mobilization was evident on the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. At the request of the military authorities, newspaper editors abstained from reporting the strong tension on the country's borders. That war constituted a breaking point or watershed in this regard. From that day on, "the security pincers" (as Zeev Schiff called them) loosened their grip and the Israeli media started to take its first steps as a kind of watchdog against "security needs".

Since the 1970s, it has not been possible to ignore the very rapid and dynamic development of the media. The Six Day War is known to us mainly as a series of narratives accompanied by black and white photographs. The 1973 war is known to us as a series of clips. This change had an enormous effect over the ability of the

media to shape war related attitudes, particularly over its contribution to shaping a critical attitude.

The relations of the media and war describe something akin to pendulum's swinging motion. The last two wars, the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead, attest that the media is still looking for its preferred mode of action. The leading concept is still "quiet, we're firing", which became common in 1982 but is still in use. In the last war, the war in Gaza, we watched with concern the way in which the media returned to its earlier days by maintaining restrained, stately solidarity.

Popular culture – from Hasamba and Danny Din to Galila Ron Feder, a corpus of children's literature has evolved to associate war with virtues of courage, beauty and camaraderie, to "beautify" war, or so to speak. But above all the branches of popular culture, there is the close connection between Hebrew songs and Israel's wars.

Israel's wars and Israel's warriors take a place of honor in Israel's songs. Our most beautiful songs, or at least our most popular ones, are military band songs and Remembrance Day songs. More than forty songs were written about the Six Day War. The paratrooper, the pilot, the diver and commandos all enjoy songs that are devoted to them and that are regularly played on the state and commercial radio channels. It is difficult to think of another subject or sector that gains such a central place in the popular music pantheon.

The place of popular music in conveying social messages and forming a national consensus around wars has started to gain research attention in the last two decades. But for consumers of Israeli culture, this is again a matter that does not need a special view. A peak expression of the power of song for imparting a tailwind to the war effort is demonstrated by the statements of Dan Almagor about Naomi Shemer's song "Jerusalem of Gold": "Were it not for this song, I doubt that there would have been so much willingness to storm the city… in my opinion, 'Jerusalem of Gold', which was innocently written by Naomi Shemer, changed the history of the Middle East".

Wars do not break out spontaneously. Nor are they waged in a vacuum. They require a complex, supportive human system to allow them to break out or continue: education, language and culture all contribute to Israeli society continuing to live by the sword as a normal part of its existence.

In 1966, the Nachal (fighting pioneering youth) won the Israel Prize in the category of "special contribution to society and state". This fact symbolizes the integral connection and special moral importance that this

relationship enjoyed in Israeli culture during those years. This connection recurs in a range of practices. It has turned "war", an extreme, exceptional concept, into a cultural "given".

Moreover, the Israeli discourse of war, has structured these practices to effectively turn war into a positive value. We are accustomed to talking with no particular difficulty about the "fruits of victory" and the "successful" aspects, and indeed the less successful ones, of wars: political benefit, the security and economic spirit that the state and the individual gain due to the outbreak of the war, and personal gains for the high command, the political establishment, and regular citizen alike. These concepts, which have been strongly rooted in Israeli culture and are expressed in the rich "Israeli war record", will continue to signal that war is a possible option – a necessary evil, albeit an unpleasant one, but a rewarding one nonetheless. As long as war is not recognized as the ultimate evil, the Israeli war record will become even more "enriched".

B. Is war a positive value in Israeli culture?

The persistent presence of war in Israeli culture has led to a structuring of special cultural mechanisms, which are intended to relieve public fatigue over the "security situation" and alleviate the psychological burden. The discourse that has developed to serve this goal I refer to as "the nice war discourse".

In this review, I wish to point out briefly something that appears to me as one of the clear roots of, or at least a milestone in, the so-called nice war discourse. The victory of the Six Day War demonstrated an exceptional cost-benefit ratio: "in exchange" for only six days of fighting, and hundreds of servicemen killed in action, a price in blood that was considered to be "tolerable", Israel made unprecedented gains. The victory tripled the territory of Israel, led to dramatic improvements in its status in the regional and international scene, and at the same time symbolized the end of the heavy recession and the beginning of six "fat" years. However, within a short time, it was found that the attempt to preserve the fruits of the victory, particularly the wish to continue to hold onto conquered territories, extolled a military, political and moral price: the War of Attrition on the southern front, terrorist attacks on land and by air, the need to manage an occupied population of more than a million people, and increasing international pressure to withdraw from the territories.

With the aim of preserving the fruits of the victory, a two-faced dialog started that allowed the price of this victory to be borne. The expressed, externalized part of the debate preserved the familiar values that sanctify

peace, and continued to portray it as a superordinate national and political goal. The other face of the debate, the "nice war discourse", functioned as a "back yard" in which the advantages of perpetuating the state of war were discussed.

A list of cultural landmarks, from victory albums that were published after the war, through military parades to leaders' speeches, all worked to shape this discourse. However, most of the burden of forming the "nice war discourse" was imposed on the shoulders of "free" culture, that which was not committed to government ideology. Canonic and non-canonic literature, children's and teenagers' literature, poetry, plays, radio choruses and military band songs all became involved. This culture, particularly the branches of popular culture – the site of discourse least suspected of ideological coercion – repeatedly provided an abundance of examples of advantages of an empowered defense ideology. They justified and rationalized the continued occupation of the territories gained in the war, reprisal actions and bombings deep in Egypt. In particular, the military bands participated in forming this discourse. The best artists of the period are enrolled to glorify the paratroopers, the tankmen, seamen and submariners, otherwise known as "the people of silence". The beautification of the warrior reaches one of its peaks with the song "Like sparks" ("On Silver Wings"), which Naomi Shemer dedicated to Israeli Air Force pilots. The pilot mentioned in the song combines mundane powers with superhuman ability and miraculous qualities "The ladder has its feet on the earth / But its top is in the skies of war / My brother is flying towards the sun / Like sparks that fly upward /[…] The sea fled and was driven back / And the river became dry/ My brother flies, his face towards the light/ And his banner over me is love".

"The nice war discourse" shed light on the concept of "war" as "something valuable", which beautifies the warriors taking part in it, and entitles even those who had a minor bearing on the war to numerous benefits. War was portrayed as a restorer of youth and as such something that granted life meaning. The very participation in war was portrayed as hard currency that could be exchanged for civil life with material benefits, upgraded social status, and self esteem. Gradually, the "nice war discourse" displaced the negative character of military occupation and blurred and reduced the prices of war, particularly of death and bereavement.

While "free" culture acted to sanitize war, the official government discourse, of leaders, could continue to echo the ethos of "pursuing peace". In speeches of leaders, Israel is repeatedly portrayed as a nation

whose hand is extended, in vain, in peace.

The Six Day War therefore had a pivotal influence over the perception of war in Israeli culture. Due to its special characteristics, the structuring and shaping of the concept of war as a positive value in cultural memory is a somewhat easy task. The happiness following the unification of Jerusalem, the mass celebration and indulgence in new territories gave the war a reasonable, even desirable quality. The War of Attrition was far away and therefore less threatening, and led to another disruption in the perception of "war".

Where has the "nice war discourse" been since the Six Day War? What is the contribution of the 1973 war, and in particular, in 2009, after two wars that have been so close to each other in time, does the term "the nice war" still have any meaning? It appears that today, the dialectics between the nice war discourse and the ugly war discourse are much more complex. The media, particularly the visual media, certainly has a key function in this process.

The "nice war discourse" certainly did not form as an act of deliberate government manipulation. It may be seen as the product of cultural structuring, a joining of forces by the media, literature, cinema and all the products of culture, which is intended to allow as normal as possible a life to continue under an unending cycle of recurring warfare. ∎

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Orit Kamir analyzed the relationship between security and society's perception of the terms dignity and honor

Introduction

In 1992, Israel's legislature determined human dignity to be a fundamental value of the State of Israel. The intent was to adopt the value that had been determined, after World War Two, in the declaration of the assembly of the United Nations to all peoples of the world concerning fundamental human rights, and in the German constitution: human dignity. However, the Hebrew word for "dignity" binds this value inseparably with a completely different value of opposite logic and spirit: honor. The concept of security has several consequences in a system that is built on each of these two distinct values. Although the State of Israel has declared its ambition to present itself as a society of dignity, in actual fact, honor is the value that structures, semiconsciously, many of the social conventions and dominant concepts in Israel. In this brief paper, I shall present in summary the meaning of security in a world based on dignity, and in a world based on honor.

Dignity

Man's "dignity" is **his absolute value as a human being**, as a "member of the human family". In the world view that sanctifies dignity, this value is the most basic and important property of a human as such. This material "attribute" does not purport to be factual, empiric, "natural"; it is moral, ideological and conceptual. As such, it is shaped as an absolute, universal attribute. It is also universal to all human beings – men and women, rich and poor, black and white, leaders and outcasts: all human beings have one human value, one "image of man". In effect, they all share a universally common human value, which everyone "takes part in" identically. Every person is born with dignity, and does not lose it until the day he dies. It is not possible to take it from him even if he is tortured, starved or imprisoned in death camps. It is possible to take everything from a person, except his "human image", the value of his humanity or his dignity.

The belief in man's dignity incorporates the belief that every person has a full, absolute right to living as a human being and realize his dignity as not being prevented by anybody; that every person is entitled to rights that ensure his existence with dignity. From this basic right, the declaration states that all people in the world have all basic human rights. Or in other words: basic human rights are intended to ensure that everyone can live a meaningful, humane life, i.e. a life

that expresses his dignity. The most basic human rights are those without which life is "inhuman". They include the rights not to be starved, not to be tortured, not to be raped, not to be imprisoned, and not to be silenced. Human dignity grants one the basic rights to think, to believe or not to believe, to realize one's sexuality, acquire education, a livelihood, participate in social and cultural life and more. According to this approach, many freedoms are fundamental basic rights, because without the freedom to think, to speak, to acquire education and earn a living, human life is "inhuman"; his dignity is not respected.

According to the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the State of Israel defines itself as committed to dignity, and aims at acting as required by the sanctification of this value. However, in effect, its commitment to dignity is only partial, and it is certainly not perceived as an absolute value that cannot be regulated with conditions.

The meaning of security in a world based on dignity

The most important concept of security in a world that sanctifies dignity is the security of man's basic rights, i.e. the security that allows a person to live with dignity. This is the security of every person from death, violence, hunger, oppression, silence and treatment that prevents him from thinking, believing, realizing his sexuality, raising a family, learning, working for a living and participating in managing the society he belongs to. This security can be called "existential security" or "dignity". In practical and more public and familiar terms, this is basic security that is social, health, occupational, educational, cultural, and includes security from violence of all kinds. This security allows every person in society to be a human, in the full sense of the word, without fearing basic dangers to one's body, mind, vicinity and fundamental well-being. Such security grants every individual a feeling that there is a "safety net" under him that prevents him from deteriorating and plummeting into destructive chasms. The sense of security frees everyone to devote human resources to activity, creation and development, instead of struggling for basic existence. It is important to note that in a world that is based on dignity, this fundamental value is universally shared. Therefore, dignity cannot be guaranteed to some members of the community, or some residents of a region, at the expense of others. Dignity must be divided equally among everyone; it must be a "resource" that is equally shared by everyone.

A state that is committed to human dignity must do everything it can to ensure the dignity of every person that comes into contact with it. This consideration must be taken into account when any policy is set – economic political or military – and therefore it cannot be compromised or deferred. However, in effect, the State of Israel is committed to the dignity of its veteran Jewish citizens living in the center of the country more than that of other citizens, and far more than that of non-citizens (such as Palestinians living outside the Green Line). For example, the lack of protection of areas that were prone to missile fire in the north or south, failure to repair dangerous roads in Galilee and in the Negev (usually between Arab towns), failure to ensure transport to schools of Bedouin children – all infringe upon the dignity of residents of the peripheral regions and non-Jews. Cruel expulsions from the country, separating family members from each other, infringes on the dignity of "foreign workers". Demolitions of houses, painful binding of arrested suspects, and inhuman conditions at border crossings and checkpoints systematically infringe upon the dignity of Palestinians.

Concerning Jewish citizens in the center of the country too, political, military and economic considerations do not necessarily consider their specific security. It is enough to remember the exclusion of life saving or intolerable pain relief drugs from the national healthcare basket. This decision, whose motives were economic, infringes on the dignity of patients, of every potential patient, and of man in general. Cuts in the police budgets that impair its ability to prevent a pedophile from attacking children infringes upon human dignity. The same applies to cuts in welfare budgets that lead to inadequate resources for taking abused children out of their homes. To the exact same degree, embarking on a military operation without making any political effort to prevent bloodshed infringes on the dignity of soldiers whose lives are endangered, along with their dignity. Unfortunately, such decisions are routinely made as a matter of course in the State of Israel.

Honor

Honor is a function of position that is related to social status, prestige, lineage and power. Honor does not relate to a person's humanity or unique human potential, but to his position relative to others; his standing in the social hierarchy. Honor is perceived as a symbolic asset; as an asset that embodies the position of its owner in the social pyramid. This honor is personal in the sense that every person forms it for itself and sustains it to a different degree in different periods, according to his situation in the world. It is affected by many components and changes easily. When a person is "in the rat race", successful, famous and in demand, he has great honor. When he is unpopular

and unsuccessful, his honor is low. A person's ethnicity, lineage, appearance, wisdom, wealth, current functions, connections and in particular his social behavior are what grant or deny him honor. Therefore, people for whom honor is important do everything to act in a manner that will grant them honor and avoid dishonorable behavior, i.e. tarnishing their honor or putting them to shame (shame, in this set of concepts, is the opposite of honor; it is the absence of honor. The same applies to stigma, humiliation and disgrace).

As opposed to dignity, honor is obligatorily conditional to competition of every individual compared to all other individuals. In order for an individual to have great honor, he must act to have more honor than some other person. For this purpose, he has to make an effort to achieve more honor than that other person has, while at the same time making sure that this other person does not accumulate more than him, lest he lose his own. In other words, honor is a competition over a limited resource; it is symbolic property in a zero sum social game. For this reason, in an honor society, mutual dishonoring is an integral part of normative, regular social conduct. This is the way in which a person gains honor (at the expense of those around him).

Honor is an old, frequent and central value in a great many societies. Societies that attribute great importance to the honor of their members are called honor societies. Such societies develop very elaborate rules that govern what a person must do to gain honor, and when he loses it he accrues shame. The members of the group are very aware of the behavior of everyone around them and are preoccupied with "measuring up" and "comparing" the honor of every individual. The rules on how to accumulate honor and avoid shame can differ from society to society. In one society, wealth is a means for accumulating honor, in another, higher academic degrees and in a third, physical fitness and distinction on the battlefield. But the "rules of play" are similar in all: competition, a zero sum game and constant comparative measurement of everything against everything. Honor societies differ in their degree of commitment to this value, and most, of course, are also committed to many other values (including dignity).

Traditional societies are usually honor societies. Traditional patriarchal societies are almost always honor societies, and their codes of conduct are similar. In such societies, the honor game is masculine: men are the players and there is almost complete identification of honor with virility. The more honor a person has, the more "macho" he is considered, and the more

macho he is, the more honor he has. Honor in such societies is "manly" by definition. The loss of honor and accumulation of "shame" is feminine. In such societies, "masculinity" is usually defined as dynamism, assertiveness, activism, achievement orientation and even belligerency, occupation and violence. Therefore, achieving honor is identified with an assertive, belligerent and conquering struggle.

The meaning of security in the honor society

In an honor society, the most important and central security is "individual security", i.e. a person's security in his social status, autonomy, reputation, his power over whatever is his; all things that constitute honor. Hence, this is "honor security".

The concept of honor security in an honor society is paradoxical. On the one hand, for a person to enjoy the status of being honorable, he must be able to ensure his honor (and that of people dependent on him, such as wives and children), and also demonstrate it in public (as a deterrence). The more a person controls his honor security (and that of people dependent on him), the more "dignified" (and "manly") he is. "Self-confidence" (in all of its aspects) is inseparable from being a "man of honor". The more a person controls his honor, the stronger he is, the safer his honor is, and the more stable is the status that he enjoys. Whatever holds true on the personal plane also applies to the collective one: the more a society is able to secure its status, i.e. its honor and honor security against other societies, the more secure and stable it is. Therefore, warlords, military figures and "security people" all gain great honor in such a society. Everyone then wishes to intermingle with them and their honor. Due to their honor, they do not examine people in great detail and they are not pushed into embarrassing corners of criticism (although it is presumed that they are people of honor, "true men", who are honest, speak the truth and are trustworthy and dependable). They are allowed more than the usual amount of self management and their discretion in their choices is trusted. Political and legal systems also bow before the honor of security people, and even their friends are happy to rub shoulders with people of honor. In Israel, this manifests clearly in the almost unqualified trust that the Knesset, the government and the courts usually give to the statements of representatives of the defense establishment (even when other, less honorable evidence, such as that of the Palestinians, suggests otherwise).

However, in effect, in honor societies, honor security is inevitable. Because it is based on competition, a struggle and constant dynamism, a society of honor can

grant only temporary honor security. And temporary security is not sustainable; it is an appearance of security. In an honor society, everyone knows that any "honor security" will only continue until another person chooses to challenge it and put it to the test. Even if at a given moment a certain person is the strongest of all and is in charge of his own honor (and of his dependents), one day, after he decides to put his honor to the test, in one such test, this honor will be denied. This certain future denial impedes the ability to feel honor security in the present too.

Therefore, members of honor society have a deep, existential feeling that there is no security and cannot be any security. That there will always be a next war, because that is the nature of human society; "that's the way it is". The possibility of a person indeed enjoying unchallenged, long-term honor is not perceived within honor society. Whoever is captivated by this approach (of security being possible) is perceived as naïve and worse more, as a "sucker". In other words, as a person who does not understand the rules of honor in his society and does not know how to stand up for his own honor. Based on such an approach, it is not possible to form conditions of true security, because it is perceived as an unrealizable fantasy.

The more that honor society is convinced that security is not possible, the greater its anxiety over lack of security; the more anxious it is over insecurity, the more resources are invested in strengthening security, and security people enjoy greater honor.

It is important to note that when honor society thinks about "security", it does not give itself a report that it is thinking in terms of "honor anxiety" and it makes no distinction between "honor security" and "individual security". The two are intermingled, without society being able to conceive either as a separate construct. I believe that Israeli society expresses many of the characteristics of "honor security" that have been mentioned, both in the significant rewards for "security people" and the existential belief that true security is impossible, and therefore there is no point in attempting to achieve it. The reliance on tragic historical experience strengthens and "proves" this approach. Strengthening the culture of dignity in Israel would lead to a dramatic change in the honor concept. ∎

Sarai Aharoni focused on an analysis of the connection between gender and security

- How can the terms "peace" and "security" be understood from a gender perspective?
- Is there a relationship between peace processes and the advancement of women's rights?
- Do men and women have a different voice regarding making peace or war?
- How do the unique experiences of women in wartime affect their ability to advance gender equality?

These and other questions are currently being debated not only in the academic context of political theory and feminist theory, but also in international political practice in which elements involved in prevention, management and settlement of violent conflicts around the world operate: non-governmental organizations at the national and international level, official organizations of the international community such as the World Bank and the UN, institutes at the state level and statesmen/stateswomen at the individual level.

The immediate theoretical context for the question of gender aspects in managing and settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the feminist criticism of the study of international relations (feminist IR), which has developed in the last twenty years. It attempts to reexamine the issues of national security, strategy studies, and the research of war and peace (Blanchard, 2003).

The key contention that appears in the criticism of the dominant security concept in international relations and in political science is that the traditional definition of "security" ignores the way in which women define and interpret this term, particularly in matters relating to the issue of personal security (Tickner, 1992; Stern, 2006). Moreover, because the war system is perceived as neutral for gender purposes, the unique influences of wars and violent conflicts over women and children are not apparent to researchers and policy makers (Tickner, 2001).

At the basis of this criticism, it is contended that the study of international relations and political science has a gender bias that affects the marginality and transparency of the position of women and their views in the international scene. Because the prevailing concept of international politics and economics is often drafted in masculine terms, there is a tendency to ignore the living reality of women and their active contribution to political and economic life (Youngs, 2004). This approach finds practical importance in academic documentation

depicting the functions and place of women in conflict resolution, particularly in order to evaluate and define their unique needs relative to existing systems, as well as contributing an alternative viewpoint to the conduct of international politics.

Other than this, the interest in gender aspects of conflict resolution processes has been influenced in recent years by discourse developments and the work of local and international women's organizations, which have led to normative and legal changes both at the level of the international community and the state. These developments are reflected in official declarations, in international law and humanitarian law in all matters regarding women, and armed conflicts.[18]

In this context, Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council is of interest, which was adopted in October 2000, with the aim of defining the unique consequences of the state of war and violent conflict on the lives of women and teenage girls: rape, domestic violence, denial of unique services, lack of political influence, poverty, transparency in the media, prostitution for survival, trafficking of women, venereal disease and more. The resolution also recognizes the importance of gender mainstreaming in peace and conflict resolution processes and the significant function of women and women's organizations in these processes (Aharoni and Dib, 2004).

Under the influence of these trends, in Israel too, attempts have been made to apply a similar policy, and in July 2005, amendment no. 4 to the "Equal Rights for Women Law" (1951) was passed, which demands adequate representation of Israeli women in national policymaking teams, including in any team that deals with "prevention, management or resolution of a political or international conflict, including holding negotiations, including before signing an interim agreement or a peace treaty." This law reflects the recognition of the difficulty of women in Israel to become involved in decision making processes in foreign and defense policy.

However, the difficulty of women to integrate into decision making-processes is only one of the manifestations of the complex relations between gender, peace and security in the Israeli context. Studies that have been held in the last two decades have

identified a number of broad trends that characterize Israeli politics that are directly derived from the long-lasting conflict in the Middle East:

Citizenship, military service and gender - military service in Israel has become one of the fields in which the civil value of individuals and groups has been defined, resulting in a hierarchy based on citizens' proximity to or distance from the ideal of the male warrior. Military service for Jewish women (as well as "encouraging the birth rate" among Jewish women) represents an expression of "the republican principle" of citizenship, which was historically applied to single, secular Jewish women. As opposed to the principle of liberal equality, which appears in the "Equal Rights for Women Law", military service forms a nexus of gender, nationality, ethnicity and citizenship and serves as the underpinnings of separate political and social rights, which perpetuate the class system and national stratification in Israel (Berkovich, 1999; Helman, 2008).

The security establishment as a system that obstructs gender equality - the inequality faced by women in formal politics in Israel is often associated with excluding them from dealing with military and security issues as a manifestation of the relationship between military service and status in the dominant social and political structure (Chazan, 1991). The dominance of the military, militarism, and masculine culture in civil life in Israel has contributed to a dichotomist separation of "public" and "private" space and has contributed to the marginalization of women to the familial and maternal space (Herzog, 1999). In addition, the way in which the security establishment and the military emphasize the "otherness" of women (as not corresponding with the idea of the "male warrior") contributes to the continued legitimacy of gender inequality (Israeli, 1999; Sason-Levi, 2001).

"The Feminist Peace Project" as an expression of feminine power in informal politics - since the mid-1980s, Israeli women have become increasingly involved in activity for promoting peace and ending the occupation.[19] These organizations formed to counteract the displacement of women from decision making and key positions in other peace organizations operating in this field. Despite the negative responses that some

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18 For example, in **Beijing Platform for Action** (1995) chapter 4 (E) paragraphs 131-149 in the UN Secretary General Report (January 23, 1998), chapter 2 paragraphs 45-87; in the CSW report, the **Commission for Women's Status** (March 1998) resolution 4, part 2; in **the Beijing Summary Document +5** (July 2000) Chapter 2 paragraphs 15-19; **Resolution 1325 of the Security Council** (October 2000), **European Union Resolution for Conflict Prevention**, **Resolution 107 of the U.S. Congress**, **the G8 Declaration in Rome** (2001); and recently **Resolution 1820 of the Security Council** (June 2008).

19 The intensification of the weight of women's protest movements in the security debate started after the First Lebanon War when the "Parents against Silence" movement was founded, and continued significantly during the first intifada with the founding of "Women in Black" (1987), "Women for Female Political Prisoners" (1988) Nalad (Women for Coexistence) (1989), "Women and Peace Coalition" (1988), "Israeli Women for Peace Network" (1989). Later, many more organizations were established, including "Bat Shalom" (1994), "Four Mothers" (1997), "New Profile" (1998), "Women's Coalition for Just Peace" (2000), "Black Laundry" (2001), and "Checkpoint Watch" (2001).

of the women's protest movements have gained, their activity has succeeded in disrupting the borders of the security discourse and staking new claims to the right of women to participate in and influence the public discourse as mothers and citizens alike (Atzmon, 1999; Sharoni, 1995; Benski, 2006).

In addition to these trends, the changes that occurred in the character of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after 2000 led to persistent damage to the civil population and a dramatic increase in the number of women and girls who were hurt by political violence. For example, from October 2000 to September 2005, 973 Israelis were killed as a result of violent activity by armed Palestinians. Most of the dead (668, approximately 70%) were civilians. 272 (approximately 30%) were women and girls, almost all of whom were civilians. This process, which may represent an expression of increased blurring between "front" and "home front" and "combatants" and "civilians", also characterized the fighting in the Second Lebanon War, as well as the protracted exposure of the southern population to rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip.

Because the civil population in Israel and in the Palestinian territories has become a legitimate target for political violence, and because women and teenage girls have many functions in the civil sphere, it is very important to perceive the unique influences of the conflict over their lives and activity. Moreover, most studies that have been held about the effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the civil population in the period after the second intifada suffer from "gender blindness" and treat "women" as a uniform demographic group without taking into account the political-economic conditions that affect women of different national, ethnic and class groups. Therefore, many of the studies that have assessed the effect of exposure of women to political violence tend to ignore their unique function as caregivers (in the physical and emotional sense), their economic dependence, and unique exposure to gender-related violence.

A study that was held at the end of the second intifada (Sachs, Saar & Aharoni, 2007) attempted to examine how traditional functions of women as caregivers (physically and emotionally) of men and children, their socioeconomic vulnerability and their being exposed to gender violence (physical, sexual and mental) might intensify harm resulting from national motives. This study showed that Israeli women exposed to political violence had to address the anxieties of children and contain the difficult emotions of family members in all matters related to the security situation, compounding their plight. Many women reported the need to be

"strong for others" and "mental fatigue and anxiety". However, despite the high level of mental stress, women do not tend to seek professional assistance. This may result from the existing frameworks not being adapted to their needs or because during national crisis, women tend to consider their problems to be a private and secondary affair.

In addition, it is known that emotional vulnerability following exposure to political violence is intensified by past traumas. For women, the major past trauma is often exposure to gender or sexual-based violence. One of the key findings in the study described is that of "doubly traumatized" women, i.e. women who have been victims of violence on a gender or sexual basis who suffer more from depression, being particularly vulnerable in the state of political violence. In this group, there was high representation of Palestinian-Israeli women and over-representation of women who had immigrated from the Former Soviet Union. Generally speaking, it may be said that this study shows that women from marginal groups (Palestinian-Israelis, immigrants, women of Oriental ethnicity) are particularly vulnerable to the influences of the armed conflict because of their relatively low earning power and higher exposure to bereavement and armed attacks against citizens in the peripheral regions and on public transport.[20]

The report that was made out by the Mahut Center (Buchsbaum, Abramovich and Dagan, 2007) on the situation of Israeli women in the North during the Second Lebanon War showed a similar but harsher picture of the influence of social gaps and gender inequality over women of weaker populations, particularly of Palestinian-Israeli women:

"Women who live in poverty sustain themselves and their families through reduced, deficient home economics. For these women, the war represented a violent violation of the fragile balance that constituted their life routine. They did not have economic reserves or safety nets that could allow them to cope with the consequences of the state of emergency".

These findings reveal the relevance of the attempt to achieve gender mainstreaming in discussions, in actions and in services relating to the security of the civil population in Israel. However, scrutiny of the unique experiences of women and girls during violent conflict reveals the tension between the concept of "national security" as an expression of the interest of

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20   A major part of these findings are cited in the report writeen by: Aharoni, S., Saar, A., Zakash, D., and Mirrtenbaum, D., **Silent Testimony: Women and the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, 2005 Situation Report**, Haifa, "Woman to Woman" – Haifa Feminist Center, 2005.

the state and the wish to maintain "human security" as a manifestation of the interests of individuals and subgroups. Shaping the agenda of the State of Israel based on a narrow definition of "national security", particularly the imposition of real or perceived threats in the center of the political and public debate, effectively facilitates the continued neglect of the personal security of the civil population in general and of women in particular, who have borne the brunt of enemy action for a considerable time. This situation also facilitates the silencing of dissenters who wish to dispute and protest against the policy that is derived from the concept of national security, particularly the organizations of civil society. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that it is not enough to create institutional mechanisms for addressing the problems of defined populations (women, Israeli- Palestinians, immigrants, etc.) in wartime, but it is necessary to act to develop a public discussion that is based on democratic principles that will focus on the many costs that the civil population pays in the persistent conflict in the Middle East. ∎

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Dov Shinar analyzed the relationship between the media and security

For the media, security, like politics, economics and crime, is a hybrid of a sacred cow, a milk cow, and a chicken that lays golden eggs. The attitude of the media to security is like its attitude to any other subject, but with greater emphasis, for on the one hand it weighs considerations of control and commercialization, and on

the other it weighs considerations of professional pride. Compounding this is the fact that security "attributes", such as range of coverage, correspond more than other fields with the generally accepted definitions of "news value", such as personal and professional challenge, colorful topics of discussion, which emphasize polarization and contrast, diversification of characters and situations, surprise and thrill; dynamic places and images, confrontation and heroism, emotions and emphasis of the present, the different, dramatic, simple, action, humanization and results. Therefore, these attributes offer more opportunities for economic and professional media achievements. This "advantage" manifests in coverage techniques and strategies, the quality of narratives and ethical dilemmas.

Coverage techniques and strategies

The fields of security in general and war in particular provide excellent media opportunities for exercising the criteria of an Aristotelian tragedy – pity and fear – to guide the media story in news, entertainment, sport, news magazine programs and more. Research shows that too often, security is covered with ritualism, ignorance and condescension that are combined with lack of context, drama, sensationalism, focusing on confrontation and events rather than processes and action. Security coverage is selective, biased and misleading. Studies that were conducted by the Keshev Center[21] and others reveal the disclosure of partial and incorrect information, a sense of an extreme difference between events unfolding in the field and the media coverage and headlines and content material. Deviations from reality in the field are conspicuous in the coverage of wars.

In Israel, in times of "victory", the coverage underlines the creation and retention of myths, increase of solidarity, "grandstand journalism" and zero sum games, which equate the coverage of security and war subjects with sports contests. When no victory can be shown, the tendency to distract the audience to related subjects is emphasized:

• Gavrieli-Nuri[22] found "metaphorical annihilation" of the events of the Second Lebanon War in deference to what Shinar called trivialization.[23]

• Mandelzis and Peleg[24] talk about "media manipulation"

in the summer of 2006, whereby public attention was gradually shifted from the unsuccessful Lebanon war to another phenomenon in the field of security: the Iranian nuclear threat. They contend that the process is one of distraction from subject to subject, from one geographical scene to another and from a climate of embarrassment and dispute to a status quo that is intended to promote solidarity and unity.

• Back in 1992, Shinar and Stoiciu raised a similar contention, but considered it to be "self manipulation": based on the assessment that it is difficult to assume that experienced journalists such as those who engage in the coverage of security and war may be easily manipulated, they talked about a transition from forced manipulation to active, voluntary mobilization.[25]

The comparison of the critical contentions concerning the coverage of the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and that of the critics of the coverage of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 indicates how the media has refined its major processes in coverage strategies.

Criticism of Media Coverage

The First Lebanon War[26]	The war in Iraq[27]:
Exaggeration, lack of care, lack of balance (for example in reporting of casualties)	Professional confusion of patriotism, obedience and "rubber stamp mentality"
Improper selectivity regarding sources	Lack of critical review, selective coverage, unquestioning acceptance of official accounts
Lack of context	Decontextualization, disinformation and fabrication of news
State takeover of information sources (censorship, IDF spokesperson)	Too weak a protest against state control over access to information, transfer of fragmented information, helpless reactions
Unilateral, exaggerated terminology	Lack of diversification: the media used and quoted people who doubt the official accounts, but seldom used retired generals, official advisors and faithful commentators

21 See www.keshev.org.il
22 Gavriely-Nuri D., "The 'Metaphorical Annihilation' of the Second Lebanon War (2006) From the Israeli Political Discourse," **Discourse and Society**, vol. 19, no.5, 2008, pp. 5-20.
23 Shinar D., "Media Diplomacy and 'Peace Talk': The Middle East and Northern Ireland," **Gazette**, vol. 62, no. 2, April 2000, pp. 83-97.
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25 Shinar D. & G. Stoiciu., "Media Representations of Socio-Political Conflict: The Romanian Revolution and the Gulf War," **Gazette**, vol. 50, 1992, pp. 243-257.
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27 Shinar D., "the media stories of war and peace: the teaching of Itzhak Roeh as a springboard", in Neiger M., Blondheim M, Liebs T. (eds.) **Coverage as Story Telling – Reflections on Media Discourse in Israel, book in honor of Itzhak Roeh**, Jerusalem, Magnes, 2008, pp. 69-84.

Techniques of exaggeration, lack of care and lack of balance that were identified in the First Lebanon War, mainly in the reports of causalities, developed from criticism of the coverage of the invasion of Iraq, including professional confusion between patriotism, obedience, and a "rubber stamp" mentality.

The technique of improper selectivity of sources, which was identified in the invasion of Lebanon, developed, in the Iraqi case, into lack of a critical review and coverage that unquestioningly accepted official accounts. The technique of absence of context in covering the invasion of Lebanon develops into decontextualization, disinformation and fabrication of news. The technique of the Israeli censorship controlling information in the Invasion of Lebanon developed into feeble protest against the state control over access of information, which leads to fragmented coverage and leads to the media accepting its own impotence; exaggerated, unilateral terminology of the coverage of the invasion of Lebanon developed into lack of diversification when the experts who interpreted the war in the media included people who doubted the official accounts, who appeared much less than official advisors and commentators who were "loyal" to the administration and military.

There is no great change in professional strategies either. They include, in both cases, three major processes: trivialization, mobilization and devotion, self-stipulation and manipulation.

Trivialization (or "grandstand journalism", or "hippodrome syndrome") is a strategy in which professional media coverage undergoes a process of "contempt". All events are treated in the same way as sporting events, in which there is no doubt as to the patriotism of the people providing the coverage. This strategy prefers to emphasize tactics to analyzing the events and their contexts. The apprehension of Saddam Hussein is a good example. Incessant broadcasts and printing of news items that emphasized the confrontation with Saddam presented an important, complex matter in the simple terms of a sports contest. This causes a tendency to emphasize military tactics, which prevents serious coverage of more important issue.

Mobilization and devotion occur directly and indirectly through "embedding". This technique has improved previous methods, such as physical isolation of journalists in covering the invasions of Grenada and Panama in the 1980s; the stifling bear hug of military spokespeople in an air conditioned tent filled with beverages and ready made information packs in Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, in the First Gulf War; and practices dictated by the IDF Spokesperson and the

Israeli Government Press Office concerning entry and activity of journalists in the Occupied Territories.

Thus, the American media can be criticized, firstly, for under-coverage of the control of the U.S. administration and military over access to information and the lack of an adequate response to this; and secondly for its excessive reliance on advisors, commentators and interviewees who are retired officers and government intelligence experts. There is no doubt that such criticism may also be voiced towards the Israeli media during wartime and other times.

Self-conditioning and manipulation is another improvement in familiar strategies: development from concepts of forced manipulation by administrations and militaries of the media, as in Vietnam, to active, voluntary enrollment by media organizations and journalists. This is also an improvement in the technique of self-manipulation, as used in the coverage of the revolution in Romania,[28] in which early expectations of editors in London, Paris, Atlanta and other centers, with the assistance of news conveying technologies, created a virtual reality that dominated the coverage, sometimes completely inverting the positions of the material that reporters from the field sent in. If forced manipulation is an illicit practice, then self stipulation and manipulation are worse, because they deal with creating voluntary, active consent by the watchdogs of public interest themselves.

This likely applies not only in wartime. For example, in the coverage of global and Israeli security issues, such as the policy towards Iran or North Korea, both when the media has independent information and when it does not, it demonstrates a tendency towards a certain, usually governmental line, as long as this does not bind it excessively.

The refinement of **"politics of empathy"**, which was first identified in the Vietnam War and was one of the hallmarks of the 1973 war, appears among the strategies. This is a policy that eliminates the critical distance between media and administration, and between journalists and government officials or military officers, distance which is vital for true, free professional coverage.

Narratives

The different narratives that form as a result of the techniques and strategies enumerated above lie between two poles on a sequence:

• At one extreme, there is the brilliant analytic trick that used Baudrillard's plea, whereby in the First

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28 Shinar & Stoiciu, op.cit.

Gulf War, the war did not exist outside of its own coverage: the pictures and stories of the war in the media were more important and more realistic than the war itself. This leads to his contention that the reality behind the picture is irrelevant, and that it is not important whether the war occurred or not, as long as we have seen the pictures.[29] Bauldrillard's thesis gains empiric confirmation from critical articles concerning the coverage of the First Gulf War.[30] The major contention is that despite this war gaining more coverage than any previous conflict, the media was proved in the end to have failed. As noted, the heavy Iraqi causalities were barely mentioned. Photographs of tanks and artillery bombardments were published extensively, but very few pictures of the destruction and killing on the other side were shown. Other than the case of the alleged military bunker bombing in Al Amaria, where some 300 civilians were killed, the war was shown in a sanitized manner like a video game without any true victims or bloodshed. This led to the development of a narrative of "our guys are at war" without portraying a single visible enemy.

• At the other extreme are narratives that were constructed in the war in Iraq by all of the media channels, which include:

- The institutionalized (official and semiofficial) western channels that were fully mobilized (CNN, Iraqi television) or chose a critical position (BBC, the Guardian).
- Third world channels, mainly private Arab channels – Al Jazeera, Al Arabia and Abu Dhabi. Despite their broadcasting in Arabic, they excelled in portraying the other side of the conflict. Without them, and without other broadcasting stations, the world would not have received more than an official American version.
- Alternative, more militant and subversive channels, mainly online ones, such as Indymedia and others.

Whatever our preference concerning these narratives, it is difficult to shake the feeling that the media audience has effectively become "information hostages" and hostages to the mode of coverage by the media. This explains the tendency for mythologization

of events or distraction towards other events.[31]

Ethical questions and dilemmas

Study of the coverage of the war in Iraq in 2003 shows that the media relied almost exclusively on official sources. These are the sources that dominate the global media, as attested by Danny Schechter, Keshev Studies and others.[32] This fact raises a practical question and a normative question. The first is, "How to check information in the absence of autonomous sources, dependence on official sources, rampant competition and immediate, direct transfer technologies?" The normative question is, "To what extent is the loss of editorial control towards government and military sources too high a price for access to events and sources?" And of course, how can there be alternatives to this dependence?

The second question in the field of ethics is, "When and where does the manipulation of defense and war news start: control and censorship, pressure, direct dependence exploitation, 'benefits' and providing of information packages, directly at the time of coverage? Selection and socialization in employing journalists long before the reporting of a certain event?"

In a similar context, it is asked how can the daily conflict between the good intentions of journalists and the conditions that affect the search and transfer of news, including the expectations of editors, owners and pressure from official sources be resolved.

Beyond this, the examination of questions must also include the question of personal compared to institutional emphasis in the context of journalist ethics. The traditional tendency is to emphasize personal ethics of media people in the field. On the other hand, the tendency in a media climate that is managed by monopolies of government media or oligopolies of commercial media, which shape and interpret reality for us, is to shape and sustain rules of ethics that will bind local and international institutional agencies alike, from the level of news editors, through the senior management levels to the owners.

Finally, how is it possible to preserve traditional ethical values? How can one work without constantly protecting the homeland? How can information be sought on both sides of the front? How can journalist decisions be made under conditions of dictatorship on the one hand, and in a climate of "democratic pressure" on the other?

29   Baudrillard J., "The Gulf War Did Not Take Place," In Mark Poster (ed.) **Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 231-253.

30   Higham N., "War reporting enters 21st Century," **BBC News World Edition**, March 12 2003; Rogers P., "The Myth of a Clean War - and Its Real Motive," **Open Democracy**, March 13, 2003.

31   Gavriely-Nuri, Shinar (2000), Mandelzis and Peleg, op. cit.

32   Schechter D., **When News Lies: Media Complicity and the Iraq War**, New York, Select Books, 2006. (+ DVD Weapons of Mass Deception); www.keshev. org.il

The power of the media

The immediate dimension: In contrast to the popular opinion that the media is the party that generates a climate in favor of or against a war, important studies contend that it is not television as a medium or technology that is what arouses public outrage.[33] In Vietnam, television did not reveal from the outset all of the atrocities, but joined the war critics at a somewhat late stage, possibly like the Israeli media in the Lebanon War, when the civilian population started to feel the price of the war (coffins in the Vietnamese context, information leaked from the front in the two wars in Lebanon). It appears that then, like today, the media is deterred, for an extended period, from showing blood and fire and makes do at the most with billows of smoke. In effect, the spirits of patriotism and devotion to the establishment at the beginning of wars help governments and militaries enter the combat zones (Vietnam, Lebanon; Gaza and more), but not necessarily pull out of them.

This leads to the conclusion that the media arrives after and not before changes in public opinion or in other fields, and that it does not lead but is led in this respect. Maybe it is true that in times of crisis, we tend to invent "idols" on the one hand, and "nasty witches" on the other. Whether we accept or reject these perceptions, they can be used for further development, as a fulcrum for advancing the discussion around the media's functioning in security contexts.

The overall systematic dimension: Two aspects may help build an agenda of thought and research on coverage of security fields, including war and other aspects of coverage. Social changes in recent years may possibly clarify how the techniques, narrative and the new ethics discussed here came to be.

The first aspect is political-economic, in the sense of the relations between the market and the values of society. The other is political-cultural, in the sense of a lack of professional tools that may ensure the survival of effective media ethics.

Political-economic aspect

The political-economic aspect deals with media ethics that reflects a strengthening of the neo-liberal presence in media practice. The starting point here is the criticism of violent, inhuman capitalism that has been imported in recent years into the west (including into Israel), particularly the new "greedy capitalism". The criticism is aimed, firstly, against eliminating the historical separation and autonomy of apparatuses that previously created social values in a manner independent of the market. Secondly, the criticism is directed against the fact that in recent years, neo-liberal capitalism and the market have been the forces to determine values of society and culture.[34]

The application of this criticism to journalist ethics leads to the conclusion that just as the market reached a status of establishing norms in commerce, in business and in society at large, it has also started to control media ethics. In the coverage of defense and wars, just as in reporting in other fields, this ethics system depends on governments, on mega-corporations, on professional institutes and on audiences that accept the legitimacy of the techniques and narratives produced in this manner. Robert McChesney remarks: "Neo-liberalism acts not only as an economic system, but also as a political and cultural one. Neo-liberalism functions better in formal electoral democracies in which the population is kept away from information, access and the public spheres that are required for significant participation in decision making …".[35]

Therefore, it may be concluded that the coverage of defense and war also requires a new separation of relations between norms of the market and professional ethics in reporting. This must be part of a new agenda in media research. However, reworking the relations between the market and the institutes of society, including the media, is as vital as air for breathing.

Political-cultural aspect

The political-cultural aspect deals with one of the dilemmas that result from the economic aspect originating from the criticism against the traditional Marxist contention, proposed by Hans Magnus Enzensberger, for example, which holds that in order to correct the problems of market penetration into the field of values and journalist ethics, progressive forces must conquer the media. However, as Baudrillard says, it is not helpful for the media consumer to take over the role of broadcaster, because conquering the media requires preserving the guiding principles of mass media systems. To change the situation, it is necessary to create a new, two-way model based on interaction (reciprocity) rather than reversibility in functions of transmissions and consumers. Here there is great hope for using new technologies to achieve this purpose.[36] ■

33　See Roeh I., **Seven Openings for View in the Media and Press**, Even Yehuda, Reches, 1994, pp. 104-106.

34　Soros G., "The Capitalist Threat," **The Atlantic Monthly Review**, 279 (2), February 1997.

35　McChesney R., **Rich Media Poor Democracy**, New Press, 1999, p. 110 .

36　36 Enzensberger H.M., "Constituents of a Theory of the Media," New Left Review, 64, 1970, pp. 13-36; Baudrillard J., "Requiem for the Media," In Jean Baudrillard, **For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign**, St. Louis, Mo, Telos Press, 1981, pp. 164-184.

Israeli Society and National Security Conference Summary

Following two workshops that took place during May and June, 2009, the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue at Netanya Academic College and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung held a summary conference on September 2, 2009 at Netanya Academic College dealing with various aspects of national security and Israeli society.

During the September 2 conference, panelists that included academics, security experts from the military and civilians branches, and journalists dealt with the following issues during four panels:

• Analyzing the influence of civilian versus military branches in the process determining national security policy, and making recommendations for defining the relations between these branches, including an examination of the level of supervision and control that the civilian branch has over the military and security establishment.

• Examining the relations between "security" and the security establishment and civilian issues, such as education, welfare, gender, and infrastructure, in determining national security priorities.

• Analyzing the relationship between territory and national security in Israeli society.

• Studying the media's role in determining the national security conception.

These and other related topics were presented and discussed to an audience of approximately 200 participants which included academics, students, members of the security establishment, NGOs, representatives from a number of embassies, and the general public.

The following document provides a brief summary of the presentations at the conference.

Opening Remarks

During the opening remarks of the conference, **Dr. Ralf Hexel**, Director of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Israel office stated that this conference attempts to ask the question, "What actually constitutes the meaning of security? We want to examine the connection between national security and the civil society," said Hexel, setting the basis for the conference's discussions.

Dr. Ephraim Sneh, Chairman of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue and former Deputy Defense Minister described the following view: "Our military superiority is constantly diminishing compared with our neighbors. The defense budget is shrinking and our once robust educational system, which ensured Israel's qualitative advantage, is breaking down. At the same time the Arab world is purchasing the most modern weapon systems and is slowly catching up to Israel," said Sneh. Dr. Sneh argued that even in times of peace Israel must ensure its military supremacy, in order to secure its survival, since changes can happen overnight.

Dr. Reuven Pedatzur, Academic Director of the Center, disagreed with Dr. Sneh's central argument, claiming that the defense budget has grown over the past ten years and that Israel's military advantage grows from day to day.

Panel I:
Political vs. Military Branches – Who Determines Policy?

The first panel dealt with the relations between military and political branches in decision-making, attempting to grapple with the question of who determines national security policy in Israel.

Tamar Malz-Ginsburg from the INSS at the Tel-Aviv University stated that cultural factors severely affect Israel's security policy. She claimed, "The behavior of the state in context of security expresses specific cultural phenomena. Culture determines politics as it specifies normative behavior," said Malz-Ginsburg. She argued that the concept of security in Israel is always connected with the fear of existential threat, and particularly today, due to fear of a nuclear Iran. At no time of its existence has Israel felt that its existence was secure. Thus, according to Malz-Ginsburg, Israel's security policy has been based on two factors: a sense of vulnerability, due to the difficult history of the Jewish Diaspora and the current "unfriendly neighborhood" of the Middle East, and a need for activism through Zionism. She argued, "The fighter is the symbol of a new, active Jew. It is demonstrated through Israel's wealth of invention and its wide range of Hi-tech products. Israel's security policy results from these approaches." She claimed that the Israeli notion of security based on activism should not be interpreted as militarism.

Dr. Kobi Michael, of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies and Ben-Gurion University in Beer Sheba, recognized, however, "political militarism" in Israel. He claimed that the army has a major influence on government decisions, as there is no counterweight to

the evaluations provided by the military agencies. "The Chief of Staff is the most powerful man in the state and nobody dares to contradict him", said Michael. Only the military possesses tools that can analyze Israel's security situation comprehensively. Michael claimed that no civilian mechanism has similar resources as the army and the secret services. "It is evident that there is a close relationship between the way a problem is analyzed and the way it is solved. If something is analyzed as a surgical problem, it is not treated homeopathically," said Michael. Michael argued that Israel views itself exposed to four vital threats: the demographic danger, the loss of the legitimacy, economic difficulties, and military threats. Since the military threat is felt as the most serious one, military approaches are also used to solve problems of a diplomatic nature. Michael recommended that politics must be separated from the military establishment in order for the civilian branch to achieve its goals.

General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, who advised Israeli governments for many years as a commander of the Israeli army intelligence, denied Michael's criticism. According to Amidror, with the exception of the 1967 Six-Day War, in which Israel conquered the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, the army never coerced the government in decision-making. On the contrary, he claimed, the Israeli governments acted both during the Oslo peace process and during the evacuation of the Gaza Strip against the explicit warnings of the army. "Each time the government wanted to make a policy decision, it could take this decision without the approval of the army or against its will, as was done during the Lebanon war, the unilateral retreat from the Gaza Strip, or the Oslo agreements", said Amidror.

Peri Golan discussed the ethical issues that arise from the interface between military and civilian branches. In his opinion, in this realm the term "values" is often equated with "quality", an equation that constitutes an essential component of the State of Israel's strength. The guarding of ethical values through this interface serve as a source of power for the security establishment. These values serve as a type of moral compass, particularly in a reality that is unclear and undefined.

According to Golan, the State of Israel, as well as the Jewish community in Palestine before the establishment of the state, has been challenged very unstable surroundings and the highest level of security dilemmas, which are part of the security conception of the entire civilian branch. Ben-Gurion was the first to determine the "rules of the game" between the military branch and decision-makers in the civilian branch.

The civilian branch depends on an expert and objective military branch, due, in part, to the complexity of the Israeli political system. The most important value in this value system is even-handedness, combined with integrity and professional objectivity, disconnected from personal worldview, free of manipulations, while presenting various dilemmas. One of Israel's problems is the existence of an overly influential professional-military branch. This branch must adopt controlling and supervising mechanisms, according to Golan

Panel II:
The Relationship between National Security and Civil Society in Israel

Dr. Orit Kamir, from the School of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem explained the difference between the terms dignity and honor, within a national security context. In 1992, the Basic Law for the human dignity and liberty was legislated in Israel, based on the classic liberal Western approach and United Nations conventions regarding dignity and liberty. According to this law, "Every human has an inherent, absolute value, and therein itself all humans are equal", said Kamir. The task of the state is to ensure that these inviolable rights associated with dignity are relevant to all citizens. However, according to Kamir, the role of Honor plays an important role in Israel's cultural environment. Honor societies value the opposite values of dignity societies: "Societies, which attach great importance to honor, have blood feuds and are very competitive," said Kamir. Honor, she claimed, is a zero-sum game: Since honor is relative, one person gaining honor always results in the dishonor of another. Thus, the personal security of each individual in such a society, according to Kamir, cannot be guaranteed.

Dr. Sarai Aharoni, of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, concentrated on the affect of the constant presence of the security crises on women in Israel. Aharoni argued that women are not strongly represented in determining Israeli policy due to their secondary roles in the army and security agencies. "In times of increasing political conflict, the voices of women are less heard and represented esoterically," she argued. She claimed that during the second Intifada, "Of approximately 1000 Israelis killed, 70% were civilians and 30% were women and children." She argued that the difference between battlefront and home front is becoming less defined in today's type of warfare, as was illustrated during the Second Lebanon and the Gaza operation, where thousands of rockets were fired at Israeli towns and settlements and families had to spend weeks in bomb shelters. Thus, women

are more adversely affected by conflict situations than ever.

Dr. Orna Sasson-Levi of Bar-Ilan University examined the myth of the IDF as "an army of the people." She argued that this claim no longer corresponds to Israeli reality. Only 75% of the Jewish men and less than 60% of the Jewish women take part in military service presently, many of them not serving the full amount of time stipulated. She claimed that during the 1990s the army began utilizing "business thinking". "The army views itself as a company, whose customers, the citizens, receive the product that it supplies," claimed Sasson-Levi. Therefore, the army relinquished its role in many socially-oriented tasks, such as the integration of new immigrants in society or the establishment of new settlements. Conversely, Sasson-Levi argued the expansion of the compulsory military service to new elements of society, such as ultra-orthodox Jews, creates new challenges. For example, the graduates of 43 Yeshivot Hesder schools demanded separate military service for men and women. This has extensive consequences on Israeli society. Sasson-Levi recognized the social advantages to transforming the IDF into a professional army, as society becomes more "demilitarized" under such conditions. However, Sasson-Levi also saw dangers involved in transformation into a professional army: "A professional army never has enough soldiers", she said. Thus, the army is forced to recruit soldiers, who usually come from the lowest social classes. Since the modern army requires a structured command level, the result would be a two-tiered army in which commanding officers come from the upper and middle classes of society, while combat soldiers would come from the lower classes. Thus, Sasson-Levi concluded, the requirement for a "people's army" enables a level of social equality.

Dov Ben-Meir, the former Vice Chair of the Knesset, argued that Israeli society should not be measured at a specific point in time, but that its development should be measured over a period of time. He claimed that the often the media does not reflect public opinion, as the public has its own opinion, independent of the media's agenda. Israel's transformation into an individualistic society must be taken into account when attempting to ensure that the political system operates according to national priorities.

Ben-Meir argued that, when attempting to examine society's values throughout time, we see that these values have changed since the state's establishment. The values that we believed in for years have changed, as methods for avoiding criticism that were previously employed, are no longer acceptable today. According

to Ben-Meir, values that may have been accepted during certain periods of time – such as the proposed "transfer" proposed by Katznelson and Arlozorov during the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the transfer proposed by Rehavam (Gandhi) Ze'evi during the 1980s – cannot be applied to the current reality. Ben-Meir argued that Israel's value system should be judged charitably, as we must concentrate on how to implement our positive elements – which are often only exposed during emergency situations. According to Ben-Meir, Israel's strength lies in its ability correct its faults.

Panel III:
National Security, Geography, and Territory

Geographer **Dr. Amiram Oren**, a research fellow at the Van Leer Institute and expert in land usage by the military, claimed that approximately half of the national territory of Israel proper (not including the Territories) either belongs to the Israel Defense Forces or is controlled by them. In addition, the air space, sea space, and electromagnetic fields are completely controlled by the military, claimed the researcher. Oren argued that the army's use of territory has a great impact on the environment and Israel's limited land resources. Oren raised the long-debated question of whether Israel is "a state that has an army or, in reality, an army that has a state" – it was clear that Oren holds with the latter opinion.

Zohar Avitan, head of the Pre-Academic Program at Sapir College in Sderot, spoke about the discriminatory approach taken by Israeli decision-making bodies when dealing with security issues in the center of the country versus security issues in the country's periphery. Avitan criticized the Israeli government for neglecting the needs of the residents of Sderot. He claimed that if all people who were born in Sderot remained in the city today, rather than departing due to the security situation, the city would have 100,000 inhabitants today. In addition, Avitan pointed out that the prominent Israeli narrative portrayed in the media depicted the reaction of the kibbutz residents of the Western Negev to rocket attacks in a different light than the residents of Sderot. While kibbutzim are thought of as "frontier" communities, Sderot, a development town populated primarily by Israelis that emigrated from Arab countries, is thought of and treated as "periphery" – geographically, politically, and culturally. He argued that the government no longer views the development of Sderot as a legitimate target for investment and development, and that the residents of Sderot simply lacked the political power to change the priorities of

the relevant decision-makers.

Colonel (ret.) Shaul Arieli, from the Council for Peace and Security, dealt with the relationship between security, territory, and demography. He described a central dilemma the Zionist movement has confronted since its emergence: it always dreamt of a Jewish democratic state in the entire territory of ancient Biblical Israel; however, demography, democracy, and geography could not be converged to make this dream a reality. The pragmatic wing of Zionism chose democracy and demography in favor of geography: "If I have to choose between one [bi-national] state in all of Palestine and a Jewish state in a part of it - I would choose the Jewish state," quoted Arieli the first Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. The national religious currents of Zionism, however, did not view Zionism as the emancipation of the Jewish people, but as "the emancipation of the Holy Land", and thus aimed to maximize territory. According to Arieli, following the Six-Day War, the newly conquered territory was viewed as an additional security buffer; however, in the eyes of many national-religious Jews, this newly conquered land was viewed as an ends in itself. Since then, according to Arieli, the thinking in Israel has changed, as the demographic danger facing Israel, resulting from the continuous control of all the territory west of the Jordan River, has become too great. In addition, Israel's national leadership, which previously sought to secure Israel's existence through large territorial buffer zones between Israel and enemy states, today aims to secure Israel's future through a demilitarized Palestinian state. Furthermore, Arieli claimed that by annexing between 2.5-6% of the West Bank territory, Israel can keep approximately 80% of Jewish residents of the West Bank under Israeli sovereignty.

Panel IV:
The Representation of Security Issues in the Israeli Media

Dr. Mike Dahan of the School for Communications and Politics at Sapir College discussed the Second Lebanon War and the "Info-Sphere". The "Info-Sphere", according Dahan, is an environment of new media, including cellular technologies, blogs, forums, and social networks such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. According to Dahan, the Info-Sphere represents a substantial challenge for authoritarian regimes such as Iran, since it is very difficult to censor. "These new frameworks enable a democratization of information," said Dahan. Dahan also illustrated how the terrorist organizations utilize various Web technologies. For example, he illustrated how during the Second Lebanon

War, Hezbollah directed rockets by using Google Earth and tracked Israeli troop movements by obtaining information from the media or by tapping mobile phone conversations. In addition, according to Dahan, during the war, propaganda campaigns were extremely prevalent on the Internet.

The IDF Spokesman, **Brigadier General Avi Benayahu**, provided a brief review of relations between the IDF and Israeli society through recent history. He pointed to five events that deeply shook the public's confidence in the army. The first traumatic event, according to Benayahu, was the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which faith in the army was severely shaken. The second traumatic event was the First Lebanon War, during which Israeli society saw a lack of transparency and honesty in decision-making process. This general feeling, according to Benayahu, was exacerbated during the First Intifada, as many Israelis for the first time viewed the continuation of the status quo in the Territories as untenable, and requiring an alternative solution. The fourth event, according to Benayahu, was the Ze'elim accident of 1994, in which five elite soldiers died during maneuvers. Following this tragedy, soldiers' parents became more actively involved in the military service of their children. The final event that shook the public's confidence in the army was the Second Lebanon War, which the public felt was, in a sense, a missed opportunity. During this war, the army had to deal with a new challenge of the ease by which information flowed during the information age, and the difficulty in controlling this flow of information, a phenomenon that was often harmful to Israeli efforts. He argued that during the recent Gaza Operation the public's confidence in the IDF has been restored, as the public sees that the IDF has the ability to defend Israel's citizens and restore Israel's deterrent posture vis-à-vis terrorist organizations.

Dr. Reuven Pedatzur, Academic Director of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue, who discussed the absence of freedom of the press when dealing with security issues, served as a type of counterweight to the IDF spokesman's lecture. Dr. Pedatzur argued that the public often only receives information in a form that is pre-packaged by the IDF spokesman. Pedatzur argued that the censor often forbids the publication of specific items, without providing any explanation for the decision to censor. He claimed that Israeli law (Journalists' Directive, 1933) permits the censor to close a newspaper immediately, if "the material that appears in the newspaper is likely, according to the Minister of Interior, to endanger public peace, or if it includes untruthful or rumor-based news items, which, in his opinion, could incite panic or

despair."

This clause has been primarily used to close Arab newspapers; however, the Minister of Interior also closed a Hebrew newspaper ("The Nation's Voice). Pedatzur claimed that the Israeli media often accepts the information provided by the IDF spokesman, without questioning this information or engaging in independent investigative work. For example, the media reported incorrect information regarding the defense budget by blindly accepting the data published by the army. While the media reported a cut in defense spending during the years leading up to the Second Lebanon War, Pedatzur presented statistics illustrating the opposite (the defense budget was not cut, but was increased during this period). Pedatzur concluded that by obediently publishing information originally supplied by the IDF spokesman, journalists tend to avoid contradicting the official army line on security issues. ∎

This summary is based on an article written by Dr. Gil Yaron.

Description of Workshop Participants

Participants of Workshop A

Colonel (ret.) Shaul Arieli is a senior researcher at the Economic Cooperation Fund (ECF), one of the initiators of the Geneva Accord and a managing member of the Council for Peace and Security. In his military service, he commanded the northern brigade in the Gaza Strip, headed the Directorate for the Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority during Rabin's term of office as Prime Minister, and served as the head of the Directorate for Negotiations for a Permanent Arrangement in Barak's government.

Peri Golan served in the General Security Service (Shabak) for many years in a range of functions within the core operational activity of the service in the field of intelligence gathering and terrorism prevention. Among other duties, Peri Golan headed the Arab division of the service and commanded its southern region.

Dr. Lev Grinberg is a sociologist and political economist who headed the Department of Sociology and Anthropology (2006-2009) and the Humphrey Institute (1998-2002) at Ben Gurion University in the Negev. Dr. Grinberg is one of the founders of the "Campus" Jewish-Arab students' movement (1974) and served as the first spokesman of the "Yesh Gvul" movement (1982, 1988). Among his other works, he studied the political economics of 1960-1980, and the contradiction between democratization and colonization processes.

Dr. Kobi Michael is a lecturer at Ben Gurion University and a research associate at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. His research focuses on military-state relations in Israel, national defense, peacekeeping operations as a means for settling conflicts and solutions to the status of Jerusalem. His book Between Militarism and Statesmanship in Israel won the prize Israeli Political Science Association prize for the best book in 2008.

Tamar Malz-Ginsburg is a research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University. Her research includes the influence of national culture in Israel over the shaping of security policy.

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror serves as the Vice President of the Lander Institute Jerusalem Academic Center and as chairman of the public advocacy program of the Jerusalem Center for Public and State Affairs. He served as the Head of the Research Division in the Military Intelligence Directorate, as the military secretary of the defense minister and as the commander of the Military Colleges.

Prof. Gabi Sheffer is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He has published several books and articles on the relations of the defense establishment and the IDF and political and social systems in Israel, and recently, a Hebrew volume that he and two research associates edited, titled *An Army that Has a State?*. He served as an advisor to the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Education.

Participants of Workshop B

Zohar Avitan serves as the Director of the Pre-Academic Center and founded the preparatory programs for discharged servicemen at Sapir Academic College. Mr. Avitan has a Master's degree in political communications from Tel Aviv University and is currently commencing his doctoral thesis at Tel Aviv University, the Department of Political Science.

Dr. Sarai Aharoni is a lecturer at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and a researcher at the Davis Institute for International Relations. Her research deals with the confluence of gender, war, and peace. Dr. Aharoni has published academic articles dealing with gender in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the participation of women in the peace talks.

Dr. Amiram Oren is a geographer, independent researcher and research associate at the Van Leer Institute, an author, and publisher of books and articles on the use of land for security purposes. He previously served as an officer in the infrastructure and deployment division of the Planning Directorate of the General Staff and Ground Corps Command and engaged in defense security planning and the interface between civilian planning and land agencies.

Dr. Dalia Gavrieli-Nuri is a senior lecturer at Hadassah College in Jerusalem and teaches at Bar Ilan University. Her studies deal with the relationship between Israeli culture and national security, and in the exploration of the discourse of war and peace in Israel. She is a graduate of the Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and holds a license to practice law. She wrote her doctoral thesis at the School of Cultural Studies at Tel Aviv University.

Dr. Orit Kamir served as a lecturer of law, gender and culture at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. She co-managed the Israel Center for Human Dignity, and served as a research associate at the Hartman Institute for Judaism in Jerusalem.

Prof. Dov Shinar serves as the head of the graduate degree program, as the head of "Fair Media: Center for the Study of Conflict, War and Peace Coverage" and as the incumbent dean (from March 2010) at the School of Media Studies, Netanya Academic College. He is a professor emeritus from Ben Gurion University and Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. He has published books and articles on the media, war and peace, media and social development, international media, and media and technology.

Workshop moderator and publication editor

Dr. Reuven Pedatzur serves as the academic director of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialog and a senior lecturer at the School for Media Studies at Netanya Academic College. Dr. Pedhazur is an expert in security and strategy, has published many articles on the subject and written four books. Dr. Pedhazur has a column on security and strategic affairs in the Haaretz newspaper, and hosts a weekly program "the Security Strip" on Army Radio.