

# The Gender Index

## Gender Inequality

### in Israel

2014

Hagar Tzameret-Kertcher

**שוות • WIPS**  
המרכז לקידום נשים בזירה הציבורית



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**מכון ון ליר בירושלים**  
THE VAN LEER JERUSALEM INSTITUTE  
معهد فان لير في القدس

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# The Gender Index Gender Inequality in Israel 2014

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**The Center for the Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere (WIPS)** was established at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute in 2009 with the support of the Dafna Fund. WIPS is committed to gender mainstreaming as an overall strategy for promoting the democratic and civil status of women in diverse social groups. This approach aims to transform the issue of gender inequality into a general social worldview that relates to both women and men and to all social structures. The WIPS center aims to make gender equality an inseparable part of the thought and action of legislators and decision makers in various areas.

**WIPS** conducts research, promotes strategic thinking, and initiates projects and programs in areas relevant to implementing gender mainstreaming and gender equality in Israel. The founders of WIPS seek to make it a framework that brings together women's organizations, feminist activists, researchers, legislators, and decision makers, so that their dialogue and sharing of ideas will serve as a source of knowledge, guidance, and experience for anyone interested in promoting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in Israel. The center also promotes strategies to coordinate the efforts and impact of social action designed to promote the status of women and gender equality by connecting grassroots women's organizations, policy makers, legislators, and those acting for broad social change.

# Acknowledgements

The 2014 Gender Index is the second in the series published by **The Center for the Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere (WIPS)**. The construction, development, and periodic publication of such an index are akin to long-distance running, in that success is contingent upon continuity. The first Gender Index was launched at an international conference attended by scholars and policy makers from both Israel and abroad, an economist from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and researchers from the world's largest women's database, The WomanStats Project. The present Index not only continues monitoring the domains examined in its predecessor but expands to include new domains as well.

We would like to thank all who participated in this important endeavor. First and foremost we thank the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (VLJI), which hosts WIPS; Prof. Gabriel Motzkin, director of the VLJI; Prof. Moshe Justman, director of the Israeli Civil Society Division; and the VLJI's administrative staff and academic faculty, for their initial and sustained support. Were it not for their faith in the importance of the Index and their continuing moral and financial support, we could not have done this work. We extend our thanks and appreciation to Dr. Hagar Tzameret-Kertcher, principal researcher and developer of the Index, and the dedicated research team that worked with her: Yulia Basin, Oleg Glybchenko, and Michal Weiss-Green. Heartfelt thanks go out to the members of the Academic Committee who have been involved with this project since its inception—Prof. Michal Shamir, Prof. Moshe Justman, and Prof. Orit Kedar. Their insightful comments and useful suggestions contributed a great deal to the development of the new domains added to this year's Index. Many thanks also to the anonymous reader-evaluator, whose in-depth perusal of the Index helped with sharp and accurate presentation of the findings and was augmented with important suggestions for continued development of the Index. We also thank representatives of the Central Bureau of Statistics, especially Yafit Alfandari; representatives of government ministries; and other bodies who participated in the conceptualization of new directions for developing the Index and new ways to gather gender-specific data. Our heartfelt thanks go to the women's organizations that cooperated and assisted in conceptualization from the inception of the Index. Again, the influence and success of the endeavor are contingent on continued efforts to develop the Index as a monitoring tool and a signpost for policy change.

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**Hanna Herzog, Naomi Chazan, Ronna Brayer-Garb, Hadass Ben Eliyahu**

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## The 2014 Gender Index: Principal Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

The purpose of the Gender Index developed by **The Center for the Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere (WIPS)** is to lay down a solid foundation for addressing an issue that has concerned researchers, policy makers, and social activists for over a decade: Why, despite many significant improvements in the status of women in a variety of spheres, does the gender gap appear not only to endure but in some instances even to grow? In the 1990s there was marked progress in eradicating discrimination against women in Israeli society through legislation. Indeed, as a result women from diverse sectors of the population recorded substantial progress in particular areas, from participation in the labor force and a rise in income levels to greater representation in public life. Nevertheless, the rate of improvement among men was no less than that among women. Consequently, gender inequality was not significantly reduced during the past decade.

In a series of meetings with a broad range of women's organizations at the **Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (VLJI)**, held in 2010–2011, it was decided to investigate the gender gap in Israeli society over time in order to understand the nature of gender inequality and formulate steps to grapple with its repercussions. It is important to stress that this undertaking is not another attempt to measure the status of women in Israel but rather an effort to create a mechanism for monitoring changes in the situation of women in comparison with that of men over time. The question of gender equality is an inherently different issue from that of the status of women, though the two are closely related. The team that developed the Gender Index views the attainment of gender equality as a fundamental social objective that, though contingent on the advancement of women, extends far beyond this goal alone. Emphasis is placed, therefore, on the presence (or absence) of social equality and on the means for its realization.

### Objectives of the Gender Index

The WIPS Gender Index is the first of its kind. It tracks the trajectory of gender inequality each year in a wide range of domains that together constitute the lives of Israeli women.<sup>1</sup> The present Gender Index, the second in a series of planned annual publications, highlights changes in inequality between women and men in Israel during the past year and enables a more precise assessment of gender inequality patterns over time. Using 2004 (the first year for which the database allows for the precise examination of this relationship) as the base year, the Index has been constructed as a monitoring instrument with three principal objectives in mind:

- a. **Increasing knowledge** about a variety of aspects of gender inequality in Israel over time. This knowledge is crucial to understanding the state of gender inequality and its specific manifestations, explaining existing trends, and forging tools to reduce gender gaps.

<sup>1</sup> A similar index, the European Gender Equality Index, was published for the first time six months after the first Israeli Index and is similar in its structure, methodology, and the trends it depicts. See <http://eige.europa.eu/content/activities/gender-equality-index>.



- b. Fostering dialogue** about gender inequality and the factors that contribute to its perpetuation. At present there are insufficient explanations for the continuation of gender inequality despite the ongoing improvement in the status of women, and it is therefore critical to identify specific phenomena in order to focus the discussion and point to effective solutions.
- c. Formulating recommendations** for promoting policy reforms aimed at reducing gender inequality. The Index is unique in the breadth and depth of the picture it offers. As a result it can serve both as a policy compass for decision makers, government agencies, and public bodies in Israel, as well as a vital tool for civil society in general—and women's organizations in particular—in shaping a new social agenda and specific efforts to foster gender equality.

## Structure of the 2014 Gender Index

The 2014 Gender Index is based on the calculation of gender inequality in Israel from 2004 to 2012 in ten key domains: the labor market, gendered segregation of professions, violence against women, gender inequality in the periphery, gender inequality in Arab society in Israel, poverty, education, power, health, and family status. Each domain is comprised of several indicators, and the Index as a whole contains a total of fifty indicators. This year two new domains were added to the Gender Index (gendered segregation of professions and family status), along with some twenty indicators that offer broader perspectives in each of the other domains.

## Principal Findings

### Main Trends

Compared with last year's Index, the 2014 Index shows an increase in gender inequality in four domains: 2.6% in the labor market domain, 1.5% in the poverty domain, 3.1% in the power domain, and 0.7% in the measure of gender inequality in the periphery. On the other hand, the Index shows improvement in four other domains: in Arab society gender inequality decreased by 6.3%, in education by 1%, in gendered segregation of the professions by 8%, and in family status by 8.3%. There was also a slight improvement in the domain of violence against women (0.3%). The health domain remained unchanged. The composite domain shows an overall decrease of 2% in gender inequality.

In the course of the measurement period (2004–2012), gender inequality trends have changed direction several times. From 2004 to 2007 gender inequality increased by 5% owing to growing gender gaps in the domains of the labor market, power, violence against women, gender inequality in the periphery, poverty, and gendered segregation of the professions. No change was recorded in the domains of education and health. In 2008–2009 some improvement was recorded: inequality dropped from the peak it had reached in 2007, decreasing by 3.7%. In 2010 gender inequality increased again, this time by 4.2%, following a deterioration in six domains, particularly violence against women and the labor market. In 2011–2012 gender inequality dropped over 9% owing to improvements in the domains of the labor market, violence against women, Arab society, and gendered segregation of the professions. The 2012 values approached those recorded for 2004, the first year of measurement.

**It is striking that the gender inequality situation in the last year of measurement (2012) is almost identical to that in the first year of measurement (2004). Despite fluctuations over the years, there has been no significant improvement in gender inequality over the measurement period.**

### Findings in Specific Areas

The Index yields several striking findings. Gender segregation in employment is high in Israel and is narrowing at an extremely slow pace: to attain gender equality, 47% of those employed in the labor market would need to change their profession. It is also evident that women are poorer than men, with the gap between them almost static over the years. Likewise, although women have been acquiring higher education at an increasing rate and are better educated than men (48.1% of women have 13 or more years of schooling, compared with 45.2% of men), their situation in the labor market has not changed: women's gross hourly wage is 85% that of men, and there are 1.9 times more women than men employed in part-time jobs. In fact women's achievements in the education arena do not necessarily translate into better positions in the labor market or into greater influence in the power domain, as further elaborated below.

In terms of political power, the representation of women in the Knesset, government, and mayoral and regional council positions is much lower than their percentage in the population, measuring 20%, 10%, and 2%, respectively (as of the end of 2012 and before the general elections held in early 2013, after which there was a slight improvement in Knesset representation). From 2010 to 2011 there was a decrease in inequality in the political power domain, following the appointment of one woman minister (Orit Noked) and two women mayors/council heads (Tali Ploskov in Arad and Matti Tsarfati-Harkabi in the Yoav Regional Council). The paucity of women in these positions attests to how long the road to equality in political representation continues to be.

It should be stressed that a general deterioration in the situation of workers (employment conditions and wages) contributes to a decrease in gender inequality. Since the Index examines ratios between women and men, the discrepancy is reduced when the situation of men deteriorates. Thus, for example, in Arab society there was a reduction in inequality in 2012, mainly because of the increasing number of Arab men who shifted from full-time to part-time employment. In the same vein, the number of men contract workers has increased significantly in recent years, as has the number of men working part time across the entire population. These phenomena decrease the gaps between women and men in working conditions, but this pattern is less an indication of improvement in the status of women than of deterioration in the status of men.

### Conclusions and Discussion

There is no unequivocal evidence of a reduction or, for that matter, an exacerbation in the gender inequality situation during the measurement period (2004–2012). Though there was a moderate (though not unequivocal) improvement in the status of women, inequality between women and men is alive and well. Still, not all the indicators showed the same trend: some demonstrated a narrowing of the gender gap and others the opposite. This

overall pattern can be attributed to the lack of a multifaceted policy approach to closing gender gaps and the effects of this inaction on the long-term stagnation in gender inequality in Israel. This situation was generated in the context of the institutionalization of neoliberal economic policies in Israel, in which the logic of the market (and by extension the entire public sphere) dictates the logic within the family (the private sphere), creating a clear hierarchy between the two.

Indeed, the indicators in the labor market domain point to a widening of the gender gap: there are discrepancies in average monthly income (women earn 66% of the amount earned by men), the median income (women's median income is 71% that of men), and hourly wage (women's hourly wage is 85% that of men). There are also discrepancies in labor market participation levels (women's participation level is 84% that of men), the number of contract workers (the rate of women contract workers is 3% greater than that of men), the rate of part-time employment (the rate of women working part time is 89% greater than that of men), and in the gendered segregation of professions (to eliminate professional gender segregation, 47% of the labor force would have to change their current occupation).

These figures are closely tied to the traditional division of labor between men and women, according to which women continue to assume primary responsibility for care of the home and family (for many these constitute a "second shift"). In our opinion this situation is rooted in structural-institutional factors (the gendered structure of the labor market in particular, and of the public realm in general) as well as in cultural factors (mainly the persistent gendered hierarchy between the private/women and the public/men spheres). The confluence of these two fundamental sets of factors explains the long-term perpetuation of gender gaps, along with the perceptions upon which they are based.

### Structural-Institutional Factors

The gendered structure of the labor market in Israel—as reflected in the 2014 Index's data pertaining to occupational segregation—highlights the profoundly gendered nature of Israeli society. At the same time, the gendered character of power in the country emphasizes the degree to which gender-based structures are entrenched in the public sphere. It could therefore be claimed that the country's decision-making and resource-allocating apparatus is gendered by definition and that this pattern is reinforced by cultural factors. Without direct intervention based on the perception of gender equality as a universal value, it is doubtful that change will occur in these deep structures.

### Cultural Factors

Women in the labor market, even those in senior positions, are often perceived first and foremost as mothers (or future mothers) and hence as secondary in the context of the labor market. Many hold part-time positions in order to be able to meet the demands of housework and family. As long as this remains the case, it can be assumed that the stasis reflected by the Index will persist. However, the results of the Index raise another concern: the rising integration of women in the Israeli labor market is incompatible with an additional developing phenomenon—the rising demands of caring for elderly parents. According to the data, life expectancy is increasing, and consequently so is the number of aged people in need of care. For the most part the burden of caring for elderly parents falls on the

shoulders of women, and this caregiving—which might be characterized as “transparent labor” because it is neither recognized as work nor compensated as such—is deleterious to the status and earning potential of women in the labor market. Moreover, since 2005 there has been a consistent rise in the average number of children born to Jewish women in Israel. This trend not only runs counter to general global trends but also to those of Arab women in Israel. It may well be that the pattern observed in recent decades, which saw many more women choosing professional careers and active participation in the public sphere, is about to lose momentum.

## Policy Recommendations

The Gender Index, as emphasized throughout this report, does not examine the status of women but rather the level of inequality between women and men. Therefore, the central question it addresses is not how to improve the status of women but how to reduce the gap between women and men. The distinct framing of the question inevitably points to the possibility that, like the issue itself, the strategy for effecting change will differ. The strategy for narrowing gender gaps is not necessarily the same as the strategy for preventing discrimination. Indeed, the objective of all policy directed at reducing gender inequality must derive from the understanding that gender equality specifically, and social equality in general, is a higher universal value.

Three policy recommendations for the attainment of gender equality follow: gender mainstreaming, state intervention in the relationship between the labor market and the family, and the development of gender-sensitive data.

### Gender Mainstreaming as a Guiding Strategy

Gender Mainstreaming (GM) is a strategy for effecting change that facilitates the narrowing of gender gaps and the increase of gender equality, because it emphasizes a gender-sensitive understanding of problems and barriers and offers means to advance society (and not just women) as a whole. In the past, efforts to promote change in the status of women have focused, for the most part, on dismantling barriers and reducing discrimination, alongside empowering women and assisting them in achieving self-realization. However, when the declared goal of policy is to reduce gender gaps in general, and those between women and men of specific population groups in particular, a gender mainstreaming policy—meaning the incorporation of gender sensitivity into the core of political, cultural, and social thinking—is far more appropriate. This strategy exposes inequitable arrangements, demands that social systems acknowledge the various obstacles at work, and advocates systemic change that includes the removal of both official and unofficial barriers to equality. The gender mainstreaming strategy relies on three principal tools: representation, the incorporation of gender perspectives in decision making, and a gender-sensitive analysis of policy implications. These are interlocking tools that may, together, serve to reduce gender gaps and—with necessary adaptations—reduce structural gaps between other population groups.

- a. **Representation:** Adequate representation of women at every decision-making juncture is, today, a basic necessity. Unquestionably, underrepresentation of women

prevents the injection of gender considerations at the policy level and inhibits the formulation of gender-equitable policies (as elaborated below). There is no doubt that the current situation in the country calls for the institution of affirmative action measures (at least for a specified period of time) for appointed positions, to ensure adequate representation of women in elected office. Past failure to take such steps contributed directly to the perpetuation of the gendered structure of the public realm in Israel. This principle can also be applied to the labor market (especially to the professions in which gender-based segregation is particularly prevalent), as well as to the apparatus for the allocation of budgets and resources.

- b. **Integration of gender perspectives into decision making:** At present there is inadequate integration of women from a variety of population groups into policy discussions pertaining to issues on the public agenda. Consequently, the differential needs of women and men are rarely taken into account, with the result that subsequent policies may include biases that actually distance the prospects for the attainment of equality. The very inclusion of the voices of a variety of women and men facilitates the formulation of more equitable general policies that are sensitive to the needs of specific groups—that is, to the intersectionality of social discrepancies.
- c. **Gender-oriented examination of policy implications:** It is necessary to examine the implications of every new policy for women as well as for men, and at times to reevaluate existing policy in this light. Policy that is adopted without the prior assessment of its gender implications may inadvertently result in the widening of gender gaps.

The three principal gender mainstreaming tools are mutually complementary. When systematically employed in specific areas, they can expedite the reduction of gender (and other) gaps.

### State Intervention in the Relationship between the Labor Market and the Family

As a direct continuation of the adoption of gender mainstreaming tools, it is important to weigh the possibility of official involvement in an area that has until now been immune to such intrusions: the balance between work and family. The idea is not to suggest that the state intervene in private relationships but rather that a change be generated in the gendered relationship of parenting (the private realm) and the public realm of money and power through the systematic equation of the value allotted to activities in each of these two spheres. Thus, for example, shortening the workday, as some countries in Europe have already done, might increase women's participation in the labor market on the one hand, and on the other promote increased men's participation in parenting and recreation. (In France, for example, the cost of work hours beyond a thirty-seven-hour work week is almost prohibitive for employers). In the same vein extending parental leave to six months, two of these specifically for the father (which are canceled if not used), might contribute to the creation of a healthier work/family balance.

In the longer term it is worth reexamining the existing hierarchy between home and family (so-called transparent labor) and work for monetary compensation, to explore

ways to dismantle this distinction (which forms the basis for an entire system of inequality between the private and public realms) and move toward its elimination.

### Development of Gender-Sensitive Databases

In recent years various agencies—among them the Central Bureau of Statistics, the National Insurance Institute, the police, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and several government ministries—have made a real effort to gather gender-sensitive data. Nevertheless, the national database is still incomplete, and there are many glaring lacunae. For example, there is no breakdown by gender in key areas such as political representation in local government, health statistics, violence against women and men, distribution of labor within the family, and personal status. Systematic gathering of such data is essential to understanding the gender gaps and developing workable means for their reduction.

The responsibility for implementing these policy recommendations falls on all parts of the system. These suggestions are directed, first and foremost, at the senior decision-making echelons and those responsible for implementing government decisions, but they should become an integral part of the process at all levels and at all stages of policy design and implementation.

**Naomi Chazan, Hanna Herzog, Hadass Ben Eliyahu, Ronna Brayer-Garb**



## Introduction

This is the second edition of the Gender Index, a systematic monitoring of gender inequality in Israel developed by a team from The Center for Women in the Public Sphere (WIPS) under the leadership of professors Naomi Chazan and Hanna Herzog, at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (VLJI). The Index is designed to serve as a tool for examining levels of gender inequality in Israel over time. It presents differences between women and men in a variety of domains and provides an overall assessment of gender inequality in Israel today on the basis of a composite of these domains.

The Gender Index is the first of its kind in that it examines gender inequality within the state, while other such indexes compare between countries. It can therefore serve as a kind of policy compass for decision makers and government and public officials in the State of Israel, as well as guide civil organizations, among them women's organizations, in the formulation of policy that fosters gender equality. The Gender Index's contribution, in comparison with other indexes in Israel and elsewhere, lies in its systematic examination of data in a variety of spheres over several years and in its provision of a composite "score." This structure facilitates examination of various developments in each area and component while providing an overall depiction of the state of gender inequality in Israel—a whole that exceeds the sum of its parts. Moreover, this index takes into account aspects of gender inequality that are not included in other indexes—for example, the Arab society domain—because it was developed on the basis of an in-depth understanding of the Israeli context. The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) examines the rate of women in parliament, the rate of women in decision-making economic positions, and income discrepancies between women and men. The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) focuses on three areas: health and fertility, empowerment, and labor market. These well-known indexes do not address, for example, aspects of gender inequality among disadvantaged populations.<sup>2</sup> It should be noted, however, that a new index, similar in conception to the one developed, was recently published by EIGE - The European Institute for Gender Equality.<sup>3</sup>

The Gender Index is issued annually. Each year, the domains are updated, and new domains and indicators that illuminate aspects of life not addressed in other indexes are added. The objective of the Index is to provide a tool for long-term monitoring of the situation while simultaneously stimulating the creation of new data sets that are currently either not collected at all or are not broken down by gender. In this way it will help expose the gender blindness in many areas and highlight the severity of the genderization of society and of gender inequality. Without such an analysis these realities are overlooked. Furthermore, the Index can serve as a model for the development of similar indexes in other countries and thus become a new tool for intercountry comparison—which today is only available for a limited number of indicators.

The 2014 Gender Index report examines gender inequality in ten domains comprising fifty indicators, at nine points in time from 2004 to 2012. (The 2013 Gender Index had eight domains comprising thirty-one indicators. The additions will be elaborated upon as we proceed.) All indicators were subjected to statistical screening so that they could be grouped in a single

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<sup>2</sup> For more on the GEM and GDI, see Appendix I.

<sup>3</sup> See <http://eige.europa.eu/content/activities/gender-equality-index>.



index.<sup>4</sup> As noted, improvement of the Index involved, among other things, the development of new data sets that would shed light on gender inequality in previously unexamined areas in order to attain a richer, more complex and beneficial depiction of the reality of women's lives in Israel, across all levels of society. At the same time, the updating of data each year will make it possible to monitor changes in gender inequality in Israel.

## Using the Index to Examine Gender Inequality

The idea for the development of the Gender Index is rooted in several theoretical approaches, among them human development, women's empowerment, gender equality, and gender mainstreaming (GM). The first gender index, the GDI, was developed by the United Nations in 1995. The GDI viewed gender inequality as an issue related to general human development and not just to women, and it aimed to contribute to policy discussion on the subject of gender inequality and meet the need for analysis and policy formulation. Other indexes were developed with the explicit goal of women's empowerment.

In contrast to both of the aforementioned approaches, the WIPS Gender Index approaches gender inequality as a problem related to social structure. Its starting point is rooted in the principle of gender mainstreaming, according to which it is vitally important to highlight the mechanisms that create gender inequality. One such powerful mechanism is the distinction between the public and domestic/private spheres. This distinction is accompanied by a hierarchical perception of the standing and importance of the two spheres: the public sphere, mainly economics and politics, is perceived as the core of society and considered "masculine," while the domestic/private sphere is considered the domain of women. The absence of equitable division of labor between women and men in the two spheres, as well as the differential valuation of paid labor versus caregiving, gives rise to gender inequality. Thus, for example, women who work in the labor market, even those who hold senior positions (elected officials or other leadership roles), are perceived as mothers—or future mothers—and therefore as having secondary status in the labor and "power" markets. The Gender Index must therefore address manifestations of inequality that are functions of gendered perceptions and structures.

The perception reflected in this, as opposed to other gender indexes, is broad rather than specific.<sup>5</sup> Many gender indexes suffer from oversimplification of the inequality they measure. Certain indicators, such as life expectancy and education, are presented as evidence that women have significant advantages over men, but they fail to reflect women's overall quality of life—the resources at their disposal, their degree of economic independence, their medical situation, and their limitations in old age.

The uneven distribution of work (paid and unpaid) and its repercussions on access to economic resources and the risk of sinking into poverty must be adequately emphasized by any Index describing gender inequality. A gender index must focus on gender distribution in employment and unemployment rates, types of employment, available income, and economic compensation. To reflect all of these, the index must also examine time spent caring for family,

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4 For a detailed explanation of the methodology used in developing the Gender Index, see Appendix II.

5 For a list of indexes used worldwide, see Appendix I.

division of responsibilities within the family, and leisure time and activities. Time spent on caregiving, work, and leisure are extremely important indicators for the index, but owing to the unfortunate absence of long-term data, they are not included in the present iteration.

An extremely important area examined in the present index—one that does not feature in other indexes, partly because of a dearth of reliable, available data—is violence per gender group and violence against women. Inequality is prominent in this area—at home, in the workplace, and in society. Another area covered by this Index is disadvantaged women, such as Arab women, women in the periphery, and poor women—in recognition of the fact that women do not constitute a homogeneous social group and that differences between women that affect their life circumstances must be taken into account. The aim is to avoid an index that reflects only women of high socioeconomic status.

The Gender Index provides a comprehensive framework for perceiving gender inequality in society, and its development fostered dialog with policy makers and with data providers such as the Central Bureau of Statistics, the National Insurance Institute, the Ministry of Public Security, the Knesset's Research and Information Center, and the Knesset Committee for the Advancement of the Status of Women. We also established contact with the OECD, which helped us to consider ways of quantitatively measuring the gender gap and to find suitable methods of collecting data that would reflect inequality with a view to decreasing it. Contact with these agencies, some of which are directly involved in shaping and promoting policy, is an important factor in rendering this Gender Index an influential tool both in Israel and beyond.

## The Structure of the Gender Index

The Gender Index comprises ten interrelated domains that together provide a comprehensive overview of the gaps between women and men. Linking these domains enables their comparison and consequently the formulation of policy to close the gaps in each. Furthermore, and just as important, we hope that the act of measurement itself and the publication of the data will expose inequality in less predictable areas.

The following section, *Monitoring of Inequality in Israel*, describes the structure of the Index, elaborating on the domains and the indicators that comprise them. Then, in the *Summary of Results of the Gender Index* section, the comprehensive (aggregate) results are presented, showing the changes in inequality in 2012 in comparison with 2011 and preceding years and the development of inequality between the years 2004 and 2012. The next section, *Gender Index Results for the Ten Domains*, describes the results for each of the domains individually. The labor market domain outlines gaps between women and men in labor market participation levels, income, part-time employment rates, and more. The gendered segregation of professions domain outlines the rate of women in certain professions that are characterized by relatively high employment segregation (that is, a relatively high concentration of men or women in relation to the population distribution and in relation to other professions); this section also presents the gender segregation by occupation indicator, which we constructed according to the Duncan Segregation Index.<sup>6</sup> The violence against women domain describes

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<sup>6</sup> Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, "Residential Distribution and Occupational Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology* 60 (March, 1955): 493–503.

the number of new sex offense files opened by the rape crisis centers, the number of domestic violence complaints made, the number of clients at welfare ministry centers, and more. The periphery domain presents the gaps between women and men in the center of the country in comparison with the periphery, by labor market participation level and average monthly income. Our definition of the periphery as the north and south regions of the country is based on the Central Bureau of Statistics' regional sectors.

In the Arab society domain, some indicators pertain to the situation of Arab women in the labor market in contrast to that of Arab men, while other indicators pertain to family status and education. The poverty domain traces the incidence of poverty among women as opposed to men, and the gap between the number of women and the number of men receiving income support stipends. The education domain presents discrepancies between men and women acquiring higher education—by those with 13–15 years of study and those with 16 or more years of study.

The power domain features indicators that reflect social influence and power in the political and economic realms. Among these are the rates of women members of parliament, mayors, CEOs, and women in senior civil service positions. The health domain presents the gaps between women and men in life expectancy, mortality rates, and self-assessment of health status. In the family status domain, differences in (first) marriage age between men and women are described, as is the enormous discrepancy in the rate of single family households headed by women versus those headed by men, and the rate of teen pregnancies (ages 15–19).

As noted previously each of the ten domains consists of several indicators, and the overall trends are examined for the years 2004–2012. Figures for each indicator are presented in all domains, both in numeric terms and in terms of the relation between women and men. Explanatory notes accompany the figures. The conclusion to each domain features a chart that presents the development of inequality in that domain over the period of measurement.

Following presentation of the domains and their individual results, the composite 2012 results are presented in the section titled Results of the 2012 Gender Index by Domain. This section provides a more detailed elaboration of the measurement results in each domain for the last year of measurement and examines changes that occurred at this time in comparison with preceding years.

The Gender Index report has four appendixes: Appendix I describes gender indexes used elsewhere in the world, after which it lists the gender indexes developed in Israel. Appendix II provides a detailed description of the methodology employed in the development of the Gender Index. Appendix III presents the results of the Index with each of the domains removed in order to examine the Index's dependence on each of its domains. This section demonstrates that the removal of one domain at a time does not affect the Index's general pattern, which remains stable. Appendix IV presents the results of the Index without squaring of the domains' values. It shows that without such squaring, the inequality situation remains even more stable, with less prominent peaks and troughs, though the trend is maintained.

## Methodology

The data comprising the domains of the Gender Index come from different content areas in a variety of disciplines. For this reason they cannot be used collectively for the presentation

of an overall situation at any given time. However, the logic that guides the Index gives it the ability to indicate a general trend that is more comprehensive than the data displayed in each area separately. The grouping of data and their expression as a single numeric value make it possible to simultaneously examine the changes that have taken place in the gender inequality situation over the years in many areas.

Development of the Gender Index involved creating the simplest possible platform for estimation, into which more indicators and domains could be added to reflect more and more quantitative manifestations of gender inequality—separately and comprehensively. To select indicators with the capacity to express gender inequality, we held extensive talks with members of the steering committee and with feminist organizations. We compiled a list of the dozens of social manifestations of gender inequality, and sought indicators that had internal validity and lent themselves to the quantitative expression of said manifestations. The indicators are variables that are monitored consistently each year, in the same manner and by the same executors.

The next step was matching the indicators that define gender inequality with the existing indicators. We found dozens of indicators, grouped them, and then used factor analysis to determine their relevance to gender inequality. At the end of this screening process, we were left with fifty indicators that are not overly correlated with one another but that correlate to the first predictive factor established by the factor analysis. The first year for which we have data for all indicators that met the criteria is 2004, and therefore this is the first year of measurement.

The selected indicators were converted into the ratio between the rate of men and the rate of women in a manner that reflects increasing gender inequality. Indicators that were not ratios were standardized, and some are presented as a proportion of the population. All the indicators in each of the Index's ten domains were measured and their averages calculated independently. In each domain we squared the score, totaled, and divided by ten to obtain the overall Gender Index value for the given year. This formula—that is, the squaring of the average value of each domain—is based on the OECD's Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI).<sup>7</sup>

**The Gender Index is computed according to the following formula:**

$$\text{Index} = 1/10 * (\text{labor market})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{violence})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{periphery})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{Arab society})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{poverty})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{education})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{power})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{health})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{segregation of professions})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{family status})^2$$

This formula minimizes the degree to which one domain compensates for inequality in another domain. It assumes that disadvantage as a result of inequality does not increase in a linear fashion, and it augments the mobility of the Index in comparison with the mobility of its constituent domains. The comprehensive Gender Index score for each year is obtained in this manner. The significance of this number does not lie in its numeric value but in its relative value in comparison with other years.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See Appendix I for more on the SIGI Index.

<sup>8</sup> See Appendix II for a detailed description of the methodology.

## The Database

The Gender Index is based on data obtained from several official sources, chief among them the Central Bureau of Statistics. Because the Index monitors changes in gender inequality, it is imperative that it use stable data sets gathered in the same manner each year. Therefore, we also used data from the National Insurance Institute—the report on poverty and social gaps, the report on average wage and income, by locale and other economic variables—and the Knesset Research and Information Center, which obtains its data from the police, the Health Ministry, the Welfare Ministry, and the Association of Rape Crisis Centers in Israel. Another source of data pertaining to segregation in the labor market is the Civil Service Commission’s Department for the Advancement and Integration of Women.

The Central Bureau of Statistics obtains its data by issuing and processing surveys of the labor force, income, and society. In 2012 the labor force and income surveys underwent a comprehensive change that is reflected in the measurements for that year. Among other things, the sample size was different, the population definition changed so as to include the military (both conscripted and permanent forces), the measurements were conducted with higher frequency (on a monthly rather than quarterly basis), interviews were in person rather than by telephone, and the number of locales surveyed increased. These changes were a function of Israel joining the OECD. Experts from that organization recommended these changes in order to improve the comparability of data pertaining to Israel with data from other member countries. The changes affect the comparison of 2012 with the preceding years in the labor market, gendered segregation of professions, Arab society, and poverty domains.<sup>9</sup>

The Gender Index is a numerical-quantitative expression of gender gaps in Israel. It simplifies the phenomenon of inequality between women and men in Israeli society and offers clear categories of focus and comparison with a view to redefining problems in this area and formulating policy that is directed at the reduction of gender gaps. Likewise, the Index facilitates comparison of policies employed in the areas examined. It is our hope that this index will provide momentum for furthering discussion about gender inequality in Israel, effecting changes in existing policy, and formulating recommendations for improving gender equality—along with marking of instances of inequality that remain unaddressed despite the importance of taking them into account in the course of efforts to achieve gender equality.

## ■ Monitoring Gender Inequality in Israel

The chart below depicts the structure of the 2014 Gender Index. The Index is based on calculation of gender inequality in Israel in ten domains: labor market, gendered segregation of professions, violence against women, the periphery, Arab society, poverty, education, power, health, and family status. Each domain reflects an aggregation of several indicators from a group of fifty in total.

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9 See the following footnote.

# The Gender Index 2014: Domains and Indicators

## 1. Labor Market

1. Workforce participation rate
2. Part-time employment
3. Gross monthly salary
4. Gross hourly wage
5. Median wage
6. Contract workers
- 7+8. Women employed part-time and Unemployed (Homemakers)

## 2. Gendered Segregation of Professions

1. Engineers and architects
2. Doctors, pharmacists, and veterinarians
3. Judges and lawyers
4. Women in teaching professions
5. Nannies and caregivers
6. Women in hi-tech
7. Segregation by occupation
8. Segregation by industry

## 3. Violence against Women

1. Calls to rape crisis centers
2. Status of new sex offense files opened
3. Women in treatment at Welfare Ministry centers
4. Domestic violence files opened
5. Domestic violence files closed for lack of evidence

## 4. Periphery

1. Workforce participation rate
2. Gross monthly salary

## 5. Arab Society

1. Workforce participation rate
2. Part-time employment
3. Gross monthly salary
4. Gross hourly wage
5. 13–15 years of education
6. 16 or more years of education
7. Domestic violence complaints
8. Teen pregnancies (ages 15–19)
9. Average age at marriage

## 6. Poverty

1. Incidence of poverty after transfer payments and taxes
2. Income support recipients

## 7. Education

1. 13–15 years of education
2. 16 or more years of education

## 8. Power

- Political**
1. Members of parliament
  2. Government ministers
  3. Heads of local municipalities
- Economic**
4. CEOs
  5. Senior managers
  6. Other managerial positions
  7. Top three ranks of the civil service
  8. Senior contracts in the civil service

## 9. Health

1. Life expectancy
2. Mortality rate
3. Subjective Evaluation of Health

## 10. Family Status

1. Teen pregnancies (ages 15–19)
2. Women heading single-parent families
3. Average age at marriage

## Summary of the Gender Index Results

Figure 1 (below) depicts the rate of change of the level of gender inequality in Israel from 2004 to 2012. Ascending indicators are indicative of increased gender inequality. Therefore, a composite ascending curve also indicates increased gender inequality in comparison with the previous year, and a descending curve indicates decreased inequality and hence a positive trend.

The chart depicts the development of the Gender Index in Israel over the measurement period. Each point on the graph represents a weighted average of all the indicators and domains used to examine gender inequality in each year in relation to the base year—2004. Two main periods of changing trends stand out: the first is between 2004 and 2007—a rise in gender inequality (with the exception of 2006) is evident; the second is 2008–2012, in which we see a decreasing trend in gender inequality (with the exception of 2010). It is hence impossible to assert the existence of an unequivocal trend over the measurement period, either in terms of increased or decreased gender inequality.

**Figure 1**

Results of the Gender Index 2004–2012





Figure 2 (below) describes the rates of change in the Index in each year compared with the preceding year. It depicts an increase of 5% in gender inequality in the years 2004–2007, which can be attributed to increasing inequality in the labor market, poverty, violence against women, the periphery, and gendered segregation of professions domains. Two domains remained static: health and education. The years 2008–2009 showed an improvement: inequality retreated from its peak in 2007 by 3.7%. In 2010 inequality rose once again, by 4.2%, owing to deterioration in six domains, especially violence against women and the labor market. In 2011 inequality decreased by 7.2% as a result of improvements in the labor market, violence against women,

Arab society, and gendered segregation of professions domains. In 2012 gender inequality decreased by another 2% and approached the values recorded in 2004, the beginning of the measurement period.

**Figure 2**

Results of the Gender Index 2004–2012: Rates of Change for Each Year in Comparison with the Preceding Year



Results of the Gender Index 2004–2012: Fluctuations in Gender Inequality in Each Domain from One Year to the Next (+ indicates deterioration; - indicates improvement)

Year	Labor Market	Gendered Segregation of Professions	Violence against Women	Periphery	Arab Society	Poverty	Education	Power	Health	Family Status
2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2005	0	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	-
2006	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
2007	+	+	+	+	-	+	0	+	+	+
2008	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-
2009	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-
2010	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	-
2011	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	+
2012	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	0	-



As is evident from the above table, the Gender Index shows that in 2005 the status of women deteriorated in most domains: gendered segregation of professions, violence, the periphery, poverty, power, and health. There was no change in the labor market domain in comparison with the preceding year. The overall result was an increase of 3.7% in inequality between women and men in comparison with 2004.

In 2006 there was an increase in inequality in the domains of the labor market and poverty and a significant 6.2% rise in the domain of violence against women. In contrast to the increase in these domains, there was improvement in education, Arab society, the periphery, gendered segregation of the professions, and family status in comparison with the preceding year. After adjustment, the overall Gender Index dropped by 1.1%.

In 2007 there was a jump of 2.4% in gender inequality because there was an increase in most of the domains. In comparison with the preceding year, inequality in the labor market increased by 4.2%, alongside deterioration in the domain of violence against women. Other domains that also saw deterioration in 2007 were the periphery, health, gendered segregation of the professions, and family status. Improvement in the domains of Arab society and education were too negligible to reverse the overall trend.

In 2008 there were improvements: inequality in the labor market domain decreased by 2.7%; in the violence domain by 3.7%, in the gendered segregation of the professions domain by 2.2%, in the family status domain by 3.3%, and in the periphery domain by 1.4%. As a result there was an improvement of 2.1% in the overall index.

In 2009, there was further improvement and most domains demonstrated a decrease in inequality: the labor market by 1.9%, poverty by 4.4%, the periphery by 1.2%, and family status by 3.4%.

This trend was reversed in 2010 as a result of increased inequality in several domains: 2.7% in the labor market, 7.2% in violence against women, 8.2% in power, 1.4% in poverty, and 1.7% in occupational segregation. This was a peak year for violence. Though improvements occurred in Arab society, education, and family status, they did not result in an improved overall result. A deterioration of 4.2% was recorded for 2010.

In 2011 the gender inequality situation improved: the overall index decreased by 7.2% in comparison with the preceding year, mainly because of a marked improvement in the power domain but also because of an improvement in the labor market, violence, and gendered segregation of the professions domains.

In 2012 there was yet another improvement in gender inequality. While there were increases in four of the domains that make up the Index—2.6% in the labor market, 1.5% in poverty, 3.1% in power, and 0.7% in the periphery—there was a decrease in inequality in other domains: 6.3% in Arab society, 1% in education, 3.8% in gendered segregation of the professions, 8.3% in family status, and 0.3% in violence. Health remained static. Overall, in 2012 there was a 2% decrease in gender inequality.<sup>10</sup>

10 As mentioned above, the changes in measurement methods used by the Central Bureau of Statistics in its labor force and income surveys have made it difficult to compare data between the 2011 Index and the 2012 Index. Therefore, we examined the results of the Index in indicators affected by the change by means of extrapolations based on previous trends. The results of this examination are as follows: there was a very slight reduction of 0.3% in inequality in the labor market (as opposed to an increase of 2.6% according to the official figures). The most influential indicators in this domain in 2012 were the rate of women who work part time because they are housewives and the rate of women unemployed because they are housewives. In the gendered segregation of professions domain, all the indicators

At this point in the analysis, it is evident that the indicators do not point to a uniform trend: the gender gap is decreased in some areas and exacerbated in others. It can be inferred from this that there has not been a multifaceted effort to reduce gender gaps in Israel. The overall result shows a rise in gender inequality, followed by a return to the lower levels of 2004. As such, the overall picture for the measurement period is one of stagnation and stasis.

## Discussion

The Gender Index is an attempt to render, in quantitative terms, the gaps between women and men in public activity, the labor market, areas of vulnerability (violence against women), and in disadvantaged positions (for example, Arab society and the periphery). Aggregation of the multiple results that constitute gender inequality and its ramifications into a single value that can be tracked is a significant challenge of unparalleled importance, and the results of the Index affirm this. In many senses public sentiment holds that feminism has already achieved most of its goals, but the comprehensive data indicate that this is not the case. The gaps are deeply embedded in the structure of the labor market, in the various domains of power, and among disadvantaged population groups—the periphery and Arab society. Moreover, violence against women has not decreased, and women are still more prone to poverty than men. The only area in which a steady improvement is evident is higher education. Comparison of the rate of educated women with that of men (in 2012, 48.1% of women had 13 or more years of education, while 45.2% of men had 13 or more years of education) attests to women's aspiration toward full participation in the public sphere, since education is mainly “human capital” and an entrance ticket to relatively sought-after leadership positions in the labor market. Nevertheless, the data indicate that the gaps in the labor market and politics remain, and there is no clear evidence of a convergent trajectory. The conclusion that must be drawn is that women are not managing to translate their education into achievements that reduce gaps between women and men in the labor market and the power domain. The explanation for this difficulty lies in the deeply gendered structure of society: one foundation of gender inequality is the gendered distribution of responsibility for care of home and family, the tension between work and career pursuits, and caring for home and family.

The feminist revolution liberated women from the domestic sphere to some extent, enabling them to participate in certain areas considered to be within the masculine realm, such as the labor market and politics, but it failed to introduce men into the areas considered feminine (Hochschild 1997).

Ultimately, when women entered the workforce in large numbers, a deep transformation in employment expectations took place but without a parallel change in the private sphere that would facilitate more equitable cooperation between women and men in caring for home and

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are based on the Central Bureau of Statistics' labor force survey and are hence affected by the change in measurement strategy. There was an increase of 3.2% in gender inequality in the domain (not a decrease of 3.8% as indicated by the official figures). The same phenomenon is evident in the Arab society domain: the official figures indicate a decrease in inequality—mainly because of the decreased ratio of women to men in part-time employment—but the extrapolation of the domain shows an increase of inequality in 2012. In the final analysis it appears that the indicators from the Central Bureau of Statistics labor force survey influenced the entire Index: according to the Index, there was a decrease of 2% in overall gender inequality in 2012, but the utilization of extrapolations that traced previous trends in the data showed a slight increase of 0.3% in inequality.

children. In this respect a new demand on women transpired, one that had not previously been their lot and had never been the lot of men: the expectation that they would find a balance between work and family. Women were liberated so that they could join the workforce, but this was not accompanied by liberation from the work they do in the home, because their entry into the workforce was not accompanied by the entry of men into the home. This one-sided revolution made women increasingly involved in spheres regarded as masculine (not necessarily as equals to men) while remaining responsible for the domestic sphere (England 2010). Thus, women were saddled with their new out-of-the-home responsibilities in addition to their work at home, which Hochschild dubs the “second shift” (Hochschild and Machung 1989). Though this situation did involve a redefinition of femininity, it did not weaken the traditional gender divisions and categories. For this reason the “feminist revolution” amounted to a stagnated or stalled revolution.

The tension that arose as a result of this stalled revolution is also described in the research of Claudia Goldin (1997). Goldin traces the patterns of balancing work with family among women in the US in the course of the twentieth century. She identifies five patterns of handling this tension, each prominent during a specific period. The first pattern is “career or family”—that is, choosing between pursuing a career and having a family (this was common among women born in the late nineteenth century). The second pattern is “job then family.” Women who employed this pattern went to work after college and then left the labor market to raise a family, a step that was detrimental to their potential for career development (this was common among women born in the first two decades of the twentieth century). The third pattern is “family then job.” Women who subscribed to this approach first established their families and then went to work in noncareer positions because their late arrival in the workforce reduced their range of possibilities for career development (this pattern was common among women born in the 1930s and 1940s). The fourth pattern is “career then family”—a genuine attempt to choose a career path, which caused women to delay having a family until their late forties or early fifties (this was common among women born in the 1940s and 1950s in the US). The fifth pattern is “career and family”—a frustrating attempt to combine working and establishing a family simultaneously (common among women born in the 1960s and 1970s). Goldin notes that American women were successful in implementing the first three patterns (career or family, job then family, family then job) but that the latter two—most recent—patterns (career then family, career and family) were a virtually unattainable aspiration that caused women much frustration.

These trends were described following statistical monitoring of a large number of women in the US, and they constitute a sort of large-scale social experiment in which different women in different periods tried all possible constellations of combining career and family. Goldin completed her study in the late 1990s. She maintains that women at the end of the second millennium were troubled and frustrated even though many doors that had previously been closed to them had been opened. Hochschild and Goldin, using their respective research methods, present a similar portrait of the difficulties faced by women trying to negotiate career and family. Among other things, these difficulties delay the closing of the gender gap.

The results of this Gender Index support the finding that gender gaps have stagnated or remained static, largely owing to gender inequality in the labor market. Despite the slight, insignificant trend toward improvement, inequality between men and women is still apparent. All indicators in the labor market domain point to a widening of the gap: gaps in pay, labor

market participation, rates of contract and part-time workers, and gendered segregation of professions. Today, when 80% of jobs are in the service sector and do not involve physical strength, the question of why the gap remains so stable begs to be asked.

The lack of change is rooted to a large extent in the gendered structure of the labor market and in the “second shift” that women undertake with home and family—for which we have no consistent annual data. On the home front women’s work is uncompensated, while their participation in the labor market is perceived as secondary to that of men, and therefore their wages are lower. The Index shows this to be true for all years of the measurement period. More women than men work part time (twice as many, on average),<sup>11</sup> more women than men are contract workers, and women are not equally compensated for their work (women’s average monthly pay is 34% lower than that of men)—not even in terms of gross wage per hour (women earn 15% less than men per hour). The rate of women who do not work outside the home at all goes up with each year of measurement (from 24% in 2004 to 34% in 2012). This points to the gendered perceptions so deeply entrenched in society, according to which men are free to go out to work, and women are obliged to care for home and children. Women’s partial participation in the labor market perpetuates both their inferiority therein and the gaps in earnings between men and women. Moreover, as a result of women’s looser connection to the labor market, their pensions suffer (it should be recalled that women live an average of 3.6 years longer than men), and they are not eligible for the same benefits as men. The prevalence of poverty is also higher among women than among men (the rate of poor women is 14% higher than the rate of poor men, after benefits and taxes), and women are therefore more reliant on income support stipends (the rate of women who receive such stipends is 18% higher than that of men).

Fertility trends and Israel’s rising average birth rate reinforce the conflict between career and family in which women in Israel are enmeshed. The overall fertility rate in Israel has been on the increase since 2005, when it was 2.88, having reached 3.05 in 2012. Israel has the highest reproduction rate of any Western country. According to OECD data, Israel is the only developed country that has surpassed the three-child mark.<sup>12</sup> By way of comparison, the reproduction rate in the US is 1.93, in Britain 1.98, in Sweden 1.98, and in Iceland—the country that is second to Israel in this regard—2.2. It should be stressed that the rise in the number of children is a feature of the Jewish mainstream and middle class.<sup>13</sup> This increase is indicative of a shift in trend: the sixty years preceding 2005 showed a decrease in birthrate per woman. Moreover, as is evident from Figure 3 below, there are differences in birthrate trends among Jewish women and non-Jewish women: while Jewish women have had a rising birthrate in the past ten years, Muslim, Christian, and Druze women have had the opposite.

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
11 On the negative impact of part-time employment on the status of women, see Stier and Lewin-Epstein (2000).

12 See [www.oecd.org/els/family/SF2\\_1\\_Fertility\\_trends.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/els/family/SF2_1_Fertility_trends.pdf)

13 To ascertain that the trend does not derive solely from a rise in the number of children in ultra-Orthodox families, we analyzed the average number of children per family on the basis of the Central Bureau of Statistics’ surveys of expenses and income. This calculation gives us grounds for believing that the rise in the number of children is characteristic of all Jewish women.

Figure 3

Average Number of Children per Woman, by Population Group



This change in trend must be seen in the context of housework and parenting still being largely the responsibility of women. The percentage of women who work part time, or do not work outside the home, is increasing steadily. The number of women part-time or contract workers is also rising (more than half a million women work part time, and 30,000 are contract workers).

It can be inferred from these data and the increasing family size that Jewish women in Israel are forgoing career and success in the public sphere for the good of the family unit. In terms of Goldin's patterns of balancing family and work (career or family, job then family, family then job, career then family, career and family), it may be inferred that women in Israel are retreating from the attempt to combine career and family, in effect choosing family and forgoing achievement in the labor market. Of course, Israeli women are not a homogeneous group, there is inequality within the category of Jewish women itself (between women of different socioeconomic classes, social groups, and so on), and there may hence be diversity among them with regard to the models of integrating family and paid work. This factor itself may contribute to inequality between women in Israel.

# ■ The Gender Index Results in Each of the Ten Domains

## ■ DOMAIN 1: The Labor Market

The labor market has a direct, tangible, and decisive influence on gender inequality, determining the gendered division of labor between the public and private spheres. There are 1.5 million working women in Israel, amounting to 47% of the labor market, while men make up 53%. Approximately one third of working women (some 525,200) hold part-time jobs; the number of men with part-time jobs is less than half that (approximately 244,200). Women's participation level in the labor market has risen over the years and reached 58.1% (of working age women), in comparison with 69.3% for men. However, part of this increase can be attributed to growing numbers of women in part-time employment. The discrepancy between women's and men's monthly salaries is hence greater than the discrepancy between their hourly wages. Nevertheless, the gap between the hourly wages of women and men has endured and even increased slightly. Inequality in the labor market domain is measured and presented according to several indicators:

1. The ratio of women to men in labor market participation rate
2. The ratio of women to men in part-time employment
3. The ratio of women to men in gross monthly salary
4. The ratio of women to men in gross hourly wage
5. The ratio of women to men in median wage
6. The ratio of women to men among contract workers
7. Rate of women employed part time owing to self-definition as housewives, among all part-time working women
8. Rate of women who are unemployed owing to self-definition as housewives, among all unemployed women

### 1. The ratio of women to men in labor market participation rates


Women's level of participation in the labor market in Israel has been lower than that of men since it was first measured. Over the years, however, there has been some convergence, and the gaps in participation levels have narrowed. Figure 4a shows that between the years 2004 and 2011, men's participation rate fluctuated between 60.6% and 62.3%, while women's participation rate fluctuated between 49.6% and 52.6%.<sup>14</sup> In 2012 participation levels in the workforce were measured for the entire population, including military personnel, and thus men's rate of participation went up to 69.3% and women's went up to 58.1%.<sup>15</sup>

14 Some of the indicators include data from years prior to 2004, and these are presented here in the name of comprehensiveness. However, the base year for calculation of the Index is 2004 because this is the first year for which we have complete data for all indicators.

15 The increase in labor market participation can be attributed to the change in the Central Bureau of Statistics' surveys. As noted previously, from 2012 the data pertain to the entire workforce (including conscripted and permanent military personnel). Likewise, from 2012

Figure 4a

## Labor Market Participation Rates, by Gender (Age 15 and Up)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Rising participation levels of both women and men are evident in almost every year of measurement.<sup>16</sup> One of the things this can be ascribed to is a change in welfare policy made in 2003, when National Insurance stipends were cut, among them income support stipends. This unexpected reduction in the income of disadvantaged households resulted in all those who were able, men and women, going out to work. This supposition is supported by the fact that men's participation level had been on the decline until the early 2000s. Another reason for the change is that in recent decades the average cost of living went up, but the average wage did not. Buying power was hence weakened, and this compelled many more Israelis to go out to work (Trajtenberg Report 2011).

Figure 4b depicts the ratio between women's and men's participation rates in the civilian labor force (with the exception of 2012, when the entire workforce is referred to). It is apparent that in recent years the gap between the participation rates of men and women in the labor force has narrowed somewhat—that is, the participation rate of women increased faster than that of men. Nevertheless, this narrowing did not close the gap between men and women in labor market participation rates. This is because of the manner in which women were integrated into the labor force, as demonstrated by other indicators (part-time, contract workers, and so on). In other words, the ratio between the genders in labor market participation rates in Israel


the data are based on monthly rather than quarterly surveys, as had been the prior case. Since the Index expresses the ratio between women and men, it should be assumed that the value of the Index itself is not affected by the change in measurement methods.

16 As noted, the sharpest increase was in 2012, following changes made in the Central Bureau of Statistics' labor force survey, one of them being inclusion of both conscripted and permanent members of the military service in the total workforce. Until 2012 this was not the case, and therefore the labor force participation rate in the Israeli labor market appeared low.

has been perpetuated, remaining constantly in favor of men. In the years 2011–2012 there was even deterioration in comparison with 2009–2010 because women’s participation rate dropped while men’s rose, thus increasing the inequality between them slightly.

**Figure 4b**

Ratio between the Labor Market Participation Rates of Women and Men



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

As per the chart, in 2004–2010 this indicator contributed to reducing gender inequality in labor market participation rates. This trend was reversed in 2011 and 2012, with an increase in the gap between the participation rates of women and men leading this indicator to increase inequality in the labor market domain.

**International Comparison of Labor Market Participation Rates:** In 2012 women’s labor market participation rate in the US was 68% and men’s 80% (a ratio of 0.85); in Britain women’s participation rate was 69% and men’s 82% (a ratio of 0.84); in Sweden women’s participation rate was 77% and men’s 82% (a ratio of 0.94); in Spain women’s participation rate was 63% and men’s 82% (a ratio of 0.77). (Source: Global Gender Gap Index)


## 2. The ratio of women to men in part-time employment

Part-time employment brings to the fore the gaps in the employment patterns of women and men. It reflects women’s partial interaction with the labor market, one that is usually not career oriented. Figure 5a shows the number of part-time employees in Israel. It shows that the number of women among part-time workers is higher than that of men in all years. This reflects the gendered division of roles, which still places most of the responsibility for childcare and housework on women.



Figure 5a

## Part-Time Workers, by Gender




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

This figure presents the absolute number of part-time workers and demonstrates that there has been an increase in the number of both women and men employed part time. Figure 5b presents the rate of part-time workers in the population. The figures show that in 2004 and 2006 the rate of men working part time in the civilian labor force decreased while that of women increased. In other words, these years saw an increase in inequality in the labor market. In 2007 the number of men working part time rose, while the number of women remained at the level of the preceding year—that is, this year saw a slight improvement, and inequality decreased. From 2008 to 2010 the rate of men working part time continued to rise, while the number of women working part time actually decreased slightly before rising again. In these years also this indicator contributed to a slight decrease in labor market inequality. In 2011 there was a change: the number of men working part time and their ratio in the civil work force rose sharply in comparison with the preceding years, while the rate of women working part time dropped.

Figure 5c presents the ratio between men and women among part-time workers. The graph shows that in 2011–2012 there was a change of trend and the gap narrowed, though it remained significant. The result was that despite the sharp increase in the number of men employed part time, women still outnumbered them 2:1 (525,000 women versus 244,200 men—as shown in figure 5a). This indicator had a significant influence on the reduction of inequality between women and men in the labor market domain. The narrowing gap between the rates of women and men employed part time indicates deterioration in both the availability of jobs and in working conditions.

Figure 5b


Rate of Part-Time Workers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 5c

Ratio between Women and Men among Part-Time Workers




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

### 3. The ratio of women to men in gross monthly salary

Between 2004 and 2012 the gap between women and men in average monthly salary remained almost static—women earned 63% to 66% of men’s monthly salary. Figure 6a below presents average monthly income by gender. It shows that in 2012 women earned an average gross monthly salary of NIS 7,244, while men earned NIS 10,953. The gap between the monthly income of women and men is larger than the gap between the hourly income of women and men because it factors in the extent of the position (as noted, more women than men work part time because of women’s responsibility for home and childcare).

Figure 6a

Average Monthly Salary, by Gender (in New Israeli Shekels—NIS)




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 6b presents the ratio between the average monthly salaries earned by women and men. The chart shows that overall the average monthly salary has increased from year to year, but the gap between women and men has remained intact, and women consistently earn less than men. Interestingly, during the 2009 economic crisis, there was a decrease in inequality in this indicator: the average monthly salary of women went up while that of men went down, reducing inequality. This appears, however, to have been an isolated incident. In 2010–2012 the discrepancy between women’s and men’s wages remained steady at 0.66.

Figure 6b

Ratio between Women and Men in Average Monthly Salary



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

**International Comparison of Average Monthly Salary:** In 2012 women in the US earned 0.92 times the average monthly wage of men; in Britain, 0.74; in Sweden, 0.91; in Spain, 0.60 (Source: Global Gender Gap Index).


#### 4. The ratio of women to men in gross hourly wage

Figure 7a shows the average hourly wages of women and men, both of which have gone up over the years. However, as is evident from Figure 7b, the discrepancy between them persists. In 2005–2007 the gap was relatively stable, but in 2008 deterioration in the hourly wage of women caused it to grow wider: women earned only 82% of men's hourly wage. In 2009 there was a slight improvement, and women's hourly wage went up to 84.5% that of men. However, in 2010 it once again deteriorated, dropping to 83% of the hourly wage of men. In 2011 the gap remained steady, with men earning an average hourly wage of NIS 53, while women earned NIS 44—namely, 83% of men's wage. In 2012 there was an improvement: men earned an average hourly wage of NIS 55.1, and women earned NIS 46.8—that is, 85% of men's wage.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> The wage figures for 2012 cannot be compared with those for previous years, because of changes in the measurement methods used in the Central Bureau of Statistics' income and expenses surveys. These changes were made in order to comply with OECD standards, and they included monthly, rather than quarterly, measurement and different sampling. Some of the changes evident in the 2012 results can be attributed to these changes in measurement methods.

Figure 7a


Average Gross Hourly Wage, by Gender (in NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 7b

Ratio between Men and Women in Gross Hourly Wage



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors


Comparative measurement of hourly wages by gender neutralizes the effects of the scope of the position and hence the monthly earning discrepancy. The gap in gross monthly income can be partially attributed to the fact that more women than men are employed in part-time positions, but the difference in hourly wages is not necessarily affected by the scope of those part-time positions. Figure 7b, depicting the discrepancy between the hourly wages of women and men, shows that this gap is 15% to 17% for all the years in which hourly wage was measured, reflecting the difference in wages between the positions held by women in comparison with positions held by men. One reason is that women work less, on average, and therefore have less experience; another reason is that women work in fields that pay less. Still, some of the gap derives from discrimination in the labor market. In the years 2010–2011, this indicator increased inequality in the labor market, but in 2012—as a result of decreased discrepancy in hourly wage between the genders—this indicator led to a decrease in inequality in the labor market.

## 5. The ratio of women to men in median wage

The median wage is the wage that half the workers in the economy earn equivalent to or less than. Because there is no maximum ceiling for monthly salary, though there is a minimum threshold of 0, most wage distributions in the world are characterized by a median wage that is lower than the average. In other words, very high salaries pull the average upward, but they have no impact on the median wage. Figure 8a presents the median wages of women and men.

Figure 8a

Median Wage, by Gender (in NIS)




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

The figure shows that, over the years, the discrepancy between the median wage of men and women persists: whereas the median wage of women is in the fourth percentile, the median wage of men is in the sixth percentile. In 2012 men's median wage was NIS 7,774, while women's median wage was just NIS 5,489.<sup>18</sup> Figure 8b shows the ratio between the median wages of women and men.

**Figure 8b**

Ratio between the Median Wages of Women and Men



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

The figure shows that the ratio between the median wages of women and men rose from 0.67 in 2004 to a peak of 0.72 in 2011. In 2012 it dropped, bringing women's median wage to 71% of men's median wage. The gap between the median wages of women and men is lower than the gap between the average monthly salary (women's average monthly salary being 66% that of men). This is because the average is influenced by the upper extreme of the salary distribution curve, which is very high and moving further away from the median as the gaps in income continue to widen. Thus, a small group of employees that earns very high wages pulls the average upward.


<sup>18</sup> The median wage data also comes from the Central Bureau of Statistics' survey of income and expenses, which underwent changes in 2012. As a result of these changes, there is a fairly sharp hike in the median wage for both women and men in this year.

## 6. The ratio of women to men among contract workers, of all employed persons

Figure 9a reflects the rate of women working for employment agencies, among the overall population of contract workers (which in 2012 was 59,000). The figure shows that the rate of women among all contract workers in Israel is over 50%—that is, more women than men are employed under the problematic conditions and detrimental agreements that characterize jobs offered by human resource companies.

Figure 9a

Rate of Women among All Contract Workers




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

The figure shows that from 2005 to 2007 the rate of women among contract workers climbed gradually, increasing inequality and gaps in the labor market. In 2008 there was an improvement, and the rate of women among all contract workers decreased in comparison with previous years, though it remained higher than the rate of men among contract workers. In 2009–2010 the rate of women among contract workers jumped again, and in 2011 it dropped sharply to the level it had been in 2008—the year of improvement. In 2011, 50.3% of contract workers were women, and 49.7% were men. In 2012 this situation remained stable, unchanged from 2011. Figure 9b reflects the ratio between women and men contract workers. The figure shows that in 2004 there were 1.4 times more women than men among contract workers, while in 2012 this number had dropped to 1.13.



Figure 9b

Ratio between Women and Men among Contract Workers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors


This indicator contributed to a decrease of inequality in the labor market domain in 2011 and to an overall decrease of inequality in the Index. In 2012 this situation remained constant: 51% of contract workers were women, and 49% were men. A total of 1.7% of women in the workforce were employed as contract workers, versus 1.5% of men in the workforce.

## 7. Rate of women employed part time owing to self-definition as housewives, among all part-time working women

This indicator reflects the gendered division of labor between the public and private spheres and the relationship between the labor market and home and family. Figure 10 depicts the rate of women employed part time owing to their being housewives, out of the overall population of women employed part time. The figure shows that from 2003 to 2007 there was an increase in the percentage of women who reported that the reason for their part-time employment was their status as housewives. In 2008 there was a slight reduction in their numbers, but thereafter a rising trend saw 19% of the 80,000 women working part time in 2011 declaring that they did so because of their home responsibilities. By contrast, only 0.9% of men employed part time (1,400) reported home responsibilities as the reason. Nevertheless, according to this indicator about a fifth of women who work part time do so because they also care for home and family. In 2011 the rate of women working part time for this reason rose, increasing inequality, but in 2012 it dropped and thus reduced inequality in the labor market.

**Figure 10**

Rate of Women Employed Part Time owing to Self-Definition as Housewives, among All Part-Time Working Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors


This phenomenon reflects the gendered perceptions of division of labor within the family—namely, that women are responsible for caring for home and family, while men are responsible for breadwinning (Stier 2005). As such, women are forced to associate less with the working world. The rate of women working part time is higher than the rate of men working part time, and this perpetuates their inferiority in the labor market and the wage discrepancies between the genders.

## 8. Rate of women who are unemployed owing to self-definition as housewives, among all unemployed women

This indicator reflects the absolute disconnection of women from the labor market, referring to women who are unemployed because they devote themselves, by their own account, to home and family. It is important to note that this indicator only reflects women who were not employed in the twelve-month period preceding measurement, and not the total number of housewives in the population. Figure 11 below reflects the rate of women who are unemployed owing to their self-definition as housewives, among all unemployed women, per year.

**Figure 11**

Rate of Women Unemployed Because They Are Housewives, among All Unemployed Women




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

The figure shows that from 2004 to 2007 the rate of women who were unemployed because they were housewives rose from 24% to 33% of all unemployed women. This increase exacerbated inequality and the gaps in the labor market domain for these years. In 2008 the rate began to drop, reaching 25% in 2011, and a certain improvement in this domain is evident. However, in comparison with the rate of men unemployed because they are responsible for the home (2.7%), the rate of women is very high indeed. As noted, this discrepancy is indicative of the inequitable division of labor that places most of the burden of housework and childcare on women. In 2012 the rate of women unemployed owing to their being housewives rose to 34.1%, the highest rate since the beginning of the measurement period. This increased inequality in the labor market domain for 2012.<sup>19</sup>

### Rate of Women with Drivers' Licenses

Over the years, there have been more men than women licensed to drive in Israel, though this gap is slowly closing. In 2012, 57% of drivers were men, and 43% were women. For methodological reasons this indicator cannot be included in this index (lack of internal validity). Nevertheless, it offers a different perspective on the degree of independence possessed by women, their access to the labor market, and their ability to utilize opportunities to realize their potential.

<sup>19</sup> This information is based on labor force surveys that underwent changes in 2012, and hence comparison with previous years needs to be undertaken with caution.



## Summary: Gender Inequality in the Labor Market Domain

Figure 12a shows that gender inequality in the labor market domain remained static from 2004 to 2005, rose by 7% in 2006–2007, and then dropped by 4.4% in 2008–2009. In 2010 it rose again, by 2.7%.

The increase in inequality between men and women in the labor market in 2010 derived mainly from a widening of the gap between the number of women and men among contract workers (in this year women accounted for 56% of contract workers). This increase was also the result of widening discrepancies in hourly wages between women and men in 2010: women earned an average of 83.7% of men's average hourly wage. In 2011 we see a decrease in gender inequality and a slight improvement in the labor market domain owing to slight improvements in the number of women employed part time, a decrease in the rate of women among contract workers, and a decrease in the number of women unemployed because they are housewives. In 2012 gender inequality increased again, owing to rising discrepancies in labor market participation levels of men and women, the median wages of women and men, and a sharp increase in the rate of women unemployed because they are housewives. As is evident from Figure 12b, gender inequality in the labor market domain was higher in 2012 than it was in 2004, the base year of measurement. In other words, time has not healed this problem and has not brought about a decrease in inequality between women and men in the labor market.

Figure 12a

Gender Inequality in the Labor Market Domain, 2004–2012





Figure 12b

Labor Market Domain Values



## DOMAIN 2: Gendered Segregation of Professions

Gendered segregation of professions in the labor market is a reflection of inequality between men and women, and it also creates differences in income and opportunities for advancement. There are very few professions with equal numbers of women and men. In fact the labor market is largely characterized by occupational segregation: there are professions mostly populated by men, in which the average working conditions are better, and professions populated by women, with inferior working conditions and, accordingly, lower prestige.

The European Gender Equality Index measures occupational segregation by examining the rate of women in fields in which they are overrepresented—such as education, health, and social work—and that are not well paid. Similarly, this Index uses selected professions as indicators because they are characterized by relatively high occupational segregation—that is, a relatively high concentration of men or women in relation to the population and in relation to other professions.<sup>20</sup> Likewise, professions that have high or low pay relative to other professions were selected because pay is an indication of high or low professional prestige. The Finance Ministry’s “Work Rating” website was utilized to examine the average salary in the selected professions and the demand for these professions.<sup>21</sup> The indicators that comprise the domain are as follows:

1. Engineers and architects
2. Doctors, pharmacists, and veterinarians
3. Judges and lawyers
4. Women in teaching professions
5. Nannies and caregivers
6. Women in hi-tech
7. Segregation by occupation
8. Segregation by industry

### 1. Engineers and architects


Architecture and engineering are respected, prestigious professions, and practitioners usually enjoy high socioeconomic status. This category includes architects (including town planners), civil engineers, cartographers, electrical and electronics engineers, mechanical engineers, chemical engineers, food engineers and biotechnologists, computer engineers, industrial and management engineers, and metallurgists and metallurgical engineers. Figure 13a presents the number of women versus the number of men who practice these professions, showing a tremendous discrepancy. In 2012 there were 76,000 men who were engineers and architects, versus just 23,000 women. As is evident from Figure 13b, the rate of women among engineers and architects was 23% as of 2012.

<sup>20</sup> The categorization of professions and occupation is determined according to the Central Bureau of Statistics’ definitions.

<sup>21</sup> See <http://ovdim.gov.il/Report.aspx>.

Figure 13a


Number of Architects and Engineers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 13b

Rate of Women among All Architects and Engineers




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## 2. Doctors, pharmacists, and veterinarians

Medical professions, like engineering professions, have high status and prestige. This indicator includes doctors, dentists, pharmacists, veterinarians, and academics in medical fields. Interestingly, in recent years women are the majority in these professions. Figure 14a presents the number of women versus the number of men working in these professions. The figures show that the number of women in medical professions has risen over the years, reaching a peak of 58% in 2011. This decreased inequality in the gendered segregation of professions domain. However, it should be stated that a full understanding of trends in this field would require examination of the internal gender division according to different professions within medicine, a perspective that the data currently available do not facilitate.

Figure 14a

Number of Doctors, Pharmacists, and Veterinarians, by Gender




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors



Figure 14b

Rate of Women among All Doctors, Pharmacists, and Veterinarians




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

### 3. Judges and lawyers

This is also a prestigious field with above-average working conditions. This indicator includes judges, lawyers, and other legal professionals. The average salary in these professions is above average (over NIS 10,000 per month). As Figure 15a shows, over the years, the gap between men and women in these professions has persisted (the ratio between women and men is 0.75 on average). In 2012 something of a convergence occurred: the rate of men in legal professions dropped while the rate of women rose. Figure 15b reflects the rate of women among all legal professionals, showing that it was 47% in 2012.

Figure 15a


Number of Judges and Lawyers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 15b

Rate of Women among All Legal Professionals




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## 4. Women in teaching professions

In Israel teaching professionals earn less and have lower status than other degree holders and teaching professionals in other countries. Many of them earn less than the average wage, and sometimes near the minimum wage. This indicator includes elementary, middle, and high school teachers; preschool teachers; and guidance counselors. Figure 16a shows that in 2012 there were 224,363 women in teaching professions, versus just 65,084 men—that is, 3.5 times more women. Figure 16b reflects the rate of women among all teaching professionals and shows that this profession has a clear majority of women: some 78% of teaching professionals are women. This situation has remained fairly constant over the years.

Figure 16a


Number of Teaching Professionals, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 16b

Rate of Women among All Teaching Professionals




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## 5. Nannies and caregivers

This profession is very poorly paid (approximately NIS 4,000 per month) and is not respected or accorded social prestige. This indicator includes nannies and caregivers in both institutional and domestic settings. The gap between women and men in this field is large. While there has been an increase in the number of women providing caregiving services, the number of men doing so has barely grown. Figure 17a describes the number of women versus the number of men who are caregivers, showing that in 2012 there were some 172,000 women in this profession, versus just 13,000 men—that is, an average of 13 times more women. Figure 17b reflects the rate of women among all caregivers. The figure shows that women, at 93%, overwhelmingly dominate this profession and that the number of men in it is negligible.

Figure 17a


Number of Nannies and Caregivers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 17b

Rate of Women among All Caregivers




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## 6. Women in hi-tech

The hi-tech industry is considered the spearhead of the Israeli economy. Hi-tech employment is prestigious, the average wage is high, and the working conditions are among the best in the country. This indicator is hence extremely important in the context of gender inequality. Figure 18a reflects the number of women versus the number of men employed in the hi-tech sector, which increases from year to year (with the exception of 2009, when it decreased slightly). However, Figure 18b reflects the rate of women among those employed in hi-tech, showing that it held steady at 34% to 35% from 2002 to 2011. In 2011 there was a slight decrease in the number of women in hi-tech in comparison with 2010—when the rate dropped to 34.1%—while in 2012 it went back up to 36%, indicating a slight improvement. Women thus make up only about a third of all hi-tech employees. It would be interesting to examine the status of women versus that of men in this industry more closely.

Figure 18a


Number of Hi-Tech Employees, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 18b

Rate of Women among All Hi-Tech Employees



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## 7. Gendered segregation of professions in Israel

Gendered segregation of professions in the labor market is reflected in disproportionately high concentrations of women in certain professions, usually those with inferior working conditions. Segregation is the mechanism that perpetuates and exacerbates gaps between men and women with regard to income and opportunities for advancement. There are very few professions with similar or identical rates of men and women, and the labor market as a whole exhibits segregation by professions. Ordinarily, professions dominated by men feature better working conditions, while those dominated by women feature inferior conditions and low status.

We sought to examine changes in gendered segregation of professions in the Israeli labor market, to which end we constructed an indicator that would track development over the years. The indicator was constructed using all the professions tagged by the Central Bureau of Statistics (overall, fewer than one hundred occupations, classified by two digits) and grouping them according to the number of women and men practicing them.<sup>22</sup>

$$I = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n |M_i - F_i|$$

$$M_i \equiv \frac{m_i}{m} \text{ and } F_i \equiv \frac{f_i}{f}$$

22 The Duncan Index is the preeminent index of segregation. Its advantages are that it is not dependent on the composition of the population, it is a commonly used measurement and hence facilitates comparison among various studies, and it is easy to comprehend (see Massey and Denton 1988).


In the above formulas  $m_i$  is the number of men in a certain profession ( $i$ ), and  $m$  is the number of men in the labor market. Therefore,  $M_i$  is the rate of men in profession  $i$ , of all men in the labor market. In the same vein  $f_i$  is the number of women in a certain profession ( $i$ ), and  $f$  is the number of women in the labor market. Therefore,  $F_i$  is the rate of women in profession  $i$ , among all women in the labor market.

We used the Duncan formula to calculate the level of segregation in the Israeli labor market over the years as follows: the number of women and the number of men in each profession, divided by the total number of women and the total number of men in the labor market. Next we subtracted the percentage of men and the percentage of women in the same profession from each profession, as an absolute value, and last we combined them all and divided by two.

In the Duncan Index the results fluctuate between 0 (no segregation) and 1 (complete segregation). The results therefore show the degree to which there is gendered segregation of occupations and professions in Israel and what percentage of employees would have to switch jobs in order to level the situation and achieve full equality. Figure 19 describes occupational segregation in Israel by occupation, according to the Duncan Index (for the sake of convenience, the findings are presented in percentages, from 0%-100%).

Figure 19

#### Gendered Segregation by Occupation



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

The figure shows that over the measurement period there was a very slight improvement in occupational segregation in Israel. In 2004 segregation measured 53.7%—that is, 53.7% of people, men and women alike, would have to change jobs in order for there to be equality in the labor market. In 2011 this figure decreased slightly to 51.5%. Still, the population in question would amount to over half of the workforce. In 2012 there was a relatively significant improvement as a result of a change in the Central Bureau of Statistics' survey methodology. In 2012 the Duncan Index of occupational segregation in Israel measured 47.62%.




## 8. Gendered segregation by employment sector

This indicator was also formulated in accordance with the Duncan Index. The grouping is per all the different employment sectors in Central Bureau of Statistics records. Among these are agriculture, industry, electricity, water, and so on. Figure 20 describes the Duncan Index calculation of occupational segregation according to employment sectors. The figure shows that segregation by occupation decreased by only 2% between 2004 and 2012.

Figure 20

Occupational Segregation by Employment Sector



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

### Summary: Gender Inequality in the Gendered Segregation of Professions Domain

Figures 21a and 21b indicate a consistent trend of improvement in the area of gendered segregation of professions in Israel between 2004 and 2012. In other words, the distribution of men and women across professions and occupations is becoming increasingly equitable but at a relatively slow pace. The findings did not indicate the presence of policy directed at reducing professional segregation in Israel, and many fields are still characterized by a significant majority of men or women. In professions in which most workers are women, the average wage is lower than the general wage. In professions in which most workers are men, however, the wages are higher than the average wage.

Figure 21a

Gender Inequality in the Gendered Segregation of Professions Domain, 2004–2012





Figure 21b

Gendered Segregation of Professions Domain Values



## DOMAIN 3: Violence against Women

The Central Bureau of Statistics does not monitor violence against women on a regular basis. Therefore, most of the data sets in this domain come from other sources: Knesset Research and Information Center reports and Association of Rape Crisis Centers reports. The rise in the number of complaints and victims is only significant when compared with the increase in the population; therefore, for each year in which we estimated the domain, we took the total number of women in the population into account. The indicators in this domain are as follows:

1. Number of calls to rape crisis centers
2. The status of new sex offense files opened: the number of files transferred to the police prosecutor or state attorney's office
3. Number of women in treatment at welfare ministry domestic violence centers
4. Number of domestic violence files opened
5. Rate of domestic violence files closed for lack of evidence

In order to examine the increase in this phenomenon, after correcting for natural population growth, all the data were examined in relation to population growth and not as absolute values.

### 1. Number of calls to rape crisis centers


An examination of the number of calls made to rape crisis centers in relation to the natural growth of the population shows that in the late 1990s these calls increased in volume, particularly from women,<sup>23</sup> as is reflected in Figure 22. One of the reasons for this increase was the growing number of crisis organizations and the increasing public awareness of their ability to help women who suffer physical violence or feel threatened. In the early 2000s there was a certain decrease in the volume of new calls made to crisis centers. In 2010, after a decreasing trend from 2005 to 2009, there was a reversal, and the number of women calling the crisis centers rose—as did the level of inequality in the violence against women domain. In 2011 as well the number of calls went up, but the number of women in the population also rose, and the ratio between the number of new calls and the number of women remained stable. In 2012 the number of new calls dropped slightly, while the population grew, which led to a decrease in inequality in this domain.

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23 The data come from the Association of Rape Crisis Centers' reports and Internet site ([www.1202.org.il](http://www.1202.org.il)). The data are not categorized by gender, but most calls received by the centers are made by women.

Figure 22

Number of New Calls to Rape Crisis Centers




Source: Association of Rape Crisis Centers data processed by the authors

## 2. The status of new sex offense files opened following complaints made by women: the number of files transferred to the police prosecutor or state attorney's office

Figure 23 traces the number of sex offense cases transferred to the police prosecutor or the state attorney. The figure shows that from 2005 to 2007 the number of such cases opened by women rose from 698 to 955, which increased gender inequality in the violence domain. In 2010 the number of cases rose again; in 2011 there was a slight decrease to 921 cases, bringing a slight reduction in inequality in the violence domain; and in 2012 the number of cases rose to 1,006, increasing inequality in this domain.

**Figure 23**

Number of Files Related to Sex Offense Complaints, Filed by Women, That Were Transferred to the Police Prosecutor or State Attorney



Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors


### 3. Number of women in treatment at welfare ministry domestic violence centers

Figure 24 shows that throughout the period of measurement there was a steady increase in the number of women treated at the welfare ministry's domestic violence centers. The only exception was 2012, when there was a slight decrease in the number. To some extent this phenomenon can be attributed to the increase in the number of centers, but even more so to the rising incidence of domestic violence, usually against women.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, it should be noted that part of the increase may be attributed to increased reporting and not to an increase in the incidence of violence. This interpretation reflects an improvement in the situation, with the rise in reporting of cases testifying to increasing awareness of domestic violence, which is an important component of controlling it.

<sup>24</sup> An increase in domestic violence is also evident from the results of the following indicator—the year-to-year increase in the number of complaints made to the police.

Figure 24

Number of Women in Treatment at Welfare Ministry Domestic Violence Centers




Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors

#### 4. Number of domestic violence files opened following complaints by women

Figure 25 shows that the number of domestic violence cases women filed with the police ranges from 14,500 to 16,500 per annum. In 2004–2006 there was a decrease in comparison with the preceding years. In 2006–2010 this number rose in absolute terms, as well as relative to the natural population growth. This increased inequality in the violence domain. In 2012 the number of cases went up relative to the natural population growth, and therefore this indicator increased inequality in this domain for this year.

Figure 25

Number of Domestic Violence Files Opened



Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors


## 5. Rate of domestic violence files closed owing to insufficient evidence

Closing of a domestic violence case means no further investigation and no criminal prosecution. Of course, this is not indicative of innocence but rather a lack of sufficient evidence to warrant an indictment. Lack of evidence is a particularly acute problem with regard to domestic violence—especially with regard to rape and sexual assault—because the violence is usually perpetrated in the private sphere with no witnesses. The figure shows that from 2008 to 2010 the rate of domestic violence cases closed because of lack of evidence rose, and this increased inequality in this domain. By contrast, in 2011 there was a significant decrease in the number of cases closed owing to insufficient evidence, and gender inequality in the domain decreased.<sup>25</sup>

25 Data for 2012 have not yet been published.

Figure 26

Rate of Domestic Violence Files Closed owing to Insufficient Evidence



Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors

### National Violence Index: The Ministry of Internal Security

A research team led by Police Commander Dr. Besora Regev at the Ministry of Internal Security developed a national violence index that monitors the incidence of violence in Israeli society. The team assented to our request to analyze their results on the basis of gender—that is, to differentiate between acts of violence directed at women and those directed at men.

It emerged that women are the primary target of sexual offenses, and there is no decreasing trend in evidence. In 2006, 9.79 of every 1,000 women fell victim to sexual offenses, compared with 3 of every 1,000 men. In 2010 the numbers rose: 13.16 women per 1,000 were victims of sexual offenses, versus 3.38 men in every 1,000.

In the years 2006–2008, there was a sharp rise in severe violent crimes against both men and women. In 2006, 22.2 men in every 1,000 were victims of severe violence, compared with 10.5 women in every 1,000. In 2008 the numbers peaked: 30.14 out of every 1,000 men and 13.53 out of every 1,000 women were victims of violence. Since then severe violent crime has been decreasing very gradually.

Less severe violent crimes are far more common. The numbers peaked in 2007 when 196.34 in every 1,000 men and 156.05 in every 1,000 women were victims. In 2007 there was a gradual decrease in the incidence of nonsevere violence.

Robbery is less common than other violent crimes. Since 2006 about 4 out of every 1,000 men and 3 out of every 1,000 women have been robbed each year.



## Summary: Gender Inequality in the Violence against Women Domain

Figures 27a and 27b show that between 2004 and 2006 gender inequality increased in almost all the indicators. From 2007 to 2009 there was something of a reduction in violence, mainly because of a decrease in the number of new calls made to rape crisis centers. The year 2010 saw a rise in inequality in the violence domain because of deterioration in all indicators comprising the domain. In 2011, by contrast, the violence domain decreased, reflecting a significant improvement relative to 2010. In 2012 there was a very slight improvement of 0.3% in the violence domain—resulting from a drop in the number of new calls to rape crisis centers (7,700 compared with 7,930 calls in 2011) and a decrease in the number of women being treated at welfare ministry domestic violence centers (7,335 versus 7,872). The mixed trend of the indicators may point to the lack of metapolicy directed at reducing violence against women in Israel.

Figure 27a

Gender Inequality in the Violence against Women Domain, 2004–2012





Figure 27b

Violence against Women Domain Values



## DOMAIN 4: The Periphery

A broad perspective on gender gaps that extends beyond the mainstream, to the geographical and social peripheries, is extremely important. Therefore, we compared the situations of men and women in peripheral locales. Our definition of the periphery is based on that of the Central Bureau of Statistics with regard to participation in the labor market and income gaps between women and men in the center versus the periphery. According to these definitions the southern and northern regions of the State of Israel are considered the periphery. At present this domain includes two indicators, both pertaining to the labor market. Operational constraints made it unfeasible to add new indicators to this domain in the present report, but it is our intention to address the shortage of information and expand the domain in the future. The indicators are as follows:

1. Rate of workforce participation by women and men, periphery versus center
2. Wage gaps between women and men, periphery versus center

### 1. Rate of workforce participation in the periphery, women versus men


The ratio between men and women in labor force participation overall is one woman to four men. Figure 28 depicts the ratio between women and men in labor market participation in the center and periphery (from 2004 to 2011 in the civilian labor force and in 2012 in the overall labor force). The figure shows moderate changes in the indicator during the period in question. Between 2005 and 2007 inequality in the periphery (northern and southern regions, as per Central Bureau of Statistics definitions) rose because the labor force participation ratio between women and men in the periphery decreased from 0.75 to 0.73. From 2008 to 2011 there was a moderate improvement: women's participation levels in the labor market rose more than those of men, and the ratio climbed to a peak of 0.77. In 2012 this ratio dropped to 0.75 and hence increased gender inequality in this domain. In the central region labor force participation levels—of both women and men—are higher than in the periphery, but the gaps between center and periphery are greater for women than they are for men. In other words, in terms of employment living in the periphery has a greater impact on women than it does on men.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> According to the Knesset Research and Information Center.

Figure 28

Ratio of Women to Men in Rate of Workforce Participation, Periphery versus Center



Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors


## 2. Gaps between women's and men's average monthly salary, periphery versus center

In 2004 women in the periphery earned 64% of what men earned (according to this calculation the average monthly salary is the total annual earnings divided by 12). Until 2008 there was a gradual improvement, peaking in this year at 68% of the salaries of men. However, from 2009 to 2010 the gap widened, and women earned only 65% of the wages of men, a gap that persisted in 2011.<sup>27</sup> Figure 29 depicts gaps between the monthly salaries of men and women in the center and periphery. It is evident from the figure that the gap between the average monthly salaries of men and women in the center is slightly larger than it is in the periphery: the average salary of women in the periphery from 2004 to 2010 was on average 65% of the monthly salary of men during those years, while the average salary of women in the center was 60% of the average salary of men. This is because men in the periphery earn on average less than men in the center. Still, the periphery is not kind to men either: it features more low-income and low-status jobs, and therefore the wage differences between men and women in the periphery are smaller than in the center.

<sup>27</sup> Data regarding average wage by region for 2012 have not yet been published.

Figure 29

Gaps between the Average Monthly Salaries of Women and Men, Periphery versus Center



Source: National Insurance Institute data processed by the authors

## Summary: Gender Inequality in the Periphery Domain

The periphery domain examines the discrepancies in the labor market between men and women in the southern and northern regions. Figures 30a and 30b show that in the years examined there were no significant changes in the inequality situation in the periphery, though inequality in this domain did decrease slightly in 2010–2012.

Figure 30a

Gender Inequality in the Periphery Domain, 2004–2012





Figure 30b

Periphery Domain Values



## DOMAIN 5: Arab Society

Inequality between Jews and Arabs exists in all aspects of Israeli life, and gender inequality within Arab society—as manifest in the data presented in this index—is large relative to gender inequality in the general population. Arab society also has unique socioeconomic characteristics, particularly with regard to the labor force, that are indicative of extremely large gaps between Arab men and Arab women.

Inequality between Jews and Arabs, and between Jewish women and Arab women, has been documented in other studies. Our intent here is to present the prevailing situation within Arab society, namely the gaps between Arab men and Arab women.

To this end we developed a distinct domain within the Gender Index for the Arab population. (It should be noted that data for all domains of the Index pertain to the populations in general, including Arab men and women. To examine inequality between men and women within Arab society, it was necessary to focus on Arab society separately.)

The indicators of inequality between Arab men and Arab women in Israel are:

1. Ratio of women to men in rate of workforce participation
2. Ratio of women to men in rate of part-time workers
3. Ratio between women's and men's gross monthly salary
4. Ratio between women's and men's gross hourly wage
5. Ratio of women to men with 13–15 years of education
6. Ratio of women to men with 16 or more years of education
7. Rate of Arab women among women filing domestic violence complaints
8. Pregnancy rate among Arab teens, ages 15–19
9. Average age at marriage


### 1. Ratio of Arab women to Arab men in rate of workforce participation

Figure 31a depicts Arab men's and women's rates of participation in the labor market. As is evident from the figure, the rate of participation of Arab women in the labor force is much lower than that of Arab men. Figure 31b expresses the ratio of Arab women to Arab men in labor market participation, which is on average 0.34. The rate of participation of Arab men in the labor force was approximately 60% throughout the measurement period, while the rate of participation of Arab women rose throughout the period—with the exception of 2011—from 17.3% in 2003 to 22.5% in 2010. The year 2011 saw a change: Arab women's rate of participation in the labor force in relation to that of Arab men dropped to 21.9% (the rate of participation for Arab men was 59.6%), and inequality in Arab society worsened. The year 2012, however, seems to have been a real turning point in the rate of labor market participation of both Arab men and Arab women: the former rose to 66.1% and the latter rose to 27.1%.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> As aforementioned, the change must be attributed to the change in Central Bureau of Statistics' measurement methods. The data refer to the overall labor force (including conscripted and permanent members of the military) and are based on monthly rather than quarterly surveys.

Figure 31a


Labor Market Participation Rates of Arabs in Israel, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 31b

Ratio of Arab Women to Arab Men in Rate of Labor Market Participation



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors



Hence, in 2012 the entire Arab population's rate of participation in the Israeli labor market improved (though this could be an artifact of a change in measurement methods). Moreover, the gap between Arab men and women in labor force participation is shrinking, which contributes to the decrease of inequality in the Arab society domain.

## 2. Ratio of Arab women to Arab men in rate of part-time workers


Figure 32a expresses the rate of Arab women employed part time, among working Arab women, in comparison with the rate of Arab men employed part time, among working Arab men. The figure shows that not only is Arab women's rate of participation in the labor market low, but many working Arab women are employed part time. From 2004 to 2009 the rate of employed Arab women working part time climbed from 42% to 47%. In 2010–2011 this number dropped to 33.7%, but the situation deteriorated in 2012, with the rate of working Arab women employed part time rising to 37.3%. The rate of working Arab men employed part time also rose, from 11.2% in 2011 to 18.8% in 2012.<sup>29</sup> Figure 32b expresses the ratio of working Arab women employed part time to working Arab men employed part time, showing that the gap between the genders has been significantly reduced in the past few years. However, this narrowing is the result of a sharp increase in the number of Arab men working part time and not of an improvement in the situation of Arab women. Thus, in 2004 there were three times as many Arab women working part time as there were Arab men, and four times as many in 2008, decreasing to twice as many in 2012. This indicator therefore decreased inequality in the Arab society domain in recent years, 2012 included. As noted, however, this is not an indication of a reduction in the rate at which Arab women were employed part time but rather the very high rate at which Arab men were thus employed. This phenomenon attests yet again to the trend we described in reference to general labor market participation, namely a worsening of employment conditions and diminished opportunities for all workers in Israel, especially Arabs.

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29 It is likely that this change also results from the change in Central Bureau of Statistics surveys in 2012—the sample was widened and now includes many more types of workers. Nevertheless, the change was not in evidence for the whole population, and we therefore presume that it reflects a change in the situation itself and not just in the survey structure.

Figure 32a


Rate of Arab Part-Time Workers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 32b

Ratio of Women to Men among Arab Part-Time Workers




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

### 3. Ratio between Arab women's and Arab men's monthly salary

Figure 33a describes the average gross monthly income of Arab women and Arab men in Israel. Figure 33b expresses the ratio between the monthly income of Arab women and the monthly income of Arab men, and demonstrates that this ranges from 0.72 to 0.79. That is, Arab women earn a lower monthly salary than Arab men, but the gap is smaller than that between the monthly income of men and women in the general population. One of the reasons for this is the high rate of Arab women employed part time, as we saw above. In 2012 Arab men earned an average monthly salary of NIS 6,457, while Arab women earned just NIS 4,977. In the same year, the gap between women and men widened, and this indicator hence increased gender inequality in Arab society.

Figure 33a


Average Monthly Salary in Arab Society in Israel, by Gender (in NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 33b

Ratio of Arab Women's to Arab Men's Average Monthly Salary



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors


#### 4. Ratio between Arab women's and Arab men's hourly wage

Figure 34a depicts the gross hourly wage of Arab women and Arab men in Israel. Figure 34b describes the ratio between them. The figures show that Arab women's hourly wage is slightly larger than Arab men's hourly wage—contrary to the case in the general population, in which men earn 15% to 17% more per hour. This discrepancy can be attributed to the fact that the few Arab women involved in the labor market are more educated, while Arab men active in the labor market have a variety of educational backgrounds. In 2010 Arab women's advantage in hourly wage was eroded somewhat and inequality rose; in 2011 inequality decreased; and in 2012 the improvement in favor of Arab women continued.<sup>30</sup>

30 Data pertaining to the gross hourly wage of Arab women and men have yet to be published, and we therefore performed an extrapolation.

Figure 34a


Average Hourly Wage in Arab Society in Israel, by Gender (in NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 34b

Ratio of Arab Women's to Arab Men's Average Hourly Wage




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## 5. Ratio of Arab women to Arab men with 13–15 years of education

Figure 35 depicts the ratio of educated Arab women to educated Arab men in Israel. The figure shows that from 2004 to 2006 the number of Arab women with 13–15 years of education rose, surpassing the number of Arab men with 13–15 years of education and thus narrowing inequality. From 2008 to 2011 the trend reversed. The reason is that the rate of Arab men with 13–15 years of education is increasing, while the rate of women remains stable. In 2012 the rate of men with 13–15 years of education decreased by 2%, and the rate of women by 1%, in comparison with the preceding year. In general there are more women than men with 13–15 years of education. Therefore, in 2011 this led to a reduction in gender inequality in education in Arab society.

Figure 35

Ratio of Educated Arab Women to Educated Arab Men



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## 6. Ratio of Arab women to Arab men with 16 or more years of education

Figure 35 also shows that the ratio between educated Arab women and educated Arab men is approaching 1, after gradual convergence throughout the period of measurement. From 2004

to 2010 there was a continual improvement in the rate of educated Arab women, but in 2011 there was a rise in the number of Arab men with 16 or more years of education, which led to an increase in gender inequality in Arab society. By contrast, in 2012 the rate of Arab women with 16 or more years of education was the highest it has been since the beginning of the measurement period—slightly surpassing the rate of men. Hence, this indicator reflects equality.


It might therefore be said that women in Arab society are more educated than men, except that, just as in Jewish society and contrary to popular opinion, education does not spare Arabs from structural and cultural obstacles and is therefore not an effective tool for increasing gender equality in the labor market (see the education domain below).

## 7. Rate of Arab women among all women filing domestic violence complaints

Figure 36 presents the rate of Arab women among all women who have filed domestic violence complaints. The figure shows that the rate of Arab women among complainants ranges from 11% to 16% and is low relative to their proportion of the population of women in Israel (20%). From 2009 to 2012 the rate of Arab women complainants rose, and in 2012 it was 16.36%—a record in relation to preceding years. The relatively low rate of complaints by Arab women might well indicate under-reporting rather than a low incidence of violence. The supplementary data, pertaining to the number of domestic complaint files opened with the police, are lacking.

**Figure 36**

Rate of Arab Women among Women Filing Domestic Violence Complaints




Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors

## 8. Rate of teen pregnancies (ages 15–19) in Arab society

The fertility rate is measured as the number of babies born in a particular year to mothers from a certain age group, divided by the number of women in the same age group in the year in question (per 1,000 women). This indicator is used in multiple indexes around the world. Fertility rates for young age groups are considered indicative of the degree of independence women possess in the society being measured: the higher the rate, the lower their independence. The burden of raising children usually falls on the shoulders of women, and this damages the chances of economic success for both young girls and their children. Figure 37 presents the fertility rates among Arab girls in Israel. The figure shows that this rate is decreasing from year to year, leading to a decrease in gender inequality in the Arab society domain.

Figure 37

Rate of Teen Pregnancies (Ages 15–19) in Arab Society (per 1,000 Girls)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## 9. Average age at (first) marriage<sup>31</sup>

Marriage age is also considered indicative of women's degree of independence: in liberal societies with more gender equality, the gap between leaving the parental home and establishing an independent family unit is widening. At the same time, the gap between the age at which men and women marry is shrinking. Figure 38a shows the average age at which Arab Muslim men and women marry. Although the figure shows that the age of marriage for both genders is gradually going up from year to year, there is a stable gap of about 5 years between the two. In 2011 the average age at which men were married the first time was 27.5, while the average age for women was 22.2.<sup>32</sup> Figure 38b shows that the

31 For this indicator we only have data pertaining to Muslim women (85% of Arab women in Israel), not to Arab women in general.


32 Data for the average age of marriage for 2012 have not yet been published.



ratio between the age of marriage of men and that of women in Arab Muslim society is approximately 0.8.

**Figure 38a**


Average Age of Marriage in Arab Muslim Society



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

**Figure 38b**

Ratio between Average Age of Marriage of Arab Muslim Men and Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## Summary: Gender Inequality in the Arab Society Domain

In the previous Gender Index, the Arab society domain comprised seven indicators. This year two new indicators were added. As is evident from Figures 39a and 39b, the years 2004–2011 were static in terms of the equality of Arab women. The range of changes is small, albeit showing signs of slight improvement. In 2012 there was a decrease in gender inequality in Arab society: the gap in labor force participation and part-time employment shrank; the gap in monthly income rose, but the gap in hourly income shrank; the gaps in education levels (13–15 years and 16 or more years) shrank; the rate of Arab women filing domestic violence complaints with the police rose; and teen pregnancies went down, and the average childbearing age rose—all factors that contributed to the reduction of gender inequality in Arab society in 2012.

These results are testimony to a generally encouraging trend, though Arab women in Israel are still far from equal. It is interesting to note that the trajectory of the Arab society domain differs from that of the general Index: in 2008–2009 there was a rise in inequality in Arab society, while the overall Index showed a decrease. On the other hand, from 2007 to 2010 Arab society showed a decrease in inequality, whereas in the Index as a whole, inequality rose. Thus, the developmental directions of inequality in the Arab society domain differ from those in Israel in general.

We already know that the gender gap in Arab society in Israel is larger than the gender gap in Jewish society. Arab women's labor market participation rate is very low, one third of Arab men's participation rate, and their part-time employment rate is three times that of men (in 2012 the gap was mitigated by a disproportionate increase in the number of Arab men employed part time). Nevertheless, given the low status of Arab men in the Israeli labor market, the indicators of average monthly salary and average hourly wage are lower in Arab society than in the overall population. Although there has been an improvement over the years in the number of Arab women in the labor market, their main occupation is still care of home and children. These findings may reflect the alienation and isolation of Arab society, and they suggest that it is an enclave in all respects pertaining to the measurement of gaps between men and women. In 2012 there was a significant decrease in gender inequality in Arab society, largely because of increasing education levels among Arab women and a large increase in the rate of Arab men employed part time—both of which contributed to narrowing the gap between men and women.

Figure 39a

Gender Inequality in the Arab Society Domain, 2004–2012





Figure 39b


Arab Society Domain Values



## Spotlight: Gaps between Arab Women and Jewish Women

The comparison between the situation of Arab women and that of Arab men reflects gender gaps in Arab society in Israel. But Arab women are multiply disadvantaged as both a gender minority and an ethnic minority. It is therefore important to consider the gaps between Arab and Jewish women. While it is methodologically unfeasible to include the ethnic gaps in an index monitoring changes in gender gaps, given the importance of the issue we nevertheless present a comparison between women in Arab society and women in Jewish society, using the same indicators that are used to describe the gender gaps between Arab men and Arab women.


### Labor Market Participation Rates, Arab Women versus Jewish Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In 2012 Arab women's labor market participation rate was 27.1% of the labor force, as opposed to 64.3% for Jewish women. The gap has been stable over the years and does not show signs of improvement. In other words, the increasing rate of Arab women in the labor force is matched by the increasing rate of Jewish women in the labor force.


### Rate of Part-Time Workers in the General Workforce, Arab Women versus Jewish Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In 2012, 37.3% of Arab women in the general labor force were employed part time, while 35.2% of Jewish women were employed part time. The rate of Arab women employed part time has decreased over the years, and in recent years the gap between them and Jewish women has closed.


### Average Monthly Salary, Arab Women versus Jewish Women (in NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In 2011 the average monthly wage of Arab women was NIS 4,711 per month, as opposed to NIS 6,809 for Jewish women.


Average Hourly Wage, Arab Women versus Jewish Women (in NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In 2011 the average hourly wage of Arab women was NIS 33.5, as opposed to NIS 45.3 for Jewish women. As the above figure shows, the gap between Arab and Jewish women has widened over the years.


Rate of Education, Arab Women versus Jewish Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In 2012 the rate of Arab women with 13–15 years of education was 12.4%, while among Jewish women it was 26.1%. The rate of Arab women with 16 or more years of education was 12.2%, while among Jewish women it was 27%.


**Rate of Teen Pregnancies (Ages 15–19), Arab Girls versus Jewish Girls**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In 2012 the teen pregnancy rate for Arab girls was 27.6 (per 1,000), versus 5.3 among Jewish girls. The figure shows a clear downward trend in the pregnancy rate of Arab girls.


**Overall Fertility Rate, Arab Women versus Jewish Women**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

The trend in fertility rates is very interesting: while Arab women have been having fewer children on average, since 2005 Jewish women have been having more children. Arab women still have more children on average than Jewish women do, but if the trend continues, this gap should close in the next few years.

#### Average Age at Birth of First Child, Arab Women versus Jewish Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In all years, Arab women have children at a younger age than do Jewish women. In 2012 Arab women had their first child at an average age of 23.8, while the average age was 28.2 for Jewish women.

In conclusion the gaps between Arab women and Jewish women remain stable with regard to labor market participation and education. In the areas of birth and fertility, the gaps appear to be closing, as they are in the area of part-time employment. On the other hand, the discrepancy in wages between Arab and Jewish women is growing, both in average monthly salary and average hourly wage.



## DOMAIN 6: Poverty

Poverty is a domain that carries a lot of weight in terms of gender inequality because it is a node at which disadvantages converge and are exacerbated. Moreover, the poverty rate is controlled—albeit partially—by the welfare system and can be regulated for various population groups (Stier and Lewin 2000). Gender inequality in the area of poverty is measured by the incidence of poverty among women compared to the incidence of poverty among men, using data from the National Insurance Institute. Furthermore, we took into account the number of people who, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, received income support stipends. Inequality in the poverty domain is measured using two indicators:

1. Incidence of poverty among women versus men, after transfer payments and taxes
2. Ratio of women to men among income support recipients

### 1. Incidence of poverty by gender, after transfer payments and taxes


Figures 40a and 40b present the incidence of poverty among women and men after transfer payments and taxes, and the ratios between them. The figures show that poverty is consistently more prevalent among women than among men, although not by much. It should be stressed that reference is being made to the incidence of poverty after the intervention of the welfare system—that is, said intervention does not close the gender gap, and this is cause for consideration. In 2002–2005 and in 2008, the ratio in incidence of poverty between men and women increased, and gender inequality in these years grew. In 2011 the ratio appeared to decrease—that is, gender inequality in the poverty domain was reduced, but it grew again in 2012. Although in 2012 the rate of poor men and women dropped, the gender gap once again widened because the decrease in incidence of poverty among men was more acute. In 2012 the rate of poor women was 19.9%, and the rate of poor men was 17.3%.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Data on poverty are also influenced by the changes in Central Bureau of Statistics surveys, since they are based on the Bureau's income and expenses survey, despite being calculated by the National Insurance Institute's department of research and planning.

Figure 40a


Incidence of Poverty after Transfer Payments and Taxes, by Gender



Source: National Insurance Institute data processed by the authors

Figure 40b

Ratio of Women to Men in Incidence of Poverty




Source: National Insurance Institute data processed by the authors

## 2. Ratio of women to men among income support recipients

Figure 41a expresses the number of women versus the number of men receiving income support. The figure shows a steady gap between men and women because, among other things, women are poorer than men. Thus, as the ratio between women and men receiving income support went up, gender inequality in the poverty domain rose. Figure 41b expresses the ratio of women to men among those receiving income support. The figure shows that the gap has been narrowing since the early 2000s, a function of a directed social policy that made the conditions for eligibility for income support, as well as the conditions for being categorized as “cannot be placed [in the workforce],” stricter.<sup>34</sup> From 2009 to 2012 the ratio dropped a little because both genders received less income support, and thus inequality in the poverty domain was reduced.

Figure 41a

Number of Recipients of Income Support, by Gender




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

34 National Insurance Institute conditions can be found on their website: [www.btl.gov.il/benefits/income\\_support/Pages/default.aspx](http://www.btl.gov.il/benefits/income_support/Pages/default.aspx).

Figure 41b

Ratio of Women to Men among Recipients of Income Support



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## Summary: Gender Inequality in the Poverty Domain

Women are poorer than men—in other words, a gender gap is manifest in our indicators of poverty. Figure 42a shows that there have been no real changes in this gap over the years examined—the gap between the number of poor women and the number of poor men remained stable throughout the period of measurement. This domain is directly influenced by the welfare system, and the results therefore show that policy directed at poverty relief is guilty of gender blindness. As is evident from Figure 42b, the incidence of poverty in 2012 seems to have reverted to its 2004 level, and the situation is hence static.

Figure 42a

Gender Inequality in the Poverty Domain, 2004–2012





Figure 42b

Poverty Domain Values



## DOMAIN 7: Education

The number of educated people in the population has grown in recent years—both in number and proportion. The rate of educated women has risen faster than the rate of educated men, and as a result we might have anticipated a rise in gender equality—mainly because education is considered a factor in promoting equality in the workplace. However, the situation is complex, and the rise in education actually reduces the relative advantage of obtaining it. Likewise, in terms of gender equality, women usually go into prestigious fields just as those fields begin to lose ground in compensation and prestige. Therefore, obtaining the educational prerequisites for these fields does not afford them the same status as men who had worked in them before they began to decline. In this domain the indicators of inequality are years of education. In the future we intend to expand the education domain and include indicators such as type of education and areas of study. Inequality in the education domain is measured by two indicators:


1. Ratio of women to men among those with 13–15 years of education
2. Ratio of women to men among those with 16 or more years of education

### 1. Ratio of women to men among those with 13–15 years of education

Figure 43a shows that since 1999 the number of women with 13–15 years of education has been higher than that of men: 23.9% of women versus 20.7% of men. In 2012, 45.2% of men had 13 or more years of education, as compared to 48.1% of women. As noted above, women steadily improved the average extent of their education, but this did not find expression in their labor market conditions. Figure 43b expresses the ratio of women to men with 13–15 years of education, showing that this tends to favor women slightly. In 2012, the ratio was 1:15.

Figure 43a


Rate of Those with 13–15 and 16 or More Years of Education, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 43b

Ratio of Women to Men among Those with 13–15 Years of Education




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## 2. Ratio of women to men among those with 16 or more years of education

Figure 43a above presents the rates of women and men in Israel who have 16 or more years of education. The figure shows that from 2004 to 2006 the rate of men with 16 or more years of education was higher than that of women, and gender inequality in education grew. Figure 44 below shows the ratio of women to men among those with 16 or more years of education. The figure shows that since 2007 the ratio has remained close to 1—that is, the numbers of men and women with 16 or more years of education were close to equal, and inequality in education shrank very slightly. In 2012 the trend reversed itself again, and there were once again more men than women with 16 or more years of education. As such this indicator slightly increased inequality in the education domain for this year. It should be noted that the Central Bureau of Statistics does not differentiate between study at institutions of higher learning and yeshiva (religious) studies, and it is therefore unclear what percentage of yeshiva learners are included in the total number that make up the indicator.

Figure 44

Ratio of Women to Men among Those with 16 or More Years of Education



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

### Summary: Gender Inequality in Education

Figures 45a and 45b show that there was a slight improvement in the education domain during the period of measurement—that is, the rate of educated women increased relative to the rate of educated men. This finding shows that, contrary to what we might expect, education is not a sufficient tool to close gender gaps in the labor market. As we demonstrated in the labor market domain, not only are the gaps in this area failing to shrink, but they are actually widening.



Figure 45a

Gender Inequality in the Education Domain, 2004–2012





Figure 45b

Education Domain Values



## DOMAIN 8: Power

This is a new domain in the Gender Index, expressing the power of women in the public sphere. Our sense was that the political representation domain developed in the 2013 Gender Index did not do justice to the degree of power and influence that women have. We therefore sought a means of presenting more data. The domain focuses on the representation of women in decision-making positions, out of a general consensus that gender balance in power relations in such positions is crucial to increasing equality between women and men. Gender equality in the power domain is important because it ensures that women and men have an equal voice, and thus they have an equal opportunity to shape economic, social, and political agendas. Moreover, one of the ways to change gendered perceptions is to promote role models, and a woman in a position of economic or political power is thus meaningful on the symbolic level as well. The lack of gender equality in this domain derives from the dearth of participation by women in all aspects of national decision making.

The previous Gender Index examined political power only, by means of just two indicators: the number of women members of parliament and the number of women ministers in the government. These indicators are widely used in indexes that estimate gender inequality, but they are problematic because they cover very few observed instances. This was one of the reasons that we expanded the present Gender Index to include indicators pertaining to political power and to economic power, much like the European Gender Equality Index.<sup>35</sup>

The first subdomain, political power, consists of three indicators:

1. Ratio of women to men among members of parliament: annual highs
2. Ratio of women to men among government ministers: annual highs
3. Ratio of women to men among heads of local authorities and regional councils

The second subdomain, economic power, consists of five indicators:

4. Rate of women CEOs
5. Rate of women senior managers
6. Rate of women in other managerial positions
7. Rate of women in the top three ranks of the civil service
8. Rate of women in the civil service who are employed under senior contracts

Thus the Index now has eight indicators that examine women's representation in positions of political power—government, parliament, and local authorities—and in positions of economic power—CEOs and senior managers in the private and public sectors.


35 See <http://eige.europa.eu/apps/gei/content/Gender-Equality-Index-Report.pdf>; <http://eige.europa.eu/content/gender-equality-index#/domain/power>; on the European gender index, see Appendix I.

## 1. Ratio of women to men among members of parliament

Figure 46a presents the number of women in parliament; Figure 46b presents the ratio between women and men members of parliament. The figures show that from 2004 to 2006 the rate of women in parliament went up and inequality decreased slightly, though in 2006 there were just 22 women among the 120 members of parliament (18.33%)—that is, a very small improvement indeed. In 2007 the number of women members of parliament dropped to 17, and gender inequality in the power domain increased. From 2008 to 2012 the number of women members of parliament rose to 24 (20%), and the ratio between women and men members of parliament was 0.25. In 2013, following elections for the nineteenth Knesset, the number of women members of parliament reached a record 27. This, however, is still low relative to the rate of women in the population.<sup>36</sup> Of course, equality would entail 60 women members of parliament, and the gap remains immense.

Figure 46a

Number of Women in Parliament and Government




Source: Knesset data processed by the authors

<sup>36</sup> The current number of women members of parliament is not included in the present Index, which refers to the years 2004–2012.

Figure 46b

Ratio of Women to Men among Members of Parliament



Source: Knesset data processed by the authors

### Ratio of Women to Men in Parliament: An International Comparison


In 2012 this ratio was 0.20 in the United States, 0.29 in Britain, 0.81 in Sweden, and 0.56 in Spain. (Source: Global Gender Gap Index)

## 2. Ratio of women to men among government ministers

Figure 47 describes the ratio of women to men ministers in the government. The figure shows that the general trend over the years in which this indicator was measured was one of convergence. That is, while the highest number of women ministers ranged from 2 to 3 in each year, the number of men ministers rose from 12 to 28 in a single year. This indicator hence demonstrated gender inequality in the power domain in most years of the Index. In 2011 there was a slight improvement in the ratio between women and men ministers relative to the preceding year, but the rate of women ministers remained very low (approximately 10%). In 2012 there was yet another decrease (to 11%) in the peak number of women ministers versus men ministers because the government consisted of one less minister.

Figure 47

Ratio of Women to Men among Government Ministers



Source: Knesset data processed by the authors

#### Ratio of Women to Men among Government Ministers: An International Comparison

In 2012 this ratio was 0.38 in the United States, 0.21 in Britain, 1.09 in Sweden (that is, more women than men), and 0.44 in Spain. (Source: Global Gender Gap Index)


### 3. Ratio of women to men among heads of local authorities and regional councils

There are some 256 local and regional councils in Israel. Women's representation as heads of these is negligible, ranging from 4 to 8 women per year. The mayor or head of council has a great deal of influence on the lives of the public and a lot of autonomy relative to other administrative positions. Therefore, the lack of women in these positions in Israel is highly significant. In 2012 there were 6 women mayors/council heads: Miriam Feinberg, Yael German, Tali Ploskov, Flora Shushan, Sigal Moran, and Matti Tzarfati Harcabi —amounting to just 2% of the people in these positions. Figure 48a presents the number of mayors/council heads by gender, and Figure 48b presents the ratio between them. The figure illustrates the immensity of the gap. In 2013 only 4 women were elected as mayors/council heads.

With respect to council members, the gap is less dramatic. The rate of women elected to councils in 2008 was 11%: 232 women as opposed to 1,756 men. In the 2013 local elections, the rate went up to 13%: 344 women as opposed to 2,128 men. This is a very small improvement over a five-year period. Unfortunately there are no data that track the number of council members each year, so we were unable to include the set in the Index itself. The picture, however, is clear.

Figure 48a


Number of Heads of Local Authorities and Regional Councils, by Gender



Source: Data processed by the authors

Figure 48b

Ratio of Women to Men among Heads of Local Authorities and Regional Councils




Source: Data processed by the authors

## 4. Rate of Women CEOs

This is a new indicator in the Gender Index. It traces the number of women CEOs versus the number of men CEOs, by year. The position of CEO comes with power in decision making and policy making, and it is hence important to examine women's representation in the role. The data at our disposal include general managers of government and local services, nonprofit organizations and national institutions, and in the business sector, in private and government companies.<sup>37</sup> Figure 49a shows the number of CEOs by gender, illustrating the consistent gap between the numbers of women and men in these roles. In 2012 there were 36,114 men CEOs, versus only 5,957 women CEOs. The ratio between women and men therefore ranges from 0.13 to 0.19. Figure 49b shows that in 2012 only 14% of CEOs were women.

Figure 49a

Number of CEOs, by Gender




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

<sup>37</sup> As per the Central Bureau of Statistics' definition.

Figure 49b

Rate of Women among All CEOs



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## 5. Rate of women senior managers


This is also a new indicator. It depicts the number of senior managers, by gender, in each year. The data include managers from all branches of manufacturing, financial services and taxation, human resources and labor, advertising and marketing, suppliers, computer services, security, community and medical services, and research and development.<sup>38</sup> Figure 50a presents the number of senior managers, by gender, and shows that women are outnumbered by men in these roles. The gap narrowed somewhat between 2009 and 2011, only to widen again in 2012. Figure 50b depicts the ratio of women senior managers to men senior managers, showing that in 2012 women accounted for 35% of all senior managers—as they had done in 2004.

<sup>38</sup> As per the Central Bureau of Statistics' definition.



Figure 50a


Number of Senior Managers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 50b

Rate of Women among All Senior Managers




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## 6. Rate of women in other managerial positions at the local level

This is another new indicator, one with political significance. It includes secretaries of local municipalities and other general managers: in architecture and hunting, forestry and fishing, manufacture and construction, wholesale commerce, restaurants and hotels, transportation, storage and communication, business services, personal care, cleaning, and similar fields.<sup>39</sup> As is evident from Figure 51a, in 2004 there were 8,500 women in these positions versus 24,395 men—a ratio of 0.37. In 2005 things deteriorated, and the ratio dropped to 0.31. From then until 2011 the situation improved from year to year, with the number of women in these positions increasing. In 2012 there was a downturn—17,404 women versus 38,355 men in these positions. Figure 51b shows that in 2012 women accounted for 31% of local officials and other managers (a ratio of 0.45).

Figure 51a

Number of Local Administrators and Other Managers, by Gender




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

<sup>39</sup> As per the Central Bureau of Statistics' definition.

Figure 51b

Rate of Women among All Local Administrators and Other Managers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors


## 7. Rate of women in the top three ranks of the civil service

The Civil Service Commission is responsible for implementing government policy in administration and human resources. The representation of women in the top three ranks of the civil service<sup>40</sup> is therefore reflective of the political visibility and representation of women at the senior levels of decision making and policy formulation. Figure 52 shows that in 2004 women accounted for 41% of the top three ranks of the civil service. Since then there has been an improvement, and the rate was 46% in both 2011 and 2012. This is an example of the influence of policy directed at closing gender gaps, since the civil service has a system in place for monitoring the inclusion of women, which resulted in a consistent improvement in the number of women in senior positions.

<sup>40</sup> The reference is to the upper tiers populated in each rank and to the level of the position, not to the salary.

Figure 52

Rate of Women versus Men in the Top Three Ranks of the Civil Service




Source: Civil Service Commission data processed by the authors

## 8. Rate of women in the civil service who are employed under senior contracts

This indicator expresses the number of women in senior positions in the civil service who are employed under senior contracts. As Figure 53 shows, women accounted for 25% of such employees in 2004, but the rate went up to 34% by 2012.

Figure 53

Rate of Women versus Men among All Those Employed under Senior Contracts in the Civil Service



Source: Civil Service Commission data processed by the authors

## Summary: Gender Inequality in the Power Domain

Figures 54a and 54b show that in most years gender inequality in the power domain increased: in 2005 women were very poorly represented in senior positions in relation to men; in 2006 there was a small improvement, but in 2007–2010 inequality once again increased, owing to a deterioration in most indicators. In 2011 there was improvement in all the indicators—first and foremost, a woman minister was added (Orit Noked replaced Silvan Shalom), and two women were elected mayors/heads of council (Tali Ploskov as mayor of Arad and Matti Tzarfati Harcabi as head of the Yoav regional council)—leading to a reduction in inequality in the power domain for this year. As is apparent, each appointment of a woman has wide numerical consequences in the domain of political power, making it quite volatile. This is particularly noticeable with regard to the number of women ministers in government. This indicator is based on the total number of ministers in government, which is limited to a few dozen.

The power domain demonstrates that the number of women in senior national and local positions is still relatively low in proportion to their representation in the population: in 2012 there were only 24 women members of parliament and 3 women ministers. The number of women CEOs and senior managers dropped relative to the preceding year, and therefore, in the last year of measurement, gender inequality in the power domain rose by 3.1%.

Figure 54a

Gender Inequality in the Power Domain, 2004–2012





Figure 54b


Power Domain Values



## Women and Men Israel Prize Laureates

The Israel Prize is a prestigious award presented by the State of Israel in a wide variety of fields. The prize carries great symbolic significance as a mark of state recognition for important contributions in research and other areas of endeavor. Methodologically, this could not be included as an indicator, because of the low incidence, but it is evident that over the years, the prize has been awarded to more men than women. In 2010, for example, the laureates included thirteen men and one woman.

### Number of Israel Prize Laureates, by Gender



Source: Civil Service Commission data processed by the authors

## DOMAIN 9: Health

This domain is in the early stages of development. At present it includes only three indicators that attest to the health situation of women in comparison with that of men. Our intention is to expand the domain in the future to include health services—among them preventive medicine and health-promoting behavior. We used the Central Bureau of Statistics' social survey to construct the domain. This survey examined subjective perceptions of health and the life expectancy variable that is part of all comparative gender indexes. The indicators in this domain are as follows:


1. Ratio between women's and men's life expectancy
2. Ratio between women's and men's mortality rate
3. Ratio of women to men aged 20 and up who assessed their health as good or very good

### 1. Ratio between women's and men's life expectancy

Figure 55a presents the life expectancy of women in comparison with that of men; figure 55b shows the ratio between the two. It is apparent from the figures that throughout the measurement period the life expectancy of women was 3–4 years more than that of men. In raw numbers the difference went down from 4.4 years in 2004 (in favor of women) to 3.7 years in 2012. This change is almost negligible, and the relationship between the life expectancy of women and men is hence stable. In 2012 the average life expectancy of women was 83.6 years, and that of men was 79.9. This indicator has almost no effect on gender inequality in the health domain, given its fairly stable ratio.

Figure 55a

Life Expectancy, by Gender




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors



Figure 55b

Ratio between Women's and Men's Life Expectancy



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

### Life Expectancy: An International Comparison

In 2011 the life expectancy of women in the United States was 81 and that of men 76; in Britain it was 83 for women and 79 for men; in Sweden it was 84 for women and 80 for men; in Spain it was 85 for women and 79 for men. (Source: World Bank)


## 2. Ratio between women's and men's mortality rate

Figure 56a presents the mortality rate by gender (per 100,000 people) and Figure 56b expresses the ratio between the mortality rates of women and men. The figures show that in all years of measurement the ratio between the life expectancy of women and men remained almost constant: 525 women per 100,000 people died in 2011, and 522 men per 100,000 died in this year.<sup>41</sup> This indicator did not affect gender inequality in the health domain and was not a significant factor.

41 Data for 2012 have yet to be published.

Figure 56a


Mortality Rate, by Gender (per 100,000 People)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 56b

Ratio between Women's and Men's Mortality Rate




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

### 3. Ratio of women to men aged 20 and up who assessed their health as good or very good

This indicator presents subjective evaluations of personal health. Figure 57a shows the number of women and men aged 20 and up who assessed their health as good or very good. Figure 57b presents the ratio between them. The figures show that there is a consistent gap between women and men in this regard: a higher percentage of men than women tended to perceive their health as good or very good. The gap is particularly evident among those who reported their health as very good—the rate of women who reported their health as very good is lower than the rate of men who did so.<sup>42</sup> This indicator somewhat raised gender inequality in the health domain.

Figure 57a

Rate of Those Who Assessed Their Health as Good or Very Good, by Gender




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

42 Data for 2012 have yet to be published.

Figure 57b

Ratio of Women to Men Who Assessed Their Health as Good or Very Good



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

## Summary: Gender Inequality in the Health Domain

Figures 58a and 58b demonstrate that over the course of the measurement period there was no significant change in the gender gap in the health domain. Inequality thus remained stable. At present the health domain does not take structural differences in health budgets or differences between social groups into account. Instead, it presents results that, in our opinion, should be expanded upon in future editions of the Gender Index.

Figure 58a

Gender Inequality in the Health Domain, 2004–2011





Figure 58b

Health Domain Values



## DOMAIN 10: Family Status

This domain, included in the Gender Index for the first time, examines women’s status in terms of fertility and family. The choice of indicators that describe the personal status of women is based on the assumption that there is a close correlation between these and the degree and manner in which women participate in the public sphere.<sup>43</sup> The indicators that comprise the domain are as follows:


1. Rate of teen pregnancies (ages 15–19)
2. Ratio of women to men heading single-parent families
3. Average age at (first) marriage

### 1. Rate of teen pregnancies (ages 15–19)

This indicator measures the specific fertility rate—that is, the number of babies born in a given year to mothers in a certain age group, divided by the number of women in that age group in the year in question (per 1,000 women). Figure 59 expresses the fertility rates of girls aged 15–19, showing that there is a decrease in pregnancies in this age group. This leads to a reduction in gender inequality in the family status domain.

Figure 59

Rate of Pregnancies of Teenage Girls Aged 15–19 (per 1,000 Teenage Girls)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors


<sup>43</sup> Indicators of fertility are employed in various gender indexes worldwide. For example, the Gender-related Development Index and the Gender Inequality Index (see Appendix I for more on these indexes).

## 2. Ratio of women to men heading single-parent families

This indicator examines the number of women who head single-parent families that include children up to age 24 in comparison with the number of men who do so. Figure 60a shows that the number of single-parent families headed by women is increasing over the years, reaching some 148,000 families in 2012 in comparison with only 18,000 families headed by men. Figure 60b shows that the ratio between the two types of families stands at an average of 8 single-parent families headed by women to one headed by men. In 2012 this ratio dropped slightly relative to the preceding year, which led to a decrease in inequality in the family status domain for that year.

Figure 60


Heads of Single-Parent Families, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 60b

Ratio of Women to Men Heading Single-Parent Families



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

#### Single-Parent Family Heads, by Gender: An International Comparison

In 2010 there were 8,419,000 single-parent families headed by women and 2,224,000 headed by men in the United States—a ratio of 3.78. In Britain there were 2,520,000 such families headed by women and 378,000 by men—a ratio of 6.67. In Sweden there were 228,626 single-parent families headed by women and 67,154 headed by men—a ratio of 3.4. (Source: UNECE)

## 5. Average age at (first) marriage


This indicator tracks the average ages at which men and women first marry. Figure 61a shows that men are about 3.5 years older throughout the measurement period—that is, they marry later than women (it should be noted that the gap remains in evidence even when the median marriage age is considered). Figure 61b shows the ratio between women's and men's age of marriage was 0.89 in 2011. Given that men marry later, they are able to focus on professional and economic establishment before they have a family. By contrast, the fact that women marry younger may be detrimental to their professional advancement.<sup>44</sup>

44 Data for 2012 have yet to be published.



Figure 61a


Average Age at (First) Marriage, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 61b

Ratio between Women's and Men's Average Age at (First) Marriage



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

### Average Marriage Age: An International Comparison

In 2010 the average age at (first) marriage in the United States was 26.1 for women and 28.2 for men—a difference of 2.1 years. In Britain the average age at (first) marriage was 29.9 for women and 32.1 for men—a difference of 2.2 years. In Sweden the average age at (first) marriage was 32.9 for women and 35.5 for men—a difference of 2.6 years. In Spain the average age at (first) marriage was 31.0 for women and 33.2 for men—a difference of 2.2 years. (Source: UNECE)

## Summary: Gender Inequality in the Family Status Domain

Figures 62a and 62b show a decrease in gender inequality in the family status domain. The improvement appears to have occurred in most of the indicators over the years: the teen pregnancy rate declined sharply, as did the gap between marriage age of women and men. Likewise, in 2012 there was a certain decrease in the gap between the number of single-parent families headed by women and those headed by men.

Figure 62a

Gender Inequality in the Family Status Domain, 2004–2011





Figure 62b

Family Status Domain Values



## Gender Index Results for 2012 by Domain

**Labor Market Domain:** Inequality increased in this domain as a result of widening gaps in three of its eight indicators: the gap between women and men in civil labor force participation rates grew, measuring 0.83; the proportion of women unemployed as a result of being housewives rose from 25.2% to 34.1%; the gap in the median wage widened to a ratio of 0.71. There was improvement in three other indicators: the gap between the number of men part-time workers (244,200) and the number of women part-time workers (525,400) narrowed as more men and fewer women were employed in this manner; the gap in gross hourly wage also shrank from 83% to 85%; and the proportion of women employed part time because they were housewives decreased from 19.2% to 17.4%. The remaining indicators showed no change: the gap between the gross monthly wage of men (NIS 10,953) and the gross monthly wage of women (NIS 7,244) remained the same as in 2011, with women's monthly income amounting to 66% of the monthly income of men; the number of women contract workers (30,100) among the total number of contract workers (59,000) remained at 51%, as it had been in 2011. Overall, this domain showed a 2.6% increase in gender inequality in the labor market relative to 2011.

**Gendered Segregation of Professions Domain:** There was improvement in almost all the indicators in this domain in 2012. The rate of women engineers and architects rose from 22% in 2011 to 23%; the rate of women lawyers rose from 42% to 47%; and the rate of women hi-tech workers rose from 34% to 36%. Improvement was evident in both segregation by occupation and segregation by industry: the former decreased from 51% to 47% and the latter decreased from 58% to 56%. Overall, gender inequality decreased by 3.8% in the gendered segregation of professions domain.

**Violence against Women Domain:** There was a very slight improvement in this domain in 2012. Two indicators saw improvement: the number of new calls to rape crisis centers decreased in proportion to the number of women in the population and stood at 7,700; and the number of women being treated at welfare ministry centers for domestic violence went down slightly in relation to the preceding year, from 7,872 to 7,335. By contrast, other indicators saw a rise in inequality: the number of sex offense cases transferred to the police prosecutor or state attorney increased; the number of domestic violence complaints made to the police rose by some 400 in comparison with 2011; and the number of cases closed for lack of evidence also rose. Overall, this domain showed a slight improvement of 0.3% in gender inequality relative to 2011.

**The Periphery Domain:** A slight deterioration in gender inequality is evident in this domain. The gap between the labor market participation rates of women and men in the periphery widened to a ratio of 0.75, while gaps in wages (extrapolated) actually shrank. These two indicators combined demonstrate a worsening of 0.7% in inequality in this domain.

**Arab Society Domain:** There were significant changes in gender inequality in this domain relative to the preceding year.<sup>45</sup> Six of the nine indicators that constitute the domain saw a decrease in inequality, while three saw an increase: gaps between Arab men and women in

<sup>45</sup> As mentioned, all the other domains and the Index in its entirety pertain to the overall population of Israel.

labor market participation rates narrowed following a significant influx of Arab women into the workforce, an increase from 21.9% to 27.1%; the rate of Arab women working part time, which had been on the decline for the three years prior to 2012, shot up from 33.7% to 37.3%. However, at the same time, the rate of Arab men working part time also shot up from 11.2% to 18.8%. This change led to a decrease in inequality in the Arab society domain because the gap between women and men was narrowed. The rate of educated women in Arab society also rose, contributing to a reduction of gender inequality (24.6% of Arab women have 13 or more years of education, while 22% of Arab men have 13 or more years of education), and the rate of teen pregnancies dropped from 30.9 to 27.6. By contrast, gaps in the average monthly wage of Arab women and Arab men increased, as did the percentage of Arab women filing domestic violence cases (the latter from 15% to 16%). The age of marriage ratio remained stable, and the overall result for this domain was a decrease of 6.3% in inequality in comparison with 2011.

**Poverty Domain:** In 2012 inequality in this domain was higher than in 2011. The incidence of poverty indicator saw an increase: in 2012 it was 17.3% among men and 19.7% among women—that is, a gap of 2.4% as opposed to 1.5% in 2011. On the other hand, the number of income support recipients dropped: in 2012 there were 56,619 women receiving income support (325 less than in 2011) versus 47,884 men—a ratio of 1:18. Overall, there was an increase of 1.5% in inequality in terms of the incidence of poverty.

**Education Domain:** This domain shows a decrease in gender inequality in 2012 relative to 2011. In both indicators that comprise the domain—the gap between the numbers of women and men with 13–15 years of education and the gap between women and men with 16 or more years of education—small changes occurred. In 2012, 24% of women and 21% of men had 13 or more years of education. The proportion of women (in the total population of women) with 16 or more years of education rose to 24.2% (as opposed to 24.5% of men in the total population of men). Overall there was a decrease of 1% in gender inequality in education because the ratio of men to women with 13–15 years of education improved in favor of women.

**Power Domain:** There was an increase in gender inequality in this domain in 2012 relative to 2011. The domain is divided into two subdomains: political and economic power. Under political power we examined three indicators: women members of parliament, women government ministers, and women mayors/heads of local or regional councils. In 2012 there were 24 women members of parliament, implying a need for 46 more to attain equality; the number of ministers in government was 3, making the ratio of women to men 0.11 (after the 2013 elections the situation improved in both indicators, but given that all other data pertained to 2012, we examined political power in this year as well); and the rate of women mayors/heads of councils was just 2%, as it had been in 2011. With regard to economic power, women's representation in the top three ranks of the civil service held steady, but more women were hired under senior contracts (34% as opposed to 33% in 2011). By contrast, the indicators of CEOs, senior managers, and women in other managerial positions saw decreased rates of women in these positions, which raised inequality in the power domain by 3.1% in comparison with 2011.

**Health Domain:** The health domain showed no changes in 2012. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the gap in life expectancy between women and men dropped from 4.4 years

in 2004 to 3.7 years in 2012. The ratio between the genders remained fairly stable at 1.04 in favor of women. The gap between women and men in subjective assessment of health also decreased over the years, measuring 0.95 in 2012.

**Family Status Domain:** There was a decrease in gender inequality in this domain in 2012. This can be attributed to a certain narrowing of the gap between the number of single-parent families headed by women versus men (the ratio was 7.87 compared with 9.59 in 2011) and also to a decrease in teen pregnancy rates (ages 15–19) from 12.5 to 11.6. Overall, the family status domain shows a decrease of 8.3% in gender inequality.

To conclude, a comprehensive analysis that compounds all the domains and indicators of the Index shows that gender inequality decreased by 2% in 2012 in comparison with 2011.

## Appendices

### Appendix I: International Gender Indexes

In part, the public and professional validation of indexes rests on their similarity to indexes used in other countries and international organizations. Similar indexes facilitate comparison between Israel and other countries and provide a fuller picture of the situation in the relevant field. Below is an elaboration of the preeminent indexes used in the world (it should be noted that we did not find a gender index that monitors developments in inequality between men and women). The description of the international indexes is followed by a list of indexes in this field developed in Israel.

- **The Gender-related Development Index (GDI)**

Source: United Nations, 1995. This index is a gender-focused expansion of the organization's Human Development Index (HDI). Its components are life expectancy, illiteracy, education, and income. The GDI reflects the situation of women in three domains: health and fertility, empowerment, and labor market. It monitors the impact of its results on the HDI—in other words, it examines the impact of gender inequality on general human development. The GDI is constructed in such a manner as to follow the influence of national achievements on the overall development of each country examined by the HDI. A value of 0 denotes full equality between the genders and 1 indicates full inequality. The operationalization of women's health is expressed by two variables: the rate of mortality in childbirth and the birthrate among young girls. The empowerment domain is also measured via two variables: the rate of women in parliament and the rate of women with higher education. The operationalization of the degree of equality between the genders in the labor market is expressed by women's labor market participation levels.<sup>46</sup>

- **The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)**

Source: United Nations, 1995. The purpose of this index is to measure inequality between men and women all over the world with respect to their active participation in political and economic life- and decision-making processes in their countries. The GEM's components are the rate of women in parliament, the rate of women in key economic positions, and income gaps. Its operationalization is based on three indicators: the rate of women in parliament, the rate of women in economic decision-making positions (administrative, managerial, professional, and technical) and gaps in income between women and men. The GEM is grounded in the concept of agency—that is, what women are capable of executing—and less on their feelings or self-perception.<sup>47</sup>

Both the GDI and the GEM were published in 1995, placing the discussion of gender inequality firmly at center stage. The interest they generated among academics and policy makers raised the need for more systematic gathering of data. However, criticism was leveled at both indexes. It was claimed that they did not measure gender inequality itself, that they were overdetermined, open to interpretation and did not survey all the

46 See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/undp%E2%80%99s-revisions-gender-related-development-index>.

47 See [www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1464988032000125773#.U\\_CWaPI\\_tHg](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1464988032000125773#.U_CWaPI_tHg).

relevant information, and that they did not constitute a means of measuring gender gaps that facilitated international comparisons. One critique claimed: “More importantly, the indicators are not easily interpreted and, in fact, are often misinterpreted, which undermined their usefulness” (Klasen 2007).

- **The Gender Inequality Index (GII)**

Source: United Nations, 2010. This index was developed after its two UN predecessors were subjected to fierce criticism. Its components are health (fertility and maternal mortality), empowerment (rate of women in parliament and education), and rate of women in the labor market.<sup>48</sup>

- **The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI)**

Source: OECD, 2009. This is a special index that examines social structure. The OECD maintains the Gender, Institutions and Development Database, which consists of over sixty indicators of equality between the genders and information on 162 countries. The database was established in 2006 to assist researchers and decision makers in understanding the obstacles that were obstructing the social and economic development of women. The database is constructed on the basis of several key variables that measure gender equality in the traditional manner in terms of education (illiteracy rates, years of study, and so on), health (for example, birthrate and fertility), economic situation, and political situation (rate of women in parliament). The social institutions in the OECD database are perceived as long-term codes for behavior, norms, traditions, and formal laws and informal rules that may contribute to gender inequality in all aspects of life. In addition to these traditional domains, the database consists of indicators of social institutions as reflected in social practices and legal norms that create inequality between women and men. The five institutional domains of the index are family codes, civil liberty, physical fairness, preference for male children, and property rights. The family code deals with institutions that affect women’s capacity for decision making in the home; civil liberty deals with the opportunity to participate in society; physical fairness comprises indicators of violence against women; preference for male children deals with the subject of abortion or mistreatment of women; and the last, property rights, examines women’s access to ownership of certain kinds of assets. Twelve indicators were selected to represent these five domains, each one belonging to one of four categories. To make it possible to rank as many countries as possible, the guiding principle behind the design of the index was availability of information; indeed, the index covers a wide range of countries (102). However, it was designed primarily to examine problems associated with countries in the developing world and does not include countries that are members of the OECD.<sup>49</sup>

- **The Global Gender Gap Index**

Source: The World Economic Forum in collaboration with Harvard University and the University of California, Berkeley, 2006. The index’s components are labor market participation (including wage gaps and rate of managers and senior employees in

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48 See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/gii/>.

49 See <http://genderindex.org>. For more on the development of the index, see Branisa, Klasen, and Ziegler (2009).



economic positions), education, health and survival, and political empowerment (women in parliament, length of terms served).<sup>50</sup>

- **The Gender Equity Index (GEI)**

Source: Social Watch, 2004. Its components are labor market participation, education (illiteracy), and empowerment (senior positions).

- **The African Gender Status Index**

Source: Economic Commission for Africa, 2004. Its components are social power (education, health), economic power (income, labor market participation, access to resources), and political power (senior positions in parliament, public sector, civil society institutions).<sup>51</sup>

- **The Women Social Rights Index**

Source: The CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 2007. This index adds the human rights perspective. It examines whether women's rights are entrenched in the legal systems of countries all over the world and whether governments enforce laws in this regard. The index includes one indicator from each country, which receives a value of one in four.<sup>52</sup>

- **The Global Gender Index**

Source: *Times Higher Education*, 2013. The index maps the percentages of women in academe throughout the world.<sup>53</sup>

- **The Gender Equality Index**

Source: The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), 2013. This is a new index that examines gender inequality in 27 European Union countries over three years. The index's domains are labor (labor market participation, segregation), money (means, economic situation), knowledge (access to education, segregation), time (caregiving and social activities), power (political, economic, and social), and health (situation and access). (The domain of violence was not developed in this index.) Each country is ranked on a scale and compared to the overall European Union average.<sup>54</sup>

## Indexes Developed in Israel

- **Women's Economic Power Index**

Source: Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center, 2013. This is a comparative index that examines women's economic power as opposed to that of men in comparison with the OECD countries. The index consists of ten main variables, including labor (labor market participation rate, ratio of working hours, rate of unemployed women), pay (wage gaps between the genders), education/human capital (percentage of university graduates), power (percentage of managers and rate of parliament members), and business entrepreneurship (percentage of business owners). The results of the index show that women in Israel have less economic power than women in OECD countries, especially with regard to power and

50 See Lopez-Claros and Zahidi (2005).

51 See Economic Commission for Africa 2004, [www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/agdi\\_book\\_final.pdf](http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/agdi_book_final.pdf).

52 See [www.humanrightsdata.com](http://www.humanrightsdata.com).

53 See [www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/the-global-gender-index/2003517.article](http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/the-global-gender-index/2003517.article).

54 See <http://eige.europa.eu/content/document/gender-equality-index-main-findings>.

entrepreneurship. In education, by contrast, Israeli women have full power and even over-representation. These findings align with the findings of our Gender Index.<sup>55</sup>

- **The Equal Value Index**

Source: The Israel Women's Network, 2011. This index focuses on wage gaps between women and men. Its components are women in the labor market (participation rate, rate of women employees, rate of women contract workers, rate of business owners, rate of managers, rate of part- and full-time workers), discrimination against women in the workplace (glass ceiling and mud floor—that is, discrimination from above and below—and sexual harassment), women and career (women's entrepreneurship), Arab women in the labor market, and equal opportunities.<sup>56</sup>

- **The Gender Representation Index**

Source: D&B Israel, 2011. This index analyzes data from 361 leading public companies in the Israeli economy. The companies included were selected according to criteria that included being public companies on Dun's 100 list, in central sectors, and employing more than 100 people. Among the prominent industrial and financial companies included were Bank HaPoalim, Bank Leumi, Fox, and Analyst. The index examines the rate of women in management positions in these companies (board chairs, board members, CEOs or partners or presidents, and managers). The percentage of women serving in each of the positions was examined. The results for 2011 show that women are the minority in almost all positions: only 19% of management, 4% of CEOs, and 4% of board chairs.<sup>57</sup>

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55 See [www.herzliyaconference.org/?CategoryID=584&ArticleID=3543](http://www.herzliyaconference.org/?CategoryID=584&ArticleID=3543).

56 See [www.iwn.org.il](http://www.iwn.org.il).

57 See [www.dunandbradstreet.com/pdf/kendb.pdf](http://www.dunandbradstreet.com/pdf/kendb.pdf).

## Appendix II: Construction of the Gender Index: Methodology

An index is a quantitative estimation of a social phenomenon, based on multiple indicators that pertain to the phenomenon the index seeks to represent and measure. For example, the consumer price index (CPI) is a comprehensive measure of changing prices in various economic sectors and a means of monitoring those changes. An index operationalizes a concept by monitoring measurable manifestations that purportedly reflect its essence, presenting cumulative values of the variables measured for each indicator. An index of nominal variables (for example, variables that are list items, with no significance to their order) is basically a typology. While an index usually focuses on one domain, a typology ordinarily examines the intersection between two or more domains. A scale is yet another type of quantification that can be applied to social phenomena. Unlike an index, it usually includes only one domain.

Gender equality can be defined thus: a situation in which there is no difference between women and men in social, economic, and demographic indexes. Today, significant disparities between women and men exist in every variable examined. While examination of each initial indicator is essential, it is also very important to aggregate the indicators into a single gender index that depicts the overall state of inequality between women and men in society.

### The Consumer Price Index (A Case Study)

The Consumer Price Index expresses, in a single number, a variety of fluctuations in price that affect a broad range of products and commodities. The conceptual problem with this index is that it does not facilitate clear apprehension of the cumulative changes in prices overall. The simple average of all consumer spending throughout the market, as reflected in the Consumer Price Index, reflects changes in consumer behavior in the designated period, as well as changes in prices. On the other hand, the changes in consumer behavior can be isolated by fixing the quantities of goods and calculating the average prices of these goods, weighted according to the volume of consumption. However, the assignation of weights is random in terms of time, and the question arises as to which year's consumption of each commodity should be measured—since afterward, that year should then remain unchanged to facilitate comparison (that is, that year should become the base year). In fact, all consumer price indexes in the world are based on a fixed basket—that is, a predefined group of products. The basket usually reflects the proportional consumption of products and services in a given period. A fixed basket index can therefore be defined as the ratio between the cost of the basket's contents in one period of time and the cost of the same basket's contents in the base year. Prices are usually compared with those in the base year, when the number of products in the basket was determined.

The methodological rationale behind the CPI can be of use to us in the development of the Gender Index. Gender inequality can be defined as the ratio between inequality manifested in a fixed group of socioeconomic indicators in a given time period and inequality manifested in the same group of indicators in the base period. In keeping with this definition the index can

be expressed in the following formula, which depicts an aggregation of changes occurring in the indicators of gender inequality:

$$1) E_t/O^{(c)} = (\sum E_t/O * W) / \sum W$$

E represents inequality in a particular socioeconomic indicator; t represents the period in which it was measured in comparison with the base period (0) in which there was a particular basket of indicators (c). W is the weight assigned to each indicator included in the Index.  $\Sigma$  expresses the sum of the values of all the indicators of gender equality defined by the Index.

$E_0$  is the inequality manifested in the indicator in question during the base period.  $E_t$  is the inequality manifested in the indicator in question during the period being examined.

$$2) E_t/O^{(c)} = E_t/E_0$$

This equation expresses gender equality as represented by the social indicator, relative to the equality represented by the same social indicator in the baseline period.

$$3) W = (E_0 Q_c)^{58}$$

This equation expresses the values of the weights given to each indicator for the purposes of calculating equality, relative to equality in the same indicator in the base year. W is the weight of the indicator in the overall Index based on inequality in this indicator in the baseline period, times its value (Q) during the baseline period (C). As noted above,  $\Sigma$  expresses the sum of the values of all the social indicators included in the group of equality indicators included in the Index. The construct "equality" replaces the construct "cost" used in the Consumer Index.

## Methodological Problems in Construction of the Index

When constructing a gender index, it is necessary to determine which indicators are to be included and what weight to assign each one. In the case of the CPI, these issues are resolved using data gathered by periodic surveys conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics. Such data pertain to the distribution of consumer spending and are presented for a representative sample. In this case the weights express the rate of expenditure on a product from a given basket of goods consumed in the predetermined base period, according to the survey from which the sample is taken. By contrast, the Gender Index has no analogous database that can be used to determine which indicators are to be used and how to assign each of them weights.

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58 The significance of the abbreviation Qc rests on the methodological sources of the Gender Inequality Index, which is based on the Consumer Price Index. In the present Index, the "cost" is inequality. The Index is calculated using a formula equivalent to formula (1) above, according to which the index is the cost of products in period t weighted according to consumption in period C, compared with their cost in the base period O. Each cost is multiplied by the consumption rate to make it possible to predict price increases after adjusting for changes in consumption patterns of the various commodities. In order to change the makeup of the basket and disconnect it from the base year, the CPI's products are weighted in such a way that they equal the cost of each product in period C, multiplied by the relative price of this product, which compares its price in the base year O with its price in period C for the period in which the basket was determined.

Edward Harvey, John Blakely, and Lorne Tepperman (1990) propose constructing an index thus: selection and validation of a group of indicators of equality from the array of existing equality indexes, followed by assignation of equal weights for each of the indexes selected. They argue that this approach has the advantage of being based on existing data, making the resulting index easy to compute and inexpensive. It has the disadvantage of having no theoretical or empirical basis for allocating equal weights to all of the indicators. The authors therefore propose a method that makes it possible to measure the weights for each source of inequality at a certain point in time so as to give the weights an empirical basis. The stages they propose for computing the Gender Index are as follows:

- Data selection and preparation
- Data validation
- Data synthesis
- Index calculation

## Data Selection and Preparation

This process is analogous to the CPI process of identifying a fixed basket of commodities for a relevant target population. Here we must identify socioeconomic indicators that correlate with the construct of gender inequality. In much the same way that the prices of commodities that are not consumer goods are excluded from the CPI, gender gaps in socioeconomic indicators that do not correlate with the construct of gender equality will be excluded from the Gender Index. The process of data selection and preparation consists of three main steps:

- Face validation: The indicator must be assessed to ensure that it represents what it is intended to represent. The process involves examination of all potential indicators to determine which of them pertain to gender equality. This is achieved by answering this question: Does this indicator actually reflect changes in gender equality as we perceive it?
- Repolarization: This process ensures that all the indicators operate in the same direction so that any growth in equality will be expressed as a growth in the indicator, the ratio, or the rate. For example, the ratio between women's salaries and men's salaries increases when equality prevails. On the other hand, the ratio between the number of women working part time and the number of men working part time decreases as equality increases, and the polarity of the indicator must be reversed to reflect this increase.
- Converting into proportions: This involves converting all indicators into units of rates or percentages (if they are not already so) with a score of between 0 and 1 (or 100%). Calculating the average of indicators expressed in such units is statistically more stable than calculating the average of indicators that express different units.

## Data Validation

Validation of the data ensures that indexes of gender equality that we expect to be correlated with one another are indeed correlated, their face validity notwithstanding. The validation method is factor analysis. This procedure requires a given and consecutive series, preferably annual (data collected every year since the base year). The purpose of factor analysis is to

express several variables via a limited number of factors and depict the units of examination in a concise and convenient manner.

The factors are new variables calculated as linear combinations (weighted averages) of the standardized original variables (in other words, each variable has an average of 0 and a variance of 1). Variables require standardization, since different variables are measured in different units: a variable value can be a number, a quotient, or a percentage. It can be measured in New Israeli Shekels or years of schooling. Since our index is an inequality index, all variables are presented in the form of a ratio between the rates of men and women in a given period, thus overcoming the problem of different units. In factor analysis, in order to map the differences in the status of women over time, units are arranged in a series: the first factor is the linear combination that explains most of the variance, and hence discriminates the most between the years. The second factor explains the second largest variance out of the variance that cannot be explained by the first factor, and so on.

In constructing the Index we will use a large group of variables that are by definition highly correlated since they all represent the same social phenomenon. Through factor analysis we can construct a new variable consisting of a series of existing variables. As described above, these factors constitute an orthogonal system of axes within the multidimensional array of variables (because each factor is a linear combination of the original variables and the factors are orthogonal). This kind of analysis is called principal component analysis. The factor analysis also produces the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Index of Sampling Adequacy that helps sift through the data. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index has a dual purpose: it can be used to determine whether the variables belong to the same content area, and it can be used to examine a single variable's contribution to the group in which it has been classified. This index's values range from 0 to 1, and therefore results of 0.5 and up indicate that the indicator indeed belongs to the same content area.

Another important concept is factor loading. Factor loadings are coefficients between the variables and the factor. The size of the factor loading measures the relative importance of each variable, by year. A low factor loading on a variable by all factors can be sifted out of the analysis. There are several options in factor analysis, including rotating axes (factors) to increase the association of each variable with one single factor, where possible, and decrease its association with the other factors. This can lead to each factor significantly expressing a different group of original variables that belong to a certain sphere, such as variables that define education level or standard of living. Therefore we must remember that any interpretation of the meanings of factors is but one of many that could have been obtained by rotating the factors.

Factor analysis will generate the first factor, which in this case can be interpreted as the "gender equality factor." We can expect a very high correlation between the component indexes and the first factor; therefore any factor that loads less than 0.71 on this factor will be rejected and excluded. The criterion of 0.71 was selected based on the rationale that at least half of the indicator's variance is explained by the first factor, "the gender equality factor" (namely, variance = loading squared =  $[0.707]^2 = 0.5$ ). All of the indicators that meet this criterion will be included in the Gender Index. The factor produced will be measured in terms of rate of explained variance and its polarity.

## Data Synthesis

At this stage the annual values of the indicators must be standardized. Each value is recalculated relative to its average and the Standard Deviation (SD) of the series. Standardization is the best way to calculate indicators that are originally in different units—such as currency, number of people, or number of hours—and therefore have different distributions and characteristics. Standardization also compares the weights, which are indicative of the relative importance of each indicator in the overall Index. The results of the standardization enable us to compare indicators using the same units. Thus, for example, we could say that between 2000 and 2005, equality improved by an SD of 1 in terms of relative income, while the relative unemployment rate improved by only half an SD—that is, half as much as the income indicator.

An alternative procedure is to use the weight of each indicator in standard scores to influence their relative importance in the overall index. Some, however, claim that in the absence of any logical theory or empirical data that support giving weights to each indicator, they should be evenly weighted (Harvey, Blakely, and Tepperman 1990, 306).

## Calculation of the Index

This is the final stage in the calculation of the Gender Index. As we saw from the aforementioned formula, this is when we calculate the weighted average of gender inequality as manifested in the social indicators, relative to the equality situation in the base year. The average in the base year is determined to be 100, and index values are determined accordingly. That is, the standard scores for the base year are transformed to make them equal 100. The standard scores for all the other years are transformed so that their values are less than 100 when equality in an indicator decreases relative to the base year and above 100 when equality increases relative to the base year.

To demonstrate such a transformation: If the standard score of one indicator in the base year is  $-1.0$  (or 1 standard deviation below the indicator's average) we will decide that that value,  $z = -1.0$ , equals 100. If the standard score for the following year is  $-0.25$  (or  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a standard deviation below the average), the transformed value will equal the sum of 100 plus the product of the standard deviation and the gap (in terms of standard deviation) between the base year and the following year. Suppose an indicator's standard deviation equals 20. The gap in terms of standard deviation between the base year and the following year is 0.75 (or the gap between  $-1.0$  and  $-0.25$ ). Therefore, the indicator's value for the next year is 115 ( $100 + 0.75[20]$ ).

The last stage involves calculating the index using the aforementioned equation for doing so. To illustrate this calculation by way of an example: Suppose we have six indicators in the Gender Index. In the base year each one of them equals 100 and their values for the following year are 110, 115, 120, 105, 100, and 110, respectively. Moreover, all six indicators have equal weights that get the value of 1. Following the equation, the calculation of the index would be as follows:

$$E_t/0(c) = \frac{(110/100)+(115/100)+(120/100)+(105/100)+(100/100)+(110/100)}{1+1+1+1+1+1} = 1.10$$

The accepted practice is to multiply the index by 100 and express it relative to its value in the base year, which would make the result, in this case, 110. The index moved 10 points toward equality between the two periods—from 100 to 110.

## Calculating the Gender Index

As indicated above, to calculate the index we need a data series that goes back a few years, preferably an extended one. Indicators usually present two typical problems: some have the necessary number of values but do not have face validity—that is, they do not measure gender equality; other indicators have face validity but do not have enough continuity of measurement or enough values to provide a statistical basis for evaluating missing values.

### The Algorithm for Calculating the Gender Index

1. Selection of a series of indicators that have face validity: checking that the indicator assesses what it is intended to measure (face validation). This involves examining all potential indicators to determine which of them is pertinent to the assessment of gender equality. We set out to determine whether each indicator expressed changes in gender equality. This was a two-stage process consisting of descriptive analysis and preliminary screening.
 

**Descriptive analysis:** Analysis of the initial list of variables, including statistical indexes for analyzing the distribution of each one independently according to distribution parameters, distribution symmetry, and extreme values. We also calculated coefficients between pairs of variables. The purpose of these measures was to reduce the number of variables and avoid including overly influential variables or highly correlated variables. When the Pearson coefficient between two variables is higher than 0.8, the possibility of excluding one of them from the Index should be considered. The rule was that variables representing different social phenomena would be included despite being highly correlated, while variables representing the same phenomenon should preferably have symmetrical distribution, high variance (differences between instances), and low correlations between them.

**Preliminary screening:** Preliminary screening of suitable indicators was accomplished on the basis of

  - a. the indicator's relevance to gender issues in Israeli society;
  - b. reliable data for every point of time, to ensure consistency of the Index;
  - c. consistency with other studies. It was important to include as many variables used in other studies on gender equality as possible so as to facilitate comparison with other studies and contribute to the discussion of the subject. At this stage we recommend consultation with relevant agents in the field of gender in order to achieve as broad a consensus as possible for the Index.
2. Repolarization of the indicators so that they all express decreasing gender equality: this process ensures that all measures operate in the same direction—that is, increase along with gender equality. For example, the ratio between the salaries of men and women rises when equality is attained. Conversely, the ratio between the part-time employment rates




of men and women decreases when equality is achieved, and the direction of this indicator must hence be reversed.

3. Examining the construct validity of the indicators by means of factor analysis: factor analysis is used to predict the gender equality factor that will emerge from the statistical process used to determine what links the variables that have been selected and examines the correlation of each indicator with that factor.
4. Rejecting data sets with an explained variance of less than 0.71 according to the first predictive factor: factor analysis will lead to the factorization of a first factor, which in this case can also be interpreted as the "gender equality factor." We can expect a very high correlation between the component indexes and the first factor; therefore, any factor that loads less than 0.71 on that factor will be rejected and eliminated from the Index. The criterion of 0.71 was selected based on the rationale that at least half of the variance of the indicator (namely, variance = loading squared =  $(0.71)^2 = 0.5$ ) is explained by the first factor, "the gender equality factor." All the indicators that were not rejected in this process will be included in the Gender Index.
5. Standardizing of data as described above.
6. Assigning indicators to domains and calculating the averages in each domain: at this stage we divide the data sets into topics and use factor analysis to reexamine which sets fit together and do not negate each other. The areas in which we will examine gender inequality are naturally those that appear in international gender indexes: the labor market, health, political representation, and so on. Our objective was to challenge the standard list of areas in which gender inequality is measured and identify new ones that are derived from feminist principles. We therefore added the examination of women of different social statuses, violence against women, and women in Arab society in Israel.
7. Weighting by area or on a theoretical empirical basis: at this stage the Index's formula is consolidated and the proper weights are given to each domain. Considerations in determining the various weights might be theoretical (that is, based on a theory regarding which areas influence gender inequality and to what extent) or empirical (based on research data such as a survey of which aspects of inequality bother women more than others). At this stage of the research, we cannot establish weights, and therefore the assumption is that each area has the same impact on the general Index. Accordingly, the formula for calculating the index by its domains is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{The index} = & 1/10^*(\text{labor market})^2 + 1/10^*(\text{violence})^2 + 1/10^*(\text{periphery})^2 + \\ & 1/10^*(\text{Arab society})^2 + 1/10^*(\text{poverty})^2 + 1/10^*(\text{education})^2 + 1/10^*(\text{power})^2 + \\ & 1/10^*(\text{health})^2 + 1/10^*(\text{segregation of professions})^2 + 1/10^*(\text{family status})^2 \end{aligned}$$

8. Calculating the index average for all the years of measurement.
9. Setting the average for the base year at 100. The base year is randomly determined and serves mainly as a point of origin for comparison.
10. Calculating the current year's Index in comparison with that of the base year. (The base year can be changed and the Index recalculated. The interyear values will be maintained.)

## Israel Gender Index Model



## Selection of Variables to be Included in the Gender Index

The variables included in the Index must be consecutive series going back several years so their relevance to factors that explain gender inequality can be examined. They must also have potential for continued measurement because our intention is to update the Index every year. Stable data series are mostly found in CBS publications and to a lesser extent in NII publications.

Given that the agencies that have been collecting data in Israel over the years are not committed to gender equality, much of the data collected is not gender disaggregated. Moreover, the categories determined and the subjects researched by those agencies are biased toward the men's sphere and its topical dictates.

There is rarely adequate data regarding women's status and experiences, including violence against women, the distribution of resources within the nuclear family, state allocation of resources by gender, compound disaggregation by ethnicity and gender, and more. These technical but critical constraints limit the indicators that can be included in the Index. The preliminary screening of the relevant variables was performed according to the considerations described above.

## Indicators That Were Considered but Not Included in the Present Index

As noted, not all the indicators that were considered were ultimately included in this Index. A list of the excluded indicators and the reasons for their exclusion follows. Some of them may be included in future iterations of the Index.

- Murder of women by their partners: according to the standard analysis—rate per 1000 women. Fluctuation is negligible in this indicator.
- Arrest of men for domestic violence offenses: data are available only for the years 2008–2013.
- Arrest of men for sex offenses: data are available only for the years 2008–2013.
- Prison sentences for men convicted of domestic violence offenses: data are available only for the years 2007–2013.
- Rate of repeated incarceration of prisoners convicted of domestic violence offenses: data are available only for the years 2007–2013.
- Prison sentences for prisoners convicted of sex offenses: data are available only for the years 2007–2013.
- Rate of repeated incarceration of sex offenders: data are available only for the years 2007–2013.
- Rate of participation of men and women aged 15 and up in the civilian labor force in Israel, Ashkenazim versus Mizrahim: does not belong to any existing domain in the index; future indexes will examine ethnic gaps.
- Ratio between the number of Arab women and Arab men who are members of parliament: the number of women Arab MKs is too low.
- Rates of women and men who report diabetes: data were collected only for 2003, 2004, and 2009.
- Rates of women and men who report a disability or a severe disability: data were collected only for 2003, 2004, and 2009.
- Rates of women and men who report physical activity: data were collected only for 2003, 2004, and 2009.
- Rates of women and men with a high BMI: data were collected only for 2003 and 2004.
- Number of domestic violence investigators in the Israeli police by religion and gender: figures were published only for 2010.
- Rate of Jewish versus Arab girls in preschool and public and city day care centers: no gender disaggregated data.
- Division of domestic responsibilities between married people aged 20 and up: data exist only for 2009.
- Overall fertility rate of women in Israel.
- Fertility rate of Arab women in Israel.
- Average age of mother at first birth—overall population.
- Average age of mother at first birth—Arab society.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> The last four indicators were eliminated because of disagreement over whether they are directly pertinent to gender inequality.

## The Indicator Selection Process: Partial Results of Factor Analysis

The statistical procedure of factor analysis allows us to select indicators by determining which of them are associated with the same hypothesized factor. Like many statistical procedures, however, factor analysis requires numerous observations—between 100 and 300 (Field 2005). Another variable that must be taken into account is the number of indicators: the ratio between the number of variables in each indicator and the number of indicators should be at least 1:2. In other words, to examine a list of fifty indicators of gender inequality, each indicator should include at least one hundred observations. Since we are working with years, this is not feasible, and we therefore had to conduct the factor analysis in stages, dividing the indicators into groups (some of the simulations we ran are presented below). Because of these constraints, most gender indexes include strong indicators that have reliable data from consecutive multiannual measurements, but these are not an exhaustive representation of the phenomenon of gender inequality. Since our goal was to present a broader picture of gender inequality, we had to compromise the sample size of each indicator and thereby limit the robustness of the results of the factor analysis used to select indicators.

Before performing the factor analysis, we examined the correlation between each pair of indicators: when no correlation between them was found, we concluded that factor analysis would not provide us with any additional information, because they appeared unrelated to the hypothesized variable of the factor analysis. Conversely, if we found high or full correlation between two indicators, it would be impossible to isolate each of their contributions to the hypothesized factor, which would indicate that the analysis was invalid. Therefore, examining correlations between pairs of indicators was another tool used to select indicators. Another preliminary stage before factor analysis, which also contributed to indicator selection, was an examination of whether their distributions were normal, or at least not overtly contrary to a normal distribution. Sharp ups or downs might have impaired the factor analysis.

Several indicators were thus filtered out—for example, in the areas of education and poverty. All the education indicators are correlated with each other. We selected two—people with 13–15 years of education and people with 16 or more years of education—and the indicators of undergraduate degrees and at least 13 years of education were dropped. Poverty after transfer payments and poverty before transfer payments are highly correlated; we retained the former because it is related to the involvement of the welfare system. Because of the limitations of the analysis—a result of the limited number of observations for each indicator—we performed factor analysis of each indicator within its domain and examined the correlations of each indicator with other similar indicators and with all indicators. This constituted another stage of indicator selection. Table II-a below shows the results of the factor analysis of the variables.

Table II-a

## Factor Analysis of All Indicators in the Index

Component Matrix\*

		Component							
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
w_participation100	labor market participation	.900							
w_parttime100	Part-time work	.626	.520						
w_salary100	Average monthly salary	.907							
w_wage100	Average hourly wage		.654				.601		
w_temp100	Contract workers						-.519	.508	
w_housewife_part	Housewives working part-time	-.824							
w_housewife_unempl	Unemployed housewives			-.495	-.529	.432			
w_median_salary	Median monthly salary		-.792	.474					
educ_13_15_100	Those with 13-15 years of education	.438	.731						
educ_17_100	Those with 16+ years of education	.804	-.501						
pov_after100	Prevalence of poverty		-.739						
pov_benef100	Income support	.584	.599						
pol_parl100	Members of parliament	.828							
pol_minister100	Government ministers	-.800							
pol_muni100	Mayors/Council Heads				.662		.437		
pol_general_manager100	CEOs	.823				.512			
pol_senior_manager100	Senior managers	.734	-.630						
pol_other_manager100	Other managers	.821							
pol_highest_position100	Senior civil servants	.973							
pol_senior_contract100	Senior contracted civil servants	.890							
h_expectancy100	Life expectancy	-.825							
h_mortality100	Mortality rate		.713					-.433	
h_feeling100	Perception of health	.541	-.742						
a_participation100	Arab society labor market participation	.965							
a_parttime100	Arab society part-time		.722						
a_salary100	Arab society average monthly salary	.702		-.640					
a_wage100	Arab society average hourly wage				.496	-.651			
a_educ1315_100	Those with 13-15 years of education – Arab society	-.581		.410	.648				
a_educ16_100	Those with 16+ years of education – Arab society	.895							
a_complaints100	Domestic violence complaints by Arab women	-.912							
a_fertility15_19	Arab teen pregnancies	.956							
a_age_marry	Arab society marriage age					.719			
v_sex_abuse_complaints100	Calls to rape crisis centers	.862							
v_sex_abuse_cases100	Cases transferred to police	-.659			-.514				
v_violence_abuse_victims100	Women treated at welfare centers	-.903							
v_violence_cases100	Domestic violence cases	.826			.444				
v_violence_cases_closed100	Cases closed for lack of evidence			-.504	.416	.425			
p_participation100	Participation in the periphery	.674			-.690				
p_salary100	Monthly salary in the periphery				.789				
seg_engineer_architect100	Engineers and architects	.736			.507				
seg_doctors100	Doctors and pharmacists	.683			-.655				
seg_judge_lawyer100	Judges and lawyers		.701			.424			
seg_teaching100	Educators	.781		.498					
seg_carry100	Caregivers			.772		.429			
seg_hitec100h	HiTech employees	.758	.424			-.456			
segregation_professions	Segregation of professions	.784	.535						
segregation_disciplines	Segregation of occupations	.754	.515						
family_fertility_15_19	Teen pregnancies	.939							
family_single_parent_family	Single parent families	.480	.585						
family_age_marry	Average marriage age	.533	-.638						

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

\* 8 components extracted.

Table II-b

Component Matrix\*

Component	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	22.910	45.819	45.819
2	8.425	16.850	62.669
3	5.664	11.328	73.997
4	4.418	8.835	82.832
5	3.432	6.863	89.695
6	2.109	4.218	93.913
7	1.888	3.775	97.688
8	1.156	2.312	100.000

As Table II-b shows, 46% of the variance of all indicators over the 2004–2012 period is explained by the first factor, 17% by the second factor, and 11% by the third factor. Table II-c below presents several samples of factor analysis on various domains of the Index.

Table II-c

Samples of Domain Factor Analyses

## Labor Market Domain Indicators

Component Matrix\*

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
w_participation100	.826			
w_parttime100	.789			
w_salary100	.973			
w_wage100	.488	.504	-.677	
w_temp100		.608	.634	
w_housewife_part	-.726	.498		
w_housewife_unempl			.503	.781
w_median_salary		-.908		

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

\* 4 components extracted.

## Power Domain Indicators

## Component Matrix

	Component	
	1	2
pol_par100	.827	
pol_minister100	-.824	
pol_muni100	-.448	.807
pol_general_manager100	.888	
pol_senior_manager100	.833	
pol_other_manager100	.883	
pol_highest_position100	.956	
pol_senior_contract100	.810	

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

\* 2 components extracted.

## Health Domain Indicators

## Component Matrix

	Component
	1
h_expectancy100	.875
h_mortality100	.919
h_feeling100	-.888

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

\* 1 component extracted.

## Arab Society Domain Indicators

## Component Matrix\*

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
a_participation100	.953			
a_parttime100	.569			.422
a_salary100	.802		-.579	
a_wage100		.756	-.554	
a_educ1315_100	-.591	.554	.417	
a_educ16_100	.831		.450	
a_complaints100	-.986			
a_fertility15_19	.938			
a_age_marry		-.500		.750

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

\* 4 components extracted.

### Violence Domain Indicators

	Component	
	1	2
v_sex_abuse_complaints100	-.743	
v_sex_abuse_cases100	.851	
v_violence_abuse_victims100	.922	
v_violence_cases100	-.923	
v_violence_cases_closed100	.514	.856

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

\* 2 components extracted.

### Gendered Segregation of Professions Domain Indicators

Component Matrix\*

	Component		
	1	2	3
seg_engineer_architect100	.878		
seg_doctors100		-.800	
seg_judge_lawyer100		.651	.602
seg_teaching100	.797		-.547
seg_carry100		.877	
seg_hitec100h	.810		
segregation_professions	.911		
segregation_disciplines	.899		

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

\* 3 components extracted.

### Family Status Domain Indicators

Component Matrix\*

	Component	
	1	2
family_fertility_15_19	.915	
family_single_parent_family	.748	-.568
family_age_marry		.906

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

\* 2 components extracted.



## Appendix III: The Index without Each of the Domains

This appendix addresses the question of the degree to which the Index is dependent on each one of its constituent domains. To this end we examined the trajectory of the Index with each one of the domains removed in turn. The result was as anticipated: the Index is not dependent on any particular domain. Nevertheless, although we grouped them, the units in each indicator and domain are different, and the degree of variance in each indicator is hence derived from the size of the population in which it was measured. For example, in the political power domain, the rate of change is high and the fluctuations more dramatic because the numbers of parliament members and ministers are low. On the other hand, the influence of one woman in a position of power is much larger than that of another woman who is, say, an active participant in the labor market. We therefore contend that changes in the numeric ratio between women and men in politics are likely to have great impact on the Gender Index. The table below presents the impact of each domain on the overall Index, and Figures 3a-j present the Index with each one of the domains removed in turn. They show that in no case does the removal of a domain affect the Index's trajectory; it remains stable in all cases (when the Arab society and family status domains are removed, the incline is somewhat less steep, but the trend remains the same; the removal of the poverty domain has a negligible effect; the removal of the power domain makes the incline steeper but does not affect the trend; the removal of the other domains has no effect whatsoever). Figure 3k is a repetition of Figure 1 in the report itself, presenting the overall Index with all ten domains.

### Discrepancy between the Overall Index's Incline and the Incline When Each One of the Domains Is Removed

Removed Domain	Index Formula	Discrepancy between the Overall Index's Incline and the Incline When Each One of the Domains Is Removed
Labor market	$y = -0.0065x + 1.0437$	0.001
Segregation of professions	$y = -0.0045x + 1.0438$	-0.001
Violence against women	$y = -0.007x + 1.0396$	0.0015
Periphery	$y = -0.0056x + 1.0461$	0.0001
Arab society	$y = -0.0043x + 1.0448$	-0.0012
Poverty	$y = -0.0055x + 1.044$	0
Education	$y = -0.0051x + 1.0471$	-0.0004
Power	$y = -0.0068x + 1.0306$	0.0013
Health	$y = -0.0062x + 1.0463$	0.0007
Family status	$y = -0.0033x + 1.0429$	-0.0022

As the table shows, without the Arab society and family status domains, the slope becomes a little bit smaller but the overall trend remains. The poverty domain has negligible effect, and without the power domain the slope is steeper, but even without it, the Index's trajectory remains the same. Other domains have no impact.

Figure 3a

The Gender Index without the Labor Market Domain




Figure 3b

The Gender Index without the Gendered Segregation of Professions Domain




Figure 3c

The Gender Index without the Violence against Women Domain




Figure 3d

The Gender Index without the Periphery Domain




Figure 3e

The Gender Index without the Arab Society Domain




Figure 3f

The Gender Index without the Poverty Domain




Figure 3g

The Gender Index without the Education Domain




Figure 3h

The Gender Index without the Power Domain




Figure 3i

The Gender Index without the Health Domain




Figure 3j

The Gender Index without the Family Status Domain





Figure 3k

The Gender Index with All Ten Domains



## Appendix IV: The Index without Squaring of the Domains

As noted above, the formula for calculation of this Index is:

$$\text{Index} = 1/10 * (\text{labor market})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{violence})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{periphery})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{Arab society})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{poverty})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{education})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{power})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{health})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{professional segregation})^2 + 1/10 * (\text{family status})^2$$

This formula was employed by the OECD in the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) to measure gender inequality in social institutions and to connect the various domains. The formula assigns equal weights to all the domains. As noted, in the absence of an empirical or theoretical means of determining the weights, since we have no way of prioritizing one domain over another, the common solution is equal distribution. The function selected by the OECD is not linear, assuming that gender inequality is connected to the disadvantaging of women. When inequality increases, this disadvantaging increases at a higher rate, and inequality has more weight in each domain. Nonlinearity also implies that there can be only partial compensation between the Index's domains. In other words, high inequality in one domain can only partially be counteracted by low inequality in another domain.

These considerations led us too to adopt this formula for estimating inequality. However, we wanted to examine the impact of the choice to square each domain. To this end we examined the results of the Index without squaring each domain by means of an equation that aggregates them all. Figure 4a shows the rates of change from year to year without squaring. Figure 4b presents the results of the Gender Index with equal weights for each domain without squaring of their values.



Figure 4a

The Gender Index 2004–2012: Rates of Change in Each Year in Comparison to the Preceding Year, without Squaring





Figure 4b

Results of the Gender Index 2004–2012, without Squaring



The figures show that without squaring, inequality is more stable and its highs and lows less extreme, but the trend remains the same. A small increase in inequality in 2004–2007 is evident. Between 2008 and 2009 inequality decreased, but in 2010 it increased, and in 2011–2012 there was improvement and inequality decreased.

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Table 18.1: "Persons with Functional Limitations (in at Least One Daily Activity), by Age and Socio-Demographic Characteristics," [www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/health\\_survey09\\_1500/pdf/t18\\_1.pdf](http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/health_survey09_1500/pdf/t18_1.pdf)

Table 25.1: "Persons Who Engage in Physical Activity at Least 3 Times a Week, by Age, Sex and Socio-Demographic Characteristics," [www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/health\\_survey09\\_1500/pdf/t25\\_1.pdf](http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/health_survey09_1500/pdf/t25_1.pdf)

Table 28: "Body Mass Index (BMI) of 30 or More (Based on Self-Reported Weight and Height)," [www.cbs.gov.il/www/publications/briut\\_survey/pdf/int\\_tab28.pdf](http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/publications/briut_survey/pdf/int_tab28.pdf)

Table 43: "Married Persons Aged 20 and Up, by Role in the Home and Selected Characteristics" [in Hebrew], [www.cbs.gov.il/publications11/seker\\_hevrati09/pdf/t43.pdf](http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications11/seker_hevrati09/pdf/t43.pdf)

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World Economic Forum, *The Global Gender Gap Report 2012*, [www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\\_GenderGap\\_Report\\_2012.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2012.pdf)

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The Gender Index, an innovative tool developed by **WIPS – The Center for the Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere**, serves to evaluate gender inequality in Israel across a spectrum of fields over time. The 2014 Gender Index is based on the calculation of gender inequality in Israel in ten key domains: the labor market, gendered segregation of professions, violence against women, gender inequality in the periphery, gender inequality in Arab society in Israel, poverty, education, power, health, and family status. The Gender Index's contribution lies in its systematic examination of data in a variety of spheres over several years, to provide an overall depiction of the state of gender inequality in Israel.

Unlike other gender indexes, the Gender Index takes into account aspects of gender inequality that address issues of diversity and deep social structures of inequality—for example, Arab society, gendered segregation in the workforce, and violence against women.

The Gender Index is a tool to develop public discourse and awareness regarding the varied expressions of gender inequality. Furthermore, as a monitor of the status of women in Israel, it is a powerful tool for evaluating Israeli state policies and initiatives directed at increasing gender equality and promoting social justice.



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