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1. Hamas-Angriff auf Israel

Nach dem großangelegten Überraschungsangriff gegen Israel, den blutigen Massakern bei einer Tanzparty und in den unweit vom Gazastreifen gelegenen Kibbuzim und Ortschaften hat Israels Regierung der islamistischen Terrororganisation Hamas den Krieg erklärt. Die Hamas griff aus der Luft, am Boden und vom Meer aus an. Kämpfer und palästinensische Zivilisten durchbrachen die militärischen Sperranlagen und zogen mordend durch die israelischen Ortschaften, wo die Bevölkerung über Stunden auf Hilfe der Armee wartete. Mehr als 200 Menschen, darunter Kinder, Frauen und Alte wurden in den Gazastreifen verschleppt. Angehörige warnen aus Sorge um das Schicksal der Entführten vor einer Bodenoffensive und fordern, Verhandlungen zur Freilassung der Geiseln. Katar, Ägypten oder auch die Türkei sind als potentielle Vermittler im Gespräch. Aus dem Ausland und teilweise auch innerhalb Israels werden Mahnungen an die israelische Regierung und den Sicherheitsapparat laut, sich beim Kampf gegen die Islamisten an das humanitäre Völkerrecht zu halten und die Zivilbevölkerung im Gazastreifen zu verschonen. Israel hatte in den ersten Tagen die Lieferung von Wasser, Nahrungsmitteln, Strom und Treibstoff eingestellt, versorgt den Gazastreifen inzwischen aber wieder mit Wasser. Hunderttausende Palästinenser_innen, die der Aufforderung Israels gefolgt und aus dem nördlichen Gazastreifen an die Grenze mit Ägypten geflüchtet

sind, warten nun auf die Öffnung der Grenze durch Ägypten.

Ignoring the Palestinians brings intifada, history shows

(...) Over the last few weeks, amid efforts to advance an American-Saudi agreement leading to normalization with Israel, it appears that the Palestinian issue has again been pushed to the sidelines. President Joe Biden and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, each eager for an agreement for his own reasons, will not let the Palestinian issue scuttle progress toward the emerging agreement. (...) Therefore, there is a strong possibility of an American-Saudi agreement that will facilitate Saudi uranium enrichment but will not include any practical steps that will irreversibly advance the two-state solution. An example of such a step would be the transfer of half of the West Bank territory currently defined as Area C to the status of Area B, placing these territories under Palestinian civil authority. Bin Salman has no problem attempting to satisfy the Palestinian Authority with money and words. Neither does Netanyahu. The money is not his and his attitude toward verbal promises is well known. (...) A violent conflagration in the entire territory from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, is the strategic goal of both Iran and Hamas. They consistently and forcefully strive for this goal. (...) A violent confrontation on the ground, which would cost numerous casualties, is not viewed as a threat by the

extremists in Israel's government. On the contrary, in their eyes, it is a harbinger of redemption. (...)
Dr. Ephraim Sneh, YED, 05.10.23

Israel Must Smash Hamas. But Then What?

(...) a fundamentally misguided strategic concept was the root cause of the overall failure; the belief that we were so strong that we could address the Hamas threat solely through static defense, that Hamas was deterred and focused on governance and living conditions in Gaza, and that this situation could be perpetuated indefinitely even in the absence of any diplomatic horizon. Policies of stasis never work in the long-term. Hamas is and always has been a radical and murderous terrorist organization, bent on Israel's destruction, not a diplomatic resolution of the conflict and accommodation in the interim. (...) Israel must now deal Hamas an unequivocal defeat. There will be a strong temptation to conquer all of Gaza, root out Hamas' and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's tens of thousands of rockets and even topple Hamas. The cost of doing so will be heavy, but the cost of not doing so even heavier. (...) The critical question, however, is what happens on the day after we topple Hamas (...)? What happens after we withdraw? The way to turn this into a win for Israel, is to try to take advantage of the new situation that would be created, to facilitate a restoration of PA control in Gaza. (...) With the help of the U.S., Egypt and others, however, along with a concerted Israeli effort to rebuild the PA's stature in the West Bank and a sincere commitment to diplomacy once the dust has settled, it may prove possible. The alternatives are a protracted and bloody reoccupation of Gaza, or a limited response which will achieve little more than temporarily postpone the next round. (...)

Chuck Freilich, HAA, 08.10.23

Hamas is a terrorist organization - and must be treated as such

The barbaric actions of Hamas on Saturday should appall every decent human being. They were shocking. (...) The destruction of Israel and the massacre of Jews are written in the Hamas charter. They are part of its *raison d'être*. In its DNA. (...) world leaders who today firmly condemn Hamas will inevitably drag out their tired admonitions about a "proportionate response." But what counts as proportionate to a deliberate murderous onslaught that results in the death of hundreds of innocent people? The world must (...) internalize, that when you're dealing with a terrorist organization like Hamas, the enemy is not

playing by any normal moral rules. Anyone who questioned why Israel responded in the past with live fire to Palestinian rioters on the Gaza border should now regret that Israel did not disperse the most recent disturbances. No Gazan, armed or unarmed, should have been allowed to get close to the security fence. (...) Israel previously managed to put a halt to rounds of hostilities from Gaza by allowing an inflow of Qatari money and permitting more Palestinian Gazan workers to enter Israel on the theory that this would ease the overall economic difficulties there and hence reduce the tension and likelihood of attack. We have seen what a tragic mistake that was. While Israel was making humanitarian and economic gestures, the Hamas regime in Gaza was meticulously planning its mega-attack. And this is another message to the world: You cannot appease terrorism. (...)

Editorial, JPO, 09.10.23

Time is ripe for destroying Hamas for good

(...) Israelis should demand no less than a resounding victory over the Palestinian terrorists who orchestrated what many have already called Israel's 9/11. (...) At the least, this war should end with the complete destruction of the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip. (...) Israel's leaders (...) wrongly believed that fences and other barriers would prevent Palestinian terrorists in Gaza from infiltrating Israeli territory. (...) There was a time when Israel's policy was to eradicate threats to its security. During the War of Independence and the Six-Day War, Israel didn't build fences hoping that it wouldn't get attacked. Instead, the IDF went to where the threats were and destroyed them. (...) Israel must do in the Gaza Strip what it did in the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War – go into the territory and wipe out the terrorists so that Gaza can never be used as a base to attack Israelis ever again. (...) there will probably never be a better time to destroy the terrorist regime in Gaza than now, because no one can realistically expect Israel to show the same kind of restraint it has in previous Gaza conflicts, not even the Biden administration. Israel now has the leeway it needs to do what it needs to do – eradicate the terrorist threat from the Gaza Strip once and for all.

Jason Shvili, IHY, 11.10.23

It's time to rip off the Hamas band-aid

(...) In the wake of recent events, Israel cannot be satisfied with any other goal than the elimination of Hamas in Gaza as a military and governing body. Anything less would be an Israeli failure. (...) One

option is a massive and complex ground operation, with no regard to duration and cost, while the second option is to create conditions where life in Gaza becomes unsustainable. (...) In order for this to happen, Israel needs to demand four key points with greater determination than ever before: 1. The entire population of Gaza will either move to Egypt or move to the Gulf. (...) 2. Every vehicle in Gaza is considered a military vehicle transporting combatants (...) and it does not matter whether it is transporting water or other critical supplies. 3. The UN secretary-general has initiated humanitarian aid to Gaza. The Israeli condition for any aid should be a visit by the Red Cross to Israeli hostages and especially the civilians among them. Until this happens, no aid of any kind will be permitted to enter into Gaza. (...) It will not be possible to remove Hamas without exerting pressure (...) Gaza will become a place where no human being can exist, and I say this as a means rather than an end. I say this because there is no other option for ensuring the security of the State of Israel. We are fighting an existential war.

Giora Eiland, YED, 12.10.23

There must be victory, no matter the cost

(...) Since Israel's misguided unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, and continuing since the Hamas takeover in 2007, every Israeli government shared the same unspoken strategic goal for that territory. The accepted belief and naïve approach was that as long as quiet reigned on our southern border, a blind eye would be turned to the growing fundamentalism and military capabilities there. (...) On October 7th, everything changed – and with it, Israel's strategic goals must change. (...) No longer will limited success be sufficient, it no longer is quite an acceptable objective. (...) a new strategy is vital, and a new goal is imperative. The complete and utter destruction of all terrorist capabilities in Gaza, and later in Lebanon, is the only tenable goal. The nightmare we are currently living through cannot be replayed ever again. Our government and military must guarantee that our current objective is not a short-term reprieve, but rather a final verdict. (...) Once Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and later Hezbollah are left impotent, then and only then, will our strategic goals be realized. Removing all terrorist threats from our southern and northern borders will command a very high and painful price, but the alternative has sadly proven to be even more dreadful. Our strategic goals must be clear and unwavering and can be summed up in one word. Victory. (...)

Ari Harow, JPO, 14.10.23

Urging restraint on Israel in the face of unrestrained barbarism

It is ironic that Israel, a country over which a pall of dread has settled, should have to suffer being lectured to by well-intentioned sympathisers on the importance of exercising restraint in its military responses to Hamas. A horrific scenario is being replayed here. The murderous attacks by Hamas, carried out indiscriminately and without a trace of compassion for the victims, are being balanced against the ethically driven manoeuvres by the IDF to recover hostages and destroy once and for all an enemy which has set its sights on the utter destruction of Israel and the deaths of all Jews who live there. (...) Israel urges Gaza citizens to get out of potential battle zones; Hamas orders them to stay put and blocks the routes by which they might escape from danger. Hamas thrives on the destruction of human life in the name of their fanatical ideology. Under such extreme provocation, the IDF is governed by an ethical code which runs deep in the Jewish psyche and will not be shaken. Those who watch from the sidelines range from horrified Israel sympathisers to jubilant antisemites who seize the opportunity to beat their pro-Palestinian drum. The collective mind of the latter fails to distinguish between the need to challenge the societal iniquities within Israel and the urgent need to condemn unequivocally the savagery of a terrorist group committed to genocide. (...)

Harold Behr, TOI, 14.10.23

Israel Must Topple Hamas' Genocidal Regime. But Not by Killing Countless Palestinian Civilians

(...) Hamas' genocidal aspirations are to exterminate all Jews living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, unless they agree to live under a totalitarian Islamic regime. (...) That's why Hamas never agreed to peace with Israel, but only negotiated a temporary ceasefire ("hudna") without giving up on its genocidal long-term ambition. (...) All the countries which contribute to the Gaza Strip, through NGOs, UNRWA and various humanitarian projects since Hamas took control of the Gaza by force in 2007, they in their own way have become a permanent part of the Hamas government. Their financing of the civilian needs in the Gaza Strip helped Hamas relieve its duty to care for their own people's fate. This facilitated Hamas investing its funds in building military power, its own salaries and

corruption, without fearing that the poor and the starving would rebel against them. What the international community did in Gaza is akin to the prospect of European countries taking responsibility for the civil needs of the local population in Syria and Iraq under the control of the ISIS, or in Taliban Afghanistan. (...) in order for the international community to fulfill its obligations to help Israel prevent another attempted genocide of the Jewish people and to topple the Hamas genocidal regime, the Palestinian civilians in the Gaza strip cannot be the sacrifice. (...) In the absence of real possibility for the rapid departure of all civilians who are not Hamas fighters from the Strip, an Israeli ground invasion could result in unprecedented damage to Palestinian civilians. (...) the international community should urgently conduct diplomatic negotiations for the Hamas leadership to leave to a third country, like the PLO left Lebanon in 1983 to Tunisia, and restore control there to the Palestinian Authority. What is needed is a diplomatic solution of any kind that could give enough guaranties to Israel that the last attack by the Hamas will never be repeated. (...) Such a proposal seems illusory, but there must be some diplomatic initiatives attractive enough to both sides that would make it possible to stop a rolling catastrophe. (...)

Eitay Mack, HAA, 15.10.23

2. Wie war das möglich? Kritik an Netanyahu und den Sicherheitsdiensten

Das Versagen der israelischen Sicherheitsdienste, die den Angriff der Hamas nicht haben verhindern können, wird in Medien und Teilen der Bevölkerung vor allem Ministerpräsident Benjamin Netanyahu zur Last gelegt, der seit knapp 14 Jahre mit kurzen Unterbrechungen das Land regiert. Seine Strategie, Zahlungen aus Katar für den Gazastreifen zu erlauben, um die Hamas damit ruhigstellen und gleichzeitig die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde in Ramallah zu schwächen, hat sich auf tragische Weise gerächt, Darüber hinaus haben sich die Streitkräfte auf die Sicherheitslage im Westjordanland konzentrierten, wo es seit Monaten zu Provokationen von Siedler_innen und zu Auseinandersetzungen zwischen militanten Palästinenser_innen und israelischen Sicherheitskräften kam. Beobachter_innen gehen davon aus, dass Netanyahus Tage als Regierungschef gezählt sind.

Hamis offensive is a failure of the government

(...) terrorists freely roaming the southern cities, kidnappings, street shootings, paratroopers, and thousands of missiles attacking different parts of the country all at once. Historically, this morning will be recorded as a "failure" in every aspect. The concept (again) collapsed, and the heavy prices citizens paid for the flawed conduct of decision-makers are unbearable and appalling. (...) Deterrence (...) is achieved by building a strong perception among foes that it's unwise to mess with the IDF and the Israeli security apparatus. However, deterrence is also achieved by a political leadership capable of creating loyalty and unity and managing all segments of the population. In this aspect, the current government has utterly and clearly failed. (...) Despite all criticism towards politicians, their decisions are based on the information and intelligence provided by security personnel. A political echelon can only formulate policy based on what it hears from its professionals. And in matters of security, the government's professionals are the military commanders, the Shin Bet, and the Mossad. They are supposed to paint the most accurate picture and enable politicians to make the best decisions. If the assessments are not good, the decisions will naturally be bad. (...) the hardest blow the terrorists inflicted on Israel is the psychological, moral one. The deterrence collapsed, and the horrifying images flooding the social networks, including bodies of civilians, abductees, street fights, and burning IDF tanks - these images are nothing short of a catastrophe. For years, Israel managed to create a sense of military, security, and moral superiority. (...) all that collapsed. (...) 50 years have passed since the Yom Kippur failure, fifty years since Israelis lost their innocence. Now, they've also lost the confidence to step out of their homes (...).

Attila Somfalvi, YED, 07.10.23

Whatever Happens in This Round of the Israel-Gaza War, We Already Lost

(...) The Israel Defense Forces is calling this Operation Iron Swords, but it's really Operation Pants Down. All the IDF and the Shin Bet security service with all their means, their drones, their eavesdropping, their human intelligence, their extortion of human sources, their artificial intelligence, the geniuses of the elite SIGINT unit 8200 - no one had a clue. (...) For 14 years, Netanyahu postponed (...) the decisions. (...) thanks to 14 years of Netanyahu, bit by bit the mutations that endanger our existence here grew and grew. The previous nine months were

just the preview. Armed militias in the West Bank with government backing; the rule of law getting weaker and weaker; fascist elements within the government; a national security minister who is a failure; Knesset members who glorify murderers; a collection of clueless Likud ministers who have no relevant professional experience; a disintegrating civil service, nonexistent social services. There's no police, there's no ladder for the Arad firefighting service. Professionals are ridiculed. Warnings were treated with disdain. And this is the price. (...) Fascist regimes have always taken advantage of security and social crises to mark traitors. We're in a war for our home, with Hamas outside and the fascists inside. For them, the crisis is an opportunity. We can't afford to close our eyes.

Chaim Levinson, HAA, 08.10.23

Netanyahu and his messianic cohorts must go

(...) The surprise attack that is the start of the 2023 Simchat Torah war is the result of a catastrophic, perverted list of priorities of this government that has since its establishment last January, concentrated almost entirely on its harmful and unnecessary judicial legislation and had capitulated to the financial and political demands of its ultra-Orthodox members. (...) The murderous invasion by Hamas from Gaza, into communities in the south, has exposed how central matters of security were neglected by the government, including the fight against Hamas. (...) This disgraceful failure can lead to only one conclusion (...). Those responsible for the catastrophe must not be allowed to continue to be at the helm. Their irresponsible and reckless conduct violated Israel's national contract with its citizens and has entirely lost Israel's faith, which is vital in order to win the war and rebuild the economy and society when it ends. (...) The Gaza war cannot become Netanyahu's political shield or that of ministers who have never considered the good of Israel over their base. They cannot be trusted. They are to blame for what has transpired. They must be sent home, here and now and relieve us from their nightmarish reign. Sever Plocker, YED, 09.10.23

Israel's Leaders Have Been Eternally Judged. What Are They Thinking Now?

What is IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi's psychological state now? Is he capable of leading the fight? Halevi already knows that he is responsible for the most serious military failure in the history of the country, more serious than the Yom Kippur War. (...) there is no equivalence between the deaths of sol-

diers in battle (...) to the murder of hundreds of innocent Israeli civilians who spent an entire day under Hamas occupation, abandoned to their fate and begging for their lives. Halevi failed in his role to defend the people of Israel in the most fundamental way possible. But it was more than just a failure. It was a case of negligence of historic proportions, among the blackest days in the history of the country, a national trauma and a massive breach of public trust – though of course not done on purpose. (...) And what is Netanyahu's state of mind? (...) Netanyahu surely understands that his legacy is lost. History will remember him as the prime minister under whose rule the greatest disaster in Israel's history happened. (...)

Rogel Alpher, HAA, 09.10.23

Netanyahu: Resign Now!

Hamas' surprise attack (...) is more serious even than the failure of Yom Kippur (...) the neglect more terrible, the blow to morale worse, the chaos crazier, the shock stronger, and the number of civilians murdered is the highest ever. The residents of the Gaza-area communities were abandoned. The army battalions guarding them were transferred to the territories to guard the settlers, and they were left without protection. (...) The shocking videos the terrorists filmed are reminiscent of the Holocaust. For such an oversight, there is no pardon (...). There is one person to blame for this terrible disaster: Benjamin Netanyahu. But in the face of this enormous failure, we are witnessing an incredible show of spinelessness. A man whom Netanyahu lied to, misled, slandered, shamed and broke every agreement with, is crawling into the government. (...) Benny Gantz apparently doesn't even realize that the crook will spit him out like a chewed-up piece of gum after three months, when he is declared guilty of all the failures. (...) Gantz, Lapid and Lieberman (...) should not be talking about false unity; they should not be providing a lifeline to a crook. If they really want to save Israel, they should remove him from power. It is obvious that even within a unity government he will continue to care only about himself and to play them for fools. (...) Netanyahu must resign, today.

Nehemia Shtrasler, HAA, 10.10.23

The Game Is Over

Bibi's call for national unity as Israel goes to war against Hamas would have made sense if he had not done everything in his power over the years to divide our nation. (...) His entire strategy was based

upon the belief that if he gave Gaza's civilian population money, food, electricity, water and employment, they would not attack us. And so it was that the majority of Israel's armed forces were on the West Bank defending the settlers. Even the IDF's Gaza Division was in Huwara when Hamas terrorists broke through the security fence on our southern border. (...) In the public inquiry that will inevitably follow this war, Bibi will no doubt try to shift the blame upon the IDF and its Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi, who has only held office since January. (...) However, an army can only act on the basis of directions given by the government of the day. Bibi is responsible. (...) the war that is just beginning represents a crossroads in Israel's history. Divisive government legislation has no place in Israel. Judicial reform must be arrived at through consensus. Politicians who seek to divide our nation and sow hatred have no place in our society, which is dependent upon co-operation and mutual respect for its very survival. (...) Bibi will need to go, and our country will need to do some soul searching in terms of the manner in which it operates and its preparedness to allow religious extremists to determine its future.

Michael Boyden, TOI, 10.10.23

Heads will roll across the board, at the highest levels

On Friday evening, unusual indicators of Hamas activity in Gaza reached the security establishment. This information pertained to suspicious movements by Hamas members that did not provide a clear picture of the expected attack. (...) Some officials believed that these movements were part of a drill (...). In the Shin Bet, there was suspicion that this was not a drill, although not on the scale that ultimately prevailed. The (...) head of the Shin Bet (...) held consultations with senior members of the organization, and at the end, he ordered a team of operation operatives composed of Shin Bet's operations branch and the special counterterrorism police unit to be sent to the south to be in a forward position in case an event unfolds. (...) IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi admitted (...) that the IDF did not live up to its task of protecting the state and its citizens. This was the first time that anyone in Israel's leadership echelons took responsibility for the failure. (...) Netanyahu will have a hard time avoiding blame for the failure, as he has served as prime minister for almost 14 consecutive years. (...) His cabinets (...) approved the offensive and defensive plans for the IDF in Gaza, and in the months leading to the attack

he had been warned several times that the judicial reform crisis has led to Israel's weakening and could encourage terrorism against it. This suspicion among the top political and security echelons is very troubling, given the dramatic issues at hand: a war in Gaza, the possibility of escalation in the north, and the need to address the unprecedented scope of casualties, captives, displaced residents, and missing persons. This is a complex situation that requires continuous and synchronized coordination among the various decision-makers. Now it is doubtful whether it can be properly managed at this time. (...)

3. Geiseln in Gaza

Über 200 Geiseln, darunter Kinder, Frauen, alte Menschen und Soldat_innen werden seit dem Angriff auf Israel im Gazastreifen festgehalten. Ihre Angehörigen organisierten sich zügig, sind in den Medien präsent und bemühen sich um Einfluss auf die Regierung. Die Hamas schickte schockierende Videos über die Handys ihrer Geiseln an die Familien. Anfangs drohte die islamistische Terrororganisation damit, einzelne Geiseln vor laufender Kamera zu töten, sollte die israelische Armee den Gazastreifen weiter angreifen. Die Angst ist auch, dass die Entführten als menschliche Schutzschilde im Falle einer israelischen Bodenoffensive missbraucht werden. Internationale Bemühungen gelten vor allem auch den Geiseln, die über eine ausländische Staatsbürgerschaft verfügen.

Red Cross must be given immediate access to Israeli hostages held by Hamas

(...) The Third Geneva Convention laid out the legal framework for the protection of POWs. (...) The detaining power must notify the authorities on which the prisoners depend of the capture. The International Red Cross must be granted regular access to visit prisoners of war in order to verify the conditions of their detention and to restore contact between them and their families. Prisoners of war who are seriously wounded or suffer from specified diseases must be repatriated directly back to their own country or to a hospital in a neutral State. In addition, any form of torture or cruelty is forbidden. (...) Women must be treated with due regard to their specific needs. (...) Prisoners of war must also be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. Therefore, International Humanitarian Law mandates that Hamas must promptly provide Israel and foreign governments with precise

information regarding the number and identities of all citizens held within Palestinian custody. Moreover, it obliges Hamas to grant unrestricted access to the Red Cross for humanitarian purposes. (...) All countries, international organizations and institutions, must demand that Hamas uphold its obligations under international law. The International Committee of the Red Cross must demand immediate access to each and every one of the hostages.
Adi Schwartz, YED, 10.10.23

#BringBackOurChildren

The savage acts of violence conducted by Hamas (...) is NOT a response to "occupation". (...) It is NOT a response to a "desecration" of Al Aqsa. It is NOT because of the lack of Peace Negotiations. Do not let the media or anyone distract you from this basic truth. (...) It is a strategy. That strategy is to get Israel to kill as many of the people in Gaza as possible so that sycophants in the media and in western cities from Paris to Chicago will stomp their feet, raise their flags, and pressure their governments to restrain Israel from doing what it needs to do to defend its people, maintain stability, and live with security. (...) But this time, Instead of calls for "both sides to show restraint" or "End to Occupation," I compel you to echo the call of "ReleaseThe-Hostages" and "End to Hamas." (...) I ask you all to simply support their cries, support Israel, do not let the Hamas sympathizers around the world put pressure on governments to intervene on their behalf. There will only be peace when Hamas knows they can no longer play this game. Only then will the violence and hatred begin to thaw and perhaps one day come to an end. (...)
Aaron Snyder, TOI, 10.10.23

A 'Humanitarian Corridor': The First Step in a Prisoner Exchange of Women and Children

The most immediate and important task now is to try (...) contacts with Hamas representatives in Gaza and abroad. These contacts should also include a plan for establishing a "humanitarian corridor," in which as a first step the elderly, the women and the children among the hostages should be exchanged, as well as the bodies of civilians. In exchange Israel will of course have to agree to release female Palestinian terrorists and young people who were arrested for relatively "minor" crimes. (...) True, it's hard to assume that the leaders of Hamas, who show no mercy and don't take into consideration the suffering of 2 million Gazans, will be impressed by world public opinion (...). And yet, we must consider a

proposal for a process of exchanges on a humanitarian basis, since afterwards it could possibly increase trust between the sides, and also lead to formulating plans to end the war and to an overall deal for an exchange of male prisoners of war and hostages. (...) Past precedents, even from the recent past, have proven that Hamas is also a rational organization, which is sometimes willing to make concessions, to compromise and to reach temporary agreements. That's why it may be a good idea for a change to think outside the box, and instead of seeing the security prisoners as a problem, to treat them as a solution. (...)

Yossi Melman, HAA, 10.10.23

My 84-year-old Mother Was Taken Hostage. In Her Name, Too, I Plead: Don't Destroy Gaza

(...) There's the obvious: I'm angry at the despicable people who kidnapped my mother and slaughtered dozens of civilians, perpetrating a pogrom on her kibbutz. (...) But beyond all (...) I'm angry at all of the Israeli governments since 2000 that have done absolutely nothing to try to end this terrible conflict. (...) My mother, and many of her friends on Kibbutz Nir Oz who were massacred, were people of peace, people who believe that there are human beings with rights also on the other side of the border fence. All that my mother and her friends wanted was to live in peace in the small Eden they had built there in the desert. (...) from this terrifying place we are now in, I call out to the government that will rise after the nightmare is over and I say: Do not destroy the Gaza Strip; that won't help anyone and will only bring an even more ferocious round of violence the next time. And when the moment for negotiations on a cease-fire arrives, take advantage of that moment to also bring about an agreement between the two sides – not an "arrangement," but a true peace agreement. History has proved that it's possible. (...)
Neta Heiman, HAA, 12.10.23

4. Weitere Themen

Die zweite Front: Hisbollah – Handlanger Teherans

On the Lebanese front, the ball is in Nasrallah and Iran's court

There cannot be a more dramatic warning to Iran and Hezbollah than the one voiced by U.S. President Joe Biden (...). The decision to enter a war against Israel and the U.S., would not be Nasrallah's

to make alone (...). While most of the focus is on the fighting in the south, (...) a senior commander and two of his men were killed in a gunfight with terrorists who cut through the Lebanon border fence. They were members of a Palestinian group but were operating in a region under Hezbollah's total control, where nothing moves without Nasrallah's consent. He launched 15 rockets at Israel during the day, four of which were intercepted by the Iron Dome missile defense system, which indicates their target was civilian centers and not open areas. (...) While the IDF is watching the northern frontier closely, its commanders currently believe he will think hard before joining the fight, while U.S. naval vessels and planes are en route, although his provocations would continue. But we've learned the hard way how wrong conceptions can be.

Yossi Yehoshua, YED, 11.10.23

A golden opportunity to focus on Hezbollah

(...) Israel faces a multi-front challenge and needs to make strategic decisions regarding the priority of different areas. (...) the northern front against Hezbollah should take precedence. (...) Hezbollah has a vast geographic area and open supply lines. In terms of military capabilities, the organization poses a much greater threat than Hamas, including hundreds of thousands of missiles (...) and many experienced fighters with combat experience in Syria. As long as Hezbollah remains unchallenged, it will continue to pose an intolerable strategic threat to the State of Israel. The recent events are horrifying and hard to watch, but they pale in comparison to what we could see and experience in an attack by Hezbollah. (...) Sooner or later, we will need to face the northern front. (...) We have a golden opportunity to act, with support and legitimacy from the international community, to open a front against the organization. Such an action sends a clear message to Arab terrorist organizations and directly challenges Iran. (...) The IDF is almost fully mobilized, with its conscripted and reserve soldiers. The spirit of the people is always strong. Most of the international community is with us, providing us with a tailwind. It is possible and appropriate to choose a strategy of war against Hezbollah, which, under the current circumstances, will be legitimate in the international arena. (...)

Michael Oren, IHY, 14.10.23

50 Jahre nach dem Yom-Kippur-Krieg

Censorship, Chaos and Corpses: What I Saw as a German Reporter in the Yom Kippur War

(...) Yes, at that time the Jewish state, with only about three million inhabitants, was demographically dwarfed by the Arab world. But Israel was a dwarf that had already shown in three wars that its military was superior to that of the Arab states. Its intelligence services and politicians, however, out of an arrogance born by power, had recklessly overlooked the obvious signs of attack. And that's why Israel fought for its very survival in the war's first days. (...) a country in which (except for the strictly religious) everyone had to perform military service, now began to materialize: the mobilization of the reservists, who always remained in training, and soon the fortunes of the war began to turn. (...) While fighting raged in the south and the north, things remained quiet on an important possible front line. Jordan's King Hussein stayed out of the war. (...) Whatever we did, one thing was certain. Military censors monitored our reporting; all manuscripts and photographs had to be submitted. (...) When the war was over on October 25, it (...) seemed to be a mixture of victory and defeat for all sides. Israel was able to defend itself again, the Arabs were defeated. But the scars in Israel were deep – Golda Meir resigned six months later. Still, the Arabs had destroyed the myth of Israel's complete superiority and gained respect. This opened the way to negotiations and ultimately to peace with Egypt, the largest Arab country. (...) Back (...) in 1973, the enemy threatening the future of this free and open democratic society came from outside. This time it's coming from within.

Werner Sonne, HAA, 05.10.23

The Yom Kippur War served as debut of religious units of soldiers

The Yom Kippur War merged tragedy and triumph, leaving us in a confusing state of sorrow mixed with joy. (...) Alongside the sadness and mourning, we search for religious meaning. (...) Our holiest day: Our enemies attempted to exploit this day to their advantage. Too occupied with prayer and penitence, we could not be expected to quickly rally to the battlefield. (...) the timing ensured that Yom Kippur would forever remain sacred for the entire nation. (...) Despite our divisions, the overwhelming majority of Israelis commemorate Yom Kippur, and for many the war is a powerful spiritual anchor to Yom Kippur. The war entrenched the Yom Kippur experience for all Israelis. (...) Religious Israelis have (...)

during this war for the first time (...) served in distinctly religious army units. In the aftermath of the Six Day War, religious frameworks combining Torah study and army service, such as hesder, were popularized, and the Yom Kippur War showcased the dedication and patriotism of newly minted soldier-scholars. Tank units, which bore the heavy brunt of the fierce battles, were composed of significant numbers of religious soldiers – many of whom lost their lives. (...). Religious soldiers typically demonstrate high levels of motivation for what they see as a religious calling. The Yom Kippur War served as the debut of religious units of soldiers protecting our homeland. (...)

Moshe Taragin, JPO, 06.10.23

HAA = Haaretz

YED = Yedioth Ahronoth / Ynetnews

JPO = Jerusalem Post

IHY = Israel HaYom

TOI = Times of Israel

GLO = Globes

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